直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

Time Urgency and Coronary-Prone Behavior: The Effectiveness of a Behavior Pattern

Previous research has implicated time urgency as a component of coronary-prone behavior. Arguments of Type A persons often suggest that their time-urgent stylistics are necessary to guarantee success, particularly in complex and/or managerial tasks. Experimentally induced time urgency was utilized in a simulated complex managerial task with unselected subjects to test the validity of such an assumption. It was found that time urgency interacts with information load to produce performance outcome. Moderately complex planning and decision making was found to be optimal at intermediate load levels, but disintegrated when time urgency increased to high levels. Similar results were obtained for long-term complex planning. Retaliatory decision making increased with load. Higher levels of time urgency resulted in greater retaliatory activity. It is concluded that managerial activities that require complex decision making and long-term future planning are hindered rather than aided by time urgency.     

Effects of information accuracy and volume on decision making

Recent advances in information technology have resulted in increasingly complex work environments. Much of the complexity is due to a deluge of information available across networks (Gleick, 2011) and unknown reliability, which introduces additional uncertainty (Platt & Huettel, 2008). Understanding the performance characteristics of human information processing for optimal decision making under such conditions of data abundance and uncertainty is critical in complex networked information environments, such as military operations. One focus of the United States military is providing troops with the richness of information formally reserved for higher echelons (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). However, this effort risks cognitive overload, where too much information can result in impaired performance. The present study examined human decision making under varying levels of cognitive load and source reliability. Participants determined the reliability of two information sources and decided how to use them to minimize cognitive load and improve performance in a visual search task. Unbeknownst to participants, one source provided highly accurate information and one provided moderately accurate information. Results showed that participants had more trust in the more accurate than the less accurate source, and decision making accuracy decreased as cognitive load increased. When cognitive load was highest, participants were more accurate on trials with the more accurate source. Thus, the more accurate source facilitated better performance, whether through better intel or through participants offloading some of the cognitive load to the reliable source.     

Information search and the effects of failure: A test of complexity theory

The effects of increasing failure and the structural complexity of decision-making teams on four aspects of information search and utilization were examined. Twenty-four structurally homogeneous dyads and 12 unselected control dyads served as Ss in a complex experimental simulation running for six 30-min periods. Information load was held constant at 7 inputs per period. The proportion of failure inputs was sequentially increased from 1:7 in period 1 through 6:7 in period 6. Dyads in the control condition were not exposed to failure. It was found that structurally simple Ss engaged in more delegated information search than complex Ss. Self-initiated information search initially increased, then remained fairly constant at higher proportions of failure. Contrary to expectations, no differences were found between simple and complex Ss in self-initiated search. Complex dyads exceeded simple dyads on two measures of information utilization. The number of search moves used in integrative decisions produced an inverted U-shaped curve with optimal levels at moderate proportions of failure. Efficiency of information utilization showed a general decrease as failure increased. The data produced limited support for complexity theory and did support, where applicable, the information search theories of Lanzetta and Feather.     

Separating cue relevance from cue importance within models of judgment and decision making

Many investigations concerned with human decision making have centered their attention on the issues of cue integration and cue importance. Unfortunately, an equally important issue—that of cue relevance—has been either neglected or equated with the importance issue. Two experiments tested the ability of information integration theory (N. H. Anderson, 1981, Foundations of information integration theory, New York: Academic Press) to disentangle cue relevance and cue importance formally as well as empirically. The decision environment was divided into two components: aspects of the information present during a decision (information context) and aspects of the situation surrounding a decision (situation context). It was hypothesized that variations in information context would affect cue importance while changes in situation context would affect cue relevance. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the weight parameter (w) of information integration theory would reflect the information context manipulations but not situation context manipulations. Results supported previous findings showing the influence of information context on w. As predicted situation context did not affect w; however, it did affect the variability of the responses to a cue's values. The relationship between perceived variability and situation context suggests that the scale dispersion parameter σ of information integration theory may be used as a measure of relevance (K. L. Norman, 1980, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 25, 289–310).     

Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction,truncation, and conversion

In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy-trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy-processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed-frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision information.     

Ambiguity and Human Versus Technological Sources of Information in Judgments Involving Base Rate and Individuating Information1

This experiment examined the role that ambiguity and uncertainty play in the use of base rate and individuating information in probability judgments. Subjects responded to a number of inference problems that varied in terms of base rates and the accuracy of the source of the individuating information. The ambiguity in the decision situation was also manipulated by varying the human or technological nature of the source of the individuating information and the causal relevance of the base rate information. The results provide substantial support for the predictions derived from the ambiguity conceptualization. Several interactions were uncovered involving attributes of the base rate and individuating information suggesting complex judgmental processes similar to anchoring and adjustment. Discussion focused on the role that human versus technological sources of information may play in judgment and decision making, and the utility of the ambiguity notion for understanding the use of base rate and individuating information in probabilistic inference problems.     

Multi-attribute decision support and complexity: An evaluation and process analysis of aided versus unaided decision making

The present study addresses the effectiveness of a computerized decision aid (DECAID, Pitz 1987) based on the Multi-Attribute Utility Model (MAU). The effectiveness of DECAID was investigated for personnel selection problems varying in complexity (number of alternatives and number of attributes). Results show that the decision aid was most successful for problems of medium complexity. DECAID significantly affected the thoroughness of the decision, preference formation, and the perceived difficulty of the decision problem for medium complex problems. This was not the case for highly complex problems. Next, a process analysis is presented of unaided decision making focusing on the selection and evaluation of information. This process analysis of verbal protocols was based on the same decision problems as the first study. Results indicate that problem complexity had a significant impact on the decision process. Increasing complexity resulted in a less thorough evaluation, and selective information processing. Subjects tended to focus on one or two most promising alternatives. Furthermore, evaluation strategies diverged from those used in DECAID in terms of standard of comparison. The paper concludes with implications for the design of decision aids.     

Metrical information load of lines and angles in line patterns

Summary Acute angles and long lines are more complex than obtuse angels and short lines. This source of complexity is called metrical information, for which a measure was proposed by Leeuwenberg (1982). According to this measure, the metrical information of a static pattern is specified as the sum of the mechanical impulses necessary to move an object according to this pattern. The perceptual relevance of this metrical load was tested in an experiment in which judged complexities were gathered for a number of simple line patterns.     

Imperfect Information in Pre-choice Screening of Options

Three experiments examined decision makers′ use of imperfect information in screening of decision options. It was found that: (1) when specific information about options was missing the absence was treated as a violation of the related decision criterion in the manner described by image theory (Beach, 1990; Beach & Mitchell, 1987) - rejection of options was a function of both the number of violations and the amount of missing information; (2) general paucity of information about options prompted rejection over and above the effects of violations, but paucity had about half the impact of violations or of missing information; (3) information about the probability that an option′s outcomes actually will occur were it the final choice was integrated additively with other information in screening, as predicted by image theory, and was integrated multiplicatively with other information in choice, as predicted by expected utility theory. Together with the results of previous research, these results support the image theory view of decision making as a two-stage process, screening followed by choice, and demonstrate once again the pivotal role of screening in this process.     

Is short‐term memory involved in decision making? Evidence from a short‐term memory patient

It is reasonable to suggest that working memory (WM; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974 ) is involved in decision making, as decision making is dependent on the ability to remember and update past choices and outcomes. However, contradictory results have been reported in the literature concerning the role of two of its components, namely the central executive and the phonological loop. In order to investigate the role of these components in the decision‐making process, we tested a patient with intact central executive but impaired phonological loop on a laboratory decision‐making task involving hypothetical gambles (gambling task, GT). When tested in a no‐load condition (simple keypress task), her performance was not significantly different from that of matched controls. We also verified whether her performance would be affected differently by memory‐load when compared with control subjects. The memory task (holding a string of letters in memory) loaded WM without incurring number‐number interference. When the memory‐load was imposed during the GT, both the patient and the controls showed a decline in performance, but the strategy they adopted differed. Possible explanations are discussed. In conclusion, our results suggest that the phonological loop is not directly involved in decision making.     

Neural affective decision theory: Choices, brains, and emotions

We present a theory and neurocomputational model of how specific brain operations produce complex decision and preference phenomena, including those explored in prospect theory and decision affect theory. We propose that valuation and decision making are emotional processes, involving interacting brain areas that include two expectation-discrepancy subsystems: a dopamine-encoded system for positive events and a serotonin-encoded system for negative ones. The model provides a rigorous account of loss aversion and the shape of the value function from prospect theory. It also suggests multiple distinct neurological mechanisms by which information framing may affect choices, including ones involving anticipated pleasure. It further offers a neural basis for the interactions among affect, prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons explored in decision affect theory. Along with predicting the effects of particular brain disturbances and damage, the model suggests specific neurological explanations for individual differences observed in choice and valuation behaviors.     

Two‐year‐old children preferentially transmit simple actions but not pedagogically demonstrated actions

Children are sensitive to both social and non‐social aspects of the learning environment. Among social cues, pedagogical communication has been shown to not only play a role in children's learning, but also in their own active transmission of knowledge. Vredenburgh, Kushnir and Casasola, Developmental Science, 2015, 18, 645 showed that 2‐year‐olds are more likely to demonstrate an action to a naive adult after learning it in a pedagogical than in a non‐pedagogical context. This finding was interpreted as evidence that pedagogically transmitted information has a special status as culturally relevant. Here we test the limits of this claim by setting it in contrast with an explanation in which the relevance of information is the outcome of multiple interacting social (e.g., pedagogical demonstration) and non‐social properties (e.g., action complexity). To test these competing hypotheses, we varied both pedagogical cues and action complexity in an information transmission paradigm with 2‐year‐old children. In Experiment 1, children preferentially transmitted simple non‐pedagogically demonstrated actions over pedagogically demonstrated more complex actions. In Experiment 2, when both actions were matched for complexity, we found no evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between our results and previous literature showing an effect of pedagogical cues on cultural transmission, and conclude that our results are compatible with the view that pedagogical and other cues interact, but incompatible with the theory of a privileged role for pedagogical cues.     

Should I go with my gut? Investigating the benefits of emotion-focused decision making

Deliberative decision strategies have historically been considered the surest path to sound decisions; however, recent evidence and theory suggest that affective strategies may be equally as effective. In four experiments we examined conditions under which affective versus deliberative decision strategies might result in higher decision quality. While consciously focusing on feelings versus details, participants made choices that varied in complexity, in extent of subsequent conscious deliberation allowed, and in domain. Results indicate that focusing on feelings versus details led to superior objective and subjective decision quality for complex decisions. However, when using a feeling-focused approach, subsequent deliberation after encoding resulted in reduced choice quality. These results suggest that affective decision strategies may be more effective relative to deliberative strategies for certain complex decisions.     

贝叶斯决策理论对复杂运动决策中运动预期的启发——以网球和足球为例

对运动决策的研究是认知运动心理学的一个重要领域。运动预期被认为是运动决策的核心, 受到运动学和非运动学信息的影响。其中, 对运动预期研究的一个关键问题是探讨不同信息源对运动结果预期的贡献以及两者之间的相互作用。研究者运用贝叶斯决策理论解释运动预期中不同信息的整合过程, 分析运动员在复杂的竞赛情景中如何做出最佳决策, 尤其是对该理论在网球和足球领域的潜在应用进行分析。在不确定的情况下, 竞技体育中并非所有的选择、结果或概率都是已知的, 故有研究者认为概率论和经典的决策理论不能有效解决此类问题。然而新近提出的启发式近似, 为运动员在贝叶斯框架下如何快速做出选择提供了理论依据：首先, 在复杂和有时间压力的竞赛情景中, 启发式近似假设运动员依据竞赛中不同信息源的不确定程度, 很可能选择在运动学信息和情境先验之间进行切换启发式, 提高运动预期的效率。其次, 判断效用通过卷积效应影响两种信息源的整合, 降低情境先验的影响程度。     

Controlling the integration of emotion and cognition: the role of frontal cortex in distinguishing helpful from hurtful emotional information

Emotion has been both lauded and vilified for its role in decision making. How are people able to ensure that helpful emotions guide decision making and irrelevant emotions are kept out of decision making? The orbitofrontal cortex has been identified as a neural area involved in incorporating emotion into decision making. Is this area's function specific to the integration of emotion and cognition, or does it more broadly govern whether emotional information should be integrated into cognition? The present research examined the role of orbitofrontal cortex when it was appropriate to control (i.e., prevent) the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 1) and to incorporate the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 2). Together, the two studies suggest that activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex is associated with evaluating the contextual relevance of emotional information for decision making.     

Cognition and Social Information-Gathering Strategies Reinterpretation Assessment in Second-Guessing

Effective social decision making often depends upon gathering needed information. Since the kind and quality of information obtained depends on the tactics used to gain it, the study of information-gathering tactics is of prime importance in understanding the processes of social decision making. We focused on one facet of information-gathering—the cognitive process of second-guessing developed by Hewes and Planalp (1982). We developed and tested a theory of reinterpretation assessment that explores the relationship between second-guessing and the use of social information-gathering tactics. Four of the five principles on which this theory is based are tested empirically. They concern the effects of motivational (need for accuracy), cognitive (processing load), and practical (social effort) antecedents on the tactics employed by social actors to improve subjectively the quality of their reinterpretations of messages. Moderate support is garnered for all four principles. Some challenging anomalies result in modifications of the theory.     

Information search in heuristic decision making

Simple heuristics of the type introduced by Gigerenzer, Todd, and The ABC Research Group ( 1999 ) embody principles for information search, stop and decision making. These heuristics suggest that such processes are simple. In an analysis of general practitioners' (GPs) information search and decision‐making behaviour when prescribing a lipid lowering drug, we examined whether information search was simple, and whether a heuristic that predicts a simple decision‐making process was also accurate at describing information search. We found that GPs' information search behaviour was simple in that it demonstrated characteristics of the matching heuristic (e.g. stopping rule). In addition, although the matching heuristic which correctly predicted on average 75% of GPs' decisions used significantly fewer cues on average than the GPs did in the information search task, it was reasonably accurate in describing order of information search. These findings have implications for the validity of simple heuristics describing both information search and decision making. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.