In defense of psychological laws

It is argued that psychological explanations involve psychological generalizations that exhibit the same features as laws of physics. On the basis of the “systematic theory of lawhood”, characteristic features of laws of nature are elaborated. Investigating some examples of explanations taken from cognitive psychology shows that these features can also be identified in psychological generalizations. Particular attention is devoted to the notion of “ccteris‐paribus laws”. It is argued that laws of psychology are indeed ceteris‐paribus laws. However, this feature does not distinguish them from the laws of physics, because such laws are found in physics as well. Moreover, the laws invoked in psychological explanations are genuine laws of psychology; they are not laws of other disciplines that are brought to bear on psychological problems. The conclusion is that if there are laws of physics then laws of psychology exist as well.     

Fundamentality,Effectiveness, and Objectivity of Gauge Symmetries

Much recent philosophy of physics has investigated the process of symmetry breaking. Here, I critically assess the alleged symmetry restoration at the fundamental scale. I draw attention to the contingency that gauge symmetries exhibit, that is, the fact that they have been chosen from an infinite space of possibilities. I appeal to this feature of group theory to argue that any metaphysical account of fundamental laws that expects symmetry restoration up to the fundamental level is not fully satisfactory. This is a symmetry argument in line with Curie’s first principle. Further, I argue that this same feature of group theory helps to explain the ‘unreasonable’ effectiveness of (this subfield of) mathematics in (this subfield of) physics, and that it reduces the philosophical significance that has been attributed to the objectivity of gauge symmetries.     

Cognitive psychology and modern physics: Some analogies

Abstract

Patterns in physics and psychology are often related. This paper examines such relations on two levels. First, a survey is made of the various possible relations between physics and psychology and, secondly, a series of analogies between patterns in modern physics and cognition is presented. The analogies pertain both to the theory of relativity (both special and general) and to quantum mechanics. While the different analogies noted are argued for independently from one another, together they do present some unified patterns. It is argued that the analogies may be useful in opening up avenues for new conceptual bameworks in psychology. In particular, they are linked to a possible critique of the representational view of mind.     

The step to rationality: the efficacy of thought experiments in science, ethics, and free will

Examples from Archimedes, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and others suggest that fundamental laws of physics were—or, at least, could have been—discovered by experiments performed not in the physical world but only in the mind. Although problematic for a strict empiricist, the evolutionary emergence in humans of deeply internalized implicit knowledge of abstract principles of transformation and symmetry may have been crucial for humankind's step to rationality—including the discovery of universal principles of mathematics, physics, ethics, and an account of free will that is compatible with determinism.     

Constructor theory

Constructor theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations–those that can be caused to happen and those that cannot. This is a departure from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics which is to predict what will happen from initial conditions and laws of motion. Several converging motivations for expecting constructor theory to be a fundamental branch of physics are discussed. Some principles of the theory are suggested and its potential for solving various problems and achieving various unifications is explored. These include providing a theory of information underlying classical and quantum information; generalising the theory of computation to include all physical transformations; unifying formal statements of conservation laws with the stronger operational ones (such as the ruling-out of perpetual motion machines); expressing the principles of testability and of the computability of nature (currently deemed methodological and metaphysical respectively) as laws of physics; allowing exact statements of emergent laws (such as the second law of thermodynamics); and expressing certain apparently anthropocentric attributes such as knowledge in physical terms.     

Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion

We examined the extent to which findings from the literature on naive physics and representational momentum studies are consistent with impetus beliefs postulating imparted internal energy as a source of motion. In a literature review, we showed that, for situations in which impetus theory and physical principles make different predictions, representational momentum effects are consistent with impetus beliefs. In three new experiments, we examined people’s implicit and explicit knowledge of the effect of mass on the rate of ascending motion. The results suggest that implicit knowledge is consistent with impetus theory and is unaffected by explicit knowledge. Expert physicists, whose explicit knowledge is in accord with Newtonian principles, exhibited the same implicit impetus beliefs as novices when asked to respond in a representational momentum paradigm. We propose that, in situations in which an immediate response is required and one does not have specific contextual knowledge about an object’s motion, both physics experts and novices apply impetus principles as a default heuristic.     

A Meaningful Justification for the Representational Theory of Measurement

Measurement, the means by which numbers enter science, is of fundamental importance to modern science. The relationship between its qualitative and quantitative aspects has generated many theories and much controversy. In 19th century geometry similar developments led mathematician Felix Klein to devise a theory for unifying qualitative and quantitative approaches to geometry. Klein's theory, which today is called the Erlanger program, was based on transformation groups. In this article, the Erlanger program is given a new foundation based on mathematical logic and is extended to science. The current dominant theory of measurement in the literature, the representational theory, is then justified in terms of the new foundation for the Erlanger program. Certain inferential techniques used in dimensional analysis and the related technique of possible psychophysical laws are also given justifications in terms of the new foundation.     

Curie's Principle and spontaneous symmetry breaking

In 1894 Pierre Curie announced what has come to be known as Curie's Principle: the asymmetry of effects must be found in their causes. In the same publication Curie discussed a key feature of what later came to be known as spontaneous symmetry breaking: the phenomena generally do not exhibit the symmetries of the laws that govern them. Philosophers have long been interested in the meaning and status of Curie's Principle. Only comparatively recently have they begun to delve into the mysteries of spontaneous symmetry breaking. The present paper aims to advance the discussion of both of these twin topics by tracing their interaction in classical physics, ordinary quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. The features of spontaneous symmetry that are peculiar to quantum field theory have received scant attention in the philosophical literature. These features are highlighted here, along with an explanation of why Curie's Principle, though valid in quantum field theory, is nearly vacuous in that context.     

ARE THEORIES OF PERCEPTION NECESSARY? A REVIEW OF GIBSON'S THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION

Representational theories of perception postulate an isolated and autonomous "subject" set apart from its real environment, and then go on to invoke processes of mental representation, construction, or hypothesizing to explain how perception can nevertheless take place. Although James Gibson's most conspicuous contribution has been to challenge representational theory, his ultimate concern was the cognitivism which now prevails in psychology. He was convinced that the so-called cognitive revolution merely perpetuates, and even promotes, many of psychology's oldest mistakes. This review article considers Gibson's final statement of his "ecological" alternative to cognitivism (Gibson, 1979). It is intended not as a complete account of Gibson's alternative, however, but primarily as an appreciation of his critical contribution. Gibson's sustained attempt to counter representational theory served not only to reveal the variety of arguments used in support of this theory, but also to expose the questionable metaphysical assumptions upon which they rest. In concentrating upon Gibson's criticisms of representational theory, therefore, this paper aims to emphasize the point of his alternative scheme and to explain some of the important concerns shared by Gibson's ecological approach and operant psychology.     

格式塔理论在医学影像学诊断中的作用

现代心理学格式塔理论强调对整体的认识,认为意识不等于感觉元素的集合,整体不等于部分之和。本文介绍几种格式塔视觉知觉原理如图形与背景关系及一系列组织原则（闭合性、相似性、接近性、共同区域、连续性及对称性）及其在医学影像学诊断中的应用,医学影像学医师可以在诊断上尽量少犯错误。     

On the general theory of meaningful representation

The numerical representations of measurement, geometry and kinematics are here subsumed under a general theory of representation. The standard theories of meaningfulness of representational propositions in these three areas are shown to be special cases of two theories of meaningfulness for arbitrary representational propositions: the theories based on unstructured and on structured representation respectively. The foundations of the standard theories of meaningfulness are critically analyzed and two basic assumptions are isolated which do not seem to have received adequate justification: the assumption that a proposition invariant under the appropriate group is therefore meaningful, and the assumption that representations should be unique up to a transformation of the appropriate group. A general theory of representational meaningfulness is offered, based on a semantic and syntactic analysis of representational propositions. Two neglected features of representational propositions are formalized and made use of: (a) that such propositions are induced by more general propositions defined for other structures than the one being represented, and (b) that the true purpose of representation is the application of the theory of the representing system to the represented system. On the basis of these developments, justifications are offered for the two problematic assumptions made by the existing theories.Material from this paper was presented at a conference on meaningfulness in the theory of measurement held at New York University in December 1984, hosted by J. C. Falmagne. I would like to thank Patrick Suppes for arranging my invitation to this conference, and David Krantz, R. Duncan Luce, and Fred Roberts for helpful comments. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for extremely detailed and helpful comments and suggestions, the most important of which are acknowledged in footnotes.     

The nature of psychology: the great dilemmas

Research about the nature of psychology, its subject matter, its level of analysis, its scientific laws, its relationship with other disciplines, and its social relevance has been a matter of great concern and interest during the development of psychology. This problem can be analyzed in terms of the dilemmas of the psychological discipline, which have been choice points, crossroads, alternative decisions that bring psychologists face to face with the following issues: (a) the subject matter of psychology: psyche, mind, or behavior?; (b) the role of scientific methodology: is psychology a natural science, a social/behavioral/human science, or a part of the humanities?; (c) the universality or particularity of scientific laws in psychology: are laws universal or culture-bound and contextual?; and (d) the balance between science and profession: is psychology a basic science, a socially relevant profession, or both?     

Categorical Ontology of Complex Spacetime Structures: The Emergence of Life and Human Consciousness

A categorical ontology of space and time is presented for emergent biosystems, super-complex dynamics, evolution and human consciousness. Relational structures of organisms and the human mind are naturally represented in non-abelian categories and higher dimensional algebra. The ascent of man and other organisms through adaptation, evolution and social co-evolution is viewed in categorical terms as variable biogroupoid representations of evolving species. The unifying theme of local-to-global approaches to organismic development, evolution and human consciousness leads to novel patterns of relations that emerge in super- and ultra- complex systems in terms of colimits of biogroupoids, and more generally, as compositions of local procedures to be defined in terms of locally Lie groupoids. Solutions to such local-to-global problems in highly complex systems with ‘broken symmetry’ may be found with the help of generalized van Kampen theorems in algebraic topology such as the Higher Homotopy van Kampen theorem (HHvKT). Primordial organism structures are predicted from the simplest metabolic-repair systems extended to self-replication through autocatalytic reactions. The intrinsic dynamic ‘asymmetry’ of genetic networks in organismic development and evolution is investigated in terms of categories of many-valued, ?ukasiewicz–Moisil logic algebras and then compared with those obtained for (non-commutative) quantum logics. The claim is defended in this essay that human consciousness is unique and should be viewed as an ultra-complex, global process of processes. The emergence of consciousness and its existence seem dependent upon an extremely complex structural and functional unit with an asymmetric network topology and connectivities—the human brain—that developed through societal co-evolution, elaborate language/symbolic communication and ‘virtual’, higher dimensional, non-commutative processes involving separate space and time perceptions. Philosophical theories of the mind are approached from the theory of levels and ultra-complexity viewpoints which throw new light on previous representational hypotheses and proposed semantic models in cognitive science. Anticipatory systems and complex causality at the top levels of reality are also discussed in the context of the ontological theory of levels with its complex/entangled/intertwined ramifications in psychology, sociology and ecology. The presence of strange attractors in modern society dynamics gives rise to very serious concerns for the future of mankind and the continued persistence of a multi-stable biosphere. A paradigm shift towards non-commutative, or non-Abelian, theories of highly complex dynamics is suggested to unfold now in physics, mathematics, life and cognitive sciences, thus leading to the realizations of higher dimensional algebras in neurosciences and psychology, as well as in human genomics, bioinformatics and interactomics.     

应用心理学的学科性质——基于钱学森学科结构模型的分析

纯粹应用观和独立观是解释应用心理学学科性质的两个代表性理论。前者认为应用心理学仅是基础心理学知识和方法的直接应用;后者则认为应用心理学有独立的本质特征。钱学森学科结构模型赞同独立观,认为应用心理学有三个本质特征：1）研究旨趣面向心理工程技术中的重大问题,生产应用性理论;2）内容体系由社会需求决定,随着需求的变化而变化;3）研究方法的个人经验成分多于基础心理学,少于心理工程技术。在应用心理学建设中,1）要敏于实际需求;2）要大力发展、创立我国需要的应用心理学分支;3）要统一人才培养规制。     

The topology of language

Based on ideas from information theory, in particular the method of arithmetic coding, we describe a metric on sets of strings. In fact, these spaces correspond exactly with compact ultrametric spaces, and we explore their properties in detail. In particular, we look at contraction mappings in these spaces, as they are of fundamental importance in building fractals. We introduce a connection between fractal geometry and formal language theory. There are a number of parallels that can be drawn between the operations that are carried out on fractals and those that occur in formal language theory, and this leads to speculation about how deep the connection goes.     

Are the laws of physics ‘economical with the truth’?

It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics are deceitful in that they give the impression of greater unity and coherence in our theories than is actually found to be the case. Causal stories and phenomenological relationships are claimed to provide a more acceptable account of the world, and only theoretical entities — not laws — are considered as perhaps corresponding to real features of the world.This paper examines these claims in the light of the author's own field of research: high energy physics. Some of the distinctions upon which the above conclusions are based are found not to be tenable in practice. Examples from experimental particle physics are presented which suggest an important role of the underlying theoretical structure which cannot be overlooked. It is argued that the fundamental theories must, in fact, be treated as being as worthy or unworthy of ontological commitment as the entities they postulate or the phenomenological relationships they inspire. Whilst it is conceded that aspects of the current theoretical formalism belie literal interpretation, it is maintained that revision in these particular areas need not affect the symmetry principles, particle spectra, or coupling strengths that largely determine the empirical content of the theory.Various other reasons for believing that the laws of physics may be dishonest are examined and in particular attention is drawn to the current tendency in particle physics to judge a theory's merits by aesthetic criteria. The difficulty of providing a sound justification for this behaviour does lead to the suspicion that our abstract representation of the world may in fact be coloured by anthropomorphic prejudices. The question then remains as to whether this merely points to a certain embellishment of the truth or the masquerading of a lie.I would like to thank my colleagues in high energy physics for their comments on this paper, and I am also particularly indebted to members of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge University for many fruitful discussions on these and related topics. I have benefitted over many years from stimulating philosophical arguments with my friend Alan Birchall, of the NRPB. I would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of John Bell, who had arranged to meet with me at CERN to discuss some of these topics shortly before his tragic death. He was an inspiration to many of us in high energy physics, with interests in the wider issues raised by our subject, and he will be greatly missed.     

Husserl on Geometry and Spatial Representation

Husserl left many unpublished drafts explaining (or trying to) his views on spatial representation and geometry, such as, particularly, those collected in the second part of Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (Hua XXI), but no completely articulate work on the subject. In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of what those views might have been. Husserl, I claim, distinguished among different conceptions of space, the space of perception (constituted from sensorial data by intentionally motivated psychic functions), that of physical geometry (or idealized perceptual space), the space of the mathematical science of physical nature (in which science, not only raw perception has a word) and the abstract spaces of mathematics (free creations of the mathematical mind), each of them with its peculiar geometrical structure. Perceptual space is proto-Euclidean and the space of physical geometry Euclidean, but mathematical physics, Husserl allowed, may find it convenient to represent physical space with a non-Euclidean structure. Mathematical spaces, on their turn, can be endowed, he thinks, with any geometry mathematicians may find interesting. Many other related questions are addressed here, in particular those concerning the a priori or a posteriori character of the many geometric features of perceptual space (bearing in mind that there are at least two different notions of a priori in Husserl, which we may call the conceptual and the transcendental a priori). I conclude with an overview of Weyl’s ideas on the matter, since his philosophical conceptions are often traceable back to his former master, Husserl.     

Darwinism and positivism as methodological influences on the development of psychology

The methodological significance of evolutionary theory for psychology may be distinguished from its substantive or theoretical significance. The methodological significance was that evolutionary theory broadened the current conceptions of scientific method and rendered them relatively independent of physics. It thereby made the application of the “scientific method” to psychology much more feasible than it had been previously, and thus established the possibility of a wide-ranging scientific psychology for the first time. The methodological eclecticism that made scientific psychology possible did not, however, remain a feature of psychology for very long. Psychology's methodology rapidly became restricted and codified through the influence of, and in imitation of, the rigorously positivistic orientation of physics around the turn of the twentieth century.