Don't Tell Me What I Don't Want to Hear! Politicization and Ideological Conflict Explain Why Citizens Have Lower Trust in Climate Scientists and Economists Than in Other Natural Scientists

Studies suggest that citizens have higher trust in some groups of scientists than in others. However, we still know little about the causes of these trust gaps. The current study fills this knowledge gap by examining Norwegian citizens' trust in climate scientists, economists, and so-called “less politicized natural scientists.” I argue that trust in climate scientists and economists is lower than trust in less politicized natural scientists because the former fields are politicized, while the latter are not. Politicization strengthens ideological conflicts between citizens' ideology and research produced by climate scientists and economists, which leads to lower trust in these groups of scientists. I test this argument by running regression analyses on data from a representative survey of the Norwegian population. The results support the argument: Citizens have significantly higher trust in less politicized natural scientists than in both climate scientists and economists, and these differences can be explained by ideological biases in trust. Citizens with a proeconomic growth ideology have significantly lower trust in climate scientists than in less politicized natural scientists, and citizens with a left-wing economic ideology have significantly lower trust in economists than in less politicized natural scientists.     

Personal Characteristics that Distinguish Creative Scientists from Less Creative Scientists

What are the personal characteristics that distinguish the creative scientist from the less creative scientist? This study used the concept of implicit theory in a four‐part study of scientists and graduate students in science. In the first part, we collected 1382 adjective words that describe the personal characteristics of the creative scientist from 354 scientists. In the second part of the study, 542 additional scientists assessed these adjectives. We determined that the personal characteristics of the creative scientist fit into four factors: personality, thinking ability, research ability, and uniqueness. In the third part of the study, we found that the concepts of thinking ability and uniqueness would positively predict 221 graduate students' self‐perceived creativity, and research ability would positively predict their creative motivation. The last part of the study involved having 283 creative scientists and 264 less creative scientists from 30 research institutions rated by three colleagues on the above four factors. A logistic regression found that thinking ability was best able to identify creative scientists while personality best predicted less creative scientists.     

Speak No Evil: Scientists,Responsibility, and the Public Understanding of Science

In this paper, I will discuss the responsibilities that scientists have for ensuring their work is interpreted correctly. I will argue that there are three good reasons for scientists to work to ensure the appropriate communication of their findings. First, I will argue that scientists have a general obligation to ensure scientific research is communicated properly based on the vulnerability of others to the misrepresentation of their work. Second, I will argue that scientists have a special obligation to do so because of the power we as a society invest in them as specialists and professionals. Finally, I will argue that scientists ought to ensure their work is interpreted correctly based on prudential, self-interested considerations. I will conclude by offering suggestions regarding policy considerations.     

Teaching social responsibility: The manhattan project

This paper discusses the critical necessity of teaching students about the social and ethical responsibilities of scientists. Both a university scientist and a middle school science teacher reflect on the value of teaching the ethical issues that confront scientists. In the development of the atomic bomb in the US-led Manhattan Project, scientists faced the growing threat of atomic bombs by the Germans and Japanese and the ethical issues involved in successfully completing such a destructive weapon. The Manhattan Project is a prime example of the types of ethical dilemmas and social responsibilities that scientists may confront.     

Conflict Between Religion and Science Among Academic Scientists?

Using new survey data ( N = 1,646), we examine the attitudes academic scientists at 21 elite U.S. research universities have about the perceived conflict between religion and science. In contrast to public opinion and scholarly discourse, most scientists do not perceive a conflict between science and religion. Different from what other studies would indicate, this belief does not vary between social and natural scientists. We argue that maintaining plausibility frameworks for religion is an important correlate of whether scientists will reject the conflict paradigm, with such frameworks taking surprising forms. When scientists do not attend religious services they are more likely to accept the conflict paradigm. When scientists think their peers have a positive view of religion, they are less likely to agree there is a conflict between science and religion. Religious upbringing is associated with scientists adopting the conflict paradigm. Spirituality is much more important in this population than other research would lead us to believe. Results reformulate widely cited earlier research, offer new insights about how scientists view the connection between religion and science, and expand public discussion about religious challenges to science.     

The social responsibilities of biological scientists

Biological scientists, like scientists in other disciplines, are uncertain about whether or how to use their knowledge and time to provide society with insight and guidance in handling the effects of inventions and discoveries. This article addresses this issue. It presents a typography of structures in which scientists may contribute to social understanding and decisions. It describes the different ways in which these contributions can be made. Finally it develops the ethical arguments that justify the view that biological scientists have social responsibilities. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense.     

Research Trails and the Creative Spirit: Can Historical Case Studies Integrate the Short and Long Timescales of Creative Activity?

In the study of scientific creativity, the purposes of cognitive scientists and of historians of science overlap but are far from congruent. Historical cases are only one of many forms of evidence that cognitive scientists bring together to arrive at general conclusions about the creative processes. Historians seek to reconstruct the investigative enterprises of particular scientists. Generalizations about creativity are useful to historians mainly as one of various means to interpret the work of those particular scientists. This article presents the argument that the extent to which these two goals can be complementary depends largely (a) on how large the gap is between the duration of the thought processes that cognitive scientists examine and the limits of resolution to which historians can penetrate in following the temporal progression of a subject's thought and work and (b) on the level of temporal organization of these thoughts and actions most revealing of their creative nature.     

The Growing Social and Moral Conflict Between Conservative Protestantism and Science

Due to conservative Protestant elites challenging scientists in the public sphere, and prominent scientists attacking religion, scholars have claimed that there is an increasing conflict between conservative Protestants and science. However, these claims have never been empirically investigated and these general claims do not specify what conflict is actually about. In this article I use the General Social Survey from 1984 to 2010 to examine whether conservative Protestants are increasingly opposed to the social and moral influence of scientists. I find evidence for increasing opposition by biblical literalist conservative Protestants to the involvement of scientists in social debates about moral issues.     

In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative

Sample (Philos Sci 82(5):856–866, 2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought to impose on scientists only an epistemic standard that they are willing to impose on themselves.     

When Are Graphs Worth Ten Thousand Words? An Expert-Expert Study

This study analyzes the interpretive activities of scientists related to familiar and unfamiliar graphs. The analyses show that when scientists were familiar with a graph, they read it transparently and thereby leapt beyond the material basis to the thing the graph is said to be about. In contrast, when scientists were less familiar with the particular graphs, their reading turned out to be a complex iterative process. In this process, scientists linked graphs to possible worlds by means of complex inferences. They checked whether an expression referred to the actual properties of the worldly things the graphs are speaking of. They also checked graphical expressions themselves on the basis of certain circumstances. In a few instances, the scientists abandoned all attempts in interpreting the graphs and classified them as meaningless. Grounded in the data, a 2-stage model is proposed. This model accounts for different levels of reading graphs observed in this study.     

Scientific Uncertainty in News Coverage of Cancer Research: Effects of Hedging on Scientists’ and Journalists’ Credibility

News reports of scientific research are rarely hedged; in other words, the reports do not contain caveats, limitations, or other indicators of scientific uncertainty. Some have suggested that hedging may influence news consumers’ perceptions of scientists’ and journalists’ credibility (perceptions that may be related to support for scientific research and/or adoption of scientific recommendations). But whether hedging does affect audience perceptions is unknown. A multiple‐message experiment (N= 601) found that across five messages, both scientists and journalists were viewed as more trustworthy (a) when news coverage of cancer research was hedged (e.g., study limitations were reported) and (b) when the hedging was attributed to the scientists responsible for the research (as opposed to scientists unaffiliated with the research).     

Scientists Negotiate Boundaries Between Religion and Science

Analysis of interviews with 275 natural and social scientists at 21 elite U.S. research universities suggests that only a minority of scientists see religion and science as always in conflict. Scientists selectively employ different cultural strategies with regards to the religion‐science relationship: redefining categories (the use of institutional resources from religion and from science), integration models (scientists strategically employ the views of major scientific actors to legitimate a more symbiotic relationship between science and religion), and intentional talk (scientists actively engage in discussions about the boundaries between science and religion). Such results challenge narrow conceptions of secularization theory and the sociology of science literature by describing ways science intersects with other knowledge categories. Most broadly the ways that institutions and ideologies shape one another through the agency of individual actors within those institutions is explored.     

Age and scholarly impact

The claim that older scientists generate research of lower quality than do younger scientists was tested through two analyses in which the age distribution of authors of frequently cited articles in psychology journals was compared with the age distribution of authors of low-impact articles published in the same journals. Most high-impact articles were published by relatively young psychologists, but so were most low-impact articles. When allowance was made for relative numerical representation, there was no evidence that publications from older scientists have less impact. Results are discussed in the context of methodological issues in evaluation of relations between age and scientific achievement.     

Theory and data interactions of the scientific mind: evidence from the molecular and the cognitive laboratory.

A number of researchers and scholars have stressed the importance of disconfirmation in the quest for the development of scientific knowledge (e.g., Popper, 1959). Paradoxically, studies examining human reasoning in the laboratory have typically found that people display a confirmation bias in that they are more likely to seek out and attend to data consistent rather than data inconsistent with their initial theory (Wason, 1968). We examine the strategies that scientists and students use to evaluate data that are either consistent or inconsistent with their expectations. First, we present findings from scientists reasoning "live" in their laboratory meetings. We show that scientists often show an initial reluctance to consider inconsistent data as "real." However, this initial reluctance is often overcome with repeated observations of the inconsistent data such that they modify their theories to account for the new data. We further examine these issues in a controlled scientific causal thinking simulation specifically developed to examine the reasoning strategies we observed in the natural scientific environment. Like the scientists, we found that participants in our simulation initially displayed a propensity to discount data inconsistent with a theory provided. However, with repeated observations of the inconsistent data, the students, like the scientists, began to see the once anomalous data as "real" and the initial bias to discount that data was significantly diminished.     

Models of Public Engagement: Nanoscientists’ Understandings of Science–Society Interactions

This paper explores how scientists perceive public engagement initiatives. By drawing on interviews with nanoscientists, it analyzes how researchers imagine science–society interactions in an early phase of technological development. More specifically, the paper inquires into the implicit framings of citizens, of scientists, and of the public in scientists’ discourses. It identifies four different models of how nanoscientists understand public engagement which are described as educational, paternalistic, elitist, and economistic. These models are contrasted with the dialog model of public engagement promoted by social scientists and policymakers. The paper asks if and in what ways participatory discourses and practices feed back into scientists’ understandings, thus co-producing public discourses and science.     

The effects of perceived pressures on managerial and nonmanagerial scientists and engineers

The two major purposes of the present study were (1) to empirically investigate the effects of excessive pressures perceived by Ph.D.-level scientists and engineers employed in a large multidivisional energy R&D laboratory on work attitudes and performance; and (2) to test the proposition that scientists with managerial responsibilities perceive more pressures and strains than do those with no such duties. Results indicated that the pressured scientists perceived more role strain and a less positive climate, were less satisfied, and received lower performance evaluations from their supervisors than non-pressured ones. No differences were found in the perception of pressures between the managerial and nonmanagerial scientists, although the managers reported a more positive climate and higher satisfaction than did nonmanagers. The implications of these findings with regard to management practice (i.e., dual ladders) and future research on stress among this occupational group were briefly discussed.     

Implicit Theories of Creativity in Computer Science in the United States and China

To study implicit concepts of creativity in computer science in the United States and mainland China, we first asked 308 Chinese computer scientists for adjectives that would describe a creative computer scientist. Computer scientists and non‐computer scientists from China (N = 1069) and the United States (N = 971) then rated how well those adjectives described creative computer scientists using a 5‐point Likert Scale. Factor analysis revealed that the concept of a creative computer scientist had four dimensions: (1) smart/effective, (2) outgoing, (3) creative thinking and (4) unsociable. Differences in the implicit concepts across disciplines, ethnicity, gender, age, and working experience were analyzed. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the domain specificity of creativity.     

Object and spatial imagery: distinctions between members of different professions

In the current research, we took a new approach to examining individual differences in mental imagery that relied on a key distinction regarding visual imagery, namely the distinction between object and spatial imagery, and further examined the ecological validity of this distinction. Object imagers consistently prefer to construct colorful, pictorial, high-resolution images of individual objects and scenes, and spatial imagers prefer to use imagery to schematically represent spatial relations among objects and can efficiently perform complex spatial transformations. To examine the ecological validity of the object versus spatial imager distinction, we examined the object and spatial imagery preferences and skills of groups of professionals.Visual artists, scientists, architects, and humanities professionals completed two types of imagery tests: spatial imagery tests assessing abilities to process spatial relations and perform spatial transformations, and object imagery tests assessing abilities to process literal appearances of objects in terms of color, shape, and brightness. A clear distinction was found between scientists and visual artists: Visual artists showed above average object imagery abilities but below average spatial imagery abilities; whereas, scientists showed above average spatial imagery abilities but below average object imagery abilities. Visual artists tended to be object imagers, and scientists tended to be spatial imagers. Thus, even though both groups use visual imagery extensively in their work, they in fact tended to excel in only one type of imagery.Furthermore, we interviewed the groups of professionals about imagery characteristics and imagery processes that they typically use when work, we had them interpret kinematics graphs and abstract art, and we monitored their eye-movements as they engaged in various perception and imagery tasks. The data revealed various qualitative differences between the professional groups. Both visual artists and scientists reported using imagery in their work. However, visual artists preferred to use object imagery, but scientists preferred to use spatial imagery for their work. Humanities professionals, however, reported less use of imagery. Additionally, visual artists reported that their images were more likely to come as a whole, but scientists reported that their images were generated part-by-part. Visual artist’s images were more persistent, less intentional, and had multiple meanings as compared to scientist’s images. Furthermore, visual artists and scientists interpreted kinematics graphs and abstract art qualitatively differently. Visual artists tended to interpret graphs literally (graphs-as-pictures), but scientists tended to interpret graphs schematically, in abstract way. However, visual artists tended to interpret the abstract art as abstract representations, but scientists tended to interpret abstract art literally, in a concrete way.The finding that professional domain, where work involves extensive use of object or spatial imagery, differentially predicted object and spatial imagery abilities and approaches in processing visual information provides ecological validation of the distinction between object and spatial imagers. Furthermore, these results provide support for the idea of a trade-off between object and spatial imagery abilities (i.e., a person being more effective at using one type of imagery and then tending to use this type of imagery more frequently than and at the expense of the other type of imagery).