Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness,Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature

The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority-of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism.     

Theory/Analysis Mismatch: Comment on Fredrickson and Joiner’s (2002) Test of the Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions

Fredrickson’s (1998, ‘What good are positive emotions?’, Review of General Psychology 2, pp. 300–319; 2001, ‘The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions’, American Psychologist 56, pp. 218–226) broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions posits that positive emotions improve coping skills and that improved coping skills increase positive emotions, resulting in an upward spiral toward emotional well-being. Fredrickson and Joiner (2002, ‘Positive emotions trigger upward spirals toward emotional well-being’, Psychological Science 13, pp. 172–175) claimed that the results of their analyses supported the broaden-and-build theory but in fact their analyses did not test this theory. The broaden-and-build theory clearly describes a within-occasion across-persons psychological process; the analyses, however, tested a within-occasion across-persons theory.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.     

Systemic Wisdom,The ‘Selving’ of Nature,and Knowledge Transformation: Education for the ‘Greater Whole’

Considerations arising in the context of burgeoning concerns about the environment can provoke an exploration of issues that have significance both for environmental education in particular and education more generally. Notions of the ‘greater whole’ and ‘systemic wisdom’ that feature in some strands of environmental discourse are a case in point. It is argued that interpretations of these notions arising in currently influential scientific and systems thinking understandings of nature that attempt to overcome a corrosive separation of humankind and nature through a dilution or dismissal of the distinction between the human and non-human, self and other, require critical evaluation if they are not to bring their own dangers. Merleau-Pontian understandings of object constitution in a subjectively informed life-world and ideas of the ‘selving’ of natural things are drawn upon in developing a non-discursively grounded interpretation of systemic wisdom. The latter is taken to raise questions that have considerable transformative potential for conventional views of knowledge and its curriculum organisation.     

The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ Argument, and The Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts

Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked.     

Summary report of the British Academy project on ‘Forced Migration,Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’

This review article provides an overview of the British Academy Project on ‘Forced Migration, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’ (January–December 2018), research questions, methodology, main findings and policy recommendations. The project compared the ways in which religious communities engaged with forced displaced populations in Eastern Europe and former Soviet states, with a particular focus on Serbia and Ukraine, collected a dataset on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Security’ and organised two workshops in Belgrade and Kyiv.     

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity,not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

According to the recognition-heuristic theory, decision makers solve paired comparisons in which one object is recognized and the other not by recognition alone, inferring that recognized objects have higher criterion values than unrecognized ones. However, success—and thus usefulness—of this heuristic depends on the validity of recognition as a cue, and adaptive decision making, in turn, requires that decision makers are sensitive to it. To this end, decision makers could base their evaluation of the recognition validity either on the selected set of objects (the set’s recognition validity), or on the underlying domain from which the objects were drawn (the domain’s recognition validity). In two experiments, we manipulated the recognition validity both in the selected set of objects and between domains from which the sets were drawn. The results clearly show that use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the set’s recognition validity. In other words, participants treat all sets as roughly representative of the underlying domain and adjust their decision strategy adaptively (only) with respect to the more general environment rather than the specific items they are faced with.     

Effects of the KiVa Anti-bullying Program on Adolescents’ Depression, Anxiety, and Perception of Peers

The present study investigated the effects of the KiVa antibullying program on students’ anxiety, depression, and perception of peers in Grades 4–6. Furthermore, it was investigated whether reductions in peer-reported victimization predicted changes in these outcome variables. The study participants included 7,741 students from 78 schools who were randomly assigned to either intervention or control condition, and the program effects were tested with structural equation modeling. A cross-lagged panel model suggested that the KiVa program is effective for reducing students’ internalizing problems and improving their peer-group perceptions. Finally, changes in anxiety, depression, and positive peer perceptions were found to be predicted by reductions in victimization. Implications of the findings and future directions for research are discussed.     

The Principle of Production and a Critique of Metaphysics: From the Perspective of Theory of Baudrillard Contractual Approach Based on Rawls’ Device of the “Original Position”

In this article, I discuss Baudrillard’s critique of metaphysics based on his work The Mirror of Production, in which he stresses the principle of production—i.e., dichotomy and derivation. In the development of classical German philosophy, the principle of production was speculatively established, first as Descartes’ cogito, then as Fichte’s Tathandlung, and finally as Hegel’s labor, and grew to be a major principle of modern metaphysics. At the article’s conclusion, the meaning of Symbolic Exchange—Baudrillard’s utopian condition lying beyond the principle of production—will be discussed.     

The Three Legs of the Practitioner’s Learning Stool: Practice,Research/Theory,and Personal Life

The goal of this article is to introduce the many guides that serve as our knowledge base in the helping professions. Practitioners work with the complexity of human emotion, thought, and variability, which at times makes the work confusing. In order to deal with the confusion, the practitioner attends many years of school and intensive practical experiences to be optimally prepared to work with human beings. Even so, different philosophies exist as to what the best sources of practitioner knowledge are. Where should practitioners get their ideas? The academic culture suggests it should be science; the practitioner culture suggests reflection on practice; candid discussion with practitioners suggests that the therapist’s personal life is the richest source of knowledge. This article argues that practitioner expertise is like a three-legged stool with each of the foregoing areas essential to optimal functioning.     

A Pilot Study on the Living-Alone, Socio-Economically Deprived Older Chinese People’s Self-Reported Successful Aging: A Case of Hongkong

This study fills the gap of literature review in the field of successful aging among non-Western older people. It identifies predictors of self-reported successful aging for living-alone older Chinese people with a relatively low socioeconomic status. Also, it records these respondents’ typical interpretations of the concept of successful aging in their own words. This study employed a single-item, subjective approach to enable elderly respondents to define their own successful aging. It made use of an open-ended question to collect respondents’ interpretations of the concept of successful aging. This study successfully interviewed, at home, 109 randomly selected older Chinese people living alone in two public housing estates. The response rate was 75.6%. Life satisfaction, sex, self-reported health status, satisfaction with living environment and major source of income were crucial predictors of these older Chinese people’s self-reported successful aging. The explanatory power was 50.9%. Several typical interpretations of the concept of successful aging obtained from these respondents were categorized into the following groups: (1) health-related issues, (2) financial issues, (3) personal issues, (4) family issues, (5) psychological issues, and (6) housing issues. Many of their interpretations were consistent with some of this study’s predictors. Living-alone, relatively deprived older Chinese respondents’ self-reported successful aging seems to focus more on subjective predictors than on objective ones. Their interpretations of the concept of successful aging are culturally and socio-economically oriented. These older people’s cognitive assessment of their successful aging is thus largely a personal experience of their daily lives.