Rationality,function, and content

Conclusions To summarize, in order for rational agents to be able to engage in the sophisticated kinds of reasoning exemplified by human beings, they must be able to introspect much of their cognition. The problem of other minds and the problem of knowing the mental states of others will arise automatically for any rational agent that is able to introspect its own cognition. The most that a rational agent can reasonably believe about other rational agents is that they have rational architectures similar to its own, and that they have thoughts related to their rational architectures in certain ways. This leads to Rational Functionalism as an account of what it is to be a cognizer having mental states. That in turn entails that a computer can be a person in precisely the same sense as my next door neighbor if it can appropriately mimic my rational architecture. There is nothing I could know about my neighbor that I could not believe with equal justification about the computer. Rational Functionalism also makes it reasonable to define the narrow content of a thought to be its overall place in the agent's rational architecture, that is, its conceptual role. This is, however, avery narrow notion of content. For practical purposes, we are not interested in knowing the narrow contents of other people's thoughts. We are only interested in rather general properties of those narrow contents. This is what is expressed by the use ofthat-clauses in public language.This is a reply to the comments by Stephen Schiffer and Robert Cummins on my bookHow to Build a Person (Bradford/MIT Press, 1989). These papers were presented at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, March, 1991. Cummins paper appears in this volume, and Schiffer's paper will appear inPhilosophy and Phenomenlogical Research.     

On the rationality of positive mysterianism

In Paradox in Christian Theology (2007) I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation of theological paradox and considering whether my proposal is indeed a form of “positive mysterianism” as Tuggy defines the term, I address the two main criticisms raised in Tuggy’s paper: first, that the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility cannot bear the weight required by my defense of paradox; and second, that my proposed model is afflicted with epistemic instability. I conclude that Tuggy has failed to show that a mysterian stance with respect to paradoxical Christian doctrines is in principle unreasonable, unnatural, or unsustainable.     

Is Nature Enough? Yes

Abstract. Religious naturalism encompasses thinkers from Baruch Spinoza, George Santayana, John Dewey, Henry Nelson Wieman, and Ralph Burhoe to recent writers. I offer a generic definition of religious naturalism and then outline my own version, the “minimalist vision of transcendence.” Many standard issues in the science‐and‐religion dialogue are seen to fade in significance for religious naturalism. I make suggestions for our understanding of science, including the importance of transcognitive abilities, the need for a revised notion of rationality as an alternative to extreme versions of postmodernism, the value of rational dissensus, and the education of appreciation. Finally, I suggest ways to interpret the religious traditions of the world by religious naturalism.     

Reflections on stimulus control

The topic of stimulus control is too broad and complex to be traceable here. It would probably take a two-semester course to cover just the highlights of that field's evolution. The more restricted topic of equivalence relations has itself become so broad that even an introductory summary requires more time than we have available. An examination of relations between equivalence and the more general topic of stimulus control, however, may reveal characteristics of both the larger and the more limited field that have not been generally discussed. Consideration of these features may in turn foster future developments within each area. I speak, of course, about aspects of stimulus control that my own experiences have made salient to me; others would surely emphasize different characteristics of the field. It is my hope that cooperative interactions among researchers and theorists who approach stimulus control from different directions will become more common than is currently typical.     

The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry

The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self‐knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non‐inferential and non‐observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else's mental life in the same way as one knows one's own mind is a complete non‐starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds and also that the idea of having someone else's mind in one's own introspective reach is not obviously self‐contradictory. So the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else's mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced.     

Metamorphosis

In this article, I indicate that I have spent most of my life in self-hatred, taking abuse from everyone; teachers, peer, family, and society at large. I am a beautiful person, we all are, and I believe that as women it is time we stopped being dictated to by others who rule the diet and fashion industries. It's time that we stopped trying to live up to unrealistic role models. We are individuals who are as different as the colors of the rainbow, and we should be treated as such, and respect each other's differences.     

An Argument for Compulsory Vaccination: The Taxation Analogy

I argue that there are significant moral reasons in addition to harm prevention for making vaccination against certain common infectious diseases compulsory. My argument is based on an analogy between vaccine refusal and tax evasion. First, I discuss some of the arguments for compulsory vaccination that are based on considerations of the risk of harm that the non-vaccinated would pose on others; I will suggest that the strength of such arguments is contingent upon circumstances and that in order to provide the strongest defence possible of compulsory vaccination, such arguments need to be supplemented by additional arguments. I will then offer my additional argument for compulsory vaccination: I will argue that in both cases of vaccine refusal and of tax evasion individuals fail to make their fair contribution to important social and public goods, regardless of whether each individual contribution ‘makes a difference’. While fairness considerations have sometimes been used to support a moral duty to vaccinate, they have not been appealed to in order to argue for a legal duty to vaccinate. I will suggest that this is due, among other things, to a misapplication of the principle of the least restrictive alternative in public health. Finally, I will address nine possible objections to my argument.     

SOME UNQUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS

I In 1848 Frederic Bastiat wrote an article in the Journal des Debats in which he said, Man struggles against pain and suffering. However, he is condemned by nature to suffering and to privation if he does not take upon himself the effort of work. Hence he has only the choice between two evils…. Up to now, however, no remedy has been found for it, except for one man to avail himself of the work of others…so that all work is for the one and all enjoyment is for the other. Hence [we have] slavery and robbery. [Today] the oppressor no longer directly compels the oppressed through his own strength. There is still a tyrant and a victim, but now the state, i.e. the law itself, is placed as a mediator between the two. What could be better for the purpose of stifling our doubts and vanquishing all resistance? We turn to the state and say to it: I find that between my enjoyment and my work there exists no relation that satisfies me. In order to bring about the desired balance, I would like to take away a little from others. However, that would be dangerous were I to do it myself. Can you, state, facilitate matters for me? Can you not assign me to a favorable position, or assign a more unfavorable one to my competitor? Can you not grant me a special “protection” and, not without plausible reason, lend me capital which you have taken from its possessors? Or, can you not educate my children at public expense? or guarantee me a carefree life from age 50 onwards?… In this case the law would be acting for me, and I would have all the advantages of exploitation without its risks and its onus.     

Self-defence Against the Innocent

Do we have the right to defend ourselves against innocent aggressors? If I amattacked in a lift by a knife-wielding lunatic, may I kill or maim him to protect my own life? On one view the insane man’s plight is his bad luck and I am under no obligation to let it be transferred to me. On the opposing view it is my bad luck to be under attack and I have no right to transfer it to an innocent man by killing him to protect myself. It is perhaps becauseneither of these opposing viewpoints is obviously preferable to the other that there is no consensus about the question. Nevertheless we can find considerations for favouring the first view over the second.     

Therapeutic versus genuine cloning: what are the real moral issues?

In order to answer the question raised in the title of my paper, I first put forward a general ethical theory, which is based on the traditional maxim neminem laedere. Second, I show how this principle in conjunction with certain assumptions concerning the value of life entails certain fundamental bioethical principles. Thus killing a living being Y is morally wrong whenever the intrinsic value of the life that Y would otherwise live is positive. But procreating a living being Y is prima facie (i.e., with regard to the interests of Y) morally neutral, i.e. neither bad nor good. Third I will argue that the question of moral rights should always be reduced to the question of the morality of certain corresponding actions. In particular, granting Y a right to life should be taken to mean that it would be morally wrong if someone else were to put an end to Y's life. In a similar vein, I suggest answers to some other questions of the reproductive rights issue. Fourth, with respect to the controversial issue of genuine cloning, I do not see any compelling moral reasons against this utopian way of procreating full-grown individuals. Nevertheless, I think there are a lot of other good (pragmatic, rational) reasons not to try to produce a human Dolly. Finally, as regards the use or abuse of human embryos as potential suppliers of stem-cells for the cure of other people's diseases, it seems morally safe to perform experiments at least with those embryos which, like spare embryos that remained from measures of in vitro fertilization, would not have a life anyway. It's more difficult to decide, however, whether it would be morally safe to produce embryos (for instance through cloning) only for the sake of using them in the aforementioned way.     

A methodological note about the measurement of the false‐consensus effect

Although the existence of the false consensus effect is beyond all doubt, its interpretation as a judgemental bias is still a matter of debate. Krueger recently proposed a new measure for this phenomenon, called the truly false consensus effect (TFCE). This measure consists of correlating the subject's endorsement of each item with the error he or she made in estimating the popularity of that same item. I question the validity of this measure, arguing that it could be negative even in cases where false consensus is at work. I present an inter‐group study where participants made percentage estimates for various behaviours. The results yielded a significantly negative TFCE, although other measures of false consensus demonstrate that the phenomenon is present. I discuss the differences between Krueger's studies and my own, and suggest that a better measure of false consensus might be the particle correlation between endorsement and estimated popularity, controlling for true popularity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Better than

It is commonly held that rational preferences must be acyclic. There have, however, been cases that have been put forward as counterexamples to this view. This paper focuses on the following question: If the counterexamples are compelling and rational preferences can be cyclic, what should we conclude about the presumed acyclicity of the “better than” relation? Building on some revisionary suggestions concerning acyclicity and betterness, I make a case for hanging on to the presumption that “better than” is acyclic even if “is rationally preferred to” is not. As I explain, the divergence my view makes room for does not threaten to make “better than” judgments less relevant to choice than judgments about rational preference. To the contrary, it makes them more relevant. Toward the end of the paper, I extend my results to the relation “is morally better than” in light of the possibility that there might be moral preferability cycles.

     

Teaching Clinical Psychology Trainees about Weight Bias

Abstract

As an assistant professor who teaches clinical psychology trainees about social aspects of behavior, I devote one week to the topic of weight bias. In this class, I rely on the research literature to challenge common myths about “obesity,” demonstrate the pervasiveness and harm of weight bias, and offer recommendations to trainees to apply to their own professional and personal lives. I encourage trainees to shift focus from weight and weight loss to health and well-being and to engage in self-reflection on the role of weight bias in their interactions with others. Here, I describe my weight bias seminar and outline common questions and my responses to them (e.g., Do you actually believe that “obese” people can be healthy?). Weight bias is a neglected topic in most clinical psychology training programs. Weight bias must be addressed in clinical psychology programs to produce culturally competent graduates who are aware of diversity issues.     

Making Up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Knowability and Personhood

If language is to serve the basic purpose of communicating our attitudes, we must be constructed so as to form beliefs in those propositions that we truthfully assert on the basis of careful assent. Thus, other things being equal, I can rely on believing those things to which I give my careful assent. And so my ability to assent or dissent amounts to an ability to make up my mind about what I believe. This capacity, in tandem with a similar capacity in respect of other attitudes, supports three important lessons. It means that I can know what I believe by seeing what commands my assent, that I can put aside the possibility of error in committing myself to holding such a belief, and that I can therefore perform as a person: I can organize my mind around commitments to which others are invited to hold me.     

Individualism, Communitarianism and Consensus

There is a contemporary conflict between individualistic andcommunitarian conceptions of rationality. Robert Goodin describes it asa conflict between an enlightenment individualistic conception of a``sovereign artificer'' and ``a socially unencumbered self'' ascontrasted with the communitarian conception of a ``socially embeddedself'' whose identity is formed by his or her community. Should wejustify and explain rationality individualistically or socially? This isa false dilemma when consensus is reached by a model articulated byKeith Lehrer and Carl Wagner. According to this model, the consensusresults from the positive weights individuals give to others and use tocontinually average and, thus, aggregate their allocations. Aggregationconverges toward a consensus in which the social preference and theindividual preferences become identical. The truth of communitarianismis to be found in the aggregate and the truth of individualism in theaggregation. The original conflict dissolves in rational consensus.     

The Hubris Hypothesis: You Can Self-Enhance, But You'd Better Not Show It

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self-superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self-superiority claims ("I am better than others"; Experiments 1-7), noncomparative positive claims ("I am good"; Experiments 1-2, 4), self-equality claims ("I am as good as others"; Experiments 3-4, 6), temporally comparative self-superiority claims ("I am better than I used to be"; Experiment 5), other-superiority claims ("S/he is better than others"; Experiment 6), and self-superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 1-7) and made inferences about the claimant's self-view and view of others (Experiments 4-7) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self-superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 4-6) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self-superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self-superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self-claims or self-improvement claims.     

The problem may be more difficult to solve than it appears: a reply to zelaznik

Zelznik (1978) and I agree that his comment applies only to Experiment 1 of my series of three experiments, and I note that the weight of my argument was based on the other two experiments. Although agreeing with his analysis of the problem in Experiment 1, I note that the recommended solution may introduce a new problem in the course of eliminating the old one. It is fortunate that my conclusion can rest on converging operations and is not tied to the particular paradigm in question.     

FROM BELIEF TO UNBELIEF–AND HALFWAY BACK

Abstract. Through autobiography, I explain why I cannot accept conventional Christianity or any other form of religious belief. I sketch how, through modern evolutionary theory, I try to find an alternative world-picture, one which is, however, essentially agnostic about ultimate meanings. I characterize my position as being that of "David Hume brought up-to-date by Charles Darwin." I express sad skepticism about ever realizing the hopes on which Zygon was founded.     

Attributional style, depression, and perceptions of consensus for events

This study examined differences between depressed and nondepressed individuals' implicit perceptions of consensus, which may contribute to differences in their attributional styles. Subjects rated the extent to which positive, negative, and neutral events happen to themselves and to the average college student and completed measures of depth of depression and attributional style. Perceptions of consensus were highly correlated with all components of attributional style for negative and positive events. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that ratings of others explained variance in attributional style beyond that explained by ratings of the self for positive but not for negative events. Path analyses, however, indicated that the indirect path from perceptions of consensus to depression mediated through attributional style was nonsignificant for positive events, although it was significant for negative events. These findings are discussed in terms of the role of perceptions of others as precursors of attributional style and depression.     

The effect of Axis II disorders on the outcome of treatment of anxiety and unipolar depressive disorders: a review

Psychiatric and other clinicians have often speculated on whether the presence of a personality disorder would indicate a poorer course of treatment for an Axis I disorder. Starting around 1990, the standardized criteria of the DSM increased interest in examining this area empirically. This report updates my previous reviews and examines other writing in this area. There is still a considerable body of evidence indicating that personality may cause a poorer treatment outcome of an Axis I disorder; however, there are also intriguing new developments. The introduction of new drug treatments that may be helpful with some dysfunctional personality traits changes some of the findings and may suggest that there may be preferential treatments for some Axis I patients with certain comorbid personality traits. (In certain cases this may apply to some specific psychotherapy techniques as well.) In addition, at times, personality traits may predict a positive outcome to treatment. This review is an attempt to bring together this diverse area and suggest where fruitful areas of research and intervention may possibly be found.