血管外科CBL教学病例库的构建与应用

为克服传统教学模式的缺点,将CBL教学法引入血管外科临床教学并构建教学病例库.在本科生和轮转医生群体应用中发现,CBL教学病例库能有效促进知识理解和经验积累,并有利于培养临床思维、科研能力及合作精神,可在医学教育领域中进一步推广.     

关于建立卵子库的伦理学思考

卵子库的出现带来了一系列伦理问题,对传统道德观念引发了挑战.回顾了卵子库的建立与相关技术的发展历史,及卵子库在人工辅助生殖技术中的应用价值,并对卵子库面临的主要伦理问题进行了分析讨论,最后为建立卵子库所应采用的伦理原则提出相关建议.     

辩证法与西方思维方式

姚大志：辩证法与西方思维方式目前，国内关于辩证法的研究偏重于体系、概念之争，而对于“辩证法是什么”的问题缺乏探讨。如果从发生学来看，辩证法的产生与发展离不开具体的历史环境和历史的需要。辩证法在苏格拉底和柏拉图那里是指通过争论一步步求证真理的方法。在整...     

对现代病理学发展的哲学思考

本文通过对现代病理学发展中的分子技术多学科渗透、电子计算机的广泛应用以及发展趋势的探讨,认为现代病理学的发展离不开辩证唯物主义的指导,充满着辩证法,是现代科学技术革命成果的具体体现。并辩证地分析了现代病理学研究和应用中需要注意的几个问题。     

《启蒙辩证法》与中国虚无主义

中国学界往往把霍克海默、阿多诺的启蒙辩证法解读为启蒙已经、也必然转化为自己的反面,即转化为神话、迷信和野蛮.启蒙辩证法只有这一条不归路径.这种颇成问题的解读与讲究操作和手段的当代中国操作主义思维相结合,促生和加重着当代中国的虚无主义.按照中国传统辩证思维方法解读<启蒙辩证法>,对于正确理解<启蒙辩证法>、中和日趋严重的虚无主义,具有重要意义.     

噬菌体抗体库技术与功能模拟方法

功能模拟方法是控制论的最基本出发点，它是以原型和模型之间的功能相似为基础，用模型来再现原型功能和行为的一种研究方法。随着现代医学的不断发展，需要间接研究的对象越来越多，功能模拟方法在医学科学研究中日益显示出它的重要作用。本文通过对噬菌体抗体库技术各个技术环节的分析，来探讨功能模拟方法在噬菌体抗体库技术中的应用和意义。     

科耶夫对黑格尔辩证法的批判及其存在论本质辨析——兼论如何理解科耶夫的"哲学人类学"

科耶夫对黑格尔辩证法的解读集中于对其否定性和思辨性的强调,在他看来,辩证法不是单纯的思维运动,而是对存在本身的揭示.科耶夫实现了辩证法由方法论向生存论的转向.通过对黑格尔辩证法的改造,科耶夫完成了两个任务:其一,将原本仅仅具有逻辑思辨性的辩证法转变为一种对真实"存在"的描述;其二,将辩证法对真实"存在"的描述变成一个不断趋向真理的过程.科耶夫将真实"存在"解读为人的生存,辩证法的结构最终成为对人的生存本身的展现.     

肿瘤患者对生物样本库捐赠的观点

采用半结构式访谈调查肿瘤患者对生物样本库捐赠的态度,收集了19名过去2年因患肿瘤进行组织切除手术的患者的观点,采用框架法对访谈资料进行分析。归纳的主题包括:虽然很多患者对切除组织用于科研并不了解,但是他们愿意捐献组织到样本库进行科研;家属的意见和建议会影响他们的决定;更愿意由主治医生进行知情同意告知;广泛知情同意被大部分患者接受。研究结论提示生物样本库的知情同意有待进一步完善,大部分患者在了解生物样本库的意义和作用后,愿意捐献组织到样本库。     

辩证法与实践智慧

在西方哲学传统中,辩证法属于理论哲学的方法或研究对象,而实践智慧或明智则只限于实践哲学,只是作为能在社会生活中正确处理对人自身有益处的能力和品质而被讨论[1].但笔者以为,这种辩证法与实践智慧的分离,只是囿于理论哲学视野的缘故.而这一分离的结果是,辩证法由于用错了地方而丧失了信誉,实践智慧则被人们只看成了某种关于生活的常识性琐谈.笔者这里试图表明,辩证法能够作为实践智慧而发挥其作用,且其合法形态只能是实践哲学的实践智慧.本文将从辩证法的实质及其与实践智慧的比较来阐明这一问题.     

理性批判的辩证法——论阿多诺的合理性构造

阿多诺的《否定的辩证法》是这样开头的:“否定的辩证法的表达违背传统。辩证法在柏拉图那里就已经试图通过否定的思维方法建立一种肯定的东西;后来,否定的否定的形态就直接地被命名为肯定。本书试图在不缺少规定性的情况下把辩证法从这种肯定的本质中解放出来,对它的悖论式的标题的说明是它的企图之一。”一些传统的鉴赏家至     

Image Interpretation: Bridging the Gap from Mechanically Produced Image to Representation

There is currently a gap in our understanding of how figures produced by mechanical imaging techniques play evidential roles: several studies based on close examination of scientific practice show that imaging techniques do not yield data whose significance can simply be read off the image. If image-making technology is not a simple matter of nature re-presenting itself to us in a legible way, just how do the images produced provide support for scientific claims? In this article I will first show that there is a distinct question about the semiotics of mechanically produced images that has not yet been answered. I show that my account of visual representations can do so, and I argue that the role of convention involved in my account is compatible with the view that visual representations produced through mechanized imaging techniques can play genuine evidential roles in scientific reasoning.     

For a Humanism Amid Hypermodernity: From a Society of Knowledge to a Critical Knowledge of Society

The reflection on science seems to be linked today with the concept of hypermodernity which refers to a society of excesses without any global alternative model. In this article, my aim is to show how the modernisation of our societies was connected with scientific development, and what place science may be expected to occupy in hypermodern societies—societies built around the notion of risk. After presenting the concept of hypermodernity, I propose an analysis of the inherent risks involved by the development of technology in our societies, and what limits may be desirable in order to prevent an excessive or partial valorisation of a “society of knowledge,” a notion itself not without its problems. Finally, I remind of the possible contribution humanities and social sciences can make to maintain balance in what is today called a knowledge economy.     

How to Conduct Research in Your Private Practice

Mental health professionals who work in private practice and other clinical settings have huge opportunities to contribute to the science of our field. But they rarely do so. This article describes ways that practitioners who have research training can capitalize on recent developments in practice, science, and technology to conduct research in their private practice. I describe a model for conducting research as a practitioner that entails tightly integrating the research into clinical practice, and I point out why conducting research in your private practice is worth doing. The remainder of the paper provides a primer, describing strategies for implementing in a clinical setting all the elements of the research enterprise: addressing ethical and legal issues, keeping up to date with the scientific literature, selecting a good research question, conducting a single-case experimental design, finding collaborators and assistants, collecting the data, analyzing the data, writing the paper and getting it published, and handling time and money. Although this paper focuses on research in a solo or group private practice setting, many of the strategies described here can also prove useful in the conduct of research in hospital or community settings.     

The Community Psychologist as Critical Friend: Promoting Critical Community Praxis

Community‐engaged researchers have a responsibility to community partners to get beyond the traditional researcher stance to take on the active role of critical friend. On the basis of my own community research experiences in the USA, in this article, I argue that there is added value in taking on the practice of critical friendship to encourage a higher degree of critical reflection and critical practice in our partners and in our work together. In the context of long‐term, trusting relationships with community partners, researchers can play the role of critical friend working together to shape critical community praxis on the basis of critical theorizing, critical reflection, and a shared commitment to working for social justice. Those trying to make a difference in communities are often isolated and can benefit from opportunities for dialogue with other community practitioners within a critical frame of reference. Although not without risks and challenges, stepping into this role allows us to put into sharper relief the gap between community practice that challenges injustice and practice that maintains it. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The unity of science

The paper addresses the question of how the unity of science can adequately be characterized. A mere classification of scientific fields and disciplines does not express the unity of science unless it is supplemented with a perspective that establishes a systematic coherence among the different branches of science. Four ideas of this kind are discussed. Namely, the unity of scientific language, of scientific laws, of scientific method and of science as a practical‐operational enterprise. Whereas reference to the unity of scientific language and of scientific laws does not provide a viable basis for the unity of science, the methodological and practical unity might. The unity of science can be characterized by the way in which methodological criteria enter into the assessment or evaluation of theories, and, moreover, by a transdisciplin‐ary approach to problems. Accordingly, the unity of science is not expressed by theoretical uniformity but by the unity of scientific practice.     

Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference

It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive.     

植入前遗传学诊断中性别选择的伦理辩护

植入前遗传学诊断（PGD）是在胚胎植入子宫前进行遗传学检查的新技术。它可对植入胚胎进行性别选择,从而引发了会增加我国出生人口性别比的担忧。通过对PGD性别选择伦理风险的分析,指出其用于医学需要时不会对性别比造成危害。但在实施过程中需要医生、患者及社会全体人员共同参与,避免该技术用于非医学目的的需要。     

Sellars on thoughts and beliefs

In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars’ famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars’ account draws on both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account, Sellars is able to see reasons as causes and, hence, to respect the full range of our folk psychological generalisations. This is achieved by modelling folk psychological practice on theoretical reasoning. But despite frequent misinterpretation, Sellars does not claim that thoughts and beliefs are theoretical concepts. Thus, folk psychological explanation is not theoretical, and hence, it is not replaceable by scientific theory. Hence, scientific concepts will not eliminate folk psychological concepts. Thus, Sellars avoids eliminativism.