On noticing transparent states: A compatibilist approach to transparency

According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner-awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, they are merely translucent. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—moderate transparency—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor.     

On the validity of narrow and broad personality traits: A response to

Salgado, Moscoso, and Berges (2013) have recently commented on the issue of the comparative validity of broad factor-level personality traits and narrow facet-level personality traits, providing arguments and data suggesting superior validity for the former. In response, we first clarify some of our previous points that were discussed by Salgado et al. and comment on some other aspects of their article. We then provide an empirical example in which a facet-level personality scale does better in predicting a delinquency criterion than does the factor-level personality scale that contains that facet. We also use CFA to demonstrate that it was the specific trait variance in our narrow predictor that added significantly to predictive validity, above and beyond the validity achieved by the common factor variance contained within the trait measure. These results support our previous conclusion that exclusive reliance on broad factor measures can be counterproductive for understanding and predicting behavior.     

On Hare's attempt to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap: A response to Forschler's rejoinder

In a paper in this journal (Wall 2016), the author of the present paper critiqued Scott Forschler's attempt (2013) to establish that Jens Timmermann's argument (2005) against R. M. Hare's attempt (1981) to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap is unsuccessful. Forschler's thesis is that Hare's utilitarianism is strictly normative, not metaethical. In Hare's ethical rationalism, which is metaethical but contains no intrinsic ends (Forschler 2013), reason determines the proper ends, and preference satisfaction has no value prior to reason's determinations (Forschler 2013). The present author responded that Hare's moral approach presupposes that preference satisfaction is the ultimate end (Wall 2016) and that an analysis of preference satisfaction in Hare's moral approach cannot be confined to normative ethics. Forschler's rejoinder (2017) suggests that Hare's moral theory was misinterpreted by the author, who now shows that such a judgment results from significant oversights concerning the foundation of Hare's moral theory and utilitarian foundations.     

The whirligig of time: Some thoughts on Staddon and Higa.

Staddon and Higa's theory of timing finds analogy with physics' concern with the relativity of time and irreversible processes. Their model raises general issues about the nature and function of models and, specifically, the extent to which it has captured the stimulus events in temporal control.     

On the importance of critical thinking: A response to Wulf's (2015) commentary

In a recent paper (Toner & Moran, 2015), we argued that continued improvement among elite athletes requires alternation between external and internal foci of attention. In her commentary on this paper, Wulf (2015) claims that we have misunderstood the ‘attentional focus’ effect. Our rejoinder has three objectives. Firstly, we critically evaluate Wulf's arguments and counter her false allegations and spurious reasoning. Secondly, we explain our concerns about certain aspects of attentional focusing research. Finally, we propose that in order to explore the dynamic nature of attentional focusing, we need to go beyond restrictive theoretical dichotomies (e.g., “internal” versus “external” processes) using new approaches.     

On objectivity and subjectivity in statistical inference: A response to Mayo

In this paper we respond to the article An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing by D. G. Mayo (1983). We argue that the theory of testing developed by Mayo, NPT*, is neither novel nor objective. We also respond to the claims made by Mayo against Bayesian theory.