What preschool children do and do not do with ungrammatical word orders

Akhtar [J. Child Lang. 26 (1999) 339.] found that when 4-year-old English-speaking children hear novel verbs in transitive utterances with ungrammatical word orders (e.g., Elmo the tree meeked), they correct them to canonical SVO order almost all of the time. However, when 3-year-olds and older 2-year-olds hear these same utterances, they waver between correcting and using the ungrammatical ordering. In the current study, we adapted this task for children at 2;4, using an intransitive construction. The major finding was that children corrected the noncanonical word order less than half as often as Akhtar's 2-year-old subjects who were approximately 4 months older. At the same time, however, children showed in several ways that they had some implicit understanding of canonical SV order; for example, they used the novel verb which they heard used in grammatical word order more often than the novel verb which they heard in ungrammatical word order, and they consistently used pronouns and the progressive –s auxiliary in appropriate ways. The current findings thus contribute to a growing body of theory and research suggesting that the ontogenetic emergence of linguistic categories and schemas is a gradual process, as is the emergence of categories in other domains of cognitive development.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

What concepts do

This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.     

What time travelers may be able to do

Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such a challenge unscathed.     

What bilateral displays do

Bilateral presentations of stimuli produce asymmetries larger than those of unilateral presentations, an effect that exists across modalities. In the case of visual field differences at least 13 hypotheses of the effect have been proposed, 6 of which suggest that some form of hemispheric interaction is responsible for the bilateral advantage. Previous research has eliminated all 7 noninteraction hypotheses, has supported the class of hemispheric interaction mechanisms, and has ruled out two specific instances of the latter. Here four experiments test the remaining hypotheses. The results support the homolog activation hypothesis, which states that bilateral stimulation by similar stimuli activates homologous areas of the two hemispheres, disrupting communication between the areas. The other hypotheses were eliminated.     

What we can do

Philosophical Studies - Plural first-person pronouns have often been ignored in the literature on indexicals and pronouns. The assumption seems to be that we is just the plural of I. So, we can...     

What to do and how to do it: sequence learning of action effects and transformation rules

Many goal-oriented actions, for example in tool use, can be characterized by the involvement of two components: The effect that the acting person wants to achieve and the transformation rule that defines the relationship between a bodily movement and the associated action effect. Both in conjunction specify the concrete action that has to be executed. In our experiments, we utilized a sequence learning paradigm to investigate whether these components are represented separately or are bound together to form a more holistic representation of the action. Participants switched between different transformation rules to achieve certain action effects. In one group, there was a fixed sequence of action effects, with randomly varying transformation rules. In the other group, the sequence of transformation rules was fixed, whereas the action effects were randomly varying. Results indicate that both kinds of sequences can be learned and provide evidence for the notion that transformation rules and action effects are represented separately.     

What simulation can do to the statistics and design course

The increasing appearance of an integrated statistics and research design course is noted, and the use of computer simulation in such a course is discussed. Four different kinds of courses are suggested: the problem set course, the demonstration labs course, the design-your-own course, and the “research community” course. Example simulations are discussed for each course.     

What do differences between own,admired, and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice

Two studies examined certain discrepancies which have been considered important evidence in support of interpersonal comparison (value-adherence) explanations of group induced shifts in choice. These are (a) the differences between a person's own choice and the choice he predicts others would make and (b) the difference between the former and the choice he admires. Findings from the first study indicate that own choices are more extreme than those a person predicts others would make because he is more certain and confident about the former than the latter, not because he wishes to appear to outdo others as interpersonal comparison theories of choice-shift effect would have it. The second study strongly suggests that extreme choices are admired not because they display maximal adherence to a social ideal but because they imply that the person's solution to a problem involving choice is well-founded, that he has persuasive reasons for the choice. On the whole the evidence bodes well for explanations of choice-shift effects based on persuasive argumentation and poorly for those relying on interpersonal comparison processes.     

Programmed instruction: What it is and how to do it

Five behaviorological features of programmed instruction are outlined: behavioral objectives, reinforcement, activity rate: high and relevant, successive approximation, and mastery progression. Each of these topics is explained, and examples are given to illustrate the differences between programmed instruction and the more common transmission model of teaching. A final section provides suggestions on specific techniques of successive approximation.     

What we may do with preembryos: a response to Richard A. McCormick.

If preembryos are not persons, as Professor Richard A. McCormick recently argued in an article in this journal, then a variety of actions with preembryos should be permitted to follow. These actions include discard, freezing, research, and preimplantation genetic analysis.