萨尔蒙:"行为的因果解释"

包括逻辑经验主义在内的自然主义哲学家都认为,自然和社会是同构的,社会可以像自然科学一样进行研究,社会行为的解释也能套用自然科学的方法和理论.自然主义者相信,社会现象从属于那些类似于自然规律的决定性规律.     

Causal Exclusion and Causal Autonomism

The causal exclusion problem is often considered as one of the major difficulties for which non-reductive physicalists have no easy solution to offer. Some non-reductive physicalists address this problem by arguing that mental properties are to some extent causally autonomous. If this is the case, then mental properties will not be causally excluded by their physical realizers because causation, in general, is a relation between properties of the same level. In this paper, I argue that the response from causal autonomy cannot be successful for two reasons. First, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for how mental particulars can have causal efficacy in a non-reductive physicalist framework. Second, the causal considerations underpinning this response do not really support the conclusion that mental properties are causally autonomous.     

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's ( 2003 ) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.     

Stable Causal Relationships Are Better Causal Relationships

We report three experiments investigating whether people's judgments about causal relationships are sensitive to the robustness or stability of such relationships across a range of background circumstances. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people are more willing to endorse causal and explanatory claims based on stable (as opposed to unstable) relationships, even when the overall causal strength of the relationship is held constant. In Experiment 2, we show that this effect is not driven by a causal generalization's actual scope of application. In Experiment 3, we offer evidence that stable causal relationships may be seen as better guides to action. Collectively, these experiments document a previously underappreciated factor that shapes people's causal reasoning: the stability of the causal relationship.     

Causal Slingshots

Causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ontology of token-level causation which, in the end, are intended to show two things: (i) The logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features a binary predicate “… causes …” and (ii) that predicate takes events as arguments. Even though formalisms are only revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements, if the latter are shown to be adequately captured within a corresponding formalism, proponents of slingshots usually take the adequacy of their formalizations for granted without justifying it. The first part of this paper argues that the most discussed version of a causal slingshot, viz. the one e.g. presented by Davidson (Essays on actions and events. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), can indeed be refuted for relying on an inadequate formal apparatus. In contrast, the formal means of G?del’s (The philosophy of Betrand Russell. New York, Tudor, 1944) often neglected slingshot are shown to stand on solid ground in the second part of the paper. Nonetheless, I contend that G?del’s slingshot does only half the work friends of event causation would like it to do. It provides good reasons for (i) but not for (ii).     

Causal inference

Conclusion We have examined only a few of the basic questions about causal inference that result from Reichenbach's two principles. We have not considered what happens when the probability distribution is a mixture of distributions from different causal structures, or how unmeasured common causes can be detected, or what inferences can reliably be drawn about causal relations among unmeasured variables, or the exact advantages that experimental control offers. A good deal is known about these questions, and there is a good deal more to find out.We thank the Office of Naval Research and the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center for supporting this research. Proofs of theorems will be found in Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1991).     

Causal reasoning

The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of reasoning that, I suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of causation.     

Causal Probability

Examples growing out of the Newcomb problem have convinced many people that decision theory should proceed in terms of some kind of causal probability. I endorse this view and define and investigate a variety of causal probability. My definition is related to Skyrms' definition, but proceeds in terms of objective probabilities rather than subjective probabilities and avoids taking causal dependence as a primitive concept.     

Causal Closure,Causal Exclusion,and Supervenience Physicalism

This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's defense of supervenience physicalism succeeds, it does so by showing that supervenience physicalism is not a unique, nonredundant way to be a physicalist.     

Causal Models of Physical Exercise Participation: Testing the Predictive Power of the Construct "Pressure to Change"

This study examines 2 different causal models to predict physical exercise motivation and behavior under a longitudinal perspective. The first model includes 5 latent variables that were hypothesized to have an impact on exercise intention and behavior: behavior-specific social support, exercise self-efficacy, perceived health benefits, perceived barriers, and subjective vulnerability to cardiovascular disease. The second model was based on all variables of the first model, but additionally included the new variable "pressure to change." Pressure to change was defined as the extent to which a person feels the necessity that specific personal life circumstances (e.g., health status, social relations) may not remain as they are and ought to be changed. It was hypothesized that the inclusion of health-related pressure to change would result in a better prediction of exercise intention. The proposed causal models were tested separately at the stages of exercise adoption and maintenance. Covariance structure analyses (LISREL) confirmed that pressure to change may be an important factor in the motivational process that leads to the adoption of regular physical exercise. Adding this latent variable to the basic model improved the amount of explained variance in exercise intention by 6%. Furthermore, the results did not support the assumption that cognitive control is critical especially during the acquisition of exercise behaviors, but may be less influential once the behavioral routines have been established. Our data rather indicate that regular physical exercise, even if performed on a regular basis for years, always remains a behavior that requires a high level of cognitive guidance.     

Super-learning of Causal Judgements

In three experiments, participants learned which of a variety of foods were capable of causing an allergic reaction in a hypothetical patient during training in which a compound of a treatment and a target food cue was paired with the reaction. In Experiment 1 the causal ratings of the target cue were increased if the treatment cue was pretrained as a preventative cause of the reaction. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that the magnitude of this superlearning is unaffected by the order of compound and treatment cue training. The final study also showed that forward super-learning is not induced solely by simple exposure to the treatment cue prior to compound training but, rather, depends upon training the treatment cue as a preventative cause, whereas retrospective super-learning may be due merely to exposure of the treatment cue. These results are problematic for contingency-based accounts of causal induction but accord with modified and extended associative theories.     

Abstracta Are Causal

Philosophia - Many philosophers think all abstract objects are causally inert. Here, focusing on novels, I argue that some abstracta are causally efficacious. First, I defend a straightforward...