Signature Limits in Mindreading Systems

Recent evidence that young children seem to both understand false belief in one sense, but not in another, has led to two‐systems theorizing about mindreading. By analyzing the most detailed two‐systems approach in studying social cognition—the theory of mindreading defended by Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill—I argue that that even when dutifully constructed, two‐systems approaches in social cognition struggle to adequately define the mindreading systems in terms of signature processing limits, an issue that becomes most apparent when investigating mindreading in infancy. I end the article by developing several challenges that face any two‐systems account of mindreading.     

Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading

In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they provide a characterization of social understanding as being essentially situated. However, embodied cognition explanations seem to be limited in scope insofar as they do not target the more sophisticated forms of emotion understanding that have traditionally been the main focus of mindreading explanations. In the second part of the article we discuss Goldie’s account of emotion understanding as a possible way to complement embodied cognition approaches without re-introducing the frame problem. We offer two suggestions that might further the integration of Goldie’s account of emotion understanding within the framework of embodied cognition.     

The demanding world of emotion: A Gestalt approach to emotion experience

Psychology is biased towards thinking of emotions as feelings rather than as an experiences of the world. But they are both. World-focused emotion experiences (WFEE) are how the world appears or is consciously perceived in one's emotion experience. For example, when happy the world may seem welcoming, or when sad the world may seem barren of possibilities. What explains these experiences? This article discusses explanations of WFEE from phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Influenced by Lewin, I propose an “emotional demand model” of WFEE. The emotional demand character of objects (e.g. bear-to-be-run-from) is distinguished from their expressive character (e.g. angry bear). It is a mistake to think of emotion faces only as expressions—they are also demands. This distinction explains some anomalous findings in infancy and autism research. The model highlights another tool for recognizing our own emotions: noticing when we feel “demanded of” by the world, with implications for emotion regulation.     

Callous-Unemotional Traits in Individuals Receiving Accommodations in University

Research with antisocial individuals suggests that callous-unemotional (CU) traits, a dimension of psychopathy, consistently predict severe antisocial behaviours and correlate with deficits in recognizing negative emotions, especially fearful facial expressions. However, the generalizability of these findings to non-antisocial populations remains uncertain and largely unexplored. This small, exploratory study aimed to extend this research by measuring CU traits and facial emotion recognition in university students with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), learning disabilities, other psychiatric disorders, and comparison participants with physical/sensory disabilities. As the clinical groups can exhibit deficits in emotion recognition, this study sought to shed light on the candidacy of CU traits as a factor in emotion recognition. Results suggested that individuals in the diagnostic groups possess similar levels of CU traits to the comparison group and that the relationship between CU traits and emotion recognition deficits previously seen in antisocial populations is not present in this sample. Contrary to the hypothesis, those in the diagnostic groups displayed similar levels of accuracy on an emotion recognition task as the comparison group. Recommendations are made for future research to use more specific and representative diagnostic populations to further assess the relationships between CU traits and emotion recognition in non-antisocial populations.     

Mirroring versus simulation: on the representational function of simulation

Mirror neurons and systems are often appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people??s mental states. Such neural mirroring processes are often treated as instances of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation as specified by the simulation theory of mindreading. I begin by more precisely characterizing ??mirroring?? (Sect. 2) and ??simulation?? (Sect. 3). Mirroring results in a neural process in an observer that resembles a neural process of the same type in the observed agent. Although simulation is often characterized in terms of resemblance (Goldman, Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading, 2006), I argue that simulation requires more than mere interpersonal mental resemblance: A simulation must have the purpose or function of resembling its target (Sect. 3.1). Given that mirroring processes are generated automatically, I focus on what is required for a simulation to possess the function of resembling its target. In Sect. 3.2 I argue that this resemblance function, at least in the case of simulation-based mindreading, requires that a simulation serve as a representation or stand-in of what it resembles. With this revised account of simulation in hand, in Sect. 4 I show that the mirroring processes do not necessarily possess the representational function required of simulation. To do so I describe an account of goal attribution involving a motor mirroring process that should not be characterized as interpersonal mental simulation. I end in Sect. 5 by defending the conceptual distinction between mirroring and simulation, and discussing the implications of this argument for the kind of neuroscientific evidence required by simulation theory.     

Wittgenstein,mindreading and perception

Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.     

Mirror neurons are not evidence for the Simulation Theory

Recently, there as been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for the ST of mindreading. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I offer a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.     

Emotional Conception: How Embodied Emotion Concepts Guide Perception and Facial Action

ABSTRACT— This study assessed embodied simulation via electromyography (EMG) as participants first encoded emotionally ambiguous faces with emotion concepts (i.e., "angry,""happy") and later passively viewed the faces without the concepts. Memory for the faces was also measured. At initial encoding, participants displayed more smiling-related EMG activity in response to faces paired with "happy" than in response to faces paired with "angry." Later, in the absence of concepts, participants remembered happiness-encoded faces as happier than anger-encoded faces. Further, during passive reexposure to the ambiguous faces, participants' EMG indicated spontaneous emotion-specific mimicry, which in turn predicted memory bias. No specific EMG activity was observed when participants encoded or viewed faces with non-emotion-related valenced concepts, or when participants encoded or viewed Chinese ideographs. From an embodiment perspective, emotion simulation is a measure of what is currently perceived. Thus, these findings provide evidence of genuine concept-driven changes in emotion perception. More generally, the findings highlight embodiment's role in the representation and processing of emotional information.     

Hermeneutics and theory of mind

In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics reflect a theory approach, long before TT itself was developed. In contrast, Dilthey’s hermeneutics reflects a simulation approach. In contrast to both of these approaches, I propose a contextual theory, as a parallel to Gadamer’s work in hermeneutics, and as a view that offers the basis for an important critique of both TT and ST.

Embracing integration and complexity: placing emotion within a science of brain and behaviour

ABSTRACT

The present paper addresses conceptual issues that are central to emotion research. What is emotion? What are its defining characteristics? The field struggles with questions like these almost constantly. I argue that definitions, and deciding what is the proper status of emotion, are not a requirement for scientific progress – in fact, they can hinder it. Therefore, “emotion” researchers should strive to develop a science of complex behaviours, and worry less about their exact nature. But for interesting behaviours, is most of the explaining that is needed present at the level of isolated systems (perception, cognition, etc.) or at the level of interactions between them? I suggest that the level of interactions is where most of the work is needed. Accordingly, I advocate that it is important to embrace integration, and not to strive to necessarily disentangle the multiple contributions underlying behaviours. More generally, it is argued that we need to revise models of causation adopted when reasoning about the mind and brain. Instead, a “complex systems” approach is required where the interactions between multiple components lead to system-level – emergent – properties that cannot be isolated or attributed to more elementary parts.     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

Visual perception and visual mental imagery of emotional faces generate similar expression aftereffects

What is the relationship between visual perception and visual mental imagery of emotional faces? We investigated this question using a within-emotion perceptual adaptation paradigm in which adaptation to a strong version of an expression was paired with a test face displaying a weak version of the same emotion category. We predicted that within-emotion adaptation to perception and imagery of expressions would generate similar aftereffects, biasing perception of weak emotional test faces toward a more neutral value. Our findings confirmed this prediction. Adaptation to mental images yielded aftereffects that inhibited emotion recognition of test expressions, as participants were less accurate at recognising these stimuli compared to baseline. While the same inhibitory effect was observed when expressions were visually perceived, the size of the aftereffects was greater for perception than imagery. These findings suggest the existence of expression-selective neural mechanisms that subserve both visual perception and visual mental imagery of emotional faces.     

Embodying the False-Belief Tasks

Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition??in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others?? thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion of a joint mental state, but that doing so will require taking a less antagonistic attitude towards mainstream cognitive approach.     

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

Frames of reference in social cognition

How is mindreading affected by social context? It is often implicitly assumed that there is one single way to understand others, whatever the situation or the identity of the person. In contrast, I emphasize the duality of functions of mindreading depending on the context (social interaction and social observation), as well as the duality of social frames of reference (egocentric and allocentric). I argue in favour of a functional distinction between knowledge-oriented mindreading and interaction-oriented mindreading. They both aim at understanding other people's behaviour. But they do so using different strategies. However, to say that mindreading has two functions does not suffice to show that there are two kinds of mindreading. One and the same ability could accomplish different functions. Unfortunately, there has been almost no experimental data on a possible dissociation between two kinds of mindreading abilities. Nonetheless, I discuss a few results that point towards a dual ability.     

Why emotion recognition is not simulational

According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.     

Not all triads are created equal: further support for the importance of visual and semantic proximity in object identification

Identification deficits were investigated in ELM, a temporal lobe stroke patient with category-specific deficits. We replicated previous work done on FS, a patient with category specific deficits as a result of herpes viral encephalitis. ELM was tested using novel, computer generated shapes that were paired with artifact labels. We paired semantically close or disparate labels to shapes and ELM attempted to learn these pairings. Overall, ELM's shape-label confusions were most detrimentally affected when we used labels that referred to objects that were visually and semantically close. However, as with FS, ELM had as many errors when shapes were paired with the labels "donut," "tire," and "washer" as he did when they were paired with visually and semantically close artifact labels. Two explanations are put forth to account for the anomalous performance by both patients on the triad of donut-tire-washer.     

Emotional range and value orientation: toward a cognitive view of emotionality

This study focused on emotional range--a personality variable introduced to the study of emotion. It is argued that individual differences in emotional responsiveness need to be described and analyzed not only in terms of emotional intensity but also in terms of emotional range. What are some of the factors that influence an individual's range of emotional experiences? Do cognitive factors play a significant role? Questions such as these were central to the present investigation. In accordance with recent cognitive formulations of emotion, we hypothesized that individual differences on the emotional range variable would be associated with differences in value orientations. Lending support to this proposition, the results revealed a pattern of emotional range--value associations that challenge the prevailing view of emotionality as intimately linked with primitivism and impulsivity. At the same time, the findings strongly suggest that emotionality cannot be understood as divorced from a person's mental life. Implications of the findings for the development of a cognitively oriented approach to the study of individual differences in emotional dispositions are discussed.     

Theory of mind and its relationship with executive functions and emotion recognition in borderline personality disorder

Impaired social cognition has been claimed to be a mechanism underlying the development and maintenance of borderline personality disorder (BPD). One important aspect of social cognition is the theory of mind (ToM), a complex skill that seems to be influenced by more basic processes, such as executive functions (EF) and emotion recognition. Previous ToM studies in BPD have yielded inconsistent results. This study assessed the performance of BPD adults on ToM, emotion recognition, and EF tasks. We also examined whether EF and emotion recognition could predict the performance on ToM tasks. We evaluated 15 adults with BPD and 15 matched healthy controls using different tasks of EF, emotion recognition, and ToM. The results showed that BPD adults exhibited deficits in the three domains, which seem to be task‐dependent. Furthermore, we found that EF and emotion recognition predicted the performance on ToM. Our results suggest that tasks that involve real‐life social scenarios and contextual cues are more sensitive to detect ToM and emotion recognition deficits in BPD individuals. Our findings also indicate that (a) ToM variability in BPD is partially explained by individual differences on EF and emotion recognition; and (b) ToM deficits of BPD patients are partially explained by the capacity to integrate cues from face, prosody, gesture, and social context to identify the emotions and others' beliefs.