Magic and the aesthetic illusion

The aesthetic illusion is the subjective experience that the content of a work of art is reality. It has an intrinsic relation to magic, an intrapsychic maneuver oriented toward modification and control of the extraspyschic world, principally through ego functioning. Magic is ontogenetically and culturally archaic, expresses the omnipotence inherent in primary narcissism, and operates according to the logic of the primary process. Magic is a constituent of all ego functioning, usually latent in later development. It may persist as an archaic feature or may be evoked regressively in global or circumscribed ways. It causes a general disinhibition of instincts and impulses attended by a sense of confidence, exhiliration, and exuberance. The aesthetic illusion is a combination of illusions: (1) that the daydream embodied by the work of art is the beholder's own, the artist being ignored, and (2) that the artistically described protagonist is a real person with a real "world." The first illusion arises through the beholder's emotional-instinctual gratification from his or her own fantasy-memory constellations; the second comes about because the beholder, by taking the protagonist as proxy, mobilizes the subjective experience of the imaginary protagonist's "reality." The first illusion is necessary for the second to take place; the second establishes the aesthetic illusion proper. Both illusions are instances of magic. Accordingly, the aesthetic illusion is accompanied by a heady experience of excitement and euphoria. The relation among the aesthetic illusion, magic, and enthusiasm is illustrated by an analytic case, J. D. Salinger's "The Laughing Man," Woody Allen's Play It Again, Sam, Don Quixote, and the medieval Cult of the Saints.     

Race Magic and the Yellow Peril

Among the many historical examples in which the Orient has been imaginatively associated with magic, one of the most fascinating involves an actual overlap between race and magic in the popular performances of yellowface magicians at the turn of the twentieth century. I use this example to show and analyze some of the dynamics between magic and the aesthetics of race, especially as these play out through one of the most influential and long‐standing contradictions of the “Yellow Peril”: Chinese people are unassimilable, yet Chinese aesthetics are easily appropriated.     

The Experience of Magic

Despite its enduring popularity, theatrical magic remains all but ignored by art critics, art historians, and philosophers. This is unfortunate, since magic offers a unique and distinctively intellectual aesthetic experience and raises a host of interesting philosophical questions. Thus, this article initiates a philosophical investigation of the experience of magic. Section I dispels two widespread misconceptions about the nature of magic and discusses the sort of depiction it requires. Section II asks, “What cognitive attitude is involved in the experience of magic?” and criticizes three candidate replies; Section III then argues that Tamar Szabó Gendler's notion of “belief‐discordant alief” holds the key to a correct answer. Finally, Section IV develops an account of the experience of magic and explores some of its consequences. The result is a philosophically rich view of the experience of magic that opens new avenues for inquiry and is relevant to core issues in contemporary aesthetics.     

Magic vs. enchantment

This paper draws on a distinction by J. R. R. Tolkien between Magic (an exercise of the will to change something in the world) and Enchantment (the creation of and entering into a secondary world). After elaborating this contrast and some of its consequences—one of which is to illuminate the common ground between science and what is usually thought of as magic, as distinct (in both cases) from art—I suggest some complications and refinements, including a third category, Glamour. I then discuss contemporary modernist magic, including Weberian ‘disenchantment’ which, 1 argue, is actually central to the triumph of the former. One consequence of that triumph is to place an historically unique emphasis upon enchantment as a source of resistance and possibly re‐enchantment. I then take a closer look at wonder, as the hallmark of enchantment, and at the special relationship between wonder and nature, before concluding with some suggestions for how to recognise genuine contemporary re‐enchantment.     

Participating in social enquiry and action

This paper describes the collaborative endeavours of residents and a wide range of professional workers in a particular area of Nottingham, with reference to a community psychology approach to addressing sources of psychological distress. The activities include a survey of people's views about living in the area and the factors they identify as affecting their health; and initiatives in community participation and action. One hundred and twenty three people were interviewed by members of the Sneinton and Bakersfield Community Forum. Harmful influences upon health and causes of stress were revealed as litter, dog dirt, air and traffic pollution, feeling unsafe to go out at night and lifestyle-related issues such as smoking and diet. Public meetings, the local press and short written reports were used to publicize these results and encourage further involvement. Many local residents and professionals are now active in a network of groups which address social and environmental concerns.     

Consciousness and self-reference

Reflection on the self's way of being in consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based inany wayat all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires evensolitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I describe my kinetic model of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, aspeaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness.A version of this essay was read at Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta (February 1985), University of North Bengal (March 1985) and Jadavpur University (March 1985). My thanks to S. Basu and S. Chakraborty at Rabindra Bharati, and to M. Ghosh and S. K. Sen at North Bengal, and to Ch. Gupta and P. K. Sen of Jadavpur University. Jadavpur's Prof. Sen's extensive comments in support of the cognitive model of reference led me to revise the essay thoroughly. North Bengal University may have published a version of this essay. I also thank Kent Baldner and the referees of this journal for insightful comments forcing further revisions.     

Consciousness and Self-awareness

In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an approach of interpretive and comparative analysis, I also clarify significant differences between the theory and the correspondent Cartesian views in order to reveal the theory's contemporary relevancy.     

Consciousness and Commentaries

There are several neuropsychological syndromes in which good residual function is retained in the absence of acknowledged awareness, among them blindsight, amnesia, and unilateral neglect. All of them point to the need in studying conscious awareness not only for an “on-line” demonstration of the relevant capacity, but for an independent commentary or classificatory response by the subject, whether human or animal. The parametric limits of blindsight (visual discrimination without awareness) can be measured using a “commentary key” psychophysical paradigm, and the results may possibly allow an approach to identifying neural structures involved in visual awareness.     

Truth and Consciousness

Many work on flushing out what our consciousness means in cognitive and phenomenological terms, but no one has yet connected the dots on how consciousness and truth intersect, much less how our phenomenal consciousness can form the ground for most of our models of truth. Here, I connect those dots and argue that the basic structure of our phenomenal consciousness grounds the nature of truth as concordance, to harmonize in agreement, and that most extant theories on truth are well explained in that grounding. Said another way, the unifying and bifurcating intentional structure of phenomenal consciousness is the non-epistemic ground of truth, such that most theories of truth can be explained as particular expressions of concordance based upon the differing aspects of that ground.