The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: a basis for jus cogens prohibition of juvenile capital punishment in the United States

This article supports the position that the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) articulates a prohibition of capital punishment of juveniles that now must be considered a norm of jus cogens. The article provides statistics and trends regarding juveniles who commit capital crimes and describes how the U.S. justice system handles such juveniles, including Eighth Amendment analyses of juvenile executions under the U.S. Constitution. The article also discusses community consensus regarding evolving standards of decency, describes international law on the capital punishment of juveniles, and outlines worldwide trends in juvenile executions. It then defines and describes the concepts of customary international law and jus cogens, applying these concepts to the problem of the execution of juveniles in the United States. The article concludes by suggesting that there is a moral imperative for universal prohibition of juvenile capital punishment and by speculating about the domestic effects of applying such a jus cogens norm in the United States.     

Prioritizing Rights in the Social Justice Curriculum

The biggest problem facing schools having social justice curricula, beyond implementation of a programme, I claim, is the problem of justification: what grounds what in social justice and how do we make this manifest to ourselves and to the curricula? If we cannot address this, then social justice curricula are doomed to begging the question. I claim that a ranking of human rights is not only necessary to adjudicate competing claims for social justice and at the same time, thwart interference with already agreed-upon human rights: it is necessary for any curriculum of social justice for schools. That is to say, curricular programs of social justice cannot justify social practices that interfere with human rights, nor can they teach otherwise than this. Due attention to the violation of human rights is necessary, I shall argue, and must be central in the discussion of education for social justice.     

International Justice,Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Justice and Jobs: Three Sceptical Thoughts about Rights in Employment

ABSTRACT Are there specific moral rights connected with employment? Three putative rights are considered: The right to work, the right of the most competent to be chosen, and the right to equal pay for work of equal value. It is very commonly assumed that we enjoy one or another of these rights. This paper argues that none of these rights exists. After all, what would it be to infringe someone's right to work? And is not employment sometimes in someone's gift? Again, if two people are doing work of equal value, and the contract terms are both generous and individually acceptable to the parties, why need these terms be the same?     

Self-determination Versus the Determination of Self: A Critical Reading of the Colonial Ethics Inherent to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

The United Nations' (UN) adoption of a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is intended to mark a fundamental ethical turn in the relationships between indigenous peoples and the community of sovereign states. This moment is the result of decades of discussion and negotiation, largely revolving around states' discomfort with notion of indigenous self-determination. Member states of the UN have feared that an ethic of indigenous self-determination would undermine the principles of state sovereignty on which the UN is itself grounded. However, such fears are the result of very poor understandings of the ethical principles under which the relations between indigenous peoples and nation-states already have been formed under centuries of European colonialism. The principle of self-determination embraced in this Declaration does not diverge from colonial norms; it entrenches these norms as international policy. Without doubt, indigenous peoples are more likely to benefit than suffer from states' observance of the Articles within this Declaration. Reducing the challenge of indigenous peoples' rights to the notion of self-determination set out in this document, though, misses an extraordinarily important opportunity to critically investigate the ethic of rights that has produced an opposition between nation-states and indigenous peoples to begin with. A true turn in the ethics of this relationship would see not simply the institution of a right to self-determination but, rather, indigenous peoples' right to first determine the nature of self for themselves.     

Sacrifice and Suffering: Beyond Justice, Human Rights, and Capitalism

This essay recovers the redemptive significance of "sacrifice" as the form of Christian resistance to global capitalism. The argument unfolds by way of a comparison of sacrifice, as presented by Anselm, with one of the most compelling contemporary theological accounts of justice and human rights—that of the Latin American liberationists. After showing how the liberationists' vision is implicated in the capitalist order, I argue that Anselm's account of sacrifice displays the advent of the aneconomic order of divine charity and that it is only the recovery of life in this aneconomic mode of donation and gift that can deliver us from capitalism.     

IUPsyS — United Nations Activities

On November 11, 1997, in Paris, The General Conference of UNESCO adopted the first international recommendation concerning university and college professors. This is an important event, since the only other document that concerns teachers, i.e. those of the primary and secondary levels, was adopted in 1966 by UNESCO and IWO. This recommendation considers the rights and responsibilities of those involved in teaching and research. The concepts of academic freedom, institutional autonomy and tenure are presented and defined; they are recognized as being part of the definition of the working conditions of higher-education teaching personnel. Although not restrictive, this recommendation supplies a general framework to universities and research centers. In view of its importance, you will find in the next paragraphs the unabridged version of this recommendation.     

Preventive Wars, Just War Principles, and the United Nations

This paper explores the question of whether the United Nations should engage in preventive military actions. Correlatively, it asks whether UN preventive military actions could satisfy just war principles. Rather than from the standpoint of the individual nation state, the ethics of preventive war is discussed from the standpoint of the UN. For the sake of brevity, only the legitimate authority, just cause, last resort, and proportionality principles are considered. Since there has been disagreement about the specific content of these principles, a third question also is explored: How should they be formulated? Moreover, these questions are addressed in the context of a particular issue: the goals of the non-proliferation and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.