论构成的主体性与意动的主体性

先验主体性与客体性尽管在概念上相互对峙,但作为人类经验与实践的出发点,它们在运作上却从一开始就是浑然一体的。构成主体性是让在时空中对象化了的客体呈现在主体面前并获得意义的意向结构,意动主体性却是让主体获得目的性并将目的在与客体的相互作用中对象化的意向结构。在构成主体性和意动主体性之间的互动中协辩理性的介入,是使规范伦理学有可能在交互主体性的平台上展开的先决条件。     

Subjectivity in Issue Polarization

SYMLOG, a method and theory of group observation and analysis developed by Bales, is applied to the examination of issue polarization. Using a "phantom other" technique, the locations in SYMLOG's three-space of values for polar stands on ten controversial issues were measured. There was a high rate of agreement on these locations despite great diversity of opinion on the issues themselves. Subjectivity in locations is explained by Lewin's theory of vectors of attraction and repulsion. Individuals tend to draw toward their global favored (PRO) locations those stands with which they agree. For example, one who opposes abortion on demand will draw toward his or her PRO location the image of "opposes abortion on demand." Subjectivity in issue polarization seems to be organized around attraction to and repulsion from the PRO location without regard to the individual's global opposed (CON) location.     

The Subjectivity of Certainty and the Subjectivity of Uncertainty

Based on the acknowledgment of what I have designated as cracks in our theoretical models, I have advanced some hypotheses that account for the constitution of social, familial, and individual subjectivity. I have attributed great significance to the concept of the unforeseeable. The unforeseeable is tied to uncertainty, which is related in turn to the flow of interpersonal relations. I have also discussed new forms of suffering that stem from conditions imposed by the social context, in this case, the expulsion from one's territory. I chose this phenomenon because of the importance I attach both to the feeling of social belonging and to subjects' need to create stable places in a world in constant flux. Some clinical vignettes illustrated these reflections.     

Subjectivity in Descartes and Kant

Kant's response to Cartesian scepticism is often characterized in the following way. Whereas Descartes drives a wedge between subjective experience and objective reality, Kant argues that there could be no such thing as experience at all if reality were not itself structured in just the way our thought about it is structured. This picture of Kant's response to Descartes portrays him as succeeding, where Descartes fails, in arguing directly from the nature of experience to the nature of reality; as subscribing, therefore, to Descartes' view that one is immediately aware only of one's own mental states, but as seeing a way out of the subjective predicament. I maintain that this picture is deeply flawed. Kant's transcendental argument is in fact a thoroughgoing critique of Descartes' subjectivism, and destroys the Cartesian barrier to recognizing that our awareness of reality is unmediated and direct.     

Subjectivity and symbolization

The aim of this paper has been to demonstrate that the emergence of subjectivity as a central concept in psychoanalysis is both consistent with and intertwined with the emergence of a new great generative idea (Langer, 1942), now in its nascent stage. Langer's (1942) thesis that symbolization and the power of symbols provide the basis for the fundamental assumptions of the new great generative idea was presented in condensed form. Langer's work was then integrated with that of contemporary psychoanalytic theoretical writers, which tends to support Langer's thesis. Freud's discoveries were revolutionary insofar as they resulted in the posing of new kinds of questions that have to do with symbols and their meanings. To that extent the birth of psychoanalysis itself appears as one manifestation of the emerging new generative idea. The issue of subjectivity was examined from the specific vantage point of recent conceptualizations of self and self-experience. Symbolization, it was shown, is a crucial factor in both self-experience and conceptualizations of self. Finally, it was suggested by the author that some of the existing baffling problems concerning subjectivity, the concept of self, and self-experience may disappear in the context of the new great generative idea, based on fundamental assumptions about the power of symbols.     

Subjectivity and environmentalism

The main thesis of this paper is that the most cogent demands of subjectivity, at least with respect to questions concerning the contents of our thoughts, can be accommodated within an objectivist framework. I begin with two theses: (1) Subjectivity: I can know (the contents of) my own thoughts without appeal to any knowledge of features external to my mind; (2) Environmentalism: (The contents of) my thoughts are determined by features external to my mind, at least in this sense: without causal and/or social interaction between my internal states and various external features, these internal states would not have the particular contents they have and therefore would not be the mental states they are. Section I proceeds by elucidating various lines of environmentalism, an overtly objectivist thesis. Section II considers and refutes one purported environmentalist challenge to subjectivity, namely, that, according to it, thoughts are not in the head. Section III discusses a central subjectivist thesis, namely, thoughts do not admit of an appearance/reality distinction. Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, two environmentalists, seem to endorse such a distinction. It is argued that the two most reasonable routes of escape open to them require a retreat from environmentalism. This leaves us with an apparent dilemma: reject either subjectivity or environmentalism Section IV defends environmentalism. Section V considers and criticizes a maneuver Donald Davidson makes to preserve first‐person authority over thought‐contents. Section VI concludes with a brief defense of environmentalism which rests largely on rejecting a deeply entrenched epistemic model about how we access our own thoughts. It is argued that it is this bad epistemic model and not subjectivity per se, which has created whatever tension there appears to be between subjectivity and environmentalism.     

Subjectivity and unconsciousness

Concepts of the unconscious were crucial to both Jung's and Freud's thinking. Psychoanalytic and analytical psychological views of the unconscious are compared and contrasted, and both are critically reviewed. It is suggested that we need to revise our conceptualization so as to take better account of the role of the analyst's expectations and inferences, and therefore of his or her subjectivity, whenever he or she makes a clinical judgement that unconscious mental processes are in operation. Some technical implications of a revised definition of unconsciousness are considered, especially indications for self-disclosure by an analyst of his or her own experience of events within the treatment.     

主体性与西方文化

一西方哲学家对于何谓主体性或自我有各种不同的解释 ,大致有下列几种 :(1 )笛卡尔、康德等人认为 ,主体的认知能力是恒久不变的、超历史的 ,并且所有的人都一样 ,“人同此心 ,心同此理。”当代康德主义者亨利希(ＤｉｅｔｅｒＨｅｎｒｉｃｈ)在其著作《理性统一性》(ＴｈｅＵｎｉｔｙｏｆＲｅａｓｏｎ ,1 944)中持这种观点。(2 )人心不是指心理状态或过程 ,而是人的信念、知识、决策和行动。因而“人心”是由社会、文化、民族、语言、风俗、习惯等等产生的 ,人的信念和行动决定于当时当地的具体情况。这是当代大多数哲学家的看法。(3 ) 2 0…     

Humanistic Constructionism in the Analysis of Subjectivity

A sociologist who has to confront him/herself with social change cannot avoid running into subjectivity, which is seen as a clear indicator of the most recent tendencies that are going through contemporary society. The demand for subjectivity, generically considered as self-consciousness and the need for self-fulfilment, is undoubtedly a distinguishing feature of our age. The central role this concept has gained within recent sociological literature, however, coincides with the rise of a postmodern sociology, which tends to put forward a precise image of subjectivity that I would call “minimalist.” Through its call for subjectivity, postmodern sociology intends to celebrate indeed a radical freeing from the ethical, social, and relational constraints that would have oppressed human beings during modernity, which was characterized by a high degree of sociocentrism. Although I share all the contentions that aim at underlining the positive achievements of subjectivity over the constrictions and the de-personalizing forces that distressed the so-called homo sociologicus, I think we need nonetheless to distance ourselves from this new reductionism, which levels out subjectivity to its postmodern conception, and to underline instead the existence of a dual aspect in contemporary subjectivity. As a matter of fact, along with its minimalist and disengaged aspect, conceptualized in the homo psychologicus, another possible expression, called “significant subjectivity” is emerging, which is a typical feature of the kind of human I propose to define civicus, a human who distinguishes him/herself because of the ability to become the bearer of an authentic form of responsible freedom. Consequently, we can identify two different aspects, at least, in contemporary subjectivity, notably a minimalist and a significant aspect.