Effects of cage mesh on pointing: hand shapes in chimpanzees (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>)

It has been speculated that cage mesh exerts a shaping influence on reaching behavior by captive apes, which is then misconstrued as pointing by human observers. Although this notion is clearly falsified by the pointing of captive language-trained apes—who point in the absence of intervening cage mesh—nevertheless, the degree to which cage mesh might influence pointing hand shapes by captive great apes in other housing environments remains relatively unexplored. We examined 259 pointing gestures displayed in archival footage from over 18 h of observation by three nonlanguage-trained chimpanzees housed at a biomedical research center. We coded points in relation to how close to the boundaries of the diamond-shaped cage mesh their points were displayed. We found that points with the whole hand were significantly more likely to be displayed away from the mesh boundaries, relative to points with the index finger or other single-digit points. However, points of each hand shape were displayed at each location, demonstrating that these physical parameters do not fully account for the number of fingers extended while pointing by chimpanzees.     

Olive baboons communicate intentionally by pointing

A pointing gesture creates a referential triangle that incorporates distant objects into the relationship between the signaller and the gesture’s recipient. Pointing was long assumed to be specific to our species. However, recent reports have shown that pointing emerges spontaneously in captive chimpanzees and can be learned by monkeys. Studies have demonstrated that both human children and great apes use manual gestures (e.g. pointing), and visual and vocal signals, to communicate intentionally about out-of-reach objects. Our study looked at how monkeys understand and use their learned pointing behaviour, asking whether it is a conditioned, reinforcement-dependent response or whether monkeys understand it to be a mechanism for manipulating the attention of a partner (e.g. a human). We tested nine baboons that had been trained to exhibit pointing, using operant conditioning. More specifically, we investigated their ability to communicate intentionally about the location of an unreachable food reward in three contexts that differed according to the human partner’s attentional state. In each context, we quantified the frequency of communicative behaviour (auditory and visual signals), including gestures and gaze alternations between the distal food and the human partner. We found that the baboons were able to modulate their manual and visual communicative signals as a function of the experimenter’s attentional state. These findings indicate that monkeys can intentionally produce pointing gestures and understand that a human recipient must be looking at the pointing gesture for them to perform their attention-directing actions. The referential and intentional nature of baboons’ communicative signalling is discussed.     

The Preference for Pointing With the Hand Is Not Universal

Pointing is a cornerstone of human communication, but does it take the same form in all cultures? Manual pointing with the index finger appears to be used universally, and it is often assumed to be universally preferred over other forms. Non‐manual pointing with the head and face has also been widely attested, but it is usually considered of marginal significance, both empirically and theoretically. Here, we challenge this assumed marginality. Using a novel communication task, we investigated pointing preferences in the Yupno of Papua New Guinea and in U.S. undergraduates. Speakers in both groups pointed at similar rates, but form preferences differed starkly: The Yupno participants used non‐manual pointing (nose‐ and head‐pointing) numerically more often than manual pointing, whereas the U.S. participants stuck unwaveringly to index‐finger pointing. The findings raise questions about why groups differ in their pointing preferences and, more broadly, about why humans communicate in the ways they do.     

婴儿指示性手势与其语言学习的关系

指示性手势是指明空间中某个物体、处所或事件的手部动作,在婴儿1岁时出现,与婴儿的语言学习存在着较强的相关,然而目前尚不清楚为什么会存在此相关。可能存在两种内在机制:(1)指示性手势影响婴儿的学习环境——引发了适时的语言输入;(2)影响学习者本身——帮助婴儿创造有效的学习状态并示意给他人。未来的研究需要探讨这两种机制如何交互作用,以及如何将指示性手势作为诊断或干预工具,用于识别和帮助有语言障碍风险的个体。     

Gaze alternation during “pointing” by squirrel monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Saimiri sciureus</Emphasis>)?

Gaze alternation (GA) is considered a hallmark of pointing in human infants, a sign of intentionality underlying the gesture. GA has occasionally been observed in great apes, and reported only anecdotally in a few monkeys. Three squirrel monkeys that had previously learned to reach toward out-of-reach food in the presence of a human partner were videotaped while the latter visually attended to the food, a distractor object, or the ceiling. Frame-by-frame video analysis revealed that, especially when reaching toward the food, the monkeys rapidly and repeatedly switched between looking at the partner’s face and the food. This type of GA suggests that the monkeys were communicating with the partner. However, the monkeys’ behavior was not influenced by changes in the partner’s focus of attention.     

What is special about the index finger?: The index finger advantage in manipulating reflexive attentional shift1

Pointing with the index finger is a universal behavior. However, the functional significance of indexical pointing has not been examined empirically. We examined the efficacy of various pointing gestures in evoking viewer's attentional shifts. After viewing the gesture cue, observers quickly reported the location of a visual target. With a short cue‐target delay, reaction times were generally shorter for the target at the location where gesture cues pointed, but not with a long cue‐target delay. Moreover, the indexical pointing gesture produced a significantly larger cueing effect than the other gestures. Our control experiments indicated that the index‐finger advantage is tightly linked to the proper morphological shape (i.e. length and position of the index finger) of the indexical pointing and is not explained by the directional discriminability of the gesture. The visual system seems to use mechanisms that are partially independent of the directional discrimination of gestures, in order to quickly modulate the viewer's attention.     

Understanding the Point of Chimpanzee Pointing: Epigenesis and Ecological Validity

Abstract— Pointing has long been considered to be a uniquely human, universal, and biologically based gesture. However, pointing emerges spontaneously, without explicit training, in captive chimpanzees. Because pointing is commonplace in captive chimpanzees and virtually absent in wild chimpanzees, and because both captive and wild chimpanzees are sampled from the same gene pool, pointing by captive apes is attributable to environmental influences on communicative development. If pointing by captive chimpanzees is so variably expressed in different rearing environments, this suggests that pointing by humans may also be attributable to situational factors that make pointing effective in certain developmental contexts.     

Origins of the human pointing gesture: a training study

Despite its importance in the development of children’s skills of social cognition and communication, very little is known about the ontogenetic origins of the pointing gesture. We report a training study in which mothers gave children one month of extra daily experience with pointing as compared with a control group who had extra experience with musical activities. One hundred and two infants of 9, 10, or 11 months of age were seen at the beginning, middle, and end of this one‐month period and tested for declarative pointing and gaze following. Infants’ability to point with the index finger at the end of the study was not affected by the training but was instead predicted by infants’ prior ability to follow the gaze direction of an adult. The frequency with which infants pointed indexically was also affected by infant gaze following ability and, in addition, by maternal pointing frequency in free play, but not by training. In contrast, infants’ ability to monitor their partner’s gaze when pointing, and the frequency with which they did so, was affected by both training and maternal pointing frequency in free play. These results suggest that prior social cognitive advances, rather than adult socialization of pointing per se, determine the developmental onset of indexical pointing, but socialization processes such as imitation and adult shaping subsequently affect both infants’ ability to monitor their interlocutor’s gaze while they point and how frequently infants choose to point.     

Strategies used to combine seriated cups by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and capuchins (Cebus apella).

The authors investigated strategies used to combine seriated cups by apes (Pan troglodytes and P. paniscus) and monkeys (Cebus apella) using a protocol reported in P. M. Greenfield, K. Nelson, and E. Saltzman's (1972) study with children. It was hypothesized that apes would exhibit more hierarchical combinations of cups than monkeys, given apes' language capacity, and that apes would seriate the cups more efficiently than monkeys. As predicted, apes made many structures with the cups using a variety of strategies, and monkeys rarely combined the cups. After a training phase to orient monkeys to the task, the 2 genera did not differ in the strategies used to combine the cups or in efficiency in seriating the cups. Success in this task suggests that sensorimotor versions of hierarchically organized combinatorial activity are well within apes' and monkeys' abilities.     

Comprehension of signs by dolphins (Tursiops truncatus)

The authors assessed the ability of 6 captive dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) to comprehend without explicit training 3 human communicative signs (pointing, directed gaze, and replica). Pointing consisted of indicating the target item with the index finger and a fully extended arm. Directed gaze consisted of orienting the head and eyes toward the target item while the rest of the body remained stationary. The replica signal consisted of holding up an exact duplicate of the target item. On the initial series of 12 trials for each condition, 3 dolphins performed above chance on pointing, 2 on gaze, and none for replica. With additional trials, above chance performance increased to 4 dolphins for pointing, 6 for gazing, and 2 for replica. The replica sign seemed to be the most taxing for them (only 2 dolphins achieved results significantly above chance). Taken together, these results indicate that dolphins are able to interpret untrained communicative signs successfully.     

Capuchin monkeys’ use of human and conspecific cues to solve a hidden object-choice task

Learning by watching others can provide valuable information with adaptive consequences, such as identifying the presence of a predator or locating a food source. The extent to which nonhuman animals can gain information by reading the cues of others is often tested by evaluating responses to human gestures, such as a point, and less often evaluated by examining responses to conspecific cues. We tested whether ten brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella) were able to use cues from monkeys and a pointing cue from a human to obtain hidden rewards. A monkey could gain access to a reward hidden in one of two locations by reading a cue from a conspecific (e.g., reaching) or a human pointing. We then tested whether they could transfer this skill from monkeys to humans, from humans to monkeys, and from one conspecific to another conspecific. One group of monkeys was trained and tested using a conspecific as the cue-giver and was then tested with a human cue-giver. The second group of monkeys was trained and tested with a human cue-giver and was then tested with a monkey cue-giver. Monkeys that were successful with a conspecific cue-giver were also tested with a novel conspecific cue-giver. Monkeys learned to use a human point and conspecific cues to obtain rewards. Monkeys that had learned to use the cues of a conspecific to obtain rewards performed significantly better than expected by chance when they were transferred to the cues of a novel conspecific. Monkeys that learned to use a human point to obtain rewards performed significantly better than expected by chance when tested while observing conspecific cues. Some evidence suggested that transferring between conspecific cue-givers occurred with more facility than transferring across species. Results may be explained by simple rules of association learning and stimulus generalization; however, spontaneous flexible use of gestures across conspecifics and between different species may indicate capuchins can generalize learned social cues within and partially across species.     

Asymmetries in the spatial localization of transformed targets

This study was designed to examine the contribution of the right cerebral hemisphere in the spatial localization of visual targets for manual aiming. Visual targets were briefly presented to the right and left fields and subjects were required to point either to the target location, or a "mirror" image of the target location with their right or left index finger. Whereas reaction times were faster for left-hand pointing than for right-hand pointing, there was no differential effect of the mirror image transformation. This suggests that left-hand reaction time advantages are more related to right hemisphere involvement in the spatial parameterization of the movement than spatial localization of the target.     

Dynamic pointing triggers shifts of visual attention in young infants

Pointing, like eye gaze, is a deictic gesture that can be used to orient the attention of another person towards an object or an event. Previous research suggests that infants first begin to follow a pointing gesture between 10 and 13 months of age. We investigated whether sensitivity to pointing could be seen at younger ages employing a technique recently used to show early sensitivity to perceived eye gaze. Three experiments were conducted with 4.5- and 6.5-month-old infants. Our first goal was to examine whether these infants could show a systematic response to pointing by shifting their visual attention in the direction of a pointing gesture when we eliminated the difficulty of disengaging fixation from a pointing hand. The results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that a dynamic, but not a static, pointing gesture triggers shifts of visual attention in infants as young as 4.5 months of age. Our second goal was to clarify whether this response was based on sensitivity to the directional posture of the pointing hand, the motion of the pointing hand, or both. The results from Experiment 3 suggest that the direction of motion is necessary but not sufficient to orient infants' attention toward a distal target. Infants shifted their attention in the direction of the pointing finger, but only when the hand was moving in the same direction. These results suggest that infants are prepared to orient to the distal referent of a pointing gesture which likely contributes to their learning the communicative function of pointing.     

Pointing At Smaller Food Amounts In An Analogue Of Boysen And Berntson's (1995) Procedure

Boysen and Berntson (1995) showed that apes could not learn to point to a small amount of candy in order to get a larger amount when pointing to the larger amount was reinforced by receipt of the alternate, smaller amount. They explained this result as an unlearned predisposition to reach for higher value foods that overrides the effects of reinforcement. This report tests their thesis. In the first condition, 3 monkeys chose between one raisin held in one hand by the experimenter and four raisins held in the other hand. If a monkey pointed at four raisins, it received one. If it pointed at one, it received four. Over ten 20-trial sessions, no monkey learned to point at the one-raisin alternative, a result similar to that of Boysen and Berntson. In the second condition, pointing at one raisin still produced four; however, pointing at four raisins now produced no reinforcement. In five 20-trial sessions, all monkeys learned to point at one raisin in order to get four. This finding demonstrates that at least in monkeys there is no predisposition to reach for higher value foods that cannot be readily overridden by reinforcement contingencies, and casts doubt on Boysen and Berntson's claim to have demonstrated such a process in apes.     

A comparative approach to dogs’ (Canis familiaris) and human infants’ comprehension of various forms of pointing gestures

We investigated whether dogs and 2-, and 3-year-old human infants living, in some respects, in very similar social environments are able to comprehend various forms of the human pointing gesture. In the first study, we looked at their ability to comprehend different arm pointing gestures (long cross-pointing, forward cross-pointing and elbow cross-pointing) to locate a hidden object. Three-year-olds successfully used all gestures as directional cues, while younger children and dogs could not understand the elbow cross-pointing. Dogs were also unsuccessful with the forward cross-pointing. In the second study, we used unfamiliar pointing gestures i.e. using a leg as indicator (pointing with leg, leg cross-pointing, pointing with knee). All subjects were successful with leg pointing gestures, but only older children were able to comprehend the pointing with knee. We suggest that 3-year-old children are able to rely on the direction of the index finger, and show the strongest ability to generalize to unfamiliar gestures. Although some capacity to generalize is also evident in younger children and dogs, especially the latter appear biased in the use of protruding body parts as directional signals.     

Effects of gesture and target on 12- and 18-month-olds' joint visual attention to objects in front of or behind them

Factors affecting joint visual attention in 12- and 18-month-olds were investigated. In Experiment 1 infants responded to 1 of 3 parental gestures: looking, looking and pointing, or looking, pointing, and verbalizing. Target objects were either identical to or distinctive from distractor objects. Targets were in front of or behind the infant to test G. E. Butterworth's (1991b) hypothesis that 12-month-olds do not follow gaze to objects behind them. Pointing elicited more episodes of joint visual attention than looking alone. Distinctive targets elicited more episodes of joint visual attention than identical targets. Although infants most reliably followed gestures to targets in front of them, even 12-month-olds followed gestures to targets behind them. In Experiment 2 parents were rotated so that the magnitude of their head turns to fixate front and back targets was equivalent. Infants looked more at front than at back targets, but there was also an effect of magnitude of head turn. Infants' relative neglect of back targets is partly due to the "size" of adult's gesture.     

Development of precision grips in chimpanzees

Although chimpanzees generally grasp small objects imprecisely between the knuckle joint of the index finger and thumb, they are capable of a true precision grip, which resembles the human pincer grip. They also grip small objects between the index and middle finger. The development of these precision grips takes place over several years into adulthood and they are not frequent before 8 years of age. Precision grips and imprecise grips are equally likely to be selected for objects of small size. Thus, not only is precise prehension relatively delayed in chimpanzees but also there is lack of consistency in selecting the distal parts of the index finger for thumb opposition. This is a qualitatively different developmental pattern than occurs in human infants who systematically select precision grips for small objects by 15 months.     

Dogs' (Canis familiaris) responsiveness to human pointing gestures

In a series of 3 experiments, dogs (Canis familiaris) were presented with variations of the human pointing gesture: gestures with reversed direction of movement, cross-pointing, and different arm extensions. Dogs performed at above chance level if they could see the hand (and index finger) protruding from the human body contour. If these minimum requirements were not accessible, dogs still could rely on the body position of the signaler. The direction of movement of the pointing arm did not influence the performance. In summary, these observations suggest that dogs are able to rely on relatively novel gestural forms of the human communicative pointing gesture and that they are able to comprehend to some extent the referential nature of human pointing.     

A prelinguistic gestural universal of human communication

Several cognitive accounts of human communication argue for a language-independent, prelinguistic basis of human communication and language. The current study provides evidence for the universality of a prelinguistic gestural basis for human communication. We used a standardized, semi-natural elicitation procedure in seven very different cultures around the world to test for the existence of preverbal pointing in infants and their caregivers. Results were that by 10-14 months of age, infants and their caregivers pointed in all cultures in the same basic situation with similar frequencies and the same proto-typical morphology of the extended index finger. Infants' pointing was best predicted by age and caregiver pointing, but not by cultural group. Further analyses revealed a strong relation between the temporal unfolding of caregivers' and infants' pointing events, uncovering a structure of early prelinguistic gestural conversation. Findings support the existence of a gestural, language-independent universal of human communication that forms a culturally shared, prelinguistic basis for diversified linguistic communication.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.