Children's essentialist reasoning about language and race

Across four studies, we directly compared children's essentialist reasoning about the stability of race and language throughout an individual's lifespan. Monolingual English-speaking children were presented with a series of images of children who were either White or Black; each face was paired with a voice clip in either English or French. Participants were asked which of two adults each target child would grow up to be - one who was a 'match' to the target child in race but not language, and the other a 'match' in language but not race. Nine- to 10-year-old European American children chose the race-match, rather than the language-match. In contrast, 5-6-year-old European American children in both urban, racially diverse, and rural, racially homogeneous environments chose the language-match, even though this necessarily meant that the target child would transform racial categories. Although surprising in light of adult reasoning, these young children demonstrated an intuition about the relative stability of an individual's language compared to her racial group membership. Yet, 5-6-year-old African American children, similar to the older European American children, chose the race-match, suggesting that membership in a racial minority group may highlight children's reasoning about race as a stable category. Theoretical implications for our understanding of children's categorization of human kinds are discussed.     

Children's reasoning about the causes of human behavior

Three studies examined young children's ability to predict how certain internal and external conditions affect behavior. Study 1 included 136 children from early preschool, late preschool, kindergarten, and second grade. A forced choice procedure revealed that even the youngest group could predict the effect of various internal-personal causes (e.g., interest, intelligence) and external-situational causes (e.g., rewards, adult pressure). Older preschoolers and second graders considered these internal causes more powerful than these external causes. With the same procedure, in Study 2 the 16 preschoolers predicted that both physical characteristics (e.g., strength, energy level) and the internal-personal characteristics of Study 1 affect performance in athletic activities. In addition, they considered the physical causes more important. Study 3 examined more complex types of causal reasoning. Younger preschoolers responded randomly but older preschoolers combined two causes to create a greater effect than one cause and used an external cause to enhance, rather than discount, an internal cause. The discussion focused on the cognitive development underlying developmental differences in the ability to predict behavior on the basis of one or two causes.     

Children's reasoning about physics within and across ontological kinds

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds.     

Children's patterns of reasoning about reading and addition concepts

Children's reasoning was examined within two educational contexts (word reading and addition) so as to understand the factors that contribute to relational reasoning in the two domains. Sixty‐seven 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds were given a series of related words to read or single‐digit addition items to solve (interspersed with unrelated items). The frequency, accuracy, and response times of children's self‐reports on the conceptually related items provided a measure of relational reasoning, while performance on the unrelated addition and reading items provided a measure of procedural skill. The results indicated that the children's ability to use conceptual relations to solve both reading and addition problems enhanced speed and accuracy levels, increased with age, and was related to procedural skill. However, regression analyses revealed that domain‐specific competencies can best explain the use of conceptual relations in both reading and addition. Moreover, a cluster analysis revealed that children differ according to the academic domain in which they first apply conceptual relations and these differences are related to individual variation in their procedural skills within these particular domains. These results highlight the developmental significance of relational reasoning in the context of reading and addition and underscore the importance of concept‐procedure links in explaining children's literacy and arithmetical development.     

Children's syllogistic reasoning

Most theories of the development of deductive ability propose that children acquire formal rules of inference. An alternative theory assumes that reasoning consists of constructing a mental model of the situation described in the premises, scanning the model for an informative conclusion, and then searching for alternative models that refute this conclusion. Hence, performance should reflect two principal factors: the difficulty of constructing a model, which depends on the “figure” of the premises, and the number of models that have to be evaluated to respond correctly. In Experiment 1, two groups of children (9- to 10- and 11- to 12-year-olds) drew conclusions from 20 pairs of syllogistic premises. The results confirmed that children are affected both by figure and by number of models. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings for all 64 possible forms of syllogistic premises. The development of reasoning ability may therefore depend on the acquisition, not of formal rules of logic, but of procedures for manipulating models.     

Children's reasoning about the temporal order of past and future events

Four- and five-year-olds completed two sets of tasks that involved reasoning about the temporal order in which events had occurred in the past or were to occur in the future. Four-year-olds succeeded on the tasks that involved reasoning about the order of past events but not those that involved reasoning about the order of future events, whereas 5-year-olds passed both types of tasks. Individual children who failed the past-event tasks were not particularly likely to fail the more difficult future-event tasks. However, children's performance on the reasoning tasks was predictive of their performance on a task assessing their comprehension of the terms “before” and “after.” Our results suggest that there may be a developmental change over this age range in the ability to flexibly represent and reason about the before-and-after relationships between events.     

Children's reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events

Four experiments examined children's ability to reason about the causal significance of the order in which 2 events occurred (the pressing of buttons on a mechanically operated box). In Study 1, 4-year-olds were unable to make the relevant inferences, whereas 5-year-olds were successful on one version of the task. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were successful on a simplified version of the task in which they were able to observe the events although not their consequences. Study 3 found that older children had difficulties with the original task even when provided with cues to attend to order information. However, 5-year-olds performed successfully in Study 4, in which the causally relevant event was made more salient.     

Sex differences in reactions to evaluative feedback

Two studies tested the influence of various types of verbal evaluative feedback men's and women's self-evaluations of their performance in achievenment situations. We tested a theory that women perceive evaluative feedback, particularly negative feedback, to be more informative about their abilities than do men. Because of this, women's self-assessments of their abilities are more straightforwardly influenced by evaluative feedback than are men's. In contrast, men take a more self-promotional approach to evaluative situations, and therefore are more selective in their responses to feedback. Results from our questionnaire study showed that women's self-evaluations were influenced by both positive and negative evaluative statements. Men allowed positive feedback to influence them more than negative feedback, and were less influenced overall by negative feedback than women. Furthermore, women reported that evaluative feedback, particularly negative feedback, contained more information relevant to their abilities than men. Our laboratory study showed that women's actual self-evaluations were impacted differently by positive and negative feedback, whereas men's were not. In addition, we found some evidence to indicate that women were more negatively influenced by feedback that was positively toned, yet irrelevant with respect to their performance, than men. This finding underscores the fact that the focus, and not just the valence, of evaluative feedback plays an important role in men's and women's responses to it.     

Children's reasoning about spatial relational similarity: the effect of alignment and relational complexity

We investigated 4- and 5-year-old children's mapping strategies in a spatial task. Children were required to find a picture in an array of three identical cups after observing another picture being hidden in another array of three cups. The arrays were either aligned one behind the other in two rows or placed side by side forming one line. Moreover, children were rewarded for two different mapping strategies. Half of the children needed to choose a cup that held the same relative position as the rewarded cup in the other array; they needed to map left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups together (aligned mapping), which required encoding and mapping of two relations (e.g., the cup left of the middle cup and left of the right cup). The other half needed to map together the cups that held the same relation to the table's spatial features-the cups at the edges, the middle cups, and the cups in the middle of the table (landmark mapping)-which required encoding and mapping of one relation (e.g., the cup at the table's edge). Results showed that children's success was constellation dependent; performance was higher when the arrays were aligned one behind the other in two rows than when they were placed side by side. Furthermore, children showed a preference for landmark mapping over aligned mapping.     

The interplay between counterfactual reasoning and feedback dynamics in producing inferences about the self

Counterfactual reasoning research typically demonstrates contrast effects—nearly winning evokes frustration, whereas nearly losing evokes exhilaration. The present work, however, describes conditions under which assimilative responses (i.e., when judgements are pulled towards a comparison standard) also occur. Participants solved analogies and learned that they had either nearly attained a target score or nearly failed to attain it. Participants in the no trajectory condition received this feedback in the absence of any prior feedback, whereas those in the trajectory condition received feedback after having received prior feedback conforming to either an ascending or descending pattern. Participants then provided perceptions of their verbal intelligence. Assimilation effects were observed in the trajectory conditions but attenuated in the no trajectory conditions. Discussion focuses on the role of feedback dynamics in determining responses to close-call counterfactuals.     

Children's reasoning about responses to peer aggression: Victim's and witness's expected and prescribed behaviors

This research examined children's reasoning about expected (i.e., what a peer would do) and prescribed (i.e., what a peer should do) responses to unprovoked, intentional aggressive actions in two contexts: as a victim of such a transgression and as a witness to the incident. Physical harm and property damage items were used in a structured interview format. There were 90 subjects drawn from three elementary school grades (2nd, 4th, and 6th). Children differentiated between the expected and prescribed responses of peers and significant developmental differences in children's evaluations were found. Although the majority of the subjects in all grades denounced retaliation on the basis of concerns about others' welfare, older children stated that peers were likely to retaliate against the perpetrator nonetheless. Across different contexts, older children's responses appeared to reveal a greater independence from authority in negotiating peer interactions. In evaluating the witness's responses to aggressive acts, younger children's expected and prescribed responses were less disparate than that of the older children. The utility of including different vantage points of the child in examining children's social reasoning about aggression and the application of the present findings to social information-processing models are discussed. © 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Children's,adolescents’, and adults’ judgments and reasoning about different methods of teaching values

This study investigated children's, adolescents’, and young adults’ judgments and reasoning about teaching two values (racial equality and patriotism) using methods that varied in provision for children's rational autonomy, active involvement, and choice. Ninety-six participants (7–8-, 10–11-, and 13–14-year-olds, and college students) evaluated four methods of teaching values in schools (Inculcation, Direct Teaching, Behavioral, and Discussion) for agents of two ages (3rd and 8th grade students), and in two contexts (student- vs. teacher-implemented methods). Older participants were more likely than younger participants (7–8-year-olds) to distinguish value education methods that stimulated children's rational thought processes and active involvement, and to coordinate factors such as the age of agents and the context of implementation in their judgments and reasoning.     

Children's reasoning about the self‐presentational consequences of apologies and excuses following rule violations

The accounts given by those who have violated a rule are likely to have important self‐presentational consequences, potentially reducing the negative impact of the breach on social evaluations of transgressors. However, little is known about young children's self‐presentational reasoning about such accounts. In the present study, a sample of 120 4‐ to 9‐year‐olds responded to rule violation stories where the transgressor uses either an apology, an excuse, or no account. Results showed that whereas children rated both account types similarly in terms of their impact on punishment consequences, even the youngest saw apologies as leading to significantly more positive social evaluation than excuses. Correspondingly, children were more likely to identify prosocial motives for apologies than for excuses, and more likely to identify self‐protective motives for excuses than for apologies. Explicit references to self‐presentational motives when explaining the accounts increased significantly with age, and were more likely following social‐conventional rather than moral rule violations.     

Common reasoning about admissibility

We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common reasoning about admissibility does not depend on how the strategic situation is represented. We further explore the links between iterated admissibility and backward and forward induction.     

Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts

We report two studies that demonstrate how five‐ and seven‐year‐olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more ‘two‐sided’ arguments. Also, seven‐year‐olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments.

Statement of contribution

What is already known on this subject ?

• Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions.
• Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations.
• By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals).

What the present study adds?

• Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production.
• Seven‐year‐olds are more strategic than five‐year‐olds in their reasoning with peers.
• Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.

     

Upsetting others and provoking ridicule: Children's reasoning about the self‐presentational consequences of rule violation

This study examined children's understanding of the distinctive ‘self‐presentational’ impacts of moral and social‐conventional rule violations. A sample of 80 children aged 7–8 and 9–10 years generated examples of interpersonal events that would upset others and events that would elicit social attention to the self. As expected, both age groups consistently identified moral violations as leading to the former, and deviations from social norms as leading to the latter. Crucially, when children were asked to identify the social‐evaluative consequences of those breaches, they exhibited a significant increase with age in recognizing the self‐presentational risks of social‐conventional deviations.