Choosing your informant: weighing familiarity and recent accuracy

In two experiments, children aged 3, 4 and 5 years (N= 61) were given conflicting information about the names and functions of novel objects by two informants, one a familiar teacher, the other an unfamiliar teacher. On pre‐test trials, all three age groups invested more trust in the familiar teacher. They preferred to ask for information and to endorse the information that she supplied. In a subsequent phase, children watched as the two teachers differed in the accuracy with which they named a set of familiar objects. Half the children saw the familiar teacher name the objects accurately and the unfamiliar teacher name them inaccurately. The remaining half saw the reverse arrangement. In post‐test trials, the selective trust initially displayed by 3‐year‐olds was minimally affected by this intervening experience of differential accuracy. By contrast, the selective trust of 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds was affected. If the familiar teacher had been the more accurate, selective trust in her was intensified. If, on the other hand, the familiar teacher had been the less accurate, it was undermined, particularly among 5‐year‐olds. Thus, by 4 years of age, children trust familiar informants but moderate that trust depending on the informants’ recent history of accuracy or inaccuracy.     

Preschoolers trust particular informants when learning new names and new morphological forms

Across three studies, we investigated whether 4‐year‐olds would trust a previously reliable informant when learning novel morphological forms. In Experiment 1, children (N= 16) were presented with two informants: one who correctly named familiar objects and another who named them incorrectly. Children were invited to turn to these informants when learning novel labels and morphological forms. The majority of children chose the previously correct labeller when learning novel label and morphology. In Experiment 2, children (N= 16) were presented with an informant who used familiar plurals correctly and one who used them incorrectly. Children chose the previously correct morphologist when learning novel labels and past tense forms. Thus, children track both semantic and morphological accuracy. In Experiment 3, some children (N= 16) were presented with two informants who differed in naming accuracy, whereas others (N= 16) were presented with two informants who differed in morphological accuracy. To forestall any risk of experimenter cuing, one experimenter blind to the training children had received, tested children with novel labels and morphology. The results replicated those of Experiments 1 and 2. Implications for how children's trust in an informant might play a role in their acquisition of morphological forms are discussed.     

The good, the strong, and the accurate: preschoolers' evaluations of informant attributes

Much recent evidence shows that preschoolers are sensitive to the accuracy of an informant. Faced with two informants, one of whom names familiar objects accurately and the other inaccurately, preschoolers subsequently prefer to learn the names and functions of unfamiliar objects from the more accurate informant. This study examined the inference process underlying this preference. We asked whether preschoolers make narrow inferences about informants, broader trait-based inferences, or more global evaluative inferences. We further asked what inferences preschoolers make about a potential informant based on distinctions in the unrelated domain of physical strength. The results indicate that preschoolers make relatively narrow inferences when observing individual differences in accuracy even though they are prone to global evaluative inferences when observing individual differences in strength. Preschoolers’ burgeoning understanding of others as expert language users may underlie their selective endorsement of a more accurate informant.     

The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children’s selective trust: Three meta‐analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children’s selective trust. Three meta‐analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children’s selective trust in an informant based on the informant’s epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children’s selective trust decisions. The first and second meta‐analyses found that children displayed medium‐to‐large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4‐year‐olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3‐year‐olds. The third meta‐analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3‐year‐old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta‐analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant’s testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children’s selective trust are discussed.     

Identifying unreliable informants: do children excuse past inaccuracy?

In three experiments (N = 123; 148; 28), children observed a video in which two speakers offered alternative labels for unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds endorsed the label given by a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects accurately, rather than that given by a speaker with a history of inaccurate labeling, even when the inaccurate speaker erred only while blindfolded. In Experiments 2 and 3, 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds showed no preference for the label given by a previously inaccurate but blindfolded speaker, over that given by a second inaccurate speaker with no obvious excuse for erring. Children based their endorsements on speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy irrespective of the speakers’ information access at the time, raising doubts that children made mentalistic interpretations of speakers’ inaccuracy.     

When do children trust the expert? Benevolence information influences children's trust more than expertise

How do children use informant niceness, meanness, and expertise when choosing between informant claims and crediting informants with knowledge? In Experiment 1, preschoolers met two experts providing conflicting claims for which only one had relevant expertise. Five‐year‐olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3‐year‐olds. In Experiment 2, niceness/meanness information was added. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, the children often chose the nice irrelevant expert when the relevant one was mean. In Experiment 3, a mean expert was paired with a nice non‐expert. Although this nice informant had no expertise, preschoolers continued to endorse his claims and credit him with knowledge. Also noteworthy, children in all three experiments seemed to struggle more to choose the relevant expert's claim than to credit him with knowledge. Together, these experiments demonstrate that niceness/meanness information can powerfully influence how children evaluate informants.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.     

In the absence of conflicting testimony young children trust inaccurate informants

The present research investigated the nature of the inferences and decisions young children make about informants with a prior history of inaccuracies. Across three experiments, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds (total N = 182) reacted to previously inaccurate informants who offered testimony in an object‐labeling task. Of central interest was children's willingness to accept information provided by an inaccurate informant in different contexts of being alone, paired with an accurate informant, or paired with a novel (neutral) informant. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that when a previously inaccurate informant was alone and provided testimony that was not in conflict with the testimony of another informant, children systematically accepted the testimony of that informant. Experiment 3 showed that children accepted testimony from a neutral informant over an inaccurate informant when both provided information, but accepted testimony from an inaccurate informant rather than seeking information from an available neutral informant who did not automatically offer information. These results suggest that even though young children use prior history of accuracy to determine the relative reliability of informants, they are quite willing to trust the testimony of a single informant alone, regardless of whether that informant had previously been reliable.     

Children assess informant reliability using bystanders' non-verbal cues

Recent findings show that preschool children are selective with respect to whom they ask for information and whose claims they endorse. In particular, they monitor an informant's record of past accuracy or inaccuracy and use that record to gauge future trustworthiness. We ask if preschoolers also monitor the non-verbal cues of assent or dissent that bystanders display toward an informant's claims and use that information to gauge an informant's trustworthiness. In familiarization trials, 4-year-olds watched as two adult informants made conflicting claims regarding the name of an unfamiliar object. Two adult bystanders consistently signaled assent - via nods and smiles - to the claims of one informant, and dissent - via head shakes and frowns - from the claims of the other informant. When invited to endorse one of the two claims, 4-year-olds mostly agreed with the informant who had received bystander assent. Thus, in the absence of background knowledge about an object's name, children use third-party non-verbal signals to assess the accuracy of conflicting labels. On subsequent test trials, the informants again made conflicting claims about novel object names, but in the absence of the two bystanders. Despite the lack of any informative bystander signals, children with more advanced understanding of mental states continued to display greater trust in the informant who had received bystander assent in the earlier trials.     

Labelling patterns and object naming

We examined the effects of different labelling patterns on the generalization of object names. Two‐year‐olds, three‐year‐olds and adults were shown two ‘standard’ objects, which were named with the same label, or with two different labels, or with no label at all. Participants were then asked whether objects morphed to be intermediate to the standards belonged to one of the labelled categories or, in the No Label condition, were ‘like’ one of the standards. The Same Label condition showed generalization to all intermediates, whereas the Different Label and No Label conditions showed division of the intermediates into two separate categories, with somewhat sharper division under Different Label. These results suggest two possible mechanisms of lexical learning: ‘boosting’ the equivalence of different exemplars through label identity, and ‘differentiating’ the exemplars through differences in labelling. The studies provided strong evidence for boosting. Learners are sensitive to the distribution of labels across exemplars, and they hold powerful assumptions about the relationship between these distributions and the underlying naming space. These findings have implications for the early emergence of cross‐linguistic differences in lexical learning.     

Preschoolers monitor the relative accuracy of informants

In 2 studies, the sensitivity of 3- and 4-year-olds to the previous accuracy of informants was assessed. Children viewed films in which 2 informants labeled familiar objects with differential accuracy (across the 2 experiments, children were exposed to the following rates of accuracy by the more and less accurate informants, respectively: 100% vs. 0%, 100% vs. 25%, 75% vs. 0%, and 75% vs. 25%). Next, children watched films in which the same 2 informants provided conflicting novel labels for unfamiliar objects. Children were asked to indicate which of the 2 labels was associated with each object. Three-year-olds trusted the more accurate informant only in conditions in which 1 of the 2 informants had been 100% accurate, whereas 4-year-olds trusted the more accurate informant in all conditions tested. These results suggest that 3-year-olds mistrust informants who make a single error, whereas 4-year-olds track the relative frequency of errors when deciding whom to trust.     

Knowing who knows: Metacognitive and causal learning abilities guide infants’ selective social learning

Given the widespread interest in the development of children's selective social learning, there is mounting evidence suggesting that infants prefer to learn from competent informants (Poulin‐Dubois & Brosseau‐Liard, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2016, 25). However, little research has been dedicated to understanding how this selectivity develops. The present study investigated whether causal learning and precursor metacognitive abilities govern discriminant learning in a classic word‐learning paradigm. Infants were exposed to a speaker who accurately (reliable condition) or inaccurately (unreliable condition) labeled familiar objects and were subsequently tested on their ability to learn a novel word from the informant. The predictive power of causal learning skills and precursor metacognition (as measured through decision confidence) on infants' word learning was examined across both reliable and unreliable conditions. Results suggest that infants are more inclined to accept an unreliable speaker's testimony on a word learning task when they also lack confidence in their own knowledge on a task measuring their metacognitive ability. Additionally, when uncertain, infants draw on causal learning abilities to better learn the association between a label and a novel toy. This study is the first to shed light on the role of causal learning and precursor metacognitive judgments in infants' abilities to engage in selective trust.     

Causal Clarity Prevents the Emergence of Social Biases in Children’s Excusing of Mistakes

In two studies, we examined how 5-­year-­olds weigh similarity against other factors in deciding from whom to learn. Specifically, we examined the factors of history of and reasons for inaccuracy in Experiment 1 (n = 64) and of competence and authority in Experiment 2 (n = 32). In the 1st phase of Experiments 1 and 2, children’s social biases were tested: 5-year-olds met both a similar informant (SI) and a dissimilar informant (DI). These informants were puppets (Experiment 1) or human teachers (Experiment 2). Children could select either informant as a source of object names. Across experiments children systematically preferred learning from the SI over DI. In the 2nd phase of Experiment 1, both informants first provided accurate information and then 1 of them became inaccurate during an event that clearly explained (being blindfolded) or did not explain (wearing a scarf) the inaccuracy. For half the children, the SI was accurate and the DI was inaccurate. Only after inaccuracy events that were causally unclear did children showcase similarity biases in their subsequent learning preferences. Experiment 2 showed that identifying a DI as a teacher (a profession associated with positive attributes) failed to counter children’s similarity bias. These findings provide important insights on contextual factors that contribute to children’s favoring of socially meaningful others.     

When being right is not enough: four-year-olds distinguish knowledgeable informants from merely accurate informants

Recent evidence demonstrates that children are selective in their social learning, preferring to learn from a previously accurate speaker than from a previously inaccurate one. We examined whether children assessing speakers' reliability take into account how speakers achieved their prior accuracy. In Study 1, when faced with two accurate informants, 4- and 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) were more likely to seek novel information from an informant who had previously given the answers unaided than from an informant who had always relied on help from a third party. Similarly, in Study 2, 4-year-olds were more likely to trust the testimony of an unaided informant over the testimony provided by an assisted informant. Our results indicate that when children reach around 4 years of age, their selective trust extends beyond simple generalizations based on informants' past accuracy to a more sophisticated selectivity that distinguishes between truly knowledgeable informants and merely accurate informants who may not be reliable in the long term.     

Preschoolers continue to trust a more accurate informant 1 week after exposure to accuracy information

To determine whether children retain a preference for a previously accurate informant only in the short term or for long‐term use, 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested in two experiments. In both experiments, children were given accuracy information about two informants and were subsequently tested for their selective trust in the two informants (Experiment 1: immediately, 1 day and 1 week later; Experiment 2: immediately, 4 days and 1 week later). Both age groups preferred to trust the accurate informant not only immediately after receiving accuracy information but also at subsequent time‐points. Children who were immediately able to explicitly identify the accurate informant were significantly more likely to seek and accept information from her 1 week later. However, even when they had not been asked to explicitly identify the accurate informant both age groups still maintained their preference for her. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously choose a previously accurate informant up to 1 week after exposure to information regarding her accuracy.     

Trust in testimony: children's use of true and false statements

The extent to which young children monitor and use the truth of assertions to gauge the reliability of subsequent testimony was examined. Three- and 4-year-old children were presented with two informants, an accurate labeler and an inaccurate labeler. They were then invited to learn names for novel objects from these informants. The children correctly monitored and identified the informants on the basis of the truth of their prior labeling. Furthermore, children who explicitly identified the unreliable or reliable informant across two tasks went on to demonstrate selective trust in the novel information provided by the previously reliable informant. Children who did not consistently identify the unreliable or reliable informant proved indiscriminate.     

The development of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant: Evidence from children aged 8–13 years

In social‐cognitive research, little attention has been paid to the developmental course of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor (STIs about the actor) and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant (STTs about the informant). Using a false recognition paradigm, Study 1 investigated the developmental course of STIs and Study 2 investigated the developmental course of STTs, comparing 8‐, 9‐, 10‐, 11‐, 12‐ and 13‐year olds. The results of Study 1 showed that 8‐year olds could make STIs about the actor, and the magnitude of STIs increased from ages 8 to 10 years, stabilised at the age of 10, 11, 12 years, and decreased from ages 12 through 13 years. The results of Study 2 showed that 8‐year olds could make STTs about the informant, and the magnitude of STTs did not vary with age. In all age groups, the magnitude of STIs about the actor was greater than that of STTs about the informant.     

Attentional distraction and time perception in children

The purpose of the present study was to test the effect of attentional distraction on temporal bisection performance in 5‐ and 8‐year‐old children. During a first learning phase, children were trained to discriminate on a temporal bisection task a short standard duration (2 sec) from a long one (8 sec), presented as visual stimuli. Later, in a second testing phase, intermediate durations (3, 4, 5, 6, 7 s), including the standard durations, were presented. Children's task still was to report if it was a short standard duration or a long one. In addition, during the non‐standard duration, a distracter either did or did not appear. Results showed increasing proportions of “it is the long standard duration” (response “long”) with increasing stimulus durations in both distracter and non‐distracter conditions. However, psychophysical functions were flatter in the 5‐year‐olds than in the 8‐year‐olds, revealing their lower sensibility to time. Nevertheless, the 5‐year‐olds' proportion of long responses was higher under the distracter than in the non‐distracter condition. Consequently, the point of subjective equality (PSE), corresponding to the stimulus duration to which the subject produced 50% of responses of “long” was lower under the distracter condition as compared to the non‐distracter condition. Conversely, for the 8‐year‐olds, the PSE was significantly higher in the distracter than in the non‐distracter condition. Five‐year old children overestimated the time in the presence of an attentional distracter, whereas 8‐year olds tended to underestimate it. The leftward shift and the rightward shift of the PSE in the 5‐ and the 8‐year‐olds, respectively, were accounted for by limited‐capacity attention in the five‐year olds.     

幼儿基于信息判断的选择性信任的发展——其持续性及与人际信任的关系

采用物品命名任务的模式, 对60名2岁、3岁、4岁幼儿的选择性信任进行研究。结果表明:(1)幼儿更信赖那些正确率高的信息传达者, 形成选择性的信任。这种选择性信任的认知能力在3岁左右出现, 并随着年龄的增长而增强, 4岁达到稳定。(2)选择性信任一旦形成, 就具有一定的稳定性和持续性, 即3岁以上的幼儿在不同时间不同地点再见到先前的信息传达者时, 依然能区分出他们。(3)基于信息判断的选择性信任可以迁移到人际信任的其他方面。