‘Who am I?’

The dreams and existential questions of those, who came into being in order to replace a dead person, pivot around a central cry: ‘Who am I?’ If conceived, born or designated as a replacement child, such an individual may suffer—even as an adult—from a rarely recognized unconscious confusion of identity, compounded by grief and survivors’ guilt. From before the child is born, the archetypal forces of death and life are joined in a fateful constellation; the soul of the replacement child bears the shadow of death from the very beginning of life. Hope for the replacement child lies in an emergence of true self as soul recreates original life. Analysis can help the replacement child experience a ‘rebirth into true life’, not as ‘the one who returned’, but as a psychologically newborn individual; the path of individuation countering the replacement child‘s identification with the dead. Jungian analysis offers unique concepts for understanding and healing the replacement child; C.G. Jung himself was born after two stillborn babies and an infant that lived only five days.     

Why ‘spiritism’?

Some of the early representatives of psychoanalysis had a lifelong interest in certain ‘occult’ phenomena. Although several theories were born for the purpose of understanding the interest of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung or Sándor Ferenczi in spiritualism and related phenomena, interpreters usually ignore the changing cultural meaning and significance of modern occult practices like spiritualism. The aim of the present essay is to outline the cultural and historical aspects of spiritualism and spiritism in Hungary, and thus to shed new light on the involvement of Ferenczi – and other Hungarian psychoanalysts like Géza Róheim, István Hollós, and Mihály Bálint – in spiritualism and spiritism. The connections between spiritualism and the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis will be discussed, highlighting the cultural and scientific significance of Hungarian spiritualism and spiritism in the evolution of psychoanalysis. Taking into account the relative lack of the scientific research in the field of spiritism in Hungary, it can be pointed out that Ferenczi undertook a pioneering role in Hungarian psychical research.     

Whither ‘TRS’?

Books reviewed in this article:
Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the Study of Religion
J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham (eds), Theological Liberalism, Creative and Critical     

‘Sluts’ or ‘Sleazy Little Animals’?: Young People's Difficulties with Carrying and Using Condoms

Qualitative data from a Western Australian study of sexual behaviour in young people were used to describe difficulties experienced in carrying and using condoms. Both men and women were concerned for their sexual reputation if they carried condoms, although this was more of a problem for the women than the men. However, these fears were not matched by the attitudes of the opposite gender: in general, there was less negativity about condom-carrying than was feared. Many of those who described using condoms had experienced condom failure and other difficulties, and it appeared that they were unfamiliar with the correct way to use condoms. It is suggested that many of these barriers to condom use can be removed with appropriate education and information strategies.     

Can Only Human Lives Be Meaningful?

Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one’s life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one’s intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists’ intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, but I disagree with Purves and Delon’s theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one’s life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon’s objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects’ existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this consequence, I argue that it only seems counterintuitive because of two false beliefs they appear to hold: that some X cannot have a meaningful existence without that meaning (a) making X better off or (b) giving X reasons for pride.     

Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?

W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism is confused in ways that have not yet been noticed in the literature. This may seem to favour Strawson's side of the debate. In fact, however, a proper analysis of the difficulties that Quine's reply faces suggests a new way to clarify and defend the view that logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms.     

What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?

Many of Habermas's critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. The reason they give is that the moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the validity of norms. Other commentators more sympathetic to his project want to abandon principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it. Still others want to downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of Habermas's less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical discourse. Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his conception of moral discourse and the moral principle (U) are central to Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in particular. The conflict may have arisen in part because the concept of a 'universalizable interest' which is central to Habermas's understanding of moral discourse and of the moral principle (U) remains opaque even after nearly two decades of critical debate. Actually Habermas's concept of interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of interest is not the source of the confusion. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate that an interest is a reason to want. The notion of reason rests loosely on the notion of a need, and the concepts of need and desire are take left deliberately vague. The source of the current confusion lies in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in Habermas's formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of the principle. I argue that only the weaker version is defensible. But I also want to show that Habermas is tempted into defending the stronger version, and to explain why he does so.     

‘Perceived ownership’ or cognitive dissonance?

In 1992 a study by Beggan claimed it had confirmed the existence of Nuttin's ‘mere ownership effect’. This study examined an alternative mechanism for Beggan's findings in the form of forced compliance cognitive dissonance. Seventy‐three participants volunteered for the study (66 females and seven males). Results support the view that cognitive dissonance, accepting ownership of a target that was earlier perceived with negative affectivity, is a sufficient condition to enhance estimates of a target object. Ownership per se was not found to be a sufficient condition to enhance owner's estimates of an owned object. In light of this finding cognitive dissonance is offered as a possible mechanism for explaining the previous reports of a perceived ownership effect. This mechanism may also be applicable to instant endowment and mere ownership phenomena. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is transference the ‘total situation’?

This paper examines through the detailed explication of analytic material the author's experience of a psychoanalytic and a Jungian way of understanding the interactions between him and his patient. This comparative approach considers where the differences lie with respect to timing and content of interpretations and where the differences are essentially tactical rather than theoretical.     

‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a 'metaphysical fideist'. This involves looking at the notion of 'truth as subjectivity'. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of 'religious truth'.
In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason-exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense.     

A Rose by Any Other Name? From ‘Christian Doctrine’ to ‘Systematic Theology’

Christian thought is uniquely resistant to systematization, yet over the centuries has produced remarkable systematic accounts of Christian truth, including those of the patristic and medieval eras before Christian theology became systematically self-conscious in modernity. The more recent fate of the notion of system is traced in Schleiermacher, Hegel and Kierkegaard, and an argument advanced that systematic theology is the expression of personal skill learned in community, and its unity and integrity are aesthetic and moral as much as rationalistic.     

‘What works?’ Therapeutic experience with grieving clients

This paper poses questions about the nature of the therapeutic process in general. Using a holistic and integrative perspective, the author argues that therapy has been influenced by considerations of therapist expertise, techniques aimed at solving problems, and a paternalistic model of doing things to the client. The paper proposes a contrasting approach involving a shared, conversational experience with clients which respects personal autonomy and encourages creative solutions. Throughout the whole paper weaves the underlying theme of unresolved grief, reflecting the author's philosophy that loss is a covert agenda for many people seeking therapeutic help. The author's thesis is that in defining the emotions associated with unresolved grief, exploring the contexts in which the losses occurred, and investigating future options and directions, therapeutic change can be effected. Finally, a quandary that therapy as conversation presents is addressed: how can we research our dialogue to ensure effective outcomes?     

‘SEEKE TRUE RELIGION. OH,WHERE?’

We precipitately express opinions about religion without reflecting critically on our conception of it, and may blame it for conduct that the religious traditions themselves judge unbecoming. A distinction can be drawn between the raw, natural self of the untrained person and the well‐tempered demeanour of a spiritually developed person. Such a distinction drives the appropriation of religious beliefs and can survive their demise. ‘Religious belief’ is not to be conflated with Abrahamic notions of ‘belief in God’ and ‘faith’. There are other versions of transcendence and other psycho‐dramas. One possible form of transcendence is available within the moral life of human beings.     

‘Does class count?’ Social class and counselling

This article explores the importance attached to social class by experienced practitioners taking part in a co‐operative inquiry group. A review of the literature from the last thirty years indicates that there is very little research on class in relation to counselling and psychotherapy reported in the UK. Both authors position themselves as coming from working class origins. Nine co‐researchers from both middle and working class origins joined the group. Eight meetings took place over a period of nine months. Extracts from the group's discussions are represented and integrated with ‘presentational knowing’ drawn from contemporary culture, including poetry and popular music. This study suggests that social class is a neglected aspect of diversity in the counselling field. Implications of the study have relevance for the language of counselling and psychotherapy and class based values; social class and its impact on initial education; and ongoing counselling practice and access to therapy for working class people.     

Are FACES-II ‘family satisfaction’ scores valid?

It has been suggested that family satisfaction can be measured by having a person complete the Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scale (FACES-II) twice: once as the person essentially sees the family (actual version), and once as they wish the family to be (ideal version). The discrepancy between the actual and ideal scores is contended to be a measure of satisfaction with family. Though conceptually attractive, this measurement strategy was not verified, as assessed in the present study by correlating the actual-ideal discrepancy scores with family discord (Index of Family Relations) scores. Clinical adoption of the actual-ideal discrepancy-score as a measure of family satisfaction is thus seen as premature, until more supportive evidence is demonstrated.