Ships That Pass In The Night.

A major source of tension between Staddon's The new behaviorism and Baum's Review is that the former was written for a general audience but the latter evaluates it as a technical work. Be that as it may, the central issue—Skinner's conception of the role of theory in behavior analysis—is inadequately portrayed in both the book and the review. The two primary sources of difficulty arise from failures to honor Skinner's distinction between experimental analysis and interpretation and to appreciate Skinner's views on events that are not observable at the behavioral scale of measurement.     

Pragmatism, Science, And Society: A Review Of Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1

Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 is a collection of papers that explores the implications of philosophical pragmatism in several areas, including natural science, mind—body issues in philosophy, and perspectives on liberal democracy and social change. Similarities between Rorty's pragmatism and Skinner's radical behaviorism are explored in each of these three areas. Although some important and interesting differences are found regarding the role of science in social change, most areas show remarkable similarities between the two systematic perspectives.     

Toward a Spinozistic modification of skinner's theory of man

B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a ‘scientific’ approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open‐ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory‐based rationale for universally valid judgments without involving one in a ‘non‐scientific’ approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory‐based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state good.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.     

Data In Search Of A Principle: A Review Of Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Count Of Human Language And Cognition.

Responding to derived relations among stimuli and events is the subject of an accelerating research program that represents one of the major behavior analytic approaches to complex behavior. Relational Frame Theory: A Post‐Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition (Hayes, Barnes‐Holmes, & Roche, 2001) offers a conceptual framework for this work and explores its implications for verbal behavior and a variety of other domains of complex human behavior. The authors dismiss Skinner's interpretation of verbal behavior as unproductive and conceptually flawed and suggest a new definition and a new paradigm for the investigation of verbal phenomena. I found the empirical phenomena important but the conceptual discussion incomplete. A new principle of behavior is promised, but critical features of this principle are not offered. In the absence of an explicit principle, the theory itself is difficult to evaluate. Counterexamples suggest a role for mediating behavior, perhaps covert, thus raising the question whether a new principle is needed at all. The performance of subjects in relational frame experiments may be a mosaic of elementary behavioral units, some of which are verbal. If so, verbal behavior underlies relational behavior; it is not defined by it. I defend Skinner's definition of verbal behavior and argue that an account of relational behavior must be integrated with Skinner's analysis; it will not replace it.     

Operants Were Never "Emitted," Feeling Is Doing, And Learning Takes Only One Trial: A Review Of B. F. Skinner's Recent Issues In The Analysis Of Behavior

This final collection of Skinner's papers was intended for the professional, although other readers will find much of interest. The first five chapters are devoted to what Skinner called “theoretical issues” and include clear presentations of his positions on “feelings” and on the “self” as an apparent agent of volition. Skinner skillfully discusses thinking, the origins of cognitive-mediational theories, and a favorite topic: the similarity of processes occurring in the histories of species and of individuals. The next four chapters cover what he called “professional issues,” including the often-misunderstood philosophy known as radical behaviorism as well as the operant aspects of behavior therapy and attempts to influence educational practices. He seemed disappointed in the lack of acceptance of programmed learning methods and pessimistic about the possibility of improving education practices. This pessimism was evident in the final section, “personal issues,” in which he expressed doubt that the powerful and self-serving forces of government, business, and religion will ever permit the changes that could be wrought by the application of behavior analysis to the great problems of society. Two other chapters in the last section will be useful to historians who are curious about the influence of logical positivism on Skinner's thinking (apparently there was not much influence) and to sophisticated readers who are interested in Skinner's retrospective consideration of his work.     

SKINNER AS MISSIONARY AND PROPHET: A REVIEW OF BURRHUS F. SKINNER: SHAPER OF BEHAVIOUR

Do we need another book about B. F. Skinner? According to Frederick Toates, the answer is “yes” because “there is still much to be said” (p. vii) about Skinner. In his recent biography, Burrhus F. Skinner: Shaper of Behaviour (2009), Toates attempts to integrate Skinner into the mainstream of psychology by showing areas of commonality between Skinner''s radical behaviorism and subdisciplines within psychology such as cognitive, social, and biological psychology. Admirably, although in some instances understandably naively, Toates attempts to demonstrate the power of positive reinforcement to explain myriad complex behaviors, including a fairly lengthy interpretation of religious behavior. In addition, Toates credits Skinner for being ahead of his time on both social and environmental issues. Toates falters, however, in his insistence that behavior analysis still needs and can benefit from cognitive concepts. He nevertheless provides an otherwise objective and sympathetic view of Skinner the person and the behavioral science he helped to create in a book that should be informative for both behavior analysts and those outside the field.     

What is Radical Behaviorism? A Review of Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

B. F. Skinner founded both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis. His founding innovations included: a versatile preparation for studying behavior; explicating the generic nature of stimulus and response; a pragmatic criterion for defining behavioral units; response rate as a datum; the concept of stimulus control; the concept of verbal behavior; and explicating the explanatory power of contingencies. Besides these achievements, however, Skinner also made some mistakes. Subsequent developments in radical behaviorist thought have attempted to remedy these mistakes. Moore's book presents a “party line” version of radical behaviorism. It focuses narrowly on a few of Skinner's concepts (mostly mentalism and verbal behavior) and contains no criticism of his mistakes. In fact, Moore adds a few mistakes of his own manufacture; for example, he insists that the mental realm does not exist—an unprovable and distracting assertion. The book's portrayal of behavior analysis would have been current around 1960; it mentions almost none of the developments since then. It also includes almost no developments in radical behaviorism since Skinner. Moore's book would give an unwary reader a highly distorted picture of contemporary behavior analysis and radical behaviorism.     

Bringing radical behaviorism to revolutionary Brazil and back: Fred Keller's Personalized System of Instruction and Cold War engineering education

This article traces the shifting epistemic commitments of Fred S. Keller and his behaviorist colleagues during their application of Skinnerian radical behaviorism to higher education pedagogy. Building on prior work by Alexandra Rutherford and her focus on the successive adaptation of Skinnerian behaviorism during its successive applications, this study utilizes sociologist of science Karin Knorr Cetina's concept of epistemic cultures to more precisely trace the changes in the epistemic commitments of a group of radical behaviorists as they shifted their focus to applied behavioral analysis. The story revolves around a self‐paced system of instruction known as the Personalized System of Instruction, or PSI, which utilized behaviorist principles to accelerate learning within the classroom. Unlike Skinner's entry into education, and his focus on educational technologies, Keller developed a mastery‐based approach to instruction that utilized generalized reinforcers to cultivate higher‐order learning behaviors. As it happens, the story also unfolds across a rather fantastic political terrain: PSI originated in the context of Brazilian revolutionary history, but circulated widely in the U.S. amidst Cold War concerns about an engineering manpower(sic) crisis. This study also presents us with an opportunity to test Knorr Cetina's conjecture about the possible use of a focus on epistemic cultures in addressing a classic problem in the sociology of science, namely unpacking the relationship between knowledge and its social context. Ultimately, however, this study complements another historical case study in applied behavioral analysis, where a difference in outcome helps to lay out the range of possible shifts in the epistemic commitments of radical behaviorists who entered different domains of application. The case study also has some practical implications for those creating distance learning environments today, which are briefly explored in the conclusion.     

From Patterns To Prosperity: A Review Of Rachlin’s The Science Of Self-control.

The Science of Self‐Control (Rachlin, 2000) presents a clear overview of research and theory on self‐control, emphasizing important recent research by Rachlin and his students on temporally extended behavioral patterning as an aid to curbing impulsive decisions. We found the book well suited as a textbook in a graduate seminar on self‐control, particularly because it lucidly presents several provocative ideas about self‐control, decision making, addiction, and general theories of behavior. Of particular interest are his discussion of the “primrose path” to addiction and his behavioral research on the “prisoner's dilemma” as it relates to self‐control. Although we take some issue with teleological behaviorism, the theory of behavior advocated by Rachlin, we recommend this book to anyone interested in self‐control.     

Modern Molar Behaviorism And Theoretical Behaviorism: Religion And Science.

Baum and staddon disagree on the status of internal states in behavior analysis. Baum advocates molar behaviorism, treating behavior in temporally extended segments and so avoiding the need for internal states. Staddon argues that internal states merely represent the effects of different histories and that their use brings behavior analysis in line with the established sciences. The dispute is one form of the age‐old molar—molecular controversy that characterized Aristotle's disagreement with Plato. Both molar and molecular analyses have their place, but molar behaviorism may apply more naturally to a variety of phenomena, ranging from the matching law and avoidance learning to socalled “higher mental processes.” When molecular analysis involves internal states, as in Staddon's Theoretical Behaviorism (or New Behaviorism), misunderstanding will be inevitable and behaviorism will be seen as one more instance of the mediational theories in which psychology has long been mired. Such theories have long dominated the physical sciences, where their usefulness is indisputable, but psychology is far behind the physical sciences and nonmediational molar behaviorism better suits a discipline that lacks the methods and the data of the established sciences.     

Pavlov And Skinner: Two Lives In Science (An Introduction To B. F. Skinner's "Some Responses To The Stimulus 'Pavlov' ")

The sesquicentennial of Ivan Petrovich Pavlov's birth in September 1999 is being celebrated in Russia by a special issue of the Russian Journal of Physiology (the former I. M. Sechenov Physiological Journal, founded by Pavlov in 1917). The following article and the address by Skinner that it introduces are scheduled to appear in Russian translation in that special issue. Skinner's “Some Responses to the Stimulus ‘Pavlov’” was his presidential address to the Pavlovian Society of North America in 1966. The following article provides the context for Skinner's address by describing some ways in which Pavlov's research influenced Skinner's contributions.     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.     

B.F. Skinner:

Skinner's non-intuitive discovery in the 1930s that response probability can be a function of not only temporal contiguity but also past consequences sparked fifty years of reaction ranging from high praise to scathing criticism and misunderstanding. Failures to distinguish between the work of Skinner and Pavlov and Watson account for some of the misunderstandings. Other criticisms stem from basic value differences. Whereas Skinner's scientific interest is in behavior per se, other psychologist are curious about inner processes. While Skinners' truth criterion is pragmatic, other psychologists hold correspondence theories of truth. Whereas Skinner is convinced that hypothetical constructs hinder scientific discovery, other psychologists are equally certain that they are essential. Skinner's eschewal of hypothetical constructs, however, has not prevented him form addressing complex behavior, as is widely believed. To the contrary, Skinner has formulated enough unexplored theories on the origin and maintenance of verbal behavior, concept development, problem solving, and creativity to keep theoreticians and empiricists occupied for decades.     

The value of everyday examples in the teaching of learning: a comment prompted by machado and silva (1998)

Why are so few psychology students and professors interested in the study of learning? Part of the answer lies in the techniques we use for teaching behavioral psychology and communicating its relevance to numerous aspects of life. We add to this journal's discussion of the teaching of learning by explaining the importance of using examples drawn from everyday life: Numerous familiar examples provide powerful pedagogical tools for showing the importance of learning theory and helping students learn behavior principles. This approach does not exclude using other strategies and techniques in our quest to communicate the value of learning theory and teach our behavioral science in meaningful and thought-provoking ways.     

Review of Living Walden Two: B. F. Skinner's Behaviorist Utopia and Experimental Communities

Kuhlmann''s Living Walden Two (2005) offers a social history of the actual experimental communities that were inspired by Skinner''s (1948) utopian novel. In the course of her examination, the author presents a reasonably accurate overview of the key cultural design elements described in the novel, of behavioral philosophy applied to cultural design, and of the academic reaction to the behavioral philosophy embodied in the fictional community. She is critical of several key behavioral tenets, but generally remains analytical rather than emotional. Kuhlmann concludes that contextual and individual factors undermined the capacity of most of the experimental communities inspired by Walden Two to sustain themselves.     

ALIVE AND KICKING: A REVIEW OF HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORISM,EDITED BY WILLIAM O'DONOHUE AND RICHARD KITCHENER

Behaviorists have struggled and continue to struggle with basic questions about behavior, such as how to define behavior, how to talk about behavior in relation to environment, and what constitutes an adequate explanation of behavior. Skinner made huge progress on these questions, because of his emphasis on the generic character of stimuli and responses, his advocacy of rate as a datum, his introduction of stimulus control, and his reliance on selection by consequences as a mode of explanation. By no means, however, did he provide final answers. In particular, Skinner fell short because he never escaped from the limitations imposed by thinking in terms of contiguity and discrete events and because he never specified a useful role for theory. The 14 chapters in this book offer varying degrees of clarity on the ways in which behaviorists and behaviorally oriented philosophers dealt with basic questions in the past and are dealing with them in the present, post‐Skinner. They are reviewed individually, because they are uneven in quality. Overall, the book is a useful tool for gaining historical and philosophical background to behaviorism and for getting some idea of behaviorists' current directions.