Young children's psychological explanations and their relationship to perception‐ and intention‐understanding

The present study examined two key aspects of young children's ability to explain human behaviour in a mentalistic way. First, we explored desires that are of a level of difficulty comparable with that of false beliefs. For this purpose, the so‐called ‘alternative desires’ were created. Second, we examined how children's psychological explanations are related to their understanding of perception and intention. A perception‐understanding task, an intention‐understanding task and a psychological‐explanation task were administered to 80 three‐year‐olds. Results offer support for the thesis that the level of difficulty of belief and desire explanations is comparable. Moreover, children's psychological explanations are related to their understanding of perception and intention. The results lend support to the idea that mentalistic explanations are an explicit manifestation of children's level of theory of mind. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children's understanding of desire formation

Two studies examined preschoolers' appreciation of how mental states arise. In Study 1, children aged 3 to 5 (24 at each age) better understood perception-generated beliefs (e.g., that looking in a certain location generates a belief about the location's content) and attitude-generated desires (e.g., that positive experiences with an activity generate a desire to partake of the activity again) than physiology-generated desires (e.g., that not eating for a long time generates a desire for food). In Study 2, 4- and 5-year-olds (48 at each age) better understood the effects of quantity of experience (e.g., eating a lot vs. a little) than of time of experience (eating just now vs. a long time ago) on physiological states and desires. The findings suggest that whether children reason in more advanced fashion about desires or beliefs depends on which aspects of these mental states are considered.     

Young children's understanding of diversity in pretense

Four studies probed preschoolers' understanding of diversity in the domain of pretense. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown video skits in which two characters pretended different things with the same object. To assess preschoolers understanding that the mind is involved in pretense, thought bubbles were superimposed over the actors' heads. Results of this study indicated that both 3- and 4-year-olds appreciate the potential for diversity in pretense, and understand pretense to be a mental activity. Results of Study 2 replicate Study 1, and argue against alternative explanations for participants' good performance in that study. Studies 3 and 4 compared the unique contributions made by dialogs and thought bubbles and revealed that 3-year-olds relied more on actors' mental contents than on their actions or dialogs when reasoning about pretense. Results of the studies are discussed in terms of children's developing understanding of the subjective and mental aspects of pretense, and the implications of this understanding for the development of their understanding of mind more generally.     

Young children's understanding of cultural common ground

Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying the common ground they have with others, based both on personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground that all members of the group share. We introduced 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children to a culturally well‐known object and a novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, ‘What is that?’, either as a request for information or in a recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds assumed she was asking about the novel object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5‐year‐olds assumed she was referring to the culturally well‐known object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to understand that they share cultural common ground with other members of their group.     

Young children's understanding of violations of property rights

The present work investigated young children’s normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party’s object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights.     

The sources of normativity: young children's awareness of the normative structure of games

In two studies, the authors investigated 2- and 3-year-old children's awareness of the normative structure of conventional games. In the target conditions, an experimenter showed a child how to play a simple rule game. After the child and the experimenter had played for a while, a puppet came (controlled by a 2nd experimenter), asked to join in, and then performed an action that constituted a mistake in the game. In control conditions, the puppet performed the exact same action as in the experimental conditions, but the context was different such that this act did not constitute a mistake. Children's normative responses to the puppet's acts (e.g., protest, critique, or teaching) were scored. Both age groups performed more normative responses in the target than in the control conditions, but the 3-year-olds did so on a more explicit level. These studies demonstrate in a particularly strong way that even very young children have some grasp of the normative structure of conventional activities.     

Young children's understanding of belief constraints on intention

One important characteristic of rational action is that our intentions should be consistent with our beliefs. That is, an intention to perform an action should normally be accompanied by a belief that the action will in fact be performed, and be supported by other relevant beliefs. Thus, if the intention is unfulfilled it will have been accompanied by false beliefs. Two studies examined whether 3-year-olds understand these belief constraints on intention. Children were shown films in which actors displayed great surprise and sadness at their failure to bring about the outcomes they intended and expected. They were then questioned about the actors' unfulfilled intentions and false beliefs. In both studies their understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent, and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs. Nevertheless, they also revealed considerable understanding of the beliefs underpinning intentions and, in Study 2, their performance in terms of such beliefs was significantly better than that on standard false-belief tasks. Three-year-olds thus appear to have a threshold understanding of the role of belief in intentional action.     

Highchair philosophers: the impact of seating context‐dependent exploration on children's naming biases

We examine developmental interactions between context, exploration, and word learning. Infants show an understanding of how nonsolid substances are categorized that does not reliably transfer to learning how these categories are named in laboratory tasks. We argue that what infants learn about naming nonsolid substances is contextually bound – most nonsolids that toddlers are familiar with are foods and thus, typically experienced when sitting in a highchair. We asked whether 16‐month‐old children's naming of nonsolids would improve if they were tested in that typical context. Children tested in the highchair demonstrated better understanding of how nonsolids are named. Furthermore, context‐based differences in exploration drove differences in the properties attended to in real‐time. We discuss what implications this context‐dependency has for understanding the development of an ontological distinction between solids and nonsolids. Together, these results demonstrate a developmental cascade between context, exploration, and word learning.     

The influence of context‐specific and dispositional achievement goals on children's paired collaborative interaction

Background . Research has demonstrated that working collaboratively can have positive effects on children's learning. While key factors have been identified which influence the quality of these interactions, little research has addressed the influence of children's achievement goals on collaborative behaviour. Aims . This paper investigates the influence of mastery and performance goals on the nature of children's collaborative participation while playing a problem‐solving computer game with a peer. Sample . Forty‐eight primary schoolchildren aged 8–10 years were divided into two groups: those displaying strong personal goal preferences (dispositional group: N = 14) and those whose goal preferences were context‐dependent, displaying no consistent bias for either mastery or performance goals (context‐dependent: N = 34). Children were paired on the basis of same gender, year group, and goal orientation. Method . Context‐dependent pairs were assigned to either a mastery or a performance condition in which they received goal‐focused instructions. Dispositional pairs received only the instructions to collaborate given to all groups. Collaborative sessions were videotaped and interactions coded. Results . Children who were assigned mastery goals engaged in significantly more elaborated problem‐solving discussion whilst children who were assigned performance goals engaged in more executive help seeking and displayed lower levels of metacognitive control. Dispositional pairs shared some similar patterns, according to goal orientation, as context‐dependent pairs. Conclusions . Goal‐focused instructions can be used to influence the nature and quality of children's paired interactions. Instructing children towards mastery goals appears to promote a more collaborative style of interaction.     

Revisiting Chinese‐speaking children's understanding of argument structure

A causative verb is likely to appear in a sentence with two noun arguments, whereas a noncausative verb tends to appear in a sentence with a single argument. The present research investigates from what point children learning Chinese begin to show this knowledge of argument structure. Two‐, 3‐, 4‐, and 5‐year‐old children were tested using a forced‐choice pointing task. The results showed that Chinese‐speaking children aged 2 years could associate a transitive construction with a causative event, whereas they were not able to map an intransitive construction to a noncausative event even after reaching 5 years of age. The reason why Chinese children have such difficulty in learning knowledge of intransitive construction is discussed, focusing on (a) the semantic properties of certain intransitive verbs, which have been found not only in Chinese but also in other languages, and (b) the ellipsis of arguments, which is characteristic of Chinese.     

Testing primary‐school children's understanding of the nature of science

Understanding the nature of science (NOS) is a critical aspect of scientific reasoning, yet few studies have investigated its developmental beginnings and initial structure. One contributing reason is the lack of an adequate instrument. Two studies assessed NOS understanding among third graders using a multiple‐select (MS) paper‐and‐pencil test. Study 1 investigated the validity of the MS test by presenting the items to 68 third graders (9‐year‐olds) and subsequently interviewing them on their underlying NOS conception of the items. All items were significantly related between formats, indicating that the test was valid. Study 2 applied the same instrument to a larger sample of 243 third graders, and their performance was compared to a multiple‐choice (MC) version of the test. Although the MC format inflated the guessing probability, there was a significant relation between the two formats. In summary, the MS format was a valid method revealing third graders' NOS understanding, thereby representing an economical test instrument. A latent class analysis identified three groups of children with expertise in qualitatively different aspects of NOS, suggesting that there is not a single common starting point for the development of NOS understanding; instead, multiple developmental pathways may exist.     

Young children's practical deceptions and their understanding of false belief

This paper deals with young children's understanding of false belief and their behaviour in situations of deception. It is argued that it is unsurprising that children under the age of 4 fail traditional false belief tests; and yet that children aged 2–3 do implement deceptive behaviours. To achieve compatibility, a particular category of deceptive acts (deceptive acts where awareness of the dupe's erroneous belief plays no role) is detailed. Deceptive behaviours are treated as belonging to the category of pretend behaviours. Some developmental considerations, concerning the links between deception and false belief are put forward.     

Young children's understanding of pretend crying: The effect of context

Reasoning about another's pretend and real crying is related to ma'ny important social cognitive abilities (e.g., emotional understanding, appearance–reality, and theory of mind). This study investigated whether children aged 6 years and younger could distinguish between instances of pretend crying and real crying as presented in stories. Sixty‐five Japanese children aged 4–6 years were given stories within two contexts (Play and Non‐play). In the Play context, the protagonist of the story was pretending to cry or really crying during a pretend play activity. In the Non‐play context, the protagonist was also pretending to cry or really crying after his/her toy had been hidden by another child. The children answered questions about these crying events. The results showed that the 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds showed significantly better understanding of pretend crying in the Play context compared to the Non‐play context. In the Non‐play context, they were significantly less likely to understand the cause of pretend crying compared to the 6‐year‐olds. The results suggest that the context of pretend play facilitates the children's understanding of pretend crying.     

Young children's selective learning of rule games from reliable and unreliable models

We investigated preschoolers’ selective learning from models that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable. Replicating previous research, children from 4 years selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children also selectively learned other kinds of acts – novel games – from reliable actors. More important, – and novel to this study, this selective learning was not just based on a preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest, critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning.     

Do monsters dream? Young children's understanding of the fantasy/reality distinction

Young children are often thought to confuse fantasy and reality. This study took a second look at preschoolers' fantasy/reality differentiation. We employed a new measure of fantasy/reality differentiation—a property attribution task—in which children were questioned regarding the properties of both real and fantastical entities. We also modified the standard forced‐choice categorization task (into real/fantastical) to include a ‘not sure’ option, thus allowing children to express uncertainty. Finally, we assessed the relation between individual levels of fantasy orientation and fantasy/reality differentiation. Results suggest that children have a more developed appreciation of the boundary between fantasy and reality than is often supposed.     

Pre‐school children's understanding of the emotional consequences for failures to act prosocially

This study compares 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children's assessment of the emotional consequences of failures to act prosocially with their assessment of the emotional consequences for prosocial and victimization situations. After listening to stories illustrating each of the socio‐moral situations, children rated the emotional consequences for an actor, recipient and observing teacher and justified their ratings. Findings show that pre‐school children's emotion ratings for failures to act prosocially differed from their emotion ratings for prosocial and victimization behaviours. Preschool children's ratings of an actor's emotions depended on the presence or absence of an observing teacher in prosocial and victimization situations, but not in failures to act prosocially. This study illustrates the complexity of young children's reasoning about failures to act prosocially and highlights the importance of contextual influences on children's understanding of socio‐moral emotions.     

Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function

Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).     

Young children's beliefs about self‐disclosure of performance failure and success

Self‐disclosure of performance information involves the balancing of instrumental, learning benefits (e.g., obtaining help) against social costs (e.g., diminished reputation). Little is known about young children's beliefs about performance self‐disclosure. The present research investigates preschool‐ and early school‐age children's expectations of self‐disclosure in different contexts. In two experiments, 3‐ to 7‐year‐old children (total N = 252) heard vignettes about characters who succeeded or failed at solving a puzzle. Both experiments showed that children across all ages reasoned that people are more likely to self‐disclose positive than negative performances, and Experiment 2 showed that children across all ages reasoned that people are more likely to self‐disclose both positive and negative performances in a supportive than an unsupportive peer environment. Additionally, both experiments revealed changes with age – Younger children were less likely to expect people to withhold their performance information (of both failures and successes) than older children. These findings point to the preschool ages as a crucial beginning to children's developing recognition of people's reluctance to share performance information.