“认知科学”与“第二代认知科学”刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换。以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的立场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向。第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析中的变量之间的交互作用关系”,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮。第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重大问题重新思考     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An epistemological problem for evolutionary psychology

This article draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain‐specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain‐general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain‐specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will be argued, are such as to deny us epistemic capacities that evolutionary psychology presupposes in its pursuit of an objective, comprehensive account of human nature.     

Mind Reading Skills and Empathy: Evidence for Nice and Nasty ToM Behaviours in School-Aged Children

We investigated the social use of theory of mind in school-aged children. The expressions Nice Theory of Mind and Nasty Theory of Mind are used to differentiate behaviours requiring a prosocial use and an antisocial use of ToM abilities respectively. Our goals was to investigate whether and how mind reading abilities and empathy affect nice and nasty ToM behaviours. One hundred and ninety-seven children who were fourth and fifth graders took part in this study. Participants were administered stories that assessed cognitive, affective or moral mental state reasoning abilities and they also completed a self-report measure of empathy. Teachers’ rating on children’s prosocial and antisocial behaviours that underpin ToM abilities led us to identify nice and nasty ToM behaviours. We found that children who engage in nasty ToM behaviour showed good abilities to understand others’ thoughts and beliefs. However, children with nice ToM behaviour showed more moral and emotional sensitivity as compared to children who engage in nasty ToM behaviour. Furthermore, the hot component of empathy is stronger in fostering prosocial behaviours and inhibiting antisocial acts than cognitive component.     

Declarative working memory: A bio-inspired cognitive architecture proposal

Memory is considered one of the most important functions since it allows us to code, store and retrieve knowledge. These qualities make it an indispensable function for a virtual creature. In general, memory can be classified based on the durability of the stored data in working memory and long-term memory. Working memory refers to the capacity to maintain temporarily a limited amount of information in mind, which can then be used to support various abilities, including learning, reasoning, planning and decision-making. Unlike short-term memory, working memory is not only a storage site, but it is also a framework of interacting processes that involve the temporary storage and manipulation of information in the service of performing complex cognitive activities. Declarative memory is a type of long-term memory related with the storage of facts and events. This research focuses on the development of a cognitive architecture for the type of working memory that maintains and manipulates declarative information. The construction of the model was grounded in theoretical evidence taken from cognitive sciences such as neuroscience and psychology, which gave us the components and their processes. The model was evaluated through a case study that covers the encoding, storing, and retrieval stages. Our hypothesis is that a virtual creature endowed with our working memory model will provide faster access to the information needed for the ongoing task. Therefore, it improves the planning and decision-making processes.     

Putnam's natural realism and the question of a perceptual interface

According to Hilary Putnam, natural realism is a form of direct realism in the philosophy of perception that promises to help see us past an irresolvable metaphysical dispute between realism and anti-realism. Illumination depends upon the claim that in perception that there is no interface between the cognitive powers of the mind and the causal powers of the world. In the present paper I aim to show that there is a hidden complexity in Putnam's notion of a perceptual interface. On a trivializing reading, Putnam intends only to reject a modern materialist version of the traditional ‘veil of ideas’. On a richer reading, he intends also to reject the view that the intentional content of experience is autonomous with respect to the external world. I conclude by suggesting that natural realism is not mere common sense and that its fate is tied to its ability to respond to the skeptical threats that help to motivate the traditional options of realism and antirealism.     

Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: toward an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science

Cognitive psychology has an opportunity to turn itself into a theoretically rigorous discipline in which a powerful set of theories organize observations and suggest focused new hypotheses. This cannot happen, however, as long as intuition and folk psychology continue to set our research agenda. This is because intuition systematically blinds us to the full universe of problems our minds spontaneously solve, restricting our attention instead to a minute class of unrepresentative “high-level” problems. In contrast, evolutionarily rigorous theories of adaptive function are the logical foundation on which to build cognitive theories, because the architecture of the human mind acquired its functional organization through the evolutionary process. Theories of adaptive function specify what problems our cognitive mechanisms were designed by evolution to solve, thereby supplying critical information about what their design features are likely to be. This information can free cognitive scientists from the blinders of intuition and folk psychology, allowing them to construct experiments capable of detecting complex mechanisms they otherwise would not have thought to test for. The choice is not between no-nonsense empiricism and evolutionary theory; it is between folk theory and evolutionary theory.     

Enculturation and narrative practices

Recent work on enculturation suggests that our cognitive capacities are significantly transformed in the course of the scaffolded acquisition of cognitive practices such as reading and writing. Phylogenetically, enculturation is the result of the co-evolution of human organisms and their socio-culturally structured cognitive niche. It is rendered possible by evolved cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily learning mechanisms that make human organisms apt to acquire culturally inherited cognitive practices. In addition, cultural learning allows for the intergenerational transmission of relevant knowledge and skills. Ontogenetically, enculturation is associated with neural plasticity and the development of new motor routines and action schemas. It relies on scaffolded learning that structures novice-teacher interactions. The acquisition of reading and writing are paradigm examples of enculturation. Based on an empirically informed analysis of the components of enculturation, I will apply the emerging account of enculturated cognition to narrative practices. To date, research on the impact of narratives on the constitution of the self and our understanding of folk psychology has not paid much attention to the question how narratives are influenced by cumulative cultural evolution and our capacity to acquire reading and writing during ontogeny. I will argue that textual narratives, above and beyond oral narratives, provide genuinely new ways of narration. Therefore, the enculturated interaction with textual narratives has the potential to contribute to a better understanding of ourselves and other cognitive agents.     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS ACQUIRED SECOND NATURE

Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility.     

Psychological foundations of number: numerical competence in human infants

An enduring question in philosophy and psychology is that of how we come to possess knowledge of number. Here I review research suggesting that the capacity to represent and reason about number is part of the inherent structure of the human mind. In the first few months of life, human infants can enumerate sets of entities and perform numerical computations. One proposal is that these abilities arise from general cognitive capacities not specific to number. I argue that the body of data supports a very different proposal: humans possess a specialized mental mechanism for number, one which we share with other species and which has evolved through natural selection. This mechanism is inherently restricted in the kinds of numerical knowledge it can support, leading to some striking limitations to early competence.     

阅读教学在大学英语中作用

英语阅读教学对大学生综合能力的培养有着至关重要的作用。由于英语阅读教学的现状,我们有必要对英语阅读教学进行研究并且提出阅读的策略,原则和阅读技巧,以提高学生的英语阅读能力。     

"认知革命"与"第二代认知科学"刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换．以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的赢场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向、第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析巾的变量之间的交互作用关系,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮,第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重夫问题重新思考。     

Does the World Leak Into the Mind? Active Externalism, “Internalism” and Epistemology

One of the arguments for active externalism (also known as the extended mind thesis) is that if a process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive when it is performed in the world. Consequently, mind extends into the world. I argue for a corollary: We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually perform in the world, so that the world leaks into the mind. I call this internalism. Internalism has epistemological implications: If a process gives us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the world, it will also give us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the head. I look at a simple example that highlights this implication. I then explore the relation between internalism and active externalism in more detail and conclude by comparing internalism with mental modeling.     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

The shape of things to come: Psychoneural reduction and the future of psychology

I contrast Bickle's new wave reductionismwith other relevant views about explanation across intertheoretic contexts. I then assess Bickle's empirical argument for psychoneural reduction. Bickle shows that psychology is not autonomous from neuroscience, and concludes that at least some versions of nonreductive physicalism are false. I argue this is not sufficient to establish his further claim that psychology reduces to neuroscience. Examination of Bickle's explanations reveals that they do not meet his own reductive standard. Furthermore, there are good empirical reasons to doubt that the cognitive approach to mind should be abandoned. I suggest that the near future will not see a reduction of psychology to neuroscience, so much as a replacement of both sciences by an improved form of neuropsychology.     

Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia

Abstract: Two common ways of explaining akrasia will be presented, one which focuses on strength of desire and the other which focuses on action issuing from practical judgment. Though each is intuitive in a certain way, they both fail as explanations of the most interesting cases of akrasia. Spinoza's own thoughts on bondage and the affects follow, from which a Spinozist explanation of akrasia is constructed. This account is based in Spinoza's mechanistic psychology of cognitive affects. Because Spinoza's account explains action asissuing from modes of mind that are both cognitive and affective, it captures the intuitions that motivate the two traditional views while avoiding the pitfalls that result from their one-sided approaches. This project will allow us a fuller understanding of Spinozist moral psychology. In addition to this historical value, the Spinozist theory may offer a satisfactory explanation of certain hard cases of akrasia while avoiding the problems be set by other theories. For this reason, the Spinozist account could also be seen as a useful contribution to our philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of akrasia.     

Dreams as portraits of self and group interaction

Dreams presented in group psychotherapy portray different aspects of the dialectic between the group and the individual. A self psychology perspective emphasizes the interplay between the current self-state of the group-as-a-whole and the selfobject needs of the individual. With this focus in mind, the therapist should help the group to deepen its awareness and capacity to reflect on emerging new abilities ("forward edge") which dream imagery conveys and the needed human responsiveness that can actualize these abilities and thus help the individual and the group to break and transform chains of repetition compulsion. We illustrate this approach with two clinical examples.