Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part A. Self‐understanding precedes understanding of others in pretence

We examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children's attributions of pretence when their own or another's behaviours were characterized as similar (usually unintentionally) to that of a real or nonexistent animal. In some pretence tasks, we asked children if they were trying to look like or looked like the animal they were characterized as looking like; in others, if and how they could (or why they could not) pretend to be a real or nonexistent animal. Children at 4–6 years of age understood their own pretences better than another's pretences, but even by 6 years of age children continued to fail to understand pretence by another. Across ages children tended to be consistent in their claims about whether or not they looked liked (or were trying to look like) the animal, and whether or not they were pretending to be it. Children appear to take someone's merely looking like an animal as evidence that the person (whether self or other) is pretending to be that animal. Their success on self‐pretence tasks probably results from their unwillingness to believe that their own actions look like those of the animal because they had not intended to look like it.     

Two‐year‐olds’ understanding of self‐symbols

This study investigated 48 2.5‐year‐olds’ ability to map from their own body to a two‐dimensional self‐representation and also examined relations between parents’ talk about body representations and their children's understanding of self‐symbols. Children participated in two dual‐representation tasks in which they were asked to match body parts between a symbol and its referent. In one task, they used a self‐symbol and in the other they used a symbol for a doll. Participants were also read a book about body parts by a parent. As a group, children found the self‐symbol task more difficult than the doll‐task; however, those whose parents explicitly pointed out the relation between their children's bodies and the symbols in the book performed better on the self‐symbol task. The findings demonstrate that 2‐year‐old children have difficulty comprehending a self‐symbol, even when it is two‐dimensional and approximately the same size as them, and suggest that parents’ talk about self‐symbols may facilitate their understanding.     

Developmental differences in children's understanding of epistemic authority

An experiment was carried out to examine age differences in children's understanding of epistemic authority and its role in conversation. Two hundred and forty-six children from two age groups (6–7 and 11–12 years) were asked to make an independent judgement as to the equality or inequality of two lines in an optical illusion. Experimental conditions varied; ‘expertise’ in the task was given by training in a measurement algorithm and ‘familiarity with related stimuli’ by being shown illusions other than the test stimulus in training. Subjects who had answered independently that the lines were equal in length were paired with a same-age subject who had responded that they were unequal, and the two were then asked to arrive at agreement. Results showed that younger children rely on external features of a situation in justifying their beliefs. Gender differences in conversations suggest younger children have difficulty differentiating status and knowledge attributes of authority. Older children displayed an awareness of self as a necessarily autonomous element in the process of knowledge acquisition. Unexpected gender effects of stimulus familiarity in the process of persuasion are probably due to differences in subjects' behavioural styles.     

Development of allocentric spatial recall from new viewpoints in virtual reality

Using landmarks and other scene features to recall locations from new viewpoints is a critical skill in spatial cognition. In an immersive virtual reality task, we asked children 3.5–4.5 years old to remember the location of a target using various cues. On some trials they could use information from their own self‐motion. On some trials they could use a view match. In the very hardest kind of trial, they were ‘teleported’ to a new viewpoint and could only use an allocentric spatial representation. This approach provides a strict test for allocentric coding (without either a matching viewpoint or self‐motion information) while avoiding additional task demands in previous studies (it does not require them to deal with a small table‐top environment or to manage stronger cue conflicts). Both the younger and older groups were able to point back at the target location better than chance when they could use view matching and/or self‐motion, but allocentric recall was only seen in the older group (4.0–4.5). In addition, we only obtained evidence for a specific kind of allocentric recall in the older group: they tracked one major axis of the space significantly above chance, r(158) = .28, but not the other, r(158) = ?.01. We conclude that there is a major qualitative change in coding for spatial recall around the fourth birthday, potentially followed by further development towards fully flexible recall from new viewpoints.     

The experiences of therapy from the perspectives of carers of people with dementia: An exploratory study

Design: Interviews were conducted with six carers of people with dementia about their experience of receiving counselling/psychotherapy. Interviews were conducted in the carer's own home, and data were analysed thematically using a narrative approach. Findings: Three themes were identified from the data: ‘Still doing the best I can’ (identified as losses and processes of personal growth); ‘Feeling connected and being understood’ (identified as attributes believed to be important within the therapeutic relationship); and ‘Wanting to share information’ (identified as sharing information with someone ‘neutral’). Carers placed emphasis on the age of the therapist and the amount of therapist self‐disclosure. Attending counselling and/or psychotherapy also helped the carer to find a ‘safe space’ to disclose and share concerns. Discussion: Carer loss and personal growth are explored, together with the importance of building therapeutic relationships and, for the therapist, seeking supervision when managing personal self‐disclosure. The theme of therapist self disclosure is explored together with the importance of therapists seeking supervision when managing personal self‐disclosure.     

The facilitatory effect of negative feedback on the emergence of analogical reasoning abilities

This paper focuses on the development of analogical reasoning abilities in 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children. Our particular interest relates to the way in which analogizing is influenced by the provision of task‐based feedback coupled with a self‐explanation requirement. Both feedback and self‐explanation provide children with opportunities to engage in self‐reflective thinking about the process of analogical reasoning. To examine the role of such metacognitive factors in analogical strategy development the reported study combined a proportional analogy paradigm with a small‐scale microgenetic approach involving multiple testing sessions over a restricted time period. The key manipulation involved exposing participants either to the correct or incorrect analogy completions of another reasoner that they were then asked to explain. The data revealed that the development of an effective analogizing strategy embodying a ‘relational shift’ from superficial to relational responding was modulated by the feedback condition that the child was placed in, with a negative feedback intervention providing the greatest developmental benefit. We suggest that the value of negative feedback for the acquisition of analogical reasoning abilities derives from the way in which a self‐reflective analysis of the reasons for erroneous responses sensitizes the child to a deeper understanding of how to make effective relational mappings.     

Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

Mapping the dialogical self: towards a rationale and method of assessment

It is widely believed that the well‐adjusted individual has an integrated, coherent and autonomous ‘core self’ or ‘ego identity’. In this paper it is argued that a ‘multi‐voiced’ or ‘dialogical self’ provides a better model. In this model the self has no central core; rather, it is the product of alternative and often opposing narrative voices. Each voice has its own life story; each competes with other voices for dominance in thought and action; and each is constituted by a different set of affectively‐charged attachments: to people, events, objects and our own bodies. It is argued that by exploring these attachments the dominant narrative voices of the self may be identified. A semi‐structured interview protocol, the Personality Web, is introduced as a method for studying the dialogical self. In phase 1, 24 attachments are elicited in four categories: people (6), events (6), places and objects (8), and orientations to body parts (4). During interviewing, the history and meaning of each attachment is explored. In phase 2, participants were asked to group their attachments by strength of association into clusters, and multidimensional scaling was used to map the individual's ‘web’ of attachments. Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, the strategy of clustering attachments was shown to be successful as a means for empirically examining the dialogical self. Two case studies of midlife adults are described to illustrate the arguments and methods proposed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

Upsetting others and provoking ridicule: Children's reasoning about the self‐presentational consequences of rule violation

This study examined children's understanding of the distinctive ‘self‐presentational’ impacts of moral and social‐conventional rule violations. A sample of 80 children aged 7–8 and 9–10 years generated examples of interpersonal events that would upset others and events that would elicit social attention to the self. As expected, both age groups consistently identified moral violations as leading to the former, and deviations from social norms as leading to the latter. Crucially, when children were asked to identify the social‐evaluative consequences of those breaches, they exhibited a significant increase with age in recognizing the self‐presentational risks of social‐conventional deviations.     

Self‐knowledge in childhood: Relations with children's imaginary companions and understanding of mind

Relations between interior self‐knowledge and (a) imaginary companion (IC) status and (b) theory of mind (ToM) abilities were investigated in a sample (N= 80) of 4‐ to 7‐year‐olds. Interior self‐knowledge was assessed in terms of the extent to which children acknowledged that they (rather than an adult) were the authority on unobservable aspects of themselves (e.g., dreaming, thinking, hunger). Compared with children without an IC, those who possessed a parentally corroborated IC ascribed less interior self‐knowledge to an adult, with a trend for them to assign more interior self‐knowledge to themselves. Children's interior self‐knowledge judgments were not associated with their ToM performance. IC status was also unrelated to ToM performance. We consider how having an IC may provide children with opportunities to distinguish between knowledge that is inaccessible to an external observer and that which an external observer may glean without being told.     

The knowledge norm of assertion in dialectical context

This paper aims to show that the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) can lead to trouble in certain dialectical contexts. Suppose a person knows that p but does not know that they know that p. They assert p in compliance with the KNA. Their interlocutor responds: ‘but do you know that p?’ It will be shown that the KNA blocks the original asserter from providing any good response to this perfectly natural follow-up question, effectively forcing them to retract p from the conversational scoreboard. This finding is not simply of theoretical interest: I will argue that the KNA would allow the retort ‘but do you know that p?’ to be weaponized in strategic communication, serving as a tool for silencing speakers without having to challenge their testimonial contributions on their own merits. Our analysis can thereby provide a new dimension to the study of epistemic injustice, as well as underscoring the importance of considering the norms governing speech acts also from the point of view of non-ideal social contexts.     

‘Seeing beyond the battled body’ – An insight into selfhood and identity from women's accounts who self‐harm with a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder

Background: Self‐harm (self poisoning and self‐injury) is broadly characterised as any act intended to harm one's own body, without a conscious intent to die. Research indicates that when practitioners encounter self‐harm they often remain anxious, fearful, frustrated, and challenged about such individuals, principally because they are constrained to understand and respond to self‐harm almost exclusively within a problematised discourse (Walker, 2006). That is, a problem that must be diagnosed and contained. Women who self‐harm with a diagnosis of BPD are often portrayed as being risky, chaotic and their identity can be unstable. The aim of this study was to examine and explore the subjective experiences of women who self‐harm with a diagnosis of BPD. Participants: Four women who had a history of self‐harming behaviour with the diagnosis of BPD volunteered for the study. Method: Face‐to‐face, in‐depth narrative interviews were undertaken and were analysed within a framework which drew upon aspects of the ‘performance’ (Langellier, 1989; 2001) and ‘narrative thematic’ approaches (Reissman, 1993). Findings: Two of the participant's accounts illustrate how their self‐harming appeared to have affected their selfhood and sense of agency. They discuss how the external signs of self‐harm may take over their identity and how others communicate and interact with them. Despite the problematic nature of self‐harm implications for practice are highlighted which practitioners may draw upon in their work around self‐harm.     

Aqua vitae,aqua permanens: dreaming,drowning, swimming and surfing in analysis

In response to the question ‘Who is My Jung?’, this paper describes the profound personal impact of Jung's creative / artistic approach to the unconscious, beginning with my discovery of The Red Book at the age of twelve. Echoing the flow of my own dream‐life, I trace the course of two analyses through the alchemical process of solutio, which began with numinous dreams of tidal waves and plunged us into inter‐ and intra‐psychic analytic relationships that evoked vestigial memories of our first aquatic world in utero.     

The role of target gender and race in children's encoding of category‐neutral person information

Two studies are reported that examine whether children encode category‐neutral information about target persons with respect to gender and race categories. In Study 1, using a semi‐naturalistic adaptation of the ‘who said what?’ technique (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), children of 5, 8 and 11 years were asked to recall peers' choices in a preference task. For all three age groups, significantly more within‐sex than between‐sex confusions were found, indicating that children had encoded neutral information about targets with respect to their sex. In Study 2, 5‐, 8‐ and 11‐year‐old children were presented with a conventional ‘who said what?’ task in which they were shown four photographs, two of black children and two of white children, along with 16 statements attributed to the target children (i.e. four statements to each child). Following this, 16 statement cards had to be assigned to photographs of the four target persons to indicate ‘who said what’. Across all age groups there were significantly more within‐ than between‐race confusions. The evidence from these two studies indicates that even for category‐neutral information, gender and race play an important role in children's initial encoding of others' behaviour.     

Children's developing understanding of differences between their own intentional action and passive movement

Four studies examined 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds' ability to judge accurately whether they acted intentionally. Children self‐initiated action to attain an outcome, or their arm was moved by the experimenter to create an outcome. In Experiment 3, children in both age groups accurately claimed they were agents of self‐guided action but not of passive movement. In contrast, in Experiments 1, 2 and 4, children in both age groups found it difficult to deny they intended to bring about the outcome, even though their movement was passive and, in some cases, the outcome was unexpected. They were consistently successful only when exclusively involved in creating one of two outcomes and asked which one they intended (Experiment 4). In sum, 3‐and 4‐year‐olds can distinguish when their movements are self‐directed and when they are passive. They are limited, however, in applying this distinction to self‐judgments concerning whether they acted intentionally. These findings are discussed with respect to linguistic and cognitive limitations that may influence the role first‐person knowledge plays in theory‐of‐mind development.     

The development of bodily self‐consciousness: changing responses to the Full Body Illusion in childhood

The present work investigates the development of bodily self‐consciousness and its relation to multisensory bodily information, by measuring for the first time the development of responses to the full body illusion in childhood. We tested three age groups of children: 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds (n = 28); 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds (n = 21); 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds (n = 19), and a group of adults (n = 31). Each participant wore a head‐mounted display (HMD) which displayed a view from a video camera positioned 2 metres behind their own back. Thus, they could view a virtual body from behind. We manipulated visuo‐tactile synchrony by showing the participants a view of their virtual back being stroked with a stick at the same time and same place as their real back (synchronous condition), or at different times and places (asynchronous condition). After each period of stroking, we measured three aspects of bodily self‐consciousness: drift in perceived self‐location, self‐identification with the virtual body, and touch referral to the virtual body. Results show that self‐identification with the virtual body was significantly stronger in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition even in the youngest group tested; however, the size of this effect increased with age. Touch referral to the virtual body was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. Drift in perceived self‐location was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for adults. Thus, the youngest age tested can self‐identify with a virtual body, but the links between multisensory signals and bodily self‐consciousness develop significantly across childhood. This suggests a long period of development of the bodily self and exciting potential for the use of virtual reality technologies with children.     

Mother–Child Book‐Sharing and Children's Storytelling Skills in Ethnically Diverse,Low‐Income Families

The present study examined book‐sharing interactions between mothers and their 4‐year‐old children from African American (n = 62), Dominican (n = 67), Mexican (n = 59) and Chinese (n = 82) low‐income U.S. families, and children's independent storytelling skills one year later. Mothers' book‐sharing style was analysed in terms of how much storyline information they provided (story components), the extent to which they asked children about the story (dialogic emphasis) and which features of the story they highlighted (story content). African American mothers referred to more story components than did Dominican mothers, and Mexican mothers surpassed Dominican and Chinese mothers. Mothers of all groups were low in dialogic emphasis; they predominantly narrated rather than asked about the story, although Mexican mothers asked relatively more questions than did African American and Dominican mothers. In terms of content, compared with other groups, African American mothers were most likely to emphasize ‘individual goals’, and Chinese mothers were most likely to emphasize ‘negative consequences’. Latino mothers were more likely to emphasize ‘emotions’ than were Chinese mothers. Children's storytelling styles partially mirrored those seen in their mothers. Mothers' dialogic emphasis related to children's contributions to book‐sharing, which in turn predicted children's later independent storytelling skills. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.