What is an Empirical Analysis of Causation?

Philosophical accounts of causation have traditionally been framed as attempts to analyze the concept of a cause. In recent years, however, a number of philosophers have proposed instead that causation be empirically reduced to some relation uncovered by the natural sciences: e.g., a relation of energy transfer. This paper argues that the project of empirical analysis lacks a clearly defined methodology, leaving it uncertain how such views are to be evaluated. It proposes several possible accounts of empirical analysis and argues that the most promising approach would treat it as a contingent identity discovered by identifying the relation (or relations) that most nearly approximate the inferential role of causal concepts in a psychological theory of causal judgment.     

Non-transitive Better than Relations and Rational Choice

Philosophia - This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reasons to accept...     

Non-transitive looks &; fallibilism

Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting putative cases of non-transitivity, fallibilists would have to claim that there can’t be any perceptual limitations of any kind on human chromatic discrimination. But there are good reasons to think such limitations exist.     

QUALIA UND PHYSIKALISMUS

Qualia and Physicalism. It is assumed that the following three relations exhaust the possibilities for a physicalist account of qualia: 1. determination, 2. identity, 3. realization. The first relation is immediately rejected because it does not exclude property dualism. The second faces the problem that it is probably impossible to discriminate empirically between the identity thesis and the epiphenomenalist position. The third cannot handle qualia adequately, for qualia are not functional properties and the realization relation is only plausible as a relation between physical realizers and functional properties. Finally, if one attempts to replace multiple realization by multiple identities it is shown that the notion of multiple property identities is unintelligible. The upshot is that if these three relations exhaust the possibilities of a physicalist construal of qualia then physicalism is wrong. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Causes of causes

When is a cause of a cause of an effect also a cause of that effect? The right answer is either ??Sometimes?? or ??Always??. In favour of ??Always??, transitivity is considered by some to be necessary for distinguishing causes from redundant non-causal events. Moreover transitivity may be motivated by an interest in an unselective notion of causation, untroubled by principles of invidious discrimination. And causal relations appear to ??add up?? like transitive relations, so that the obtaining of the overarching relation is not independent of the obtaining of the intermediaries. On the other hand, in favour of ??Sometimes??, often we seem not to treat events that are very spatiotemporally remote from an effect as its causes, even when connected to the effect in question by a chain of counterfactual or chance-raising dependence. Moreover cases of double prevention provide counterexamples to causal transitivity even over short chains. According to the argument of this paper, causation is non-transitive. Transitizing causation provides no viable account of causal redundancy. An unselective approach to causation may motivate resisting the ??distance?? counterexamples to transitivity, but it does not help with double prevention, and even makes it more intractable. The strongest point in favour of transitivity is the adding up of causal relations, and this is the point that extant non-transitizing analyses have not adequately addressed. I propose a necessary condition on causation that explains the adding up phenomenon. In doing so it also provides a unifying explanation of distance and double prevention counterexamples to transitivity.     

Is de jure coreference non-transitive?

Recent work has brought to prominence the idea that some utterances contain occurrences of noun phrases that not only corefer, but do so in a particularly guaranteed or explicit way—call such occurrences ‘de jure coreferential’. Studies of de jure coreference have considered both the characteristics of the relation, and its explanation. Pinillos (154(2):301–324, 2011) argues that de jure coreference is non-transitive, and uses this as part of his argument for a new semantic primitive explaining de jure coreference. In this paper, I draw attention to a neglected distinction between de jure coreference and another kind of coreference with which it might easily be confused. I then consider Pinillos’s claim that de jure coreference is non-transitive, and conclude that even using Pinillos’s definition of de jure coreference, it is far from straightforward that he has demonstrated the non-transitivity of de jure coreference. I question whether Pinillos’s characterisation of de jure coreference is adequate, and offer a plausible alternative characterisation. I show that on this new characterisation, there is no evidence that the relation is non-transitive.     

Tolerance and Mixed Consequence in the S’valuationist Setting

In a previous paper (see ??Tolerant, Classical, Strict??, henceforth TCS) we investigated a semantic framework to deal with the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, namely that small changes do not affect the applicability of a vague predicate even if large changes do. Our approach there rests on two main ideas. First, given a classical extension of a predicate, we can define a strict and a tolerant extension depending on an indifference relation associated to that predicate. Second, we can use these notions of satisfaction to define mixed consequence relations that capture non-transitive tolerant reasoning. Although we gave some empirical motivation for the use of strict and tolerant extensions, making use of them commits us to the view that sentences of the form ?? ${p {\vee} {\neg} p}$ ?? and ?? ${p {\wedge} {\neg} p}$ ?? are not automatically valid or unsatisfiable, respectively. Some philosophers might take this commitment as a negative outcome of our previous proposal. We think, however, that the general ideas underlying our previous approach to vagueness can be implemented in a variety of ways. This paper explores the possibility of defining mixed notions of consequence in the more classical super/sub-valuationist setting and examines to what extent any of these notions captures non-transitive tolerant reasoning.     

Conditions of contact, common in-group identity, and in-group bias toward contingent workers

In a survey-based field study of 111 permanent Finnish restaurant employees, the authors investigated intergroup relations between permanent and contingent workers. On the basis of the common in-group identity model, the authors hypothesized that the conditions of contact (supportive norms and perceived intergroup competition) would be related to common in-group identity, which in turn would be negatively related to intergroup bias. The present results indicated that perceived competition and institutional support were related to in-group bias only through their influence on the common in-group identity, as the model predicted.     

Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments

Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit's 'fission argument' for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit's argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit's conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions.     

Causal essentialism and the identity of indiscernibles

Causal essentialists hold that a property essentially bears its causal and nomic relations. Further, as many causal essentialists have noted, the main motivations for causal essentialism also motivate holding that properties are individuated in terms of their causal and nomic relations. This amounts to a kind of identity of indiscernibles thesis; properties that are indiscernible with respect to their causal and nomic relations are identical. This can be compared with the more well-known identity of indiscernibles thesis, according to which particulars that are qualitatively indiscernible are identical. Robert Adams has developed a well-known objection to this thesis by considering a series of possibilities involving nearly qualitatively indiscernible particulars that naturally leads to a possibility involving qualitatively indiscernible particulars. I argue that we can construct parallel cases involving a series of possibilities involving properties that are nearly indiscernible with respect to their causal and nomic relations that naturally lead to possibilities involving properties that are indiscernible with respect to their causal and nomic relations. The same features that make Adams’ argument forceful also carry over to my cases, giving us a powerful objection to the causal essentialist identity of indiscernibles thesis.     

How Are Religious Belief and Behavior Good for You? An Investigation of Mediators Relating Religion to Mental Health in a Sample of Israeli Jewish Students

The present study investigated the relation between aspects of religiousness and negative and positive aspects of mental health and compared three models of the psychosocial processes that may underlie this relation. A sample of 668 Jewish Israeli students filled out multidimensional self-report measures of religious belief and behavior, religious identity, personal fear of death, perceived social support, meaning in life, and mental health. This sample was divided into a religious identity subsample, a traditional identity subsample, and a secular identity subsample. Path analyses found religious belief to be positively related to psychosocial well-being and negatively related to psychological distress only for the religious and secular identity subsamples. These analyses also indicated that meaning in life, but not social support nor fear of death, accounted for both relations.     

Relations of Interpersonal Unfairness with Counterproductive Work Behavior: The Moderating Role of Employee Self-Identity

Purpose

Following the job demands–resources model, this study investigated the role of self-identity, or how employees define themselves in relation to others, in the relations between interpersonal unfairness and counterproductive work behavior (CWB). Self-identity, an important self-regulatory and resource-related variable, was proposed to moderate the unfairness–CWB relations.

Methodology

A sample of 361 Chinese airline industry employees completed measures of identity, interpersonal unfairness, and CWB directed at people or the organization. We conducted a series of moderated regression analyses to test the hypotheses.

Findings

We found as expected relational identity (identity based on dyadic connection to another person) and collective identity (identity based on membership in a social group) buffered unfairness–CWB relations, such that positive relations were weaker when relational or collective identity was high (vs. low). Support was not found for the proposed moderation effect of individual identity (identity based on uniqueness from others) on unfairness–CWB relations. Supplementary relative weight analyses indicated that multiple identity levels and interactions between them accounted for considerable proportions of explained variance in CWB.

Implications

These findings suggest that different levels of employee identity seem to play different roles in the interpersonal unfairness–CWB relations, and it is important to continue studying employee identity profiles in the context of predicting CWB occurrences.

Originality/Value

This study not only advances our understanding of potential antecedents of CWB, but also underscores the importance of simultaneously studying all three levels of employee identity.     

In defence of the Simplicity Argument

Advocates of occasional identity have two ways of interpreting putative cases of fission and fusion. One way—we call it the Creative view—takes fission to involve an object really dividing (or being replicated), thereby creating objects which would not otherwise have existed. The more ontologically parsimonious way takes fission to involve merely the ‘separation’ of objects that were identical before: strictly speaking, no object actually divides or is replicated, no new objects are created. In this paper we recommend the Creative approach as the best way of dealing with certain problem cases involving teletransportation. Our considerations yield novel takes on psychological-continuity theories of personal identity and survival, and on the puzzle of Theseus' ship.     

Function transformation without reinforcement

In studies of function transformation, participants initially are taught to match stimuli in the presence of a contextual cue, X; the stimuli to be matched bear some formal relation to each other, for example, a relation of opposition or difference. In a second phase, the participants are taught to match arbitrary stimuli (say, A and B) in the presence of X. In a final test, A often displays behavioral functions that differ from those of B, and can be predicted from the nature of the relation associated with X in the initial training phase. Here we report function-transformation effects in the absence of selection responses and of their reinforcers. In three experiments with college students, exposure to relations of difference or identity modified the responses given to later stimuli. In Experiment 1, responses to a test stimulus A varied depending on preexposure to pairs of colors that were distinct from A but exemplified relations of difference or identity. In Experiment 2, a stimulus A acquired distinct functions, depending on its previous pairing with a contextual cue X that had itself been paired with identity or difference among colors. Experiment 3 confirmed the results of Experiment 2 with a modified design. Our data are consistent with the notion that relations of identity or difference can serve as stimuli for Pavlovian processes, and, in compound with other cues, produce apparent function-transformation effects.     

Adult-child discourse: Developmental interaction between information processing and linguistic knowledge

In the present study, the discourse interaction between adult and child was examined in terms of the content of their utterances, and the linguistic and contextual relations between their messages, in order to investigate how children use the information from adults' input sentences to form contingent responses. The analyses described were based on longitudinal data from four children from approximately 21 to 36 months of age. Categories of child discourse, their development and their interactions with aspects of prior adult utterances form the major results of the study. Child utterances were identified as adjacent (immediately preceded by an adult utterance), or as nonadjacent (not immediately preceded by an adult utterance). Adjacent utterances were either contingent (shared the same topic and added new information relative to the topic of the prior utterance), imitative (shared the same topic but did not add new information), or noncontingent (did not share the same topic). From the beginning, the adjacent speech was greater than nonadjacent speech. Contingent speech increased over time; in particular, linguistically contingent speech (speech that expanded the verb relation of the prior adult utterance with added or replaced constituents within a clause) showed the greatest developmental increase. Linguistically contingent speech occurred more often after questions than nonquestions. The results are discussed in terms of how the differential requirements for processing information in antecedent messages is related to language learning.     

Perceptual Indiscriminability: In Defence of Wright's Proof

A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension with but is actually implied by the second, given a plausible physical assumption.     

Closer

Criteria of identity should mirror the identity relation in being reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. However, this logical requirement is only rarely met by the criteria that we are most inclined to propose as candidates. The present paper addresses the question how such obvious candidates are best approximated by means of relations that have all of the aforementioned features, i.e., which are equivalence relations. This question divides into two more basic questions. First, what is to be considered a ‘best’ approximation. And second, how can these best approximations be found? In answering these questions, we both rely on and constructively criticize ground-breaking work done by Timothy Williamson. Guiding ideas of our approach are that we allow approximations by means of overlapping equivalence-relations, and that closeness of approximation is measured in terms of the number of mistakes made by the approximation when compared to the obvious candidate criterion.     

Psychophysical relations

Honderich proposes a picture of mind based on three theses including, centrally, the Correlation Thesis (that there are correlations of a lawlike kind between mental occurrents and physical processes). The theses are not fully compatible with ordinary convictions about the efficacy of the mental in determining actions. This paper is mainly concerned to examine the Correlation Thesis and to secure the efficacy of the mental within a materialist picture. A consideration of the possible forms that psychophysical relations might take, with due regard to neuropsychological theory and results, supports a psychophysical identity theory. Leibniz's Law can be satisfied, on a suitably informed reading of the identity statement, so as to capture the intuition that mental occurrents are identical not with physical processes simpliciter, but with the undergoing of them. If the psychophysical relation is identity, then the efficacy of the mental is secured within a materialist picture based on a natural‐kinds theory.     

On the Concept of the Scale

The theory of linear arrays provides a definition of linear order from the reflexive, symmetric, but non-transitive relation of matching. However, a distance function is not generally available for the elements of a linear array. Given the original intended interpretation of the matching predicate as holding between phenomenal qualia, this result presents an apparent contradiction to the existence of human practices, specifically the tradition of musical practice described by common-practice music theory, that involve precise judgments of phenomenal distance. This paper resolves that seeming contradiction by constructing a notion of the musical scale out of the theory of linear arrays. First, the theory of linear arrays is briefly reviewed. Then, criteria of adequacy for the construction are adduced from common-practice music theory, the theory of measure and the semiotic theory of notation. The construction is presented along with results indicating its fulfillment of the criteria of adequacy. Finally, the relations between several variables introduced in the course of the construction are investigated.     

Class-consistent Differential Reinforcement And Stimulus Class Formation In Pigeons

Match-to-sample training clusters of A1 (sample): B1/B2 (comparisons), A2: B2/B1, B1: A1/A2, B2: A2/A1, B1: C1/C2, B2: C2/C1, C1: B1/B2, and C2: B2/B1 were presented to pigeons with class-consistent differential reinforcement using two dissimilar types of food reinforcers. Distinctive class-consistent response patterns occurred to the samples during the fixed-ratio 5 sample observing response requirement. Subsequent tests, modeled from the equivalence class paradigm demonstrated the emergence (80% class consistent) of the transitive-like A-C and C-A relations for 4 and 2 of 12 pigeons, respectively, and a strong trend (over 70%) for 7 and 6 others, respectively; the emergence of the reflexive-like identity relation when the nonidentical comparison was from the other class; and the disruption of the trained within-class relation with the addition of a reflexive comparison. After directional training of C1: D1/D2 and C2: D2/D1, tests indicated no emergence of the symmetric-like D-C relation or the composite D-B and D-A relations, but the B-D and A-D transitive-like relation occurred with some pigeons. Off-baseline training with class-consistent differential reinforcement contingent on responding to the D stimuli alone produced distinctive responding and, in turn, a trend to D-C symmetric-like control in 4 of 12 pigeons, as well as a shift toward class-consistent control on D-B and D-A test trials. Class-consistent differential reinforcement that produced distinctive sample behavior promoted stimulus control relations like those that circumscribe equivalence class formation. Respondent—operant interactions permit an analysis of the possible enrollment of stimulus values of distinctive responding to the discriminative stimuli forming the stimulus classes via processes corresponding to naming in humans.