归纳推理中的属性中心性效应

通过三个实验研究了属性的中心性程度对归纳推理的影响,结果表明,在归纳推理中存在属性中心性效应,中心属性比其他属性（次中心属性、再次中心属性）更能影响归纳推理。但属性中心性效应的出现受到了前提对象和结论对象相似性程度的制约,当前提对象和结论对象的相似程度高时,中心属性比其他属性更能影响归纳推理;随着相似性水平的降低,中心属性的归纳推理力度越来越弱,而次中心属性、再次中心属性的归纳推理力度则会依次表现出越来越强的趋势,到最后当前提对象和结论对象的属性完全不相似时,最次中心属性的归纳推理力度达到最高水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度则降低到最低水平。由于再次中心属性的归纳推理力度的最高水平没有显著高于随机水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度的最低水平却显著低于随机水平,因此,研究者认为,在前提对象和结论对象完全不相似的情况下,被试将确信不能采用中心属性来进行归纳推理的力度判断,而采用猜测的方式选择了肯定可以排除的项目之外的其他项目,这体现了具有不确定的归纳推理活动的过程的典型特征     

Interpolation and definability in abstract logics

A semantical definition of abstract logics is given. It is shown that the Craig interpolation property implies the Beth definability property, and that the Souslin-Kleene interpolation property implies the weak Beth definability property. An example is given, showing that Beth does not imply Souslin-Kleene.     

The Property Theory of Musical Works

The property theory of musical works says that each musical work is a property that is instantiated by its occurrences, that is, the work's performances and playings. The property theory provides ontological explanations very similar to those given by its popular cousin, the type/token theory of musical works, but it is both simpler and stronger. However, type/token theorists often dismiss the property theory. In this essay, I formulate a version of the property theory that identifies each type (thus, each musical work) with a unique property. I then scrutinize the arguments offered for thinking that types, including musical works, are distinct from properties. I respond that no such argument is forceful and conclude that the property theory of musical works is superior to the type/token theory.     

Cultures and Cultural Property

abstract  In a number of contexts one comes across the suggestion that cultures are collective owners of cultural property, such as particularly significant works of art. Indigenous peoples are often held to be collective owners of cultural property, but they are not the only ones. Icelandic culture is said to have a claim on the Flatejarbók and Greek culture is held to own the Parthenon Marbles. In this paper I investigate the conditions under which a culture is the rightful owner of cultural property. I argue against the claims that cultures inherit cultural property. I also argue that a culture's claim to own cultural property is seldom, if ever, founded on either practices employed in the culture or collective production of cultural property. I maintain, however, that the very value of cultural property for some culture can, in some instances, provide the basis for the culture's claim on the property.     

Hegel on Private Property: A Contextual Reading

Hegel is often read as defending private property and property rights on the basis of the so‐called “developmental thesis,” which holds that the institution of private property is a necessary condition for individuals to develop the basic capabilities required for free choice. In this paper, I challenge the developmental thesis, and present my own interpretation of Hegel's justification of private property and theory of property rights. Reconstructing Hegel's theory requires that we read the Philosophy of Right as a whole and consider the role of property within the context of the political system that Hegel sketches there, rather than merely looking at the Property subsection of the work in isolation, as works that argue for the developmental thesis tend to do.     

Is the Expiration of Intellectual Property Rights a Problem for Non-consequentialist Theories of Intellectual Property?

The expiration of intellectual property rights has been seen to amount to a problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property. In this article, I assess whether the difficulty is real. I maintain that, as things are at least, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the termination of intellectual property rights is an insurmountable problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property rights.     

Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties

A 'self-effacing' property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self-effacing property, then there are very many others — too many even to constitute a set.     

Transfer of calibration in dynamic touch: What do perceivers learn when they learn about length of a wielded object?

Successfully performing everyday behaviours requires that perceptions and actions are properly calibrated to environmental properties. In three experiments, the authors tested whether calibration was specific to perception of a particular property of a wielded object from a particular grasp position on that object. The experiments investigate whether transfer of recalibration occurs across changes in grasp position (Experiment 1), object property (Experiment 2), and grasp position and object property (Experiment 3). The results suggest that a complete transfer of recalibration occurred in each case. Such results are consistent with recent research on dynamic touch and suggest that rather than recalibrating participants to one particular property of the wielded objects, feedback about a particular property served to recalibrate participants to the properties of the rod set as a whole.     

Transfer of calibration in dynamic touch: what do perceivers learn when they learn about length of a wielded object?

Successfully performing everyday behaviours requires that perceptions and actions are properly calibrated to environmental properties. In three experiments, the authors tested whether calibration was specific to perception of a particular property of a wielded object from a particular grasp position on that object. The experiments investigate whether transfer of recalibration occurs across changes in grasp position (Experiment 1), object property (Experiment 2), and grasp position and object property (Experiment 3). The results suggest that a complete transfer of recalibration occurred in each case. Such results are consistent with recent research on dynamic touch and suggest that rather than recalibrating participants to one particular property of the wielded objects, feedback about a particular property served to recalibrate participants to the properties of the rod set as a whole.     

Knowing about the sensory properties of objects

Verification of object-property relationships, such as those involved in knowing that a canary is yellow, was examined in two studies. In the first study it was found that two variables, the dominance and the typicality of the property to an object, separately influenced verification speed. Moreover, the effectiveness of high over low dominant relationship was greater for atypical than for typical property relationships. The second study examined the two variables in a priming study. Participants were faster in verifying high compared to low typical relationships when primed by a property name; and faster with high compared to low dominant relationships when primed by the object name. This was taken as evidence for the asymmetric accessibility of object and property information. Taken together these findings indicate that the use and comprehension of property information is more complex than has hitherto been acknowledged and suggests that property statements might be verified much of the time by comparing a stored value to a prototypic standard.     

Labor as the Basis for Intellectual Property Rights

In debates about the moral foundations of intellectual property, one very popular strand concerns the role of labor as a moral basis for intellectual property rights. This idea has a great deal of intuitive plausibility; but is there a way to make it philosophically precise? That is, does labor provide strong reasons to grant intellectual property rights to intellectual laborers? In this paper, I argue that the answer to that question is “yes”. I offer a new view, different from existing labor theories of intellectual property, which I call the productive capacities view. This view gives us a way to make sense of the idea of labor as the basis for intellectual property rights, as well as a tool for critically evaluating existing intellectual property institutions.     

Labour-Based Justifications of Intellectual Property and the Problem of Disruptive Innovations

Justifying intellectual property on the basis of labour is an understandably popular strategy, but there is a tension in basing some intellectual property claims on labour that has gone largely unnoticed in treatments of the subject: many forms of innovation cause people to lose their jobs, which seriously hampers the ability of those who lose work to productively use their own labour. This article shows that even under Lockean and other labour-based justifications of intellectual property rights those who claim property rights to innovations of this type have special obligations to compensate those who lose work because of their inventions. By examining the problem that such innovations create, I hope to contribute to larger debates about automation and the job losses it often brings. Lockean and other labour-based theories of intellectual property are generally taken to secure strong, noninstrumental rights to intellectual property if they are successful. So, if even these theories imply that those who profit from the innovations driving automation have special obligations to those left jobless by it, that is strong evidence that they do in fact have such obligations.     

How permissive consent works

Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong-making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong-making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to.     

主题关系在4~5岁儿童不同属性归纳推理发展中的作用

为探讨主题关系在儿童归纳推理中的作用,采用经典的三角归纳范式,设计了主题关系和知觉相似冲突、主题关系和分类学关系冲突两种情形,来考察4~5岁儿童在内在属性和情境性属性任务中的归纳推理。结果显示：当主题关系和知觉相似冲突时,从4.5岁开始儿童主要基于主题关系对情境性属性进行归纳推理,而对于内在属性的推论,4~5岁儿童在基于主题关系和基于知觉相似上没有显著差异。当主题关系和分类学关系冲突时,从4.5岁开始儿童主要基于主题关系对情境性属性进行归纳推理,从5岁开始儿童主要基于分类学关系对内在属性进行归纳推理。两个实验结果均发现5岁和5.5岁儿童能够依据不同的属性使用不同的关系推理,表现出归纳灵活性     

Blockchain Technology as an Institution of Property

This paper argues that the practical implementation of blockchain technology can be considered an institution of property similar to legal institutions. Invoking Penner's theory of property and Hegel's system of property rights, and using the example of bitcoin, it is possible to demonstrate that blockchain effectively implements all necessary and sufficient criteria for property without reliance on legal means. Blockchains eliminate the need for a third‐party authority to enforce exclusion rights, and provide a system of universal access to knowledge and discoverability about the property rights of all participants and how the system functions. The implications of these findings are that traditional property relations in society could be replaced by or supplemented with blockchain models, and implemented in new domains.     

Contested terms and philosophical debates

There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the property does not exist, and true to say with revisionists (and others) that the property does exist. This article explores the viability of discretionism, and argues that it faces serious difficulties. Even if the difficulties faced by discretionism can be overcome, it is unclear that discretionism secures anything beyond what is already available to standard revisionist views. The article concludes with some reflections about Nichols’ account of the bare retributive norm.     

Property rights and preservationist duties

The preservationist duties that conservationists would lay upon landowners to protect the natural environment obviously interfere with what those people do with their land. That is often taken to be an equally obvious ‐ albeit possibly justifiable ‐ violation of their rights in that property. But to say that, as landowners often do, would be to imply that property rights somehow embrace a ‘right to destroy’. Closer inspection suggests that they do not. That would be a further right, additional to and independent of all the component rights standardly associated with the right to private property. A right to destroy is implicit neither in the concept nor in the justifications of property rights, as they are standardly conceived. Conservationist policies cannot, therefore, properly be opposed on the grounds that they would necessarily violate people's property rights.     

Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How <Emphasis Type="Italic">Not</Emphasis> to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument

In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to save.

The Ontological Status of Human DNA: Is It Not First and Foremost a Biological ``File Self'?

This paper investigates which of the various legal notions proposed for human DNA is the most appropriate from an ontological viewpoint - unique legal status, private property, common property, person, or information. The focus is on the difficulties that private property, common property and person present. By using Harré's notion of "file-self" we argue that, ontologically, the most appropriate legal notion to be applied is information. This has consequences for storage, control and use of genetic information as well as identifiable human body material.     

Supervenience and Causation: A Probabilistic Approach

It is often argued that if a mentalproperty supervenes on a physical property, then (1)the mental property M ``inherits' its causal efficacyfrom the physical property P and (2) the causalefficacy of M reduces to that of P. However, once weunderstand the supervenience thesis and the concept ofcausation probabilistically, it turns out that we caninfer the causal efficacy of M from that of P andvice versa if and only if a certain condition, whichI call the ``line-up' thesis, holds. I argue that thesupervenience thesis entails neither this conditionnor its denial. I also argue that even when theline-up thesis holds true, reductionism about thecausal efficacy of the mental property doesn'tfollow.