儿童社会认识论:儿童对信息提供者的选择性信任

个体掌握的知识很多来自于他人的传授。从4岁起,儿童就意识到不同的信息提供者在可靠性上存在差异。他们根据与提供者间的熟悉程度、提供者过往陈词的准确性、以及来自他人的线索等策略对于信息提供者的可靠性进行评估,从而决定谁更值得信任。未来关于儿童对于信息提供者选择性信任的研究应从扩展探究的知识领域、对于信息提供者其他特征的操纵、以及潜在文化差异检验等方面进行。     

Looking for meaning: Eye movements are sensitive to overlapping semantic features, not association

Theories of semantic memory differ in the extent to which relationships among concepts are captured via associative or via semantic relatedness. We examined the contributions of these two factors, using a visual world paradigm in which participants selected the named object from a four-picture display. We controlled for semantic relatedness while manipulating associative strength by using the visual world paradigm’s analogue to presenting asymmetrically associated pairs in either their forward or backward associative direction (e.g., ham—eggs vs. eggs—ham). Semantically related objects were preferentially fixated regardless of the direction of presentation (and the effect size was unchanged by presentation direction). However, when pairs were associated but not semantically related (e.g., iceberg—lettuce), associated objects were not preferentially fixated in either direction. These findings lend support to theories in which semantic memory is organized according to semantic relatedness (e.g., distributed models) and suggest that association by itself has little effect on this organization.     

Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean “is-ought” dictum

Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be.     

Controlling lexical contributions to the reading of pseudohomophones

Reynolds and Besner (2005) presented a computational account of six effects that emerge when readers are asked to pronounce pseudohomophones (nonwords—e.g., brane—that sound like words when pronounced). In the dual route cascaded (DRC) model of reading, they varied a parameter controlling the rate of inhibition from letter units to the orthographic lexicon to mimic strategic control over the extent of specific lexical processing. In this article, we provide an account in which the effects are simulated by varying the DRC’s reading-aloud criterion—a parameter that sets the minimal level of phonemic activation required to pronounce a letter string. We show that varying this parameter provides another means of controlling lexical contributions to reading aloud.     

MISSing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate Systems

This article shows how the MISS account of models—as isolations and surrogate systems—accommodates and elaborates Sugden’s account of models as credible worlds and Hausman’s account of models as explorations. Theoretical models typically isolate by means of idealization, and they are representatives of some target system, which prompts issues of resemblance between the two to arise. Models as representations are constrained both ontologically (by their targets) and pragmatically (by the purposes and audiences of the modeller), and these relations are coordinated by a model commentary. Surrogate models are often about single mechanisms. They are distinguishable from substitute models, which are examined without any concern about their connections with the target. Models as credible worlds are surrogate models that are believed to provide access to their targets on account of their credibility (of which a few senses are distinguished).     

Early morphological processing is morphosemantic and not simply morpho-orthographic: A violation of form-then-meaning accounts of word recognition

Many studies have suggested that a word’s orthographic form must be processed before its meaning becomes available. Some interpret the (null) finding of equal facilitation after semantically transparent and opaque morphologically related primes in early stages of morphological processing as consistent with this view. Recent literature suggests that morphological facilitation tends to be greater after transparent than after opaque primes, however. To determine whether the degree of semantic transparency influences parsing into a stem and a suffix (morphological decomposition) in the forward masked priming variant of the lexical decision paradigm, we compared patterns of facilitation between semantically transparent (e.g., coolant—cool) and opaque (e.g., rampant—ramp) prime—target pairs. Form properties of the stem (frequency, neighborhood size, and prime—target letter overlap), as well as related—unrelated and transparent—opaque affixes, were matched. Morphological facilitation was significantly greater for semantically transparent pairs than for opaque pairs. Ratings of prime—target relatedness predicted the magnitude of facilitation. The results limit the scope of form-then-meaning models of word recognition and demonstrate that semantic similarity can influence even early stages of morphological processing. The research reported here was supported by National Institute of Child Health and Development Grant HD-01994 to Haskins Laboratories.     

The rhetoric of dread: Fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) in information technology marketing

This article examines the nature and legality of FUD, which—as will be seen—is a timely subject. IBM may have been FUD’s originator but its greatest practitioner is allegedly none other than Microsoft, which (according to the firm’s critics) has repeatedly exercised FUD tactics in order to acquire and maintain its operating system monopoly. In particular, this article compares Amdahl’s experience with IBM to the emerging contours of Microsoft’s battle against a surprisingly able competitor, the open source operating system called Linux. A major contention of this essay is that attorneys, judges, and legal scholars tend to pay insufficient attention to the unique characteristics of technology enterprises, and thus cannot distinguish meaningfully between practices that are plainly legal under U. S. antitrust law, and those which are not. A perspective drawn from the history and sociology of technology (namely, Thomas P. Hughes’ concept of technological systems) is used to elucidate what is predatory, and what is not, in a dominant market player’s use of FUD and associated marketing tactics. where his scholarly and teaching interests include cyberlaw, intellectual property in high-tech industries, and the social issues posed by advanced information technology. He is also the author of several best-selling trade and textbook titles, including Webster’s New World Dictionary of Computer Terms, 9th ed. (Hungry Minds) and Computers in Your Future, 4th ed. (Prentice-Hall). He lives in Charlottesville, Virginia.     

Prospective memory: Are preparatory attentional processes necessary for a single focal cue?

The preparatory attentional and memory processes theory of prospective memory (PM) assumes that PM retrieval requires resource-demanding preparatory attentional processes, whereas the multiprocess theory assumes that retrieval can also occur spontaneously. On the basis of showing slowing on an ongoing task (i.e., task interference) —even when the PM cue was highly salient (i.e., the participant’s own name) —Smith, Hunt, McVay, and McConnell (2007) concluded that preparatory attentional processes are always necessary for PM retrieval. We argue that the presence of preparatory attentional processes cannot be used to rule out the existence of spontaneous retrieval processes, and the goal of the present research was to examine whether PM retrieval can occur in the absence of preparatory attentional processes. We varied whether we emphasized the importance of the PM task or the ongoing task, and we assessed task interference across quarters of the ongoing task. Our results showed no evidence of task interference and, hence, no evidence of preparatory attentional processes in the periods proximal to the target event, and yet participants showed high PM performance. Thus, the results suggest the existence of spontaneous retrieval processes and support the multiprocess theory.     

Associations Among Body Mass Index,Depression, and Family Factors Across Two Generations

In this pilot study, we examined the relationship between health factors, sociodemographic factors, and body mass index (BMI) across two generations (n = 41 parent-child pairs). Generation 1 study variables included parent- and family-focused characteristics and health variables, the Generation 2 variables included child demographic factors, and the outcome variable was youths’ physical health (operationalized as BMI). Regression models revealed that Generation 1 variables, taken together, accounted for 26% of the variance in youth BMI. However, only the parent’s mental health symptoms (i.e., depression symptoms) made a unique contribution to the variance in youth BMI. Logistic regression analysis revealed that the youths’ race and age—but no other demographic factor—were significantly related to youth BMI-for-age. Our findings suggest that youth race, age, and parent mental health are each associated with youth physical health (i.e., BMI), confirming previous study findings that parental factors and demographic factors should be considered when exploring youth health outcomes.     

Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem

Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, “if x, then I am awake,” x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and as such can infer the consequent, i.e., “I am awake.” Sosa’s second solution, in terms of so-called reflective knowledge, is shown to land him in the dilemma of either facing yet another conditionality problem, or violating an internalist constraint that he explicitly grants the skeptic with respect to what kind of factors can be legitimately invoked in our account of how we may know the relevant antecedent. For these reasons, I conclude that Sosa has not solved the problem of dream skepticism.     

Parent Beliefs about Treatment Credibility and Effectiveness: Assessment and Relation to Subsequent Treatment Participation

We assessed parents’ beliefs about treatment credibility and effectiveness and examined the influence of these beliefs on subsequent treatment participation. Seventy-six parents completed the Credibility/Expectancies Questionnaire—Parent Version (CEQ-P), and subsequently participated in treatment for their child's clinically referred conduct problems. The key findings were that: (a) the CEQ-P is composed of two components that measure parents’ treatment credibility and expectancies; (b) the total scale and each component are internally consistent and have strong test-retest reliability; (c) scores on the CEQ-P are significantly associated with scores on a measure of parent motivation for treatment, supporting the construct validity of this measure; and (d) scores on the CEQ-P at the first clinic visit significantly predict subsequent adherence to treatment procedures above and beyond demographic variables and parent motivation for treatment. This study provides an efficient and psychometrically sound measure of parent beliefs about treatment and demonstrates the importance of such beliefs for subsequent treatment adherence.     

Conflicts of interest in Germany: A legal perspective

In spite of recent efforts to promote cooperation between universities and industry, Germany still lacks a sufficient legal framework for regulating potential conflicts of interest resulting from university-industry cooperation. Prospective regulation of conflicts of interest has to take into account specific constraints imposed by the German constitution. It has to follow stringent procedural and material requirements and carefully weigh the individual researcher’s right to academic freedom against the public demand for objectivity in research. Because of this cautious consideration of the conflicting interests constitutionally mandated in Germany, a potential regulation legitimate in this country may serve as a model for other countries facing the need of the adoption of such a regulation. The ideas presented in this paper are developed in detail in the author’s dissertation, Rechtsfragen der Kooperation zwischen Hochschulen und Wirtschaft — Ein Rechtsvergleich: Deutschland — USA, Verlag Vahlen, München, 2002. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002.     

Same-Sex Marriage and Equality

Some argue that same-sex marriage is not an equal rights issue because, where same-sex marriage is illegal, heterosexuals and homosexuals have the exact same right to marry—i.e., the right to marry one adult of the opposite sex. I dispute this argument by pointing out that while societies that prohibit same-sex marriage equally permit individual heterosexuals and homosexuals to marry one adult of the opposite sex, same-sex couples in such societies are denied an important right that opposite-sex couples enjoy—i.e., the right to marry. I argue that the right to marry is fundamentally, not an individual right, but a couple’s collective right, analogous to assembly rights.     

Psychosocial risk factors, natural immunity, and cancer progression: Implications for intervention

One of the more important and emerging fields in which psychologists collaborate with other disciplines is psychoimmunology. Centuries of clinical anecdote and decades of psychosomatic hypotheses have gained credibility in the eyes of the medical establishment—and many patients—by the systematic investigation of mechanisms potentially explaining how events intrapsychic and interpersonal could affect physical disease processes. The central nervous system is connected with the immune system by both neuronal and endocrinological pathways. The immune system has been found to mediate the organism’s response to aberrations of its own normal functions, as well as to invading organisms from without. AIDS, arthritis, asthma, lupus, and herpes are some of the illnesses in which research is demonstrating important relationships among psychosocial and immunological factors and disease course. In this article, we first discuss the immunological apparatus in order to provide a base for subsequent discussions of the effects of stress on immune function. Then we discuss malignant diseases and current evidence that disease course is related to both psychosocial stressors and immune function. We next discuss a model of these interactions, and finally we talk about interventions incorporating psychosocial factors aimed at influencing immune status and, thus, disease course.     

Citizenship and immigration a current review

The presence of immigrants and their activities challenge traditional notions of citizenship centred on the conflation of national and state membership. Four dimensions of citizenship— defined here as membership in a socio-political community—are identified: legal status, rights, identity, and participation. Discussion centres on the constraints and determinants of naturalization, the extent to which rights are linked to personhood rather than membership in a nation-state, and the challenge to state identity and cohesion produced by multiculturalism. It is suggested that future research should consider citizenship as participation. This dimension highlights how immigrants’ transnational activities challenge traditional views of citizenship. We cannot, however, dismiss the importance of the state. The concept of participation is therefore also important since it focuses attention on dynamic interactions between the individual and the nation-state.     

Neuropragmatism, old and new

Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish between three waves among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of brain-centrism. Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Dewey’s dynamic view of mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophical pragmatism—or neuropragmatism—recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a science of mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the brain alone—just as explaining cooking entails more than understanding the gut—and therefore must establish continuity with cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragmatism advances a new and promising perspective on how to reconcile the scientific and manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between science and the humanities.     

A developed nature: a phenomenological account of the experience of home

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving.     

What in the world is weakness of will?

At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors.     

Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths

The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the non-contingent limits to any (human or non-human) knowledge. After expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch’s proof, which demonstrates the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch’s premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance.     

Ambivalent desires and the problem with reduction

Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete theory of Humean rationality.