Partition priming in judgment under uncertainty

We show that likelihood judgments are biased toward an ignorance-prior probability that assigns equal credence to each mutually exclusive event considered by the judge. The value of the ignorance prior depends crucially on how the set of possibilities (i.e., the state space) is subjectively partitioned by the judge. For instance, asking "what is the probability that Sunday will be hotter than any other day next week?" facilitates a two-fold case partition, [Sunday hotter, Sunday not hotter], thus priming an ignorance prior of 1/2. In contrast, asking "what is the probability that the hottest day of the week will be Sunday?" facilitates a seven-fold class partition, [Sunday hottest, Monday hottest, etc.], priming an ignorance prior of 1/7. In four studies, we observed systematic partition dependence: Judgments made by participants presented with either case or class formulations of the same query were biased toward the corresponding ignorance prior.     

Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty

In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on. Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events into which the state space was subjectively divided. This bias was diminished among participants more confident in what they learned, was strong and insensitive to level of confidence when ignorance priors were especially salient, and required ignorance priors to be salient only when probabilities were elicited (not during encoding).     

Human covariation judgment: Accuracy and strategy

Judgment strategy is proposed as a contributor to the variability of findings in past research on human covariation judgment. Mathematically sophisticated judgment strategies will accurately judge all event covariations. However, faulty judgment rules will also produce correct judgments of many event relationships. Several methods have been used in past research to identify subjects' strategies of covariation judgment. Each of these methods indicates that humans employ simplistic, error-prone rules to judge event relationships. Shifts in covariation strategy use are proposed as a source of past findings that judgment accuracy depends on the decision conditions.     

Causal explanation improves judgment under uncertainty,but rarely in a Bayesian way

Three studies reexamined the claim that clarifying the causal origin of key statistics can increase normative performance on Bayesian problems involving judgment under uncertainty. Experiments 1 and 2 found that causal explanation did not increase the rate of normative solutions. However, certain types of causal explanation did lead to a reduction in the magnitude of errors in probability estimation. This effect was most pronounced when problem statistics were expressed in percentage formats. Experiment 3 used process-tracing methods to examine the impact of causal explanation of false positives on solution strategies. Changes in probability estimation following causal explanation were the result of a mixture of individual reasoning strategies, including non-Bayesian mechanisms, such as increased attention to explained statistics and approximations of subcomponents of Bayes’ rule. The results show that although causal explanation of statistics can affect the way that a problem is mentally represented, this does not necessarily lead to an increased rate of normative responding.     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations.     

Inconsistency and uncertainty in multi-attribute judgment of human performance

This paper examines the effect of uncertainty and inconsistency on the judgment of human performance. The results indicate that the effect of inconsistency on judgment is not mediated by subjective uncertainty. We find that both the level and the extremity of judgment decrease with uncertainty. These effects are explained, respectively, by uncertainty aversion and by regressiveness. We also find that both the level and the extremity of judgment of human performance increase with inconsistency. These effects are explained by reliance on integration rules in which judgment is based primarily on some aspects of the information, while other aspects are, to some extent, ignored.     

Analogy as a strategy for supporting complex problem solving under uncertainty

Complex problem solving in naturalistic environments is fraught with uncertainty, which has significant impacts on problem-solving behavior. Thus, theories of human problem solving should include accounts of the cognitive strategies people bring to bear to deal with uncertainty during problem solving. In this article, we present evidence that analogy is one such strategy. Using statistical analyses of the temporal dynamics between analogy and expressed uncertainty in the naturalistic problem-solving conversations among scientists on the Mars Rover Mission, we show that spikes in expressed uncertainty reliably predict analogy use (Study 1) and that expressed uncertainty reduces to baseline levels following analogy use (Study 2). In addition, in Study 3, we show with qualitative analyses that this relationship between uncertainty and analogy is not due to miscommunication-related uncertainty but, rather, is primarily concentrated on substantive problem-solving issues. Finally, we discuss a hypothesis about how analogy might serve as an uncertainty reduction strategy in naturalistic complex problem solving.     

Effects of time-pressure on decision-making under uncertainty: changes in affective state and information processing strategy

An experiment is reported that investigated the extent to which affective state, information processing strategy and task structure determine the effects of time-pressure on decision-making. Research participants were presented with risk scenarios involving a choice between safe and risky actions. The scenarios were systematically varied in terms of outcome valence (positive or negative) and effort associated with taking the safe action (high or low). Half the participants were given unlimited time to make their decision, the other half were required to choose within a deadline. The findings showed that time-pressured participants were more anxious and energetic and used a number of different strategies to cope with the deadline. These effects, as well as changes in risk-taking, were shown to vary systematically with task structure, particularly the effort manipulation. The findings are discussed in terms of how they contribute to theories of time-pressure and the methodological implications they have for future research in this area.     

Decision-making under uncertainty: biases and Bayesians

Animals (including humans) often face circumstances in which the best choice of action is not certain. Environmental cues may be ambiguous, and choices may be risky. This paper reviews the theoretical side of decision-making under uncertainty, particularly with regard to unknown risk (ambiguity). We use simple models to show that, irrespective of pay-offs, whether it is optimal to bias probability estimates depends upon how those estimates have been generated. In particular, if estimates have been calculated in a Bayesian framework with a sensible prior, it is best to use unbiased estimates. We review the extent of evidence for and against viewing animals (including humans) as Bayesian decision-makers. We pay particular attention to the Ellsberg Paradox, a classic result from experimental economics, in which human subjects appear to deviate from optimal decision-making by demonstrating an apparent aversion to ambiguity in a choice between two options with equal expected rewards. The paradox initially seems to be an example where decision-making estimates are biased relative to the Bayesian optimum. We discuss the extent to which the Bayesian paradigm might be applied to the evolution of decision-makers and how the Ellsberg Paradox may, with a deeper understanding, be resolved.     

Considering the opposite: a corrective strategy for social judgment

It is proposed that several biases in social judgment result from a failure--first noted by Francis Bacon--to consider possibilities at odds with beliefs and perceptions of the moment. Individuals who are induced to consider the opposite, therefore, should display less bias in social judgment. In two separate but conceptually parallel experiments, this reasoning was applied to two domains--biased assimilation of new evidence on social issues and biased hypothesis testing of personality impressions. Subjects were induced to consider the opposite in two ways: through explicit instructions to do so and through stimulus materials that made opposite possibilities more salient. In both experiments the induction of a consider-the-opposite strategy had greater corrective effect than more demand-laden alternative instructions to be as fair and unbiased as possible. The results are viewed as consistent with previous research on perseverance, hindsight, and logical problem solving, and are thought to suggest an effective method of retraining social judgment.     

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

ABSTRACT

Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.     

Coping with ambiguity and uncertainty in patient-physician relationships: III. Negotiation

Since beliefs, interests, needs and values vary among individuals, potential for conflict or dispute exists in all areas of human endeavor, including a patient-physician relationship. Conflict- or dispute-resolution requires diligent and directed negotiation, which ideally is amicable, efficient, and sustainable, if the participants acknowledge the identity, individuality, and integrity of all parties involved. In this essay a concept ofprincipled negotiation is extrapolated to a patient-physician relationship and is exemplified by a case study. In addition, the validity of a concept oftract two diplomacy is discussed, relevant from the perspective of strained or fractured primary relationships.     

Relative judgment and knowledge of the category structure

For evenly spaced stimuli, a purely relative judgment account of unidimensional categorization performance is trivial: All that is required is knowledge of the size of stimulus difference corresponding to the width of a category. For unevenly spaced stimuli, long-term knowledge of the category structure is required. In the present article, we will argue that such knowledge does not necessitate a direct, absolute mapping between (representations of ) stimulus magnitudes and category labels. We will show that Stewart, Brown, and Chater’s (2005) relative judgment model can account for data from absolute identification experiments with uneven stimulus spacing.     

In times of uncertainty: predicting the survival of long-distance relationships

The authors examined the degree to which ratings of negative affectivity (NA) and relational security predicted the breakup of long-distance and same-city dating relationships. Couples completed initial surveys and were contacted 1 year later about the status of their relationship. In the initial surveys, both partners completed NA and relational security assessments. Overall, both the NA and relational security of men and women predicted stability. However, as predicted, structural equation modeling revealed a gender difference in the interaction between NA and long-distance status. The presence of high NA in men was associated with breakup for long-distance but not same-city couples. High NA in women was not differentially associated with relational stability on the basis of long-distance status. The authors discuss the psychological basis of this gender difference.     

Distributive judgments under uncertainty: Paccioli's game revisited

Many decision biases arise from the inability to ignore past events. The coherence of decisions is also compromised by the inability to fully use information related to the future. In Paccioli's game, a stake of money goes to the first player to score a certain number of wins. When the game is prematurely interrupted, they may divide the stake according to the proportions of wins relative to rounds played. Alternatively, they may assess the probability that a player would reach the criterion number of wins first if the game were continued. The first decision rule (ratio), which is past-oriented, leads to contradictions across games. The second rule (probability), which is future-oriented, does not. In seven studies, use of the ratio rule emerges across testing methods, in games of chance and games of skill, and independently of extraneous factors (such as random responding, lack of awareness, or proneness to other past-oriented biases).     

Reducing uncertainty in sustainable interpersonal service relationships: the role of aesthetics

Sustainable interpersonal service relationships (SISRs) are the outcome of a design process that supports situated meaningful interactions between those being served and those in service. Service design is not just directed to simply satisfy the ability to perceive the psychological state of others, but more importantly, it should aim at preserving these relationships in relation to the contextual requirements that they functionally need, in order to be or remain sustainable. However, SISRs are uncertain since they have many possibilities to be in error in the sense that the constructed, situated meanings may finally be proven unsuccessful for the anticipations and the goals of those people engaged in a SISR. The endeavor of this paper is to show that aesthetic behavior plays a crucial role in the reduction of the uncertainty that characterizes such relationships. Aesthetic behavior, as an organized network of affective and cognitive processes, has an anticipatory evaluative function with a strong influence on perception by providing significance and value for those aspects in SISRs that exhibit many possibilities to serve goals that correspond to sustainable challenges. Thus, aesthetic behavior plays an important role in the construction of meanings that are related to both empathic and contextual aspects that constitute the entire situation in which a SISR takes place. Aesthetic behavior has a strong influence in meaning-making, motivating the selection of actions that contribute to our initial goal of interacting with uncertainty, to make the world a bit less puzzling and, thus, to improve our lives, or in other words, to design.     

Coping with ambiguity and uncertainty in patient-physician relationships: II.Traditio argumentum respectus

A methodology of argumentation and a perspective of incredulity are essential ingredients of all intellectual endeavor, including that associated with the art and science of medical care.Traditio argumentum respectus (tradition of respectful argumentation) as a principled system of assessing the validity of beliefs, opinions, perceptions, data, and knowledge, is worthy of practice and perpetuation, because assessments of validity are susceptible to incompleteness, incorrectness, and misinterpretation. Since the latter may lead to ambiguity, uncertainty, anxiety, and animosity among the individuals (patients and physicians) involved in such dialogue, objective analyses and criteria are desirable. A tradition of respectful argumentation is a means to this end—to maximize objectivity and minimize subjectivity as part of decision-making processes and to preserve the integrity of the participants in a patient-physician relationship. During such discourse one must always be cognizant of fallacious arguments—material, verbal, and formal fallacies—since they compromise the validity of assertions. This essay summarizes a classification of fallacious arguments, by definition and by example, predicated upon the intellectual tradition of Occidental Society; and advocates a tradition of respectful argumentation to nullify them.