Analogy and exchangeability in predictive inferences

An important problem in inductive probability theory is the design of exchangeable analogical methods, i.e., of exchangeable inductive methods that take into account certain considerations of analogy by similarity for predictive inferences. Here a precise reformulation of the problem of predictive analogy is given and a new family of exchangeable analogical methods is introduced.Firstly, it is proved that the exchangeable analogical method introduced by Skyrms (1993) does not satisfy the best known general principles of predictive analogy. Secondly, Skyrms's approach — consisting of the usage of particular hyper-Carnapian methods, i.e., mixtures of Carnapian inductive methods — is adopted in the design of a new family of exchangeable analogical methods. Lastly, it is proved that such methods satisfy an interesting general principle of predictive analogy.     

Working memory capacity and time course of predictive inferences

A naming task assessed activation of inference concepts during reading. A predicting, or a control, context sentence was followed by a target word to be named, which represented the predicted event or an inconsistent event. The interval between the end of the context and the onset of the target word varied between 50 and 1050 msec. Individual differences in working memory capacity were assessed by the reading span task. As reflected by facilitation in naming latencies in the predicting condition, relative to the control condition, (a) inferences were not made within the first 50 msec after the context, regardless of reading span; (b) only the high-span participants drew inferences within a 550-msec interval; and, (c) both the high- and the low-span participants generated them within a 1050-msec interval. These results indicate that high working memory capacity accelerates the time course of predictive inferences, although they do not become automatic. We propose that this effect occurs because these inferences involve time-consuming elaborations that place demands on the effortful and limited resources of working memory. Deficiencies in word knowledge, speed of lexical access, or comprehension of explicit information do not account for low-span readers' difficulties in generating predictive inferences.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

Strategic influence on the time course of predictive inferences in reading

In the present study, we investigated how reading strategies affect the time course of online predictive inferences. Participants read sentences under instructions either to anticipate the outcomes of described events or to understand the sentences. These were followed by a target word to be named, with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 500 or 1,000 msec (50- or 550-msec interstimulus interval, respectively). Sentences either were predictive of events or were lexically matched control sentences. There was facilitation in naming latencies for predictable target words in the strategic-anticipation condition at both SOAs, but not in the read-to-understand condition, with a significant improvement in the former condition in comparison with the latter. This suggests that predictive inferences, which are typically considered to be resource demanding, can be speeded up by specific goals in reading. Moreover, this can occur at no cost to comprehension of explicit information, as was revealed by a comprehension test.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

On-line predictive inferences in reading: Processing timeduring versusafter the priming context

Prior research suggests that predictive inferences take time to construct on-line. The present study examines the relative contribution of time available during and after reading an inducing context. In six experiments, we manipulated the presentation rate of the context and the delay between the onset of the last word in the context and a target word. A predicting, or a control, sentence context was followed by a target word, which represented the predicted event or an unlikely event. The results indicated that increasing the time available during reading of the context improved comprehension of explicit information, but it did not affect construction of inferences. In contrast, increasing the delay at the end of the context did not affect explicit comprehension, but it enhanced the probability of inferences, as revealed by shorter latencies in naming the predictable target word after the inducing context, relative to the control context. These findings show that readers defer making predictive inferences until 1 sec after the sentence context has been read, regardless of the time available when they are processing the context.     

Character profiles and adolescents’ self-reported affect

Cognitive and behavioral changes during adolescence might be understood from the perspective of increased executive functioning that is expressed as gradual maturing character. Character profiles (combinations of low and high scores in three character traits: Self-directedness, Cooperativeness, and Self-transcendence) of 439 Swedish adolescents were used to evaluate the linear and non-linear relationship between character traits and self-reported positive and negative affect. Linear analysis showed that all three character traits were associated to positive and negative affect. Non-linear analysis showed that Self-directedness was associated with high positive affect and low negative affect when Cooperativeness was high. No association of higher Cooperativeness with positive and negative affect was found. Higher Self-transcendence was associated with higher negative affect when both Self-directedness and Cooperativeness were high. Although, Self-directedness, Cooperativeness, and Self-transcendence are associated to adolescents’ affective experience, these character traits are not associated to positive and negative affect in the same manner or linearly. Self-directedness’s positive relationship to high positive affect and low negative affect was present only when Cooperativeness was high. In other words, an autonomous adolescent (i.e., high Self-directedness) might experience more positive and less negative emotions as long as she/he feels as an integral part of society (i.e., high Cooperativeness).     

Hemispheric processing of anaphoric inferences: the activation of multiple antecedents

This research investigates the hemispheric processing of anaphors when readers activate multiple antecedents. Participants read texts promoting an anaphoric inference and performed a lexical decision task to inference-related target words that were consistent (Experiment 1) or inconsistent (Experiment 2) with the text. These targets were preceded by constrained or less constraining text and were presented to participants' right visual field-left hemisphere or to their left visual field-right hemisphere. In Experiment 1, both hemispheres showed facilitation for consistent antecedents and the right hemisphere showed an advantage over the left hemisphere in processing antecedents when preceded by less constrained text. In Experiment 2, the left hemisphere only showed negative facilitation for inconsistent antecedents. When readers comprehend text with multiple antecedents: both hemispheres process consistent information, the left hemisphere inhibits inconsistent information, and the right hemisphere processes less constrained information.     

Right and left hemisphere cooperation for drawing predictive and coherence inferences during normal story comprehension

In three experiments, healthy young participants listened to stories promoting inferences and named inference-related test words presented to the right visual field-Left Hemisphere (rvf-LH) or to the left visual field-Right Hemisphere (lvf-RH). Participants showed priming for predictive inferences only for target words presented to the lvf-RH; in contrast, they showed priming for coherence inferences only for target words presented to the rvf-LH. These results, plus the fact that patients with RH brain damage have difficulty drawing coherence inferences and do not show inference-related priming, suggest that information capable of supporting predictive inferences is more likely to be initially activated in the RH than the LH, but following coherence breaks these concepts (now coherence inferences) are completed in the LH. These results are consistent with the theory that the RH engages in relatively coarse semantic coding, which aids full comprehension of discourse.     

Associative and causal reasoning accounts of causal induction: Symmetries and asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic inferences

Associative and causal reasoning accounts are probably the two most influential types of accounts of causal reasoning processes. Only causal reasoning accounts predict certain asymmetries between predictive (i.e., reasoning from causes to effects) and diagnostic (i.e., reasoning from effects to causes) inferences regarding cue-interaction phenomena (e.g., the overshadowing effect). In the experiments reported here, we attempted to delimit the conditions under which these asymmetries occur. The results show that unless participants perceived the relevance of causal information to solving the task, predictive and diagnostic inferences were symmetrical. Specifically, Experiments 1A and 1B showed that implicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by having participants review the instructions favored the presence of asymmetries between predictive and diagnostic situations. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that explicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by stating the importance of the causal role of events after the instructions were given also favored the asymmetry.     

Age and the availability of inferences.

Age differences in inference availability and memory were investigated using a speeded decision procedure and cued recall. Younger and older adults read passages that directly suggested either a target inference or an incorrect, competing inference before finally supporting the target inference. At critical points in a passage, subjects judged whether each of a series of words, including either the target or competing inference, was consistent with their current interpretation. Although both groups agreed on the final target inference, younger and older adults showed different patterns of inference availability and revision. Older adults showed broader and more sustained activation of alternative interpretations and also showed lower levels of inference recall. These findings are interpretable by a framework that proposes age-related breakdowns in inhibitory mechanisms that control the contents of working memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).     

Transitive and pseudo-transitive inferences

Given that A is longer than B, and that B is longer than C, even 5-year-old children can infer that A is longer than C. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules of inference invoke simple axioms ("meaning postulates") to capture such transitive inferences. An alternative theory proposes instead that reasoners construct mental models of the situation described by the premises in order to draw such inferences. An unexpected consequence of the model theory is that if adult reasoners construct simple models of typical situations, then they should infer transitive relations where, in certain cases, none exists. We report four studies corroborating the occurrence of these "pseudo-transitive" fallacies. Experiment 1 established that individuals' diagrams of certain non-transitive relations yield transitive conclusions. Experiment 2 showed that these premises also give rise to fallacious transitive inferences. Experiment 3 established that when the context suggested alternatives to the simple models, the participants made fewer errors. Experiment 4 showed that tense is an important aspect of meaning which affects whether individuals draw transitive conclusions. We discuss the implications of these results for various theories of reasoning.     

On the relation between spontaneous trait inferences and intentional inferences: An inference monitoring hypothesis

More than twenty five years after the beginning of research on spontaneous trait inferences (Winter & Uleman, 1984) an intriguing paradox in the impression formation literature remains: if traits are spontaneously inferred, why aren't they used to organize behavioral information and thereby facilitate recall under memory instructions (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980)? We hypothesized that organization by traits is more evident under impression formation goals because only in that case then are inferences sufficiently monitored to permit their use in organizing impressions. As a consequence, such monitored traits can then be used strategically as retrieval cues. Merging the main features of the Winter and Uleman and the Hamilton et al. experimental paradigms, Experiment 1 simultaneously replicated the main results of both studies. Using a new recognition paradigm, Experiments 2 and 3 further tested this inference monitoring hypothesis by showing that monitoring of trait inferences only occurs under particular processing goals, and is dependent on the availability of cognitive resources.     

Figural factors and the development of pictorial inferences

The role of figural characteristics in the development of pictorial inferences was examined. Two versions of 10 three-picture story sequences were presented to kindergarten and third-grade children. One version maximized while the other minimized figural similarity among pictures. After viewing the sequences, the children were asked to discriminate old study pictures and inferentially consistent new pictures from distractors. While the kindergarteners identified significantly fewer inference pictures than the third graders in all conditions, there was less difference between the grades in the figurally similar conditions. Overall, the kindergarteners identified the fewest inference pictures in the presence of distractors that figurally matched the study pictures. These results indicate that although the pictorial inferences drawn by kindergarteners are heavily influenced by figural representations, such figural dependency cannot account for all of the observed developmental differences.     

On the status of statistical inferences

Can the axioms of probability theory and the classical patterns of statistical inference ever be falsified by observation? Various possible answers to this question are examined in a set theoretical context and in relation to the findings of microphysics.     

Are conjunctive inferences easier than disjunctive inferences? A comparison of rules and models

We report four experiments investigating conjunctive inferences (from a conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from a disjunction and the same two conditionals). The mental model theory predicts that the conjunctive inferences, which require one model, should be easier than the disjunctive inferences, which require multiple models. Formal rule theories predict either the opposite result or no difference between the inferences. The experiments showed that the inferences were equally easy when the participants evaluated given conclusions, but that the conjunctive inferences were easier than the disjunctive inferences (1) when the participants drew their own conclusions, (2) when the conjunction and disjunction came last in the premises, (3) in the time the participants spent reading the premises and in responding to given conclusions, and (4) in their ratings of the difficulty of the inferences. The results support the model theory and demonstrate the importance of reasoners' inferential strategies.