Are the laws of physics ‘economical with the truth’?

It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics are deceitful in that they give the impression of greater unity and coherence in our theories than is actually found to be the case. Causal stories and phenomenological relationships are claimed to provide a more acceptable account of the world, and only theoretical entities — not laws — are considered as perhaps corresponding to real features of the world.This paper examines these claims in the light of the author's own field of research: high energy physics. Some of the distinctions upon which the above conclusions are based are found not to be tenable in practice. Examples from experimental particle physics are presented which suggest an important role of the underlying theoretical structure which cannot be overlooked. It is argued that the fundamental theories must, in fact, be treated as being as worthy or unworthy of ontological commitment as the entities they postulate or the phenomenological relationships they inspire. Whilst it is conceded that aspects of the current theoretical formalism belie literal interpretation, it is maintained that revision in these particular areas need not affect the symmetry principles, particle spectra, or coupling strengths that largely determine the empirical content of the theory.Various other reasons for believing that the laws of physics may be dishonest are examined and in particular attention is drawn to the current tendency in particle physics to judge a theory's merits by aesthetic criteria. The difficulty of providing a sound justification for this behaviour does lead to the suspicion that our abstract representation of the world may in fact be coloured by anthropomorphic prejudices. The question then remains as to whether this merely points to a certain embellishment of the truth or the masquerading of a lie.I would like to thank my colleagues in high energy physics for their comments on this paper, and I am also particularly indebted to members of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge University for many fruitful discussions on these and related topics. I have benefitted over many years from stimulating philosophical arguments with my friend Alan Birchall, of the NRPB. I would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of John Bell, who had arranged to meet with me at CERN to discuss some of these topics shortly before his tragic death. He was an inspiration to many of us in high energy physics, with interests in the wider issues raised by our subject, and he will be greatly missed.     

‘Critical psychotherapy,’ ‘postpsychotherapy,’ and the cult of technicism

This paper about the terms ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ argues that the terms ‘critical psychology,’ ‘critical psychiatry,’ and ‘postpsychiatry’ are already in use, and we can see the new terms – ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ – as additions to this already existing family of terms. However, this paper also argues that what is of most importance is not the case for using these new terms, but the tendencies and features these terms might be taken to refer to. The paper begins with an experience the author had while working as a counsellor some years ago. The terms listed above are explored, as are the roots of ‘critical psychotherapy’ in psychoanalysis, before providing an example of how a philosopher’s work might be relevant to psychotherapists.     

Truth in Frege's ‘law of truth’

I wish to thank Peter Hylton, from whom I have learned much in discussion of these issues, and whose comments upon a previous draft of this paper helped to give it its present shape. I must also thank two anonymous referees, who were most helpful on both specific and general points, and Axel Boldt, who helped with the German.     

‘There and then’, ‘here and now’, ‘when and if’: The relationship of present,past and future in the consulting room

This paper revolves around the question of the patient’s inhabiting of time. Where is the main focus of the patient’s indwelling in time – the past, the present or the future – and what are the qualitative aspects of such indwelling? Of equal significance, is the patient able to move freely between past, present and future events and preoccupations and make links between them, or is he or she caught in a ‘time warp’? These questions are explored within a context of both psychodynamic and existential theory, drawing on the one hand on the work of Winnicott, Bick, Bion and Turp and on the other of Heidegger, Van den Berg, Merleau-Ponty, Kemp and Scheffler. The themes addressed are illustrated with clinical examples.     

Reiteration: The ‘Imperative of the Word’ and Echoing the ‘Significative Terms’

Abstract

The act of reiteration is viewed as a therapeutic reply that is especially responsive in the face of what Lacan (1977) and Heidegger (1927/1962) respectively refer to as “empty speech” and “idle talk.” By hearing and selecting those key signifiers and phrasings that bear the client's story of distress, the act of reiteration allows us to focus and address the “subject who speaks” rather than the commonsense storyline itself. As an active and continuing punctuation of the client's direct discourse at the level of the word, the act of reiteration is only the first moment of a more complete narrative reply. But in keeping the therapist ever grounded in the client's direct expressions, it is this first moment of reiteration that leaves the therapist positioned to be responsive to the client's discourse of “rhetorical displacements,” of intimation and allusion, as these “echo” from “elsewhere.”     

An existential-phenomenological perspective on the concept of ‘resistance’ in counselling and psychotherapy

The various phenomena that are categrised under the label of ‘Resistance’ are of central concern to most models of counselling and psychotherapy. The manner in which resistance is conceptualised has vital implications for therapists approach to the therapeutic relationship. The theory of resistance in classical Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (and particularly Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy) is examined and then compared to the radical reinterpretation possible in an Existential-Phenomenoogical perspective which promotes the rejection of the role of ‘therapist as expert change agent’.     

Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek and the ‘God filter’

Kierkegaard??s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ??special relationships??. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard??s account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira??s account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek??s concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard??s position centred round the image of God as a ??filter?? through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira??s account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard??s idea that neighbour love is only a ??sketch?? until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard??s position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek??s critique.     

Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: ‘Because’, ‘In Virtue of’, and ‘Made True By…’

Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail.     

Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.     

‘Pre-crime’, Prevent,and practices of exceptionalism: Psychotherapy and the new norm in the NHS

Section ’26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on local authorities and public sector institutions to have ‘due regard to the need to Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. Accordingly, NHS staff are now required to attend a Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP), ensuring they are trained to spot the ideological symptoms and psychosocial vulnerabilities thought to predict extremist activity. In this paper, I suggest that the insertion of counter-radicalisation duties into the work of psychotherapists and other mental health professionals is not simply to be understood as an attempt to forestall and avert extremist activity. Rather, drawing on the work of Georgio Agamben and Judith Butler, I argue it can be viewed as an innovative tactic of governmentality whose technologies of surveillance ensure a culture of conformity in the NHS through which a ‘state of exception’ can be established and normalised. I illuminate this by examining two interrelated aspects of the Prevent duty: one, the decision by the government to embed Prevent within the existing rhetoric and practice of ‘safeguarding vulnerable children and adults’; and two, its discursive representation of the consulting room as ‘pre-criminal space’. I conclude by suggesting that the government’s determination to allow ‘no ungoverned space in which extremism is allowed to flourish’ targets the limits of acceptable speech and so the very conditions for radical thought and critique on which psychotherapy depends.     

Freedom Reconsidered: Heteronomy,Open Subjectivity,and the ‘Gift of Teaching’

This paper analyzes the entanglement of the modern concepts of freedom, autonomy, and the modern notion of the subject and how a passion for and insistence on freedom has undermined the reconstruction of human subjectivity in Heidegger and Foucault, and how such passion has also limited the educational effort at addressing the problems brought to education by the modern notion of the subject. Drawing on Levinas, it suggests that a new understanding of freedom as heteronomy will allow us to envision an open subjectivity that is essential for education. Particularly, it looks at Gert Biesta’s recent campaigns for “subjectification” and “the gift of teaching” to analyze the underlying contradictions caused by the entanglement of freedom and subjectivity.     

‘God's hangman’: James VI,the divine right of kings,and the Devil

This article considers James VI and I's treatise on the divine right of kings, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1598), in relation to his earlier treatise on witchcraft Daemonologie (1597). James's articulation of divine right kingship not only served to refute the arguments of his former tutor, George Buchanan (1506–1582), and the Jesuit, Robert Persons (1546–1610), but also served as a bulwark against the perceived threat of the supernatural to his rule. James incorporated the ideal of a stoic subject previously put forward in his Daemonologie into the Trew Law, offering a doctrine of non-resistance that both Catholic and presbyterian subjects were expected to follow. The ideal stoic subject would remain firmly in command of their passions, enduring the ‘curses’ of tyranny or of witchcraft without actively seeking relief for their circumstances.     

There is an ‘I’ in truth: How salient identities shape dynamic perceptions of truth

This research examined the hypothesis that people judge as true those claims aligned with the normative content of their salient social identities. In Experiment 1a, participants’ social identities were manipulated by assigning them to ‘inductive-thinker’ and ‘intuitive-thinker’ groups. Participants subsequently made truth judgements about aphorisms randomly associated with ‘science’ and ‘popular wisdom’. Those with salient inductive-thinker social identities judged science-based claims as more truthful than popular wisdom-based claims to a greater extent than those with salient intuitive-thinker social identities. Experiment 1b was a preregistered replication, with additional conditions eliminating an alternative semantic-priming explanation. In Experiment 2, American Conservatives and Liberals judged as more true claims associated with the ideological content of their social identities. This difference was attenuated through a manipulation that framed participants as more moderate than they had originally indicated. Overall, these experiments suggest an identity-truth malleability, such that making salient specific social identities can lead to related perceptions of truth normatively aligned with those identities.     

Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl’s phenomenology

The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl’s position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory.