《福乐智慧》国际学术讨论会在京举行

《福乐智慧》国际学术讨论会在京举行本刊记者此会由中国社科院、新＠社科院、新疆社科联联合主办，于１９９３年１０月１９日至２２日召开．参加这次会的，有来自中、俄、哈、蒙、吉、日、美、德等国的学者５０余人。《福乐智慧》是１１世纪我国维吾尔族的伟大学者优素甫·哈斯·哈吉甫的伟大著作，是我国文化宝藏中的一颗珍灿明珠。它的内容很广泛，是一部百科全书式的长诗．这里摘要发表这次会上有关它的哲学思想的几个发言。陈宪泉：《福乐智慧》中知识与信仰、理性与价值的问题《福乐智慧》是一部哲理性很强的伟大诗作。作者以诗剧形式表达了他深刻的哲学思想：幸福源于智慧和知识，智慧和知识带来幸福。他说；“真主赋予谁意识、知识和智慧，他就能打开美德善行的门扉。”（１５１行，以下引文均见民族出版社１９８６年出版的《福乐智慧》汉文版）在这部长篇诗剧中，他还用“意识”、“知识”、“智慧”、“美德”和“善行”等概念范畴，来构建他的哲学宏论。在他看来，哲学家“是真理和信仰的支柱”（４３４５行），他们“用知识为区人将近路指山厂’ｃ（４３ｕ行）《福乐智慧》中的哲学思想，内容十分丰富，涉及领域很广，论述问题很多。这里．找试旧对计人优东南关于知识与信仰、９ＩＴ性与价     

谁对世界哲学负责?

研究哲学是哲学家的责任。研究世界哲学是世界哲学家的责任。什么是哲学?什么是世界哲学?谁是世界哲学家?他们的责任是什么? 哲学不仅是爱智慧,它还含有探求事物(自我、社会与宇宙)本质的意思,即探求它们的产生、价值与将来发展。哲学探索往往被限制在最普遍的问题(属于实存、认识与价值的问题),虽然它的目的在于个别个人的改善的(明智的)生活。     

谈冯契对中国传统哲学价值的认识

冯契先生是受人敬仰的一位学者,是对中国哲学和中国哲学史的研究有很大贡献的哲学家和哲学史家。他对中国传统哲学有无价值、中国传统哲学价值的二重性以及中国传统哲学的最高价值即智慧与知识的关系等问题,有着全面、深刻的认识,可以说是20世纪中国哲人对中国传统哲学价值认识的总结者。他对中国传统哲学的当代价值尤为关注,他所建立的     

哲学的本性与前途

人们对哲学的本性是什么可以有各种各样的说法,但谁都不会否认哲学最初的含义是“爱智慧”。哲学家是爱智者而不只是智者, 唯有真正爱智慧的人才是哲学家。智慧与爱智慧的重要区别在于,智慧是人的思维能力,而爱智慧则以这种思维能力为对象,必然导向对思维的反思。 对于智慧的深沉的爱,作为理性的激情是一种巨大的精神力量。没有爱的情感,没有把爱奉献给智慧的热诚,就没有哲学或没有     

艺术对哲学特权的剥夺

在现代主义的形式主义之后,当代艺术作品经常被赋予一种批判功能。这样的作品据说"质疑"世界,并要求对世界"重新思考"以及"反思"……这样的表述指向了苏格拉底式的哲学基础,即哲学家揭示了意见的不稳定性、偏见,废除了没有在理性中奠基的日常信仰和信念。因此,在主宰了19世纪的哲学体系中发生的哲学对艺术占据优势之后,我们在今日发现一种艺术对于哲学任务即批判性质疑所占据的优势。本文试图重建这一新理论态度的历史起源,并试图通过对艺术得以实施这一批判性纲领所需的条件进行考察来评价这一理论态度的相关性。     

黑格尔与作为隐秘虚无主义的现代性

黑格尔社会哲学的兴起存在着两个外在维度:现代性与虚无主义。现代性是在"信仰与知识"的矛盾中,随着自然科学的发展,理性不断取得奠基地位的过程。随着科学理性与实证精神的不断取得支配地位,作为超感性世界的最高价值遭到贬黜,造成植根于形而上学的价值论的虚无主义的兴起。     

中国知识者“志难酬”的哲学思考

中国知识者“志难酬”的哲学思考刘士林怀才不遇、壮志难酬…是传统知识者生命咏叹中最重要的主题之一。在现当代诸多学人中,也常能见到这种复杂情感。这就是中国知识者特有的“志难酬”现象。从哲学角度看,它涉及的是理论与实践的基本关系问题。也只有从这里,才能排除情感和心理因素的困挠,给以科学的解释。“志难酬”现象表明了理论与实践的脱节。“志难酬”的精神痛苦是基于“志酬”（知行合一）这一主观信仰之上的。理论与实践的关系在中国哲学中从未经历过康德式的批判阶段,而是由先秦儒家哲学先验地规定下来的,这种规定也源于儒家学说自身的自我崇拜和信仰方式,因之它的理论根据只能是一种危险的独断论。这种独断论主要表现在：１．出于实践理性的需要,先验地规定理论必须有实用目的,理论必须与实践本身一致,因此理论只能是一种实践理性。２．知识探索被道德命令取代,必然导致对知识的轻视和独断、专制要求。这尤其表现在儒家的知识价值观上,强调学以致用。于是,本应起理论作用的“志”就成为一种与实践理性一体化的道德人格与人生信仰。这就完全混淆了知识与信仰、理论与实践的区别。所以,“志”就仅仅成为实用性的“志向”和“政治理想”。“志难酬”悲剧的最深根源正在于混淆了     

寻求宗教间的新和谐——约翰·希克的宗教多元论思想

约翰·希克(John Hick 1922～)是当代最著名的宗教哲学家和普世神学家之一,他在宗教认识论、神正论、基督论(Christology)以及对宗教间关系的研究等领域都有重大的理论建树。其主要著作有:《信仰与知识》、《恶与仁爱的上帝》、《宗教哲学》、《死亡与永生》、《上帝与信仰     

哲学回归生活

古希腊哲学不仅是话语体系、理论体系、论辩活动或逻辑分析,更是追求智慧的生活方式,哲学话语与作为生活方式的哲学本身是不同的。古代哲学与哲学家的具体生活不可分,哲学家总是不满于流俗的生活,他们竭力追求一种真正值得过的生活,从而追求极高明的生活智慧,极高明的生活智慧与哲学家的生活是不可分的,换言之,古代哲学家是知行合一的。古代汉语中没有"哲学"一词,但古代中国一直不乏追求极高明的生活智慧的哲学,孔子、老子、庄子、王阳明等都是知行合一的哲人(哲学家)。但现代学院派哲学已沦为话语体系、论辩活动或逻辑分析,已不再追求极高明的生活智慧,这是哲学的堕落和悲哀。哲学须回归生活,重新追求极高明的生活智慧,才能对世道人心有所裨益。     

价值哲学研究的新境界——《从理论价值哲学到实践价值哲学》评介与讨论

<正>2006年,我国著名价值哲学家王玉樑先生出版了一本代表作:《21世纪价值哲学:从自发到自觉》。1在该书中,王先生通过对一百多年来中外价值哲学发展轨迹的理性审视和解读,揭示了当代西方价值哲学崇拜自发性的局限,提出了走出价值哲学研究困境的期盼——从自发到自觉。同时,在该书中王先生还区分和讨论了理论价值哲学和实践价值哲学,主张在价值哲学的研究中摒弃单极思维、贯彻全面彻底的关系思维。针对当年王先生的这本代表作,我曾发表了书评:《价值哲学的回顾与     

How new is the new philosophy of psychiatry?

In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford University Press series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry,” an international book series begun in 2003 focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at the interface of philosophy and psychiatry. According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series represents a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing lately. Philosophers and psychiatrists face a “new philosophy of psychiatry”. However, the optimism which the “new” philosophy of psychiatry celebrates is precisely the exiling of philosophy from the foundations of psychiatry. The 150 year old belief that psychopathology cannot do without philosophical reflection has virtually disappeared from common psychiatric education and daily clinical practice. Though the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from philosophy, the impact of philosophy on psychiatry nowadays remains limited. With some exceptions, philosophical papers are embedded in a philosophical context inscrutable to ordinary psychiatrists. Much current philosophical work is perceived by psychiatrists as negativistic. I would encourage the field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philosophical attitudes which render possible true dialogue with philosophy and enrich both disciplines. The views developed here should not discredit the value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton’s paper and the excellent series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.” As Jaspers said “Everybody inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by philosophy in an unperceived way”.     

Idealistische Häresien in der Wissenschaftsphilosophie: Cassirer, Carnap und Kuhn

Idealist Heresies in Philosophy of Science: Cassirer, Carnap, and Kuhn. As common wisdom has it, philosophy of science in the analytic tradition and idealist philosophy are incompatible. Usually, not much effort is spent for explaining what is to be understood by idealism. Rather, it is taken for granted that idealism is an obsolete and unscientific philosophical account. In this paper it is argued that this thesis needs some qualification. Taking Carnap and Kuhn as paradigmatic examples of positivist and postpositivist philosophies of science it is shown that these accounts share important features with Cassirer's idealist philosophy of science developed in the first half of this century. As it turns out, often Cassirer is more modern than those classical philosophers of (post)posivitist philosophy of science. For instance, Quine's criticism against Carnap's empiricist philosophy of science launched in Two Dogmas of Empiricism is anticipated by Cassirer for several decades. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Philosophy Makes No Progress,So What Is the Point of It?

Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.     

第五讲灵敏度分析在临床决策中的应用

通常情况下,在临床上由于病人病情的复杂性,医生在处理病人时要承受一定的风险,此时医生所做出的决策就是风险性型决策.风险型决策之所以有风险,是因为决策所依据的主要参数中,存在不确定性(即概率性)的参数,如果这些参数发生一点变化,或估计时不够准确,有一点出入又会产生怎样的结果呢?这时决策方案还如以前一样稳定吗?因此,应该对决策方案的稳定性进行分析和估计.这时所作的分析和估计就是灵敏度分析.     

HUMANE PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUESTION OF PROGRESS

According to some recent critics, philosophy has not progressed over the course of its history because it has not exhibited any substantial increase in the stock of human wisdom. I reject this pessimistic conclusion by arguing that such criticisms employ a conception of progress drawn from the sciences which is inapplicable to a humanistic discipline such as philosophy. Philosophy should not be understood as the accumulation of epistemic goods in a manner analogous to the natural sciences. I argue that the progressiveness of philosophy consists, if anything, in its capacity to provoke and sustain critical reflections upon the ideas and practices which shape and guide human life.     

Philosophy and Its Pitfalls

Philosophy is an ambitious, speculative practice, aimed at finding out what wisdom is and how to attain it, in so far as that can be done by explicit discussion and argument. A likely pitfall of any such enterprise is that it loses touch with concerns in human life outside itself and becomes scholastic, in the pejorative sense. Academic institutions which encourage wide and outward‐looking intellectual sympathies, and which do not reward narrow point‐scoring specialism, are helpful in resisting the tendency to scholasticism. The Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge might have provided some of the elements of such a setting, by framing an academic structure in which philosophy was studied in conjunction with other subjects in the humanities and social sciences. As things actually developed, that possibility was not realised. Nevertheless, philosophy at Cambridge maintained vigour and significance, through the intellectual freedom and encouragement it provided to some notable individual philosophers.     

HOW I SEE PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND BEYOND

Abstract: This article raises some questions about the relevance and value of philosophy at present and suggests some ways in which philosophy can become relevant again. It challenges philosophers to become more actively engaged in the world and to restore Western philosophy's original vision of “love of wisdom,” a value sorely lacking in the present‐day world and abandoned by much of contemporary Western philosophy. The pursuit of wisdom would involve the quest for sound judgment and synoptic insights regarding the ends humankind should strive to realize, including moral visions to help Homo sapiens emerge from the atavistic jungle. It would also involve sound judgment regarding the proper means for the attainment of these desirable ends. For these things to be possible, philosophy would need to draw upon humankind's collective wisdom in philosophy, religion, and myth, and on advances in scientific knowledge, thereby gaining an ever‐deeper understanding of ourselves and of our place in the cosmos.     

What’s wrong with contemporary philosophy?

Philosophy in the West divides into three parts: Analytic Philosophy (AP), Continental Philosophy (CP), and History of Philosophy (HP). But all three parts are in a bad way. AP is sceptical about the claim that philosophy can be a science, and hence is uninterested in the real world. CP is never pursued in a properly theoretical way, and its practice is tailor-made for particular political and ethical conclusions. HP is mostly developed on a regionalist basis: what is studied is determined by the nation or culture to which a philosopher belongs, rather than by the objective value of that philosopher’s work. Progress in philosophy can only be attained by avoiding these pitfalls.     

Facing being: the significance of Thomist ontological epistemology to realism in post-Kantian philosophy

The Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution’ contained in his Prologomena and The Critique of Pure Reason deemed metaphysical statements to be ‘transcendental illusions’, so directing metaphysics to its dearth. As a consequence, no longer could objects be known ‘in-themselves’ by the sensorily-reliant human. This perceived impossibility of metaphysical knowledge in the turn to the subject from Kant through Nietzsche's rejection of true knowledge has heavily inclined Continental Philosophy to an anti-metaphysical quandary. Analytic Philosophy is no different following the influence of Carnap, Wittgenstein and Rorty upon its own ‘linguistic turn’. An inevitable consequence of things not being knowable in themselves is the philosophical distance from ‘the world’, which Stephen Hawking has argued, makes the philosophical enterprise ‘dead’. In dialogue with this widespread decline in metaphysics, I will attempt to reclaim realist metaphysics through the employment of a Thomist paradigm. If philosophy is to be relevant to the knowledge economy, it is compelled to be in relation with what is. Thus, in my theoretical framework, being will be considered as central to all knowledge systems seeking to correspond to ‘hard’ science. The Thomist realist natural philosophy of ‘scientia’ – wherein truth is conformed with being – will be at the core of the argument. This paper challenges the ignoring of being because extant reality is composed of all that is, continuously faced and never evadable. Consequently, Thomism is recaptured as significant to post-Kantian philosophy as Aquinas articulated a means through which the thinking subject engages with being through sensation and cognition.     

智慧:结构、类型、测量及与相关变量的关系

智慧是个体在其智力与知识的基础上,经由经验与练习习得的一种德才兼备的综合心理素质,包括聪明才智与良好品德两大成份.智慧可分为常规智慧与应变智慧、群体智慧与组织智慧、个人智慧与一般智慧、德慧与物慧等,可用三维智慧量表、自我评估智慧量表以及智慧发展量表等进行测量,并与年龄、性别、文化、教育、人格、思维方式、智力等存在重要关联.今后应该深入探究智慧的概念与结构,拓展其研究方法、测量工具与教育策略以及开展中国化研究.