Mood as input and perseverative worrying following the induction of discrete negative moods

Previous research has demonstrated that a combination of negative mood and rigorous "as many as can" stop rules can be used to help explain a range of perseverative psychopathologies such as pathological worrying, compulsive checking, and depressive rumination (known as the mood-as-input hypothesis). The aim of the present study was to extend this work and examine whether specific emotions of the same valence will have similar or differential effects on task perseveration. The study experimentally induced discrete moods and manipulated task stop rules in an analog population. Results showed that perseveration at a worry-based interview task conformed to standard mood-as-input predictions in which perseveration was significantly greater when an "as many as can" stop rule was paired with a negative mood or a "feel like continuing" stop rule was paired with a positively valenced mood. The pattern of results revealed no significant inherent differences in processing depending on the type of discrete negative mood being experienced. These findings support a view of mood-as-input effects where overall valency is the important factor in determining perseveration.     

Inflated responsibility and perseverative checking: the effect of negative mood

This article reports the results of 2 experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis on the role of inflated responsibility in perseverative checking. Through the use of an analog checking task in both experiments, the authors showed that perseveration, as indicated by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by a combination of the level of inflated responsibility and the valency of mood at the outset of checking. In particular, inflated responsibility significantly facilitated checking perseveration only in the context of a negative mood and was not a sufficient condition for checking perseveration to occur. These effects of the various configurations of inflated responsibility and mood valency are predicted by the mood-as-input hypothesis.     

What ends a worry bout? An analysis of changes in mood and stop rule use across the catastrophising interview task

This paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis about the factors that contribute to the ending of a worry bout. Experiment 1 looked at changes in self-reported mood across a catastrophising interview task. Experiment 2 investigated whether there were any changes in stop rule deployment between the beginning and end of a catastrophising interview task. Experiment 1 demonstrated that worriers tended to show increases in negative mood and decreases in positive mood over the course of catastrophising. In Experiment 2, participants exhibited a significant shift away from endorsing the use of 'as many as can' stop rules and a significant increasing tendency to endorse the use of 'feel like continuing' stop rules over the course of catastrophising. These results suggest that worriers exhibit increases in negative mood across the worry bout, but shift from the use of 'as many as can' to 'feel like continuing' stop rules. Mood-as-input hypothesis predicts that if high worriers ask the question "do I feel like continuing?" in the context of increasing negative mood, this will imply that the activity is no longer enjoyable or profitable and should be terminated. The results are discussed in the context of mood-as-input accounts of pathological worrying and the therapeutic implications of these findings are reviewed.     

Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

Inflated responsibility and the use of stop rules for catastrophic worrying

The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test some predictions from a mood-as-input explanation of catastrophic worrying (). In particular, these experiments attempted to identify whether worriers possess characteristics that would contribute to the use of relatively strict 'as many as can' closure rules for catastrophising. Experiment 1 demonstrated that high worriers begin a catastrophising task with higher self-reported levels of responsibility towards fully considering all issues involved, than low worriers. Experiment 2 suggested that inflated responsibility has a causal effect on perseveration at the catastrophising task (rather than being a simple non-causal by-product of excessive worrying), and that inflated responsibility exacerbates catastrophising only in conjunction with negative mood. This suggests a relatively complex relationship between responsibility and mood, where there are mood conditions in which high responsibility does not generate greater persistence than low responsibility. These findings are consistent with predictions from a mood-as-input account of catastrophic worrying, and provide evidence for a putative mechanism that mediates the influence of variables such as inflated responsibility on perseveration.     

Mood-as-input and depressive rumination

This article describes a test of mood-as-input theory predictions as applied to a rumination task in a nonclinical population. An experimenter-controlled interview was used to allow participants to reflect on a personal period of depression while in an experimentally-induced mood state (either negative or positive) or while deploying a specific stop rule for the task (either an “as many as can” or “feel like continuing” stop rule). As predicted by mood-as-input theory, persistence at the rumination task was greatest in the group experiencing negative mood while deploying an “as many as can” stop rule, and this suggests a mechanism that may contribute to perseverative depressive rumination. It is argued that the variables that contributed to perseveration in this study are already known to be characteristic of ruminative thinkers (e.g. negative mood and positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination that will command the deployment of “as many as can” stop rules for rumination). It is also argued that mood-as-input processes may provide a common mechanism for perseverative rumination and perseverative worry, and this common mechanism may account for many of the similarities between these two functionally-distinct activities.     

Mood as input and catastrophic worrying

The authors describe 3 experiments investigating a "mood-as-input" approach to understanding catastrophic worrying. Experiment 1 found that induced negative mood increased the number of steps emitted in both a catastrophizing interview procedure and a positive iteration task. Experiment 2 found that the number of items that worriers emitted in an iterative item generation task was dependent on the stop rules specified by the procedure. Experiment 3 found that manipulating the stop rules for catastrophizing had differential effects on worriers and nonworriers, depending on the nature of the stop rules specified. These results suggest that mood provides information about continuing or terminating the catastrophizing process that is interpreted in the context of the stop rules for the task. It is argued that the mood-as-input hypothesis accounts for the facts of exacerbated catastrophizing in worriers better than explanations couched in terms of either mood congruency effects or worriers possessing a generalized perseverative iterative style.     

Am I guilty or not? Deontological guilt,uncertainty, and checking behavior

Literature suggests that checking behaviors are aimed at reducing feelings of uncertainty both in clinical samples with obsessive‐compulsive disorder and in general population. Previous studies also showed that deontological guilt is an emotion often associated with obsessive‐compulsive disorder. Thus, the aim of the current study was to investigate the differences in checking behaviors in the condition of high versus low uncertainty, by exploring the moderating role of deontological versus altruistic guilt. Participants were 108 undergraduate Italian university students who took part in a visual search task designed to elicit checking behavior. Ahead of the visual task, participants were administered one scenario in order to manipulate either deontological or altruistic guilt. The results showed that in the condition of uncertainty, compared with the condition of certainty, participants spent more time in checking behaviors and that such a difference was more consistent when participants experienced deontological rather than altruistic guilt. Limitations and further directions are discussed.     

Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception

Earlier studies have found that perseverative checking provokes memory distrust for checked stimuli, suggesting that compulsive checking is a counter-productive strategy to increase memory confidence. Obsessive Compulsive (OC) uncertainty also occurs for functions other than memory, like perception. Uncertainty about perception in OC patients gives rise to prolonged attending to the issues that patients feel uncertain about. In an experiment with 40 healthy volunteers, it was tested whether OC-like, perseverative (visual) attending induces OC-like experiences of dissociation and perceptual uncertainty. Participants had to look at an object (a gas stove or a light bulb) during a pre-test and a post-test. In between these tests, participants in the experimental condition were asked to stare at an object that was the same as the to-be-looked-at object during the pre/post-tests. Participants in the control condition stared at an object that was different from the object they looked at during pre/post-test. Both in the experimental and control conditions, dissociation was observed; the effects were equally strong. Critically, with regards to OC-like perceptual uncertainty, the effects were significantly stronger in the experimental condition. The findings indicate that OC-like perseveration induces distrust, not only about memory, but also about perception. To explain the results, we suggest that perseveration interferes with spreading of activation and that cognitive uncertainty (and possibly derealisation) is the experiential end-product of perseveration. It is suggested that all forms of OC perseveration share such interference and that all undermine confidence in cognitive operations.     

Relationships between anger, symptoms, and cognitive factors in OCD checkers

The purpose of this study was to examine whether individuals diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) with primary checking compulsions report higher levels of trait anger and anger expression compared with a student control group, and whether trait anger and anger expression are correlated with specific beliefs and interpretations that are common among individuals who compulsively check. A group of individuals with OCD reporting significant checking compulsions (n=33) and a group of undergraduate students (n=143) completed a questionnaire package that included measures of trait anger and anger expression, as well as measures of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and beliefs. The compulsive checking group reported greater trait anger, though not greater anger expression, than the student control group. Furthermore, beliefs concerning perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty were positively correlated with anger expression and trait anger among compulsive checkers but not among the student control group. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of cognitive-behavioural treatments for and models of compulsive checking in OCD.     

Repeated checking causes distrust in memory but not in attention and perception

Repeated checking to reduce memory distrust seems to be counterproductive: it increases memory distrust. Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients tend to be uncertain about other cognitive domains as well, like attention and perception. In an experiment with 70 healthy participants, we tested whether perseverative checking induces distrust not only in memory, but also in attention and perception. Participants were administered a computer task in which they had to activate, deactivate, and check threat-irrelevant stimuli, and rate their confidence in memory, attention, and perception in a pre-test and post-test. In between these tests, the relevant checking group performed 20 checks of the same stimuli used in the pre- and post-test. The irrelevant checking group performed 20 checks of different stimuli. Although memory accuracy improved in both groups, repeated checking reduced confidence in memory, vividness, and detail in the relevant checking group, but not in the irrelevant checking group. A trend was found towards a decline in attentional confidence in the relevant checking group only. Perception was not affected by repetitive checking. A replication study revealed similar results of relevant checking on meta-memory, however, the trend for attentional distrust was not confirmed. The results suggest that perseveration may be domain specific, i.e., only the cognitive processes that are subject to perseveration are affected.     

Compulsive checking and anxiety in a nonclinical sample: Differences in cognition,behavior, personality,and affect

This study addresses the question of why some highly anxious individuals exhibit excessive levels of compulsive checking behavior while other do not. To this end, nonclinical samples of compulsive checkers (n=19), (nonchecking) anxious controls (n=16), and (nonchecking) nonanxious controls (n=12) were compared on a variety of cognitive, behavioral, personality, and affective measures hypothesized to differentiate checkers from anxious controls. Results indicated that checkers exhibited higher levels of perfectionism and worry, and demonstrated greater cognitive impairment on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Furthermore, performance and subjective experiences of performance appeared to be mediated by perfectionism and worry. Findings suggest that both personality and cognitive variables are important correlates of the form of anxiety-related symptomatology.     

Causal uncertainty and metacognitive inferences about goal attainment

These four studies investigated G. Weary and J. A. Edwards’ (1996) hypothesis that causal uncertainty feelings serve as input to perceivers regarding the adequacy of their causal knowledge and thus determine the amount of processing accorded a given task. Participants worked on a task until they had satisfied an assigned stop rule. In three experiments, high causally uncertain people processed more information under a sufficiency of information rule and less under an enjoyment rule, whereas low causally uncertain people generally did not differentiate between the rules. In the last experiment, low causally uncertain people exhibited a similar pattern to the chronic causally uncertain individuals in the first experiments, but only after their causal uncertainty beliefs and feelings had been primed.     

Body checking behaviors in men

Males have been facing increasing pressure from the media to attain a lean, muscular physique, and are at risk for body dissatisfaction, disturbed eating and exercise behaviors, and abuse of appearance- and performance-enhancing drugs (APEDs). The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between body checking and mood, symptoms of muscle dysmorphia, importance of shape and weight, and APED use in undergraduate males. Body checking in males was correlated with weight and shape concern, symptoms of muscle dysmorphia, depression, negative affect, and APED use. Body checking predicted APED use and uniquely accounted for the largest amount of variance in Muscle Dysmorphic Disorder Inventory (MDDI) scores (16%). Findings support the view that body checking is an important construct in male body image, muscle dysmorphia, and body change strategies and suggest a need for further research.     

“That camera adds ten pounds!:” Women's reactions to visual weight-related feedback and the role of trait body checking

In Study 1 women were randomly assigned to viewing: (1) no photo of themselves, (2) an accurate, full-body photo, (3) a photo modified to make them appear thinner than usual, or (4) a photo modified to make them appear heavier than usual. Measures of mood, state self-esteem, and body dissatisfaction were completed. There were no main effects of photo condition; participants were generally poor at perceiving weight change. The heavier that participants thought they looked in their photo as compared to usual, the worse their appearance self-esteem and body dissatisfaction. Study 2 replicated these results and found that participants with higher levels of trait body checking were more likely to report that they looked heavier than usual in the photo. Study 3 replicated these results and found that the correlation between body parts checking and how participants thought they looked in the photo held true even after controlling for appearance investment.     

Confidence in memory and other cognitive processes in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Previous studies have implicated beliefs about one's memory (i.e., meta-memory), in maintaining the symptoms of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD), particularly with respect to checking rituals. However, most research has focused on task- or situation-specific perceptions about memory performance. Expanding on this research, we undertook two studies with analogue and clinical cohorts to examine the relationship between general ‘trait’ beliefs about memory and related processes and OCD symptoms. Trait meta-memory as measured in the current study was conceptualised as a multi-dimensional construct encompassing a range of beliefs about memory and related processes including confidence in one's general memory abilities, decision-making abilities, concentration and attention, as well as perfectionistic standards regarding one's memory. Meta-memory factors were associated with OCD symptoms, predicting OCD symptoms over-and-above mood and other OCD-relevant cognitions. Meta-memory factors were found to be particularly relevant to checking symptoms. Implications for theory and research are discussed.     

Advances in the Cognitive Behavioural Treatment of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder

The aim of this paper is to highlight key advances in the cognitive-behavioural treatment of obsessive compulsive disorder over the course of Professor Lars Göran Öst's illustrious career. The paper will focus on three specific areas of interest: the treatment of obsessions, compulsive checking, and the fear of contamination. It will also highlight recent advances concerning the broader need to ensure that treatment is acceptable. An increase in acceptability could result in improvements in completion rates so that more patients benefit from the recent improvements in the science and therapy for this disabling disorder.     

Selective information use and perseveration in the search behavior of infants and young children

Two experiments examined the early development of selective information use in search. The first experiment tested 9- and 16-month-olds on a modification of Piaget's Stage IV object permanence task. It examined infants' use of information from previous experiences with an object (prior information) and from the most recent hiding (current information) to locate a hidden object. In the second experiment, 2-, $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}$-, and 4-year-old children received these same sources of information along with new forms of prior and current information: information about the typical locations of objects (location specificity) and verbal information. No systematic perseveration was observed at 9 months, although previous findings related to perseveration were replicated. Perseveration was found at 16 months, but there was also evidence of selectivity at that age. When errors occurred, they tended to be to the prior location, but they were infrequent in comparison to correct searches at the current location. The preschoolers, while continuing to show perseveration, were more consistently selective than the infants. They also showed considerable generality in extending their selectivity to new sources of information.     

Why do children lack the flexibility to innovate tools?

Despite being proficient tool users, young children have surprising difficulty in innovating tools (making novel tools to solve problems). Two experiments found that 4- to 7-year-olds had difficulty on two tool innovation problems and explored reasons for this inflexibility. Experiment 1 (N = 51) showed that children’s performance was unaffected by the need to switch away from previously correct strategies. Experiment 2 (N = 92) suggested that children’s difficulty could not easily be explained by task pragmatics or permission issues. Both experiments found evidence that some children perseverated on a single incorrect strategy, but such perseveration was insufficient to explain children’s tendency not to innovate tools. We suggest that children’s difficulty lies not with switching, task pragmatics, or behavioral perseveration but rather with solving the fundamentally “ill-structured” nature of tool innovation problems.     

Accessibility as input: The use of construct accessibility as information to guide behavior

Priming typically increases behavioral enactments of primed constructs. The current work explored a novel mechanism for the behavioral effects of priming, termed the “accessibility as input” account. In two experiments, participants were nonconsciously primed and then completed anagrams until they judged themselves to have reached a particular state. Two different states, or stop rules, were specified, and were matched to the primed constructs such that the combination either implied that the state had been met (e.g., “slow” prime and “tired” stop rule) or had not been met (e.g., “fast” prime and “tired” stop rule). The priming and stop rule manipulations interacted to determine persistence on the anagram task. The results demonstrate that the heightened accessibility resulting from priming can be used as information about one’s current state in relation to situational requirements and, hence, can produce varying, contextually-dependent behavior.