A baldrige process for ethics?

In this paper we describe and explore a management tool called the Caux Round Table Self-Assessment and Improvement Process (SAIP). Based upon the Caux Round Table Principles for Business — a stakeholder-based, transcultural statement of business values — the SAIP assists executives with the task of shaping their firm’s conscience through an organizational self-appraisal process. This process is modeled after the self-assessment methodology pioneered by the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Program. After briefly describing the SAIP, we address three topics. First, we examine similarities and differences between the Baldrige approach to corporate self-assessment and the self-assessment process utilized within the SAIP. Second, we report initial findings from two beta tests of the tool. These illustrate both the SAIP’s ability to help organizations strengthen their commitment to ethically responsible conduct, and some of the tool’s limitations. Third, we briefly analyze various dimensions of the business scandals of 2001–2002 (Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc.) in light of the ethical requirements articulated with the SAIP. This analysis suggests that the SAIP can help link the current concerns of stakeholders — for example, investors and the general public — to organizational practice, by providing companies with a practical way to incorporate critical lessons from these unfortunate events. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

Are ethics different in different settings?

Practicing counselors may interpret ethical obligations differently according to their work settings. These differences are related to: (a) the relative strength of the professional identification of counselors in various settings, and (b) differences in the support for or pressures against ethical practice in different settings. This article focuses on one of the problems related to the nature of the client population and the counseling setting: What rights of confidentiality do minors have against disclosure to their parents?     

Virtue ethics and modern society—A response to the thesis of the modern predicament of virtue ethics

The revival of modern Western virtue ethics presents the question of whether or not virtue ethics is appropriate for modern society. Ethicists believe that virtue ethics came from traditional society, to which it conforms so well. The appearance of the market economy and a utilitarian spirit, together with society’s diversification, is a sign that modern society has arrived. This also indicates a transformation in the moral spirit. But modern society has not made virtues less important, and even as modern life has become more diversified, rule-following ethics have taken on even greater importance. Modern ethical life is still the ethical life of individuals whose self-identity contains the identity of moral spirit, and virtues have a very important influence on the self-identical moral characters. Furthermore, modern society, which is centered around utilitarianism, makes it apparent that rules themselves are far from being adequate and virtues are important. Virtues are a moral resource for modern people to resist modern evils.     

Why teach ethics in science and engineering?

The following views were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993 organized by Stephanie J. Bird (M.I.T.), Penny J. Gilmer (Florida State University) and Terrell W. Bynum (Southern Connecticut State University). Opragen Publications thanks the AAAS, seminar organizers and authors for permission to publish extracts from the conference. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of AAAS or its Board of Directors.     

Is ethics fundamental? Questioning Levinas on irresponsibility

Continental Philosophy Review - My title echoes Levinas' 1951 “Is ontology fundamental?” – a seminal piece that paved the way for his justly famous Totality and Infinity and...     

Certifying clinical ethics consultants: who pays?

The movement advocating the formal certification of clinical ethics consultants may result in major changes to the field of clinical ethics consultation by creating a new standard of care. The actual certification process is still in the development phase, but unanswered questions include: What will certification cost, and, Who will pay? Currently there is little salary support for ethics consultants and no regulation requiring healthcare institutions to offer clinical ethics consultation. Without the support of healthcare administrators and accreditation bodies, this may remain unchanged. Healthcare administrators may be unwilling to pay for certification or professional services if accreditation bodies do not require healthcare institutions to provide certified ethics consultants' services. If consultants will not be reimbursed or paid, they may not seek certification. If certified consultants are required, healthcare administrators may look for ways to cover the costs for providing this service, including insurance or third-party reimbursement and direct billing of patients for consultations, which may affect who performs and who participates in ethics consultation. However, this is less than ideal, as bioethicists believe ethics consultation should be available to all as part of providing safe, quality ethical care and support and guidance for patients, families, and healthcare staff. Going forward, bioethicists should study quality improvement, patient safety, and cost-savings resulting from certification-eligible clinical ethics consultants' activities. Administrators and financial personnel can be surveyed regarding their support for the certification process. Bioethicists should enlist the help of patient rights and safety advocacy groups, professional medical associations, and healthcare administrators. Bioethicists should invite accreditation bodies, healthcare administrators, and financial personnel to collaborate in the development of the certification process. Without their support, certification may be of value only to the bioethics community, and may have little standing in actual clinical healthcare institution settings.     

Exploration of values: Israeli teachers’ professional ethics

The main purpose of this study was to explore Israeli teachers’ professional ethics and values using the Facet Theory (Guttman in Psychmetrika 33:469–506, 1968). Since Israel does not have a teachers’ code of ethics, such exploration can be a basis for constructing one. The study is mainly exploratory, and the main hypotheses that guided the study were based upon universal structure of values (Pakizeh et al. in J Exp Soc Psychol 43(3): 458–465, 2007 Schwartz, in Advances in experimental social psychology. Academic Press, San Diego, 1992), and were examined using a mapping sentence. The initial findings showed the data deployment on the SSA map exhibits both a radial and an angular form in a Radex configuration. Israeli teachers believe that professional ethics is based on conditioned values. The variables in the SSA map appear in a radial configuration forming three concentric circles: personal values, social values, and universal values. The components representing the code of ethics were deployed in an angular form showing three elements: professionalism, reliability and honesty, and decency.     

Can phronesis save the life of medical ethics?

There has been a growing interest in casuistry since the ground breaking work of Jonsen and Toulmin. Casuistry, in their view, offers the possibility of securing the moral agreement that policy makers desire but which has proved elusive to theory driven approaches to ethics. However, their account of casuistry is dependent upon the exercise of phronesis. As recent discussions of phronesis make clear, this requires attention not only to the particulars of the case, but also to the substantive goods at stake in the case. Without agreement on these goods attention to cases is unlikely to secure the productive consensus that Jonson and Toulmin seek.     

What’s philosophically interesting about engineering ethics?

What makes a subject philosophically interesting is hard-to-resolve confusion about fundamental concepts. Engineering ethics suffers from at least three such fundamental confusions. First, there is confusion about what the “ethics” in engineering ethics is (ordinary morality, philosophical ethics, special standards, or something else?) Second, there is confusion about what the profession of engineering is (a function, discipline, occupation, kind of organization, or something else?) Third, there is confusion about what the discipline of engineering is. These fundamental confusions in engineering ethics connect with philosophically interesting work in moral theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of science. Work in these areas may help with the philosophical problems of engineering ethics. But, equally important, work in engineering ethics may help with the philosophical problems in these others fields.