Criteria for the design and evaluation of cognitive architectures

Cognitive architectures are unified theories of cognition that take the form of computational formalisms. They support computational models that collectively account for large numbers of empirical regularities using small numbers of computational mechanisms. Empirical coverage and parsimony are the most prominent criteria by which architectures are designed and evaluated, but they are not the only ones. This paper considers three additional criteria that have been comparatively undertheorized. (a) Successful architectures possess subjective and intersubjective meaning, making cognition comprehensible to individual cognitive scientists and organizing groups of like-minded cognitive scientists into genuine communities. (b) Successful architectures provide idioms that structure the design and interpretation of computational models. (c) Successful architectures are strange: They make provocative, often disturbing, and ultimately compelling claims about human information processing that demand evaluation.     

Constructive criticism: An evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle's genetic and neuroscientific arguments against Evolutionary Psychology

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations.     

Why philosophy and history matter: A conversation with Ann Taves

The article picks up some ideas that Ann Taves presents in her book Religious Experience Reconsidered, and looks at possible conversations that are not fleshed out in detail in Taves' book. In particular, it is argued that the disciplinary confrontation with philosophy and with historiography is of crucial importance if the disciplines of cognitive science and psychology of religion want to become in the future what they pretend to be nowda serious alternative and complement to the study of religion as we know it from other contexts, such as cultural studies and historiography     

Why philosophy and history matter: A conversation with Ann Taves

The article picks up some ideas that Ann Taves presents in her book Religious Experience Reconsidered, and looks at possible conversations that are not fleshed out in detail in Taves’ book. In particular, it is argued that the disciplinary confrontation with philosophy and with historiography is of crucial importance if the disciplines of cognitive science and psychology of religion want to become in the future what they pretend to be now—a serious alternative and complement to the study of religion as we know it from other contexts, such as cultural studies and historiography.     

Language access and language selection in professional translators

Two experiments were conducted measuring self-paced reading to study language access and language selection in professional translators and bilinguals when they understood sentences randomly presented in their first language (L1, Spanish) and second language (L2, English). These sentences contained a critical cognate word or a control matched word. The effect of cognate words was considered an index of between-language activation while the inhibition of the non-target language was examined with the asymmetrical switching cost. In Experiment 1, participants read and repeated sentences while in Experiment 2 participants read sentences without repeating them after reading. The results indicated that lexical processing depended on the experience of participants in professional translation and the demands imposed by the understanding task (reading and repeating or only reading).     

An organizing model for recent cognitive science work on the self

An organizing model of ‘the self’ emerges from applying various kinds of brain injury to recent cognitive science and philosophical work on ‘the self’. This model unifies various contents and mechanisms central to current notions of the self. The article then highlights several criteria and aspects of this notion of self. Qualities of the right type and level of psychological significance delineate ‘the self’ as an organizing concept useful for recent philosophical work and cognitive science research.     

Representing time in language and memory: The role of similarity structure

Every day we read about or watch events in the world and can easily understand or remember how long they last. What aspects of an event are retained in memory? And how do we extract temporal information from our memory representations? These issues are central to human cognition, as they underlie a fundamental aspect of our mental life, namely our representation of time. This paper reviews previous language studies and reports a visual learning study indicating that properties of the events encoded in memory shape the representation of their duration. The evidence indicates that for a given event, the extent to which its associated properties or sub-components differ from one another modulates our representation of its duration. These properties include the similarity between sub-events and the similarity between the situational contexts in which an event occurs. We suggest that the diversity of representations that we associate with events in memory plays an important role in remembering and estimating the duration of experienced or described events.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

Automatic perceptual simulation of first language meanings during second language sentence processing in bilinguals

Research supports the claim that, when understanding language, people perform mental simulation using those parts of the brain which support sensation, action, and emotion. A major criticism of the findings quoted as evidence for embodied simulation, however, is that they could be a result of conscious image generation strategies. Here we exploit the well-known fact that bilinguals routinely and automatically activate both their languages during comprehension to test whether this automatic process is, in turn, modulated by embodied simulatory processes. Dutch participants heard English sentences containing interlingual homophones and implying specific distance relations, and had to subsequently respond to pictures of objects matching or mismatching this implied distance. Participants were significantly slower to reject critical items when their perceptual features matched said distance relationship. These results suggest that bilinguals not only activate task-irrelevant meanings of interlingual homophones, but also automatically simulate these meanings in a detailed perceptual fashion. Our study supports the claim that embodied simulation is not due to participants' conscious strategies, but is an automatic component of meaning construction.     

Children's understanding of natural language hierarchies

Three experiments examined young children's ability to evaluate the relationship between concepts as one of inclusion. In Experiment 1, the same group of 4-to 7-year-old children were given three tasks: one in which they made judgments about whether “all” or “some” members of a category were included in another category, and two tasks in which they made inferences based on knowledge of inclusion relations. The majority of children succeeded on at least one of the tasks, thereby implying that they could evaluate inclusion relations. Two further experiments provided more evidence for this hypothesis: Experiment 2 confirmed that nursery children could answer quantitative questions about conceptual interrelationts; Experiment 3 demonstrated that nursery schoolers could solve certain inference problems involving the construction and evaluation of hierarchies.     

Mental rotation is not easily cognitively penetrable

When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their “tacit knowledge” of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the corresponding perceptual task? Two experiments were conducted to examine whether such an account can be applied to mental imagery in general. These experiments both examined tasks that required participants to “mentally rotate” stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could reorient shapes in one step or avoid reorienting the shapes altogether. Regardless of instruction type, response times increased linearly with increasing rotation angles. In Experiment 2, participants first observed novel objects rotating at different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the underlying internal representation and processes that transform it, rather than participants’ pre-existing knowledge.     

Network structure influences speech production

Network science provides a new way to look at old questions in cognitive science by examining the structure of a complex system, and how that structure might influence processing. In the context of psycholinguistics, clustering coefficient-a common measure in network science-refers to the extent to which phonological neighbors of a target word are also neighbors of each other. The influence of the clustering coefficient on spoken word production was examined in a corpus of speech errors and a picture-naming task. Speech errors tended to occur in words with many interconnected neighbors (i.e., higher clustering coefficient). Also, pictures representing words with many interconnected neighbors (i.e., high clustering coefficient) were named more slowly than pictures representing words with few interconnected neighbors (i.e., low clustering coefficient). These findings suggest that the structure of the lexicon influences the process of lexical access during spoken word production.     

Frames of reference in spatial language acquisition

Languages differ in how they encode spatial frames of reference. It is unknown how children acquire the particular frame-of-reference terms in their language (e.g., left/right, north/south). The present paper uses a word-learning paradigm to investigate 4-year-old English-speaking children’s acquisition of such terms. In Part I, with five experiments, we contrasted children’s acquisition of novel word pairs meaning left-right and north-south to examine their initial hypotheses and the relative ease of learning the meanings of these terms. Children interpreted ambiguous spatial terms as having environment-based meanings akin to north and south, and they readily learned and generalized north-south meanings. These studies provide the first direct evidence that children invoke geocentric representations in spatial language acquisition. However, the studies leave unanswered how children ultimately acquire “left” and “right.” In Part II, with three more experiments, we investigated why children struggle to master body-based frame-of-reference words. Children successfully learned “left” and “right” when the novel words were systematically introduced on their own bodies and extended these words to novel (intrinsic and relative) uses; however, they had difficulty learning to talk about the left and right sides of a doll. This difficulty was paralleled in identifying the left and right sides of the doll in a non-linguistic memory task. In contrast, children had no difficulties learning to label the front and back sides of a doll. These studies begin to paint a detailed account of the acquisition of spatial terms in English, and provide insights into the origins of diverse spatial reference frames in the world’s languages.     

The relationship between emotional-state language and emotion understanding: A study with school-age children

We carried out an investigation with primary-school children on the relationship between both use and comprehension of emotional-state language and emotion understanding. Participants were 100 students between 7 and 10 years old (mean age=8 years and 10 months; SD=15.3 months), equally divided by gender. They completed four tests evaluating their language ability, use of emotional-state language, comprehension of emotional-state language and emotion understanding (EU) respectively. Significant correlations were found between both use and comprehension of emotional-state talk and children's EU. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of emotional-state language, rather than its use, plays a significant role in explaining children's emotion understanding.     

Situated language understanding as filtering perceived affordances

We introduce a computational theory of situated language understanding in which the meaning of words and utterances depends on the physical environment and the goals and plans of communication partners. According to the theory, concepts that ground linguistic meaning are neither internal nor external to language users, but instead span the objective-subjective boundary. To model the possible interactions between subject and object, the theory relies on the notion of perceived affordances: structured units of interaction that can be used for prediction at multiple levels of abstraction. Language understanding is treated as a process of filtering perceived affordances. The theory accounts for many aspects of the situated nature of human language use and provides a unified solution to a number of demands on any theory of language understanding including conceptual combination, prototypicality effects, and the generative nature of lexical items. To support the theory, we describe an implemented system that understands verbal commands situated in a virtual gaming environment. The implementation uses probabilistic hierarchical plan recognition to generate perceived affordances. The system has been evaluated on its ability to correctly interpret free-form spontaneous verbal commands recorded from unrehearsed game play between human players. The system is able to "step into the shoes" of human players and correctly respond to a broad range of verbal commands in which linguistic meaning depends on social and physical context. We quantitatively compare the system's predictions in response to direct player commands with the actions taken by human players and show generalization to unseen data across a range of situations and verbal constructions.     

Individual differences in children's emotion understanding: effects of age and language

Over the last two decades, it has been established that children's emotion understanding changes as they develop. Recent studies have also begun to address individual differences in children's emotion understanding. The first goal of this study was to examine the development of these individual differences across a wide age range with a test assessing nine different components of emotion understanding. The second goal was to examine the relation between language ability and individual differences in emotion understanding. Eighty children ranging in age from 4 to 11 years were tested. Children displayed a clear improvement with age in both their emotion understanding and language ability. In each age group, there were clear individual differences in emotion understanding and language ability. Age and language ability together explained 72% of emotion understanding variance; 20% of this variance was explained by age alone and 27% by language ability alone. The results are discussed in terms of their theoretical and practical implications.     

The extended cognition thesis: Its significance for the philosophy of (cognitive) science

While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand “big science” or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?     

中医概念分析

中医是随着西医传入创立的新概念,是对中国传统汉族医学的简称,代表着中国古代文化发展的水平,蕴涵着大量的医学经验,在文化和科学研究范式方面与现代医学有明显区别。