Reply to Professor Flew

In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection : evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent's inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection : they end up relying upon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that themselves depend on unexplained judgments of rightness. Such accounts thus face a dilemma that is characteristic of virtue-ethical accounts of right action. They avoid the insularity objection only at the cost of inviting the circularity objection: they become intuitively plausible roughly to the extent that they lose their distinctively virtue-ethical character.     

Reply to Professor Baker

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

再论分配正义——答段忠桥教授

<正>我在《哲学研究》2011年第3期发表《分配正义:从弱势群体的观点看》一文(下引仅注页码),表达了关于分配正义问题的一些观点,特别是提出了分配正义的原则。这篇文章的论证逻辑如下:首先,一种分配只有得到弱势群体的同意,它才能是正义的;其次,分配正义的原则应该把弱势     

评应用伦理学的程序共识论--兼答甘绍平教授

在回答"何谓应用伦理学"这一问题时,甘绍平教授所表述的程序共识论颇为引人注目.程序共识论的基本观点如下: