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1.
Justin Broackes 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(1-2):27-71
This paper proposes a fundamentally opposite conception of the possibility of metaphysics to that of Barry Stroud in The Quest for Reality and other writings. I discuss Stroud’s views on everyday ‚truth’ and metaphysics (Section 1), on interpretation (Section
2 – replying with a theory of ‚quasi-understanding’), and his ‚no threat’ claim (Section 3). But the main argument (Section
4) is a response to Stroud’s claim that we have no right either to affirm or to deny the metaphysical reality of colours.
Stroud’s view resembles Carnap’s (1950, Revue Internationale de Philosophie
4, 20–40), that experience can in some sense never settle the metaphysical issue between e.g. materialism, idealism and phenomenalism;
though we can allow everyday ‚knowledge’ e.g. that there is a fallen tree in the garden outside, as something available on
all three views. (Carnap takes the undecidability as a sign that the metaphysical issue is a pseudo-question; Stroud insists
it is factual, but places it beyond our ken, ‚external’.) I argue, instead, that metaphysical argument is possible from within our conceptual scheme and epistemic situation (as in Gareth Evans’s arguments for realism over phenomenalism); that ‚external’
and ‚internal’ questions cannot be separated as Stroud wishes; and that if we really were denied knowledge on ‚metaphysical’
matters, that would infect our right to claim knowledge of ‚observational’ matters too. And I sketch a theory of colour that
would allow us to conclude (at once ‚metaphysically’ and ‚internally’) that things are indeed ‚really’ coloured. For all his
expressions of sympathy for Wittgenstein, Stroud’s metaphysics is remarkably Cartesian. 相似文献
2.
James John 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(3):323-346
Representational theorists identify experiences’ phenomenal properties with their representational properties. Qualia theorists
reject this identity, insisting that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational
properties. Qualia theorists account for phenomenal properties in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic mental properties they allege
experiences to instantiate. The debate between representational theorists and qualia theorists has focused on whether phenomenal
properties really can come apart from and completely outrun representational properties. As a result, qualia theorists have
failed (1) to explain how experiences owe their phenomenal properties to their instantiation of qualia and (2) to clarify
the nature of subjects’ epistemic access to qualia. I survey qualia theorists’ options for dealing with each issue and find
them all wanting. 相似文献
3.
John V. Canfield 《Philosophia》2009,37(4):691-712
In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The
essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted
spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous
scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent.
Furthermore, Block’s dangerous scenario does not follow from Wittgenstein’s innocent one, as Block believes it does, but rather
is in conflict with it. 相似文献
4.
Neil Campbell 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):137-145
Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection
claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson
by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense
might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case
the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains. 相似文献
5.
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, which asserts that scientific theories are ‘mental pictures’ having at best a partial similarity
to reality, was a core element of his philosophy of science. The aim of this article is to draw attention to a neglected aspect
of it, namely its significance for the issue of scientific explanation and understanding, regarded by Boltzmann as central
goals of science. I argue that, in addition to being an epistemological view of the interpretation of scientific theories
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie has implications for the nature of scientific understanding. This aspect has as yet been ignored because
discussion of the Bildtheorie has been restricted to the realism-instrumentalism debate. To elucidate my analysis of Boltzmann’s
Bildtheorie concrete examples are presented, and the pragmatist and Darwinist roots of Boltzmann’s view are discussed.
Moreover, I propose to use Boltzmann’s ideas as a starting-point for developing a novel analysis of the notion of scientific
understanding, of which a brief impression is given. It shows that the study of Boltzmann’s philosophy is not only of historical
interest but can be relevant also to modern philosophy of science and to the methodology of theoretical physics.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
6.
Ausonio Marras 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(3):305-327
The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate
challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive
physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear
that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a reductio, which of its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally
suggest that the issue of reductive vs. nonreductive physicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but
in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated. 相似文献
7.
Jonathan Ellis 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):273-299
A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these
theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about
phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have
different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I
argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary to appearances, this standard conjunction of externalism
about content and internalism about phenomenal character is ultimately untenable on other models of phenomenal character as
well, including even “qualia realism.” This would be significant for a number of reasons. The first is patent: it would undermine
a primary objection to representationalism. The fact that representationalism is incompatible with the conjunction would be
no serious problem for representationalism if no other plausible model of phenomenal character is compatible with it. The
second is that the many philosophers who embrace the conjunction would be forced to abandon one of the two views; externalism
would be true either of both content and phenomenal character, or of neither. Likewise, those philosophers who have taken
a stance on only one of the two internalism/externalism debates would have to be seen as thereby committed to a particular
stance on the other. The third reason stems from the fact that qualia realism typically goes hand in hand with internalism
about phenomenal character. To the extent that it does, my argument would reveal that qualia realism is itself in tension
with externalism about content. This would perhaps be the most surprising result of all. 相似文献
8.
Kevin Falvey 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):297-312
Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as
guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer
an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some
work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in
an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an
account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of
the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive
defense of the reality of tense. 相似文献
9.
Anthony Everett 《Synthese》1996,106(2):205-226
In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia.I would like to thank the referees and Leopold Stubenberg for their help and comments. 相似文献
10.
Jordi Fernández 《Synthese》2008,160(1):103-121
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features
of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is
inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’
feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next,
I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories
that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories
that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different
theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory
that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. 相似文献
11.
12.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):357-367
In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to
this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide
a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s
criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way
of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections. 相似文献
13.
Brendan O’Sullivan 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(3):353-371
Qualia have proved difficult to integrate into a broadly physicalistic worldview. In this paper, I argue that despite popular
wisdom in the philosophy of mind, qualia’s intrinsicality is not sufficient for their non-reducibility. Second, I diagnose
why philosophers mistakenly focused on intrinsicality. I then proceed to argue that qualia are categorical and end with some
reflections on how the conceptual territory looks when we keep our focus on categoricity. 相似文献
14.
Ralph Schumacher 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(1-2):233-246
One of the main targets of Barry Stroud’s criticism in his recent book ‚The Quest for Reality. Subjectivism and the Metaphysics
of Colour’ are eliminativist theories of colour which he regards as a version of the metaphysical project of the unmasking
of colours (Stroud, 2000). According to this view, no physical objects have any of the colours we see them or believe them
to have. However, although this error theory describes all our colour perceptions as illusory, and all our colour beliefs
as false, it cannot deny that we actually perceive colours and that we do believe that physical objects are coloured. Therefore,
it has to account for these psychological facts without relying on any assumptions about the colours of things. Thus, the
central question for the unmasking project is whether it is possible to acknowledge someone’s perceiving a certain colour
or having beliefs about the colours of things without holding that anything anywhere has any colour at all. Contrary to Stroud,
this paper defends the view that we can acknowledge that people believe in colours without having ourselves to accept their
existence. 相似文献
15.
Silvia Stoller 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(1):97-110
Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that
they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity
to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological
theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity,
I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must strictly be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this
line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites
but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a
non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights. 相似文献
16.
Kai Horsthemke 《Science and engineering ethics》2011,17(2):321-334
In a recent journal article, as well as in a recent book chapter, in which she critiques my position on ‘indigenous knowledge’,
Lesley Green of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town argues that ‘diverse epistemologies ought
to be evaluated not on their capacity to express a strict realism but on their ability to advance understanding’. In order
to examine the implications of Green’s arguments, and of Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin’s work in this regard, I apply
them to a well-known controversy between Native American (or First Nations) creationism and archaeology. I argue that issues
in social justice should be distinguished from issues in epistemology. Moreover, in tightening in this paper the link between
knowledge and truth, I attempt to defend science as a ‘privileged way of seeing the world’. The analysis of truth, and of
related concepts like reality and ‘the way the world is’, will assume a central role here. I contend that, ultimately, the
only coherent and consistent position is a realist view of the pertinent issues and ideas. 相似文献
17.
Stephen Davies 《Sophia》2011,50(2):265-268
I outline Robert Solomon’s Inferiority theory of humor, which he illustrated by reference to the Three Stooges and contrasted
with the Superiority, Incongruity, and Relief theories. And I discuss the status of the catchphrase with reference to ‘He’s
fallen in da water!’ from the Goon Show. Unlike Bob, I don’t think the catchphrase always operates as a set-up, because it
is not always heralded or predictable. The funny catchphrase involves a form of meta-humor that draws attention to the contrivance
of the story. 相似文献
18.
Bernhard Weiss 《Topoi》2012,31(1):27-35
In this paper I consider metaphysical positions which I label as ‘perspectival’. A perspectivalist believes that some portion
of reality cannot extend beyond what an appropriately characterised investigator or investigators can (in some sense) reveal
about it. So a perspectivalist will be drawn to claim that a portion of reality is, in some sense, knowable. Many such positions
appear to founder on the paradox of knowability. I aim to offer a solution to that paradox which can be adopted by any perspectivalist,
which involves no restriction on the claim of knowability and which allows certain sentences to be unknowable. The solution
hinges on recognising that what is meant by ‘knowable’ will vary from one type of proposition to another and thus that characterising
the modality involved in the notion in terms of possible worlds will be impossible. I thus offer a subjunctive conditional
reading of that modality, a reading which, I claim, has the virtues just recounted. 相似文献
19.
Corey J. Maley 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):117-131
Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the
mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish
between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations
vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’.
I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in
cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog
and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation.
I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest
in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy. 相似文献
20.
Ian Kidd 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):365-377
This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the
twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical
claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces
Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part
two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide
a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for
our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. 相似文献