What US judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony

In a survey, 160 US judges indicated their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. Although correct on some issues, judges were often wrong on important issues such as whether at trial eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Increased knowledge was associated with: a willingness to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony at trial; a belief that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; a reluctance to convict defendants solely from eyewitness testimony; a more accurate estimate of the extent to which wrongful convictions result from eyewitness error; and a belief that judges need more eyewitness training. Additional training about factors and procedures that affect eyewitness accuracy may help judges reduce the number of wrongful convictions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Was und wie häufig sind Fehlurteile?

Spectacular trials leading to alleged or proven wrongful convictions arouse the concern of the German public. In spite of that there is no current systematic analysis of sources of error in criminal procedures. This article defines what may be recognized as a wrongful conviction or wrongful decision and gives an account of studies on wrongful convictions in America and some European countries. Concerning the German situation, firstly possible sources of error in preliminary proceedings are highlighted and then the outcomes of appeals are analyzed, thus estimating the quantity of wrongful convictions by courts in the first instance on the basis of statistical data. Furthermore, the very restrictive prerequisites for retrials are discussed. Concluding, the author argues for a systematic empirical analysis of sources of error in criminal proceedings and a facilitation of the prerequisites for retrials.     

Eyewitness identification evidence and innocence risk

It is well known that the frailties of human memory and vulnerability to suggestion lead to eyewitness identification errors. However, variations in different aspects of the eyewitnessing conditions produce different kinds of errors that are related to wrongful convictions in very different ways. We present a review of the eyewitness identification literature, organized around underlying cognitive mechanisms, memory, similarity, and decision processes, assessing the effects on both correct and mistaken identification. In addition, we calculate a conditional probability we call innocence risk, which is the probability that the suspect is innocent, given that the suspect was identified. Assessment of innocence risk is critical to the theoretical development of eyewitness identification research, as well as to legal decision making and policy evaluation. Our review shows a complex relationship between misidentification and innocence risk, sheds light on some areas of controversy, and suggests that some issues thought to be resolved are in need of additional research.     

A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony

We compared what 160 U.S. judges, 57 law students, and 121 undergraduates know and believe about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Judges were no more knowledgeable than were undergraduates, and both groups were less knowledgeable than were law students. For all 3 groups, increased knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with beliefs that might reduce wrongful convictions. Participants in all 3 groups underestimated what potential jurors know about eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that increasing judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony might help them to reduce wrongful convictions and to more accurately assess when eyewitness experts are needed. The results also suggest that law schools need to do a better job of educating law students about eyewitness testimony.     

Line‐up Misidentifications: When Being ‘Prototypically Black’ is Perceived as Criminal

Eyewitness misidentifications are the leading factor contributing to wrongful convictions. Black men, more than any other racial group, are disproportionately affected by this, thus elevating the importance of identifying factors that contribute to the false recollection of unseen faces. In the current studies, we tested whether misplaced familiarity and subsequent misidentification of Black faces was underpinned by the degree to which target faces were considered ‘prototypical’ (i.e., representative) of the Black race category. First, results revealed that Black faces with stereotypical facial features were accurately categorized as ‘Black’ quicker than faces with nonstereotypical features (Experiment 1). Moreover, identification errors were higher for both face recognition (Experiment 2) and line‐up identification (Experiment3) for stereotypical‐featured than nonstereotypical‐featured faces. Overall, results suggest that stereotypical Black faces are representative of the category ‘Black’ and facilitated feelings of familiarity and the endorsement of memory errors that may underpin eyewitness misidentifications. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the psychology of confessions: does innocence put innocents at risk?

The Central Park jogger case and other recent exonerations highlight the problem of wrongful convictions, 15% to 25% of which have contained confessions in evidence. Recent research suggests that actual innocence does not protect people across a sequence of pivotal decisions: (a) In preinterrogation interviews, investigators commit false-positive errors, presuming innocent suspects guilty; (b) naively believing in the transparency of their innocence, innocent suspects waive their rights; (c) despite or because of their denials, innocent suspects elicit highly confrontational interrogations; (d) certain commonly used techniques lead suspects to confess to crimes they did not commit; and (e) police and others cannot distinguish between uncorroborated true and false confessions. It appears that innocence puts innocents at risk, that consideration should be given to reforming current practices, and that a policy of videotaping interrogations is a necessary means of protection.     

Individual differences in face identification postdict eyewitness accuracy

Eyewitnesses frequently mistake innocent suspects for the culprits of an observed crime, and such misidentifications have caused the wrongful convictions of many innocent people. This study attempted to establish the accuracy of individual eyewitnesses by assessing their ability to process unfamiliar faces. Observers viewed a staged crime and later tried to select the culprit from an identity lineup. This was followed by a face test that provides a laboratory analogue to lineup identifications. We found that this face test could determine the reliability of individual witnesses when a positive eyewitness identification had been made. Importantly, this was possible based on the specific response that a witness had made and without prior knowledge of whether the culprit was actually present in the lineup. These findings demonstrate that individual differences in face processing provide a potential instrument for postdicting eyewitness accuracy and for preventing miscarriages of justice.     

“Midnight Confessions”: The Effect of Chronotype Asynchrony on Admissions of Wrongdoing

Confession evidence is highly incriminating in court. We examined the interaction between chronotype and time of day on the confession decisions of 60 participants using an experimental paradigm. Pre-identified morning- and evening-type people were randomly assigned to participate in morning or evening sessions. Results supported an interactional asynchrony hypothesis that individuals are more likely to confess during “off-peak” periods (i.e., evening-types in the morning and morning-types in the evening). This interaction was obtained for both high- and low-seriousness transgressions. These results suggest that chronotype asynchrony constitutes a significant risk factor for false confessions and the wrongful convictions that often follow.     

Solving the eyewitness problem

Faulty eyewitness testimony is a major source of wrongful convictions. Four solutions are examined to safeguard against mistaken testimony having undue impact: (1) to overturn any conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, (2) to require that an attorney be present at any pretrial identification procedure, (3) to allow an expert to testify during the trial about factors of perception and memory that could affect a witness's accuracy, and (4) to have the judge deliver a cautionary instruction to the jury, admonishing them to carefully scrutinize eyewitness testimony, or to educate them about such testimony. Each alternative is discussed within the context of psychological research and legal cases.     

Risk

In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti‐risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti‐luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions.     

The neuropsychological correlates of cognitive insight in healthy participants

Cognitive insight is the ability to monitor and correct one's own erroneous convictions. The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) assesses two sub‐dimensions of cognitive insight: self‐reflectiveness (SR), which is the attitude of questioning one's own judgments; and self‐certainty (SC), which is the unwillingness to modify and correct one's own convictions. There is little information about cognitive insight in healthy participants (HP). Here we investigated the socio‐demographic and neuropsychological correlates of cognitive insight in 50 HP who were administered the BCIS and a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. The global BCIS R‐C index correlated positively with age and WCST perseverative errors. SR correlated positively with age. These data support the hypothesis that a less self‐reflective and more self‐confident style is cognitively functional in HP. Thus, what has been found malfunctioning in mental illnesses is adaptive in HP. Future studies should consider a wider range of factors that might affect this complex construct. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining the errors away: Young children forgive understandable semantic mistakes

Errors differ in degree of seriousness. We asked whether preschoolers would use the magnitude of an informant's errors to decide if that informant would be a good source of information later. Four- and 5-year-olds observed two informants incorrectly label familiar objects, but one informant's errors were closer to the correct answer than the other's (e.g., one referred to a comb as a brush and the other referred to the same comb as a thunderstorm). When informants had an unambiguous view of the objects, children could identify which informant was closer to being correct, but they did not favor novel labels the “closer” informant later provided. When the informants had an ambiguous view of the objects (e.g., only the handle of the comb was visible), children preferred the novel labels provided later by the “closer” informant. Preschoolers are willing to overlook semantic errors that are close to being correct, but only when there is an understandable reason for the speaker's errors.     

Not all errors are created equal: metacognition and changing answers on multiple-choice tests.

Two experiments investigated the role of metacognition in changing answers to multiple-choice, general-knowledge questions. Both experiments revealed qualitatively different errors produced by speeded responding versus confusability amongst the alternatives; revision completely corrected the former, but had no effect on the latter. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that a pretest, designed to make participants' actual experience with answer changing either positive or negative, affected the tendency to correct errors. However, this effect was not apparent in the proportion of correct responses; it was only discovered when the metacognitive component to answer changing was isolated with a Type 2 signal-detection measure of discrimination. Overall, the results suggest that future research on answer changing should more closely consider the metacognitive factors underlying answer changing, using Type 2 signal-detection theory to isolate these aspects of performance.     

The Text Matters: Eye Movements Reflect the Cognitive Processing of Interrogation Rights

Suspects' decisions to waive or invoke interrogation rights have considerable impact on whether subsequent interrogations ensue, self‐incriminating information is offered, and in the case of innocent suspects, wrongful convictions occur. Although interrogation warnings differ in their text characteristics, empirically examining the influence of these text differences on suspects' ability to process and comprehend their rights has largely been neglected, which is especially problematic for vulnerable populations. Using a novel approach, we monitored the eye movements of 60 juveniles as they silently read different versions of Miranda warnings in order to investigate the relationship among text characteristics, processing difficulty, and comprehension problems. Results indicated that text characteristics were associated with processing difficulties and these processing difficulties were strongly correlated with comprehension of the warnings. Along with advancing basic and applied research programs, this approach can inform policy decisions and benefit vulnerable populations whose comprehension of interrogation rights is encumbered by legalese.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagery of errors in typing

Using a typing task we investigated whether insufficient imagination of errors and error corrections is related to duration differences between execution and imagination. In Experiment 1 spontaneous error imagination was investigated, whereas in Experiment 2 participants were specifically instructed to imagine errors. Further, in Experiment 2 we manipulated correction instructions (whether or not to correct errors) and controlled for visual feedback in executed typing (letters appearing on the screen or not). Participants executed and imagined typing proverbs of different lengths. Errors and error corrections explained a significant amount of variance of execution minus imagination differences in Experiment 1, and in Experiment 2 when participants were instructed to correct errors, but not when participants were instructed not to correct errors. In Experiment 2 participants corrected and reported more errors with than without visual feedback. However, the relation between execution − imagination duration differences and errors and error corrections was unaffected by visual feedback. The types of errors reported less often in imagination than in execution were related to processes in typing execution. We conclude that errors and error corrections are not spontaneously imagined during motor imagery, and that even when attention is drawn to their occurrence only some are imagined. This may be due to forward models not predicting all aspects of an action, imprecise forward models, or a neglect of monitoring error signals during motor imagery.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.     

Characterizing Human Expertise Using Computational Metrics of Feature Diagnosticity in a Pattern Matching Task

Forensic evidence often involves an evaluation of whether two impressions were made by the same source, such as whether a fingerprint from a crime scene has detail in agreement with an impression taken from a suspect. Human experts currently outperform computer‐based comparison systems, but the strength of the evidence exemplified by the observed detail in agreement must be evaluated against the possibility that some other individual may have created the crime scene impression. Therefore, the strongest evidence comes from features in agreement that are also not shared with other impressions from other individuals. We characterize the nature of human expertise by applying two extant metrics to the images used in a fingerprint recognition task and use eye gaze data from experts to both tune and validate the models. The Attention via Information Maximization (AIM) model (Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009) quantifies the rarity of regions in the fingerprints to determine diagnosticity for purposes of excluding alternative sources. The CoVar model (Karklin & Lewicki, 2009) captures relationships between low‐level features, mimicking properties of the early visual system. Both models produced classification and generalization performance in the 75%–80% range when classifying where experts tend to look. A validation study using regions identified by the AIM model as diagnostic demonstrates that human experts perform better when given regions of high diagnosticity. The computational nature of the metrics may help guard against wrongful convictions, as well as provide a quantitative measure of the strength of evidence in casework.     

Denoting the base-free measure of change

Bond criticized the base-free measure of change proposed by Tucker, Damarin, and Messick by pointing to an incorrect derivation which is here viewed instead as a correct derivation entailing an inadequately specified tacit assumption. Bond's revision leads to estimates of the correlation between initial position and change which are negatively biased by correlated errors, whereas the original approach, with the tacit assumption properly denoted, leads to unbiased values.     

An event-related potential study on the observation of erroneous everyday actions

Recent experiments have demonstrated that error-related negativity (ERN) is not only elicited when people commit errors, but also when they observe others committing errors. The present study investigates whether this observed ERN is also present when participants observe execution errors in an everyday context. Participants observed short sequences of pictures showing steps of everyday actions ending either erroneously or correctly. Participants were instructed to indicate by a delayed response whether the observed action was correctly executed or not. The results showed a large P300 for execution errors compared with the observation of correct sequences, but no ERN activity was found. The present experiment indicates that the detection of execution errors in observation does not rely on the error processing mechanism responsible for generating the ERN. The increased P300 amplitudes suggest a more general monitoring process that signals that the occurrence of unexpected events is involved in the detection of execution errors.     

Self‐Reported Beliefs About Verbal Cues Correlate with Deception‐Detection Performance

In this study, we investigated whether people who hold more correct beliefs about verbal cues to deception are also better lie detectors. We investigated police officers and undergraduates' beliefs about (i) cues to deception via an open‐ended question and (ii) 17 specific verbal cues, after which participants were asked to judge the truthfulness of eight video fragments. Results showed that undergraduates and police officers still hold wrongful beliefs about nonverbal cues, but have better insight into verbal cues. Moreover, a better insight in verbal cues was related to an increased accuracy for identifying truthful statements, showing that verbal cues do drive credibility judgments to some extent.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.