Karol Wojtyla and Emmanuel Levinas on the Embodied Self: the Forming of the Other as Moral Self-disclosure

The 'other' has taken on an increased theological significance for the Church in the advent of post-modern reflection, resulting in a myriad of possibilities for those who would reflect on the significance of the other in relation to the 'self', largely in connection with various theories of embodiment. Following Karol Wojtyla's (John Paul II) emphasis on the given-ness of the body I wish to illustrate a way in which the other might be understood theologically, informed by the insights of the continental philosophical tradition, specifically Emmanuel Levinas' phenomenological outline of the other as a key locus of ethical reflection. Bringing Levinas' continental philosophy into dialogue with Wojtyla's philosophical theology, it will be argued that the other must be re-approached in terms of their subjective self-disclosure, centring upon the en-fleshed and bodily form of the human person, who confronts us as a reflection of both that which is most other to ourselves (the divine) and paradoxically that which most resembles ourselves (the human). The other is always an en-fleshed subject and in their action, their subjective identity is disclosed on the relational level.     

Euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and Christianity's positive relationship to the world.

This essay addresses the problem of communication between Christianity and the secular world in an area where the latter tends to oppose the moral norms endorsed by the former. How, in the interest of missionary outreach (and with which understandings of what such outreach involves) can the language barriers be bridged? Whereas the Roman Catholic natural law tradition posits a neutral common ground of (traditional or hermeneutical) rationality between Christianity and the world, an Ebeling- and Barth-modified Lutheranism engages in an argument ad hominem by seizing upon an admitted deficiency within that world, and by recommending Christianity for mending that deficiency. Both positions differ from the Evangelical claim that since that which the world politically values is derived from Christianity, it must remain subject to Christianity's moral legislation. An entirely different approach to the communication- and outreach-problem is taken by Orthodox Christianity: The gulf which separates it from the world is acknowledged, and the possibility of trans-gulf-traffic is referred to God's grace. It is only this latter model, however, which preserves Christianity's theological terms (such as "Scripture", "law", and "holiness") from common-ground-securing, deficiency-mending, or authority-imposing secularizing, and thus from compromising that very theological context into which communicative outreach endeavors were to invite.     

I through thou,and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community

This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second-person engagement in the constitution of first-person-plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face-to-face “I-thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the constitutive primacy of first-person plural over first-person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”     

The Werther effect and assisted suicide

In the course of a large epidemiological study in the region of Basle, Switzerland, from 1992 to 1996, a considerable rise in suicides assisted by the right-to-die society EXIT was uncovered after wide press coverage of an assisted double suicide of a prominent couple in that region in March 1995. Further investigation revealed that the rise of assisted suicides for a period of 2 years after the critical event was statistically significant compared to the 2 years previous to the double suicide. This was especially true for women older than 65 years. Hence, the almost enthusiastic kind of reporting about this event was apt to induce imitation suicides or a "Werther-effect."     

Right to life, right to die and assisted suicide

In 2002 Diane Pretty went to the European Court of Human Rights to gain a ruling about assisted suicide. In the course of this she argued that the right to life implied a right to die. This paper will consider, from an ethical rather than a legal point of view, how the right to life might imply (or not) a right to die, and whether this includes either a right that others shall help us die, or a right against non-interference if others are willing to help us. It does this by comparing the right to life to conceptions of property rights. This is not because I think human life is property, but because some of our ways of talking and thinking about our control over our own lives seem to be similar to our thoughts about our control over our own property. The right to life has traditionally been taken as a negative right, that is a right that others not deprive us of life. Pretty's argument, however, seems to be moving towards a positive right, not just to remain alive, but to be enabled in doing what we want to with our lives, and thus disposing of them if we so choose. The comparison with property rights suggests that the right to die only applies if our lives are ours absolutely, and may itself be modified by the suggestion that suicide harms all of us by devaluing human life in general.     

The life of order and the order of life: Eric Voegelin on modernity and the problem of philosophical anthropology

This paper was delivered to The Eric Voegelin Society at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, in Atlanta, Georgia, between 31 August–3 September 1989.     

Euthanasia,Senicide, and the Aging Society

ABSTRACT

The elderly, particularly the severely demented, are at the cutting edge of the debate over active euthanasia. Such debilitated persons fall below the standards of “personhood” as these have been defined by various moral philosophers. With the pressures of economic hard times, one might predict that the most impaired aged would be candidates for “direct termination.” However, this essay defends the thesis that the prohibition against mercy killing must be upheld despite such pressures. It draws on the wisdom of both Hippocrates and Abraham.     

Euthanasia and the quality of life debate.

Orthodox Christian ethics is grounded in the sacredness of life principle. Yet, it can accept a quality of life approach where "quality" refers not to capacities or states, but to the relationship between the patient's condition and the quest for transcendent life goals (Walter and Shannon, 1990). The true quality of human life derives from the vocation to stewardship, which enjoins an attitude of humble acceptance toward beneficial or "redemptive" suffering. The proper response to suffering in terminal cases is not active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide but appropriate pain management and personal care. In cases of PVS or deep coma, only the determination of higher brain death can warrant the withholding or withdrawing of food and hydration. Yet, artificial maintenance of biological existence is also immoral. Death is to be accepted and embraced as a transition to eternal life.     

Euthanasia,Autonomy and Beneficence

Our interpretation of the Greek term sarx (σ?ρξ) has great impact on how we view the anthropology and theology expressed in Paul’s letters, and in Luke/Acts. This article takes Nida and Taber’s depiction of the semantic componential structure of σ?ρξ in Luke 24:39 and in Romans 11:14 as a starting point for a discussion of the semantic structure of σ?ρξ in these texts. The hermeneutical and translational principle of mental cascades (Lakoff and Wehling) provides a way to describe the associative links that exist between concepts in any language. Often, but not always, σ?ρξ has been translated into the English term flesh.     

Voluntariness,Suffering and Euthanasia

Abstract

Dutch euthanasia legislation states that an act of euthanasia is only permissible if it is based on a voluntary request made in a situation of unbearable suffering to which there are no alternatives.The central question of this article is whether these criteria can be satisfied simultaneously. In an analysis of several (partly overlapping) definitions of voluntariness it is argued that there are circumstances in which this question should be answered negatively.The possible incompatibility of the criteria reveals a tension between different defences of the permissibility of euthanasia.     

Death, suicide and the older adult.

Elderly people who are at high risk for suicide often have characteristics that are associated with reduced opportunity or inclination to communicate (e.g., male, living alone, residing in a low-income transient urban area, suffering from a depressive state). This paper attempts to provide converging perspectives on death and suicide from the standpoints of both the external observer and the elderly person. An interpretation of the statistical pattern is followed by a critique of current policy proposals for limiting society's response to the needs of vulnerable people on the basis of a "natural life span." Studies of elderly people themselves reveal a great diversity of attitudes toward death that is not well served by generalizations and stereotypes. However, it appears that stressful conditions of life arouse more anxiety among older people than does the prospect of death.