Decision Development in Computer-Assisted Group Decision Making

New computer technologies to aid group communication and decision making are becoming increasingly widespread. This study analyzes how one such technology, a group decision support system (GDSS), affected how group decisions developed over time. The study contrasted decision paths in groups using the GDSS with groups using the same procedural structures incorporated in the GDSS manually and with groups using no procedural structures. A flexible phase mapping method was employed to map group decision paths. The resulting set of seven decision paths varied in both sequence and number of decision phases. An optimal matching procedure was used to compute similarity measures among the 40 paths, and cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling were used to generate an empirical taxonomy of decision paths. Results indicated that the nature of decision paths varied both across the three conditions and within conditions. The decision path types were also related to three outcome variables: consensus change, perceived decision quality, and decision scheme satisfaction. Results indicated that those decision paths that most resembled logical normative sequences had superior outcomes to those that did not.     

The Effects of Decision Outcome Dispersion Upon Organizational Decision Making

The effects of varying decision outcome dispersion on organizational decision making were investigated under individual and group decision making conditions. Thirty-six female and pg]36 male subjects made decisions for organizational decision scenarios in which outcomes affected primarily the decision maker, people other than the decision maker, or a group of which the decision maker was a member. Subjects rated their levels of perceived risk and confidence in their decisions and made decisions within a simulated context of either a small or a large organization. Results indicated that subjects perceived significantly less risk and more confidence in their decisions when outcomes affected primarily themselves rather than others regardless of whether the decisions were made individually or by a group. Males perceived their decisions as significantly more risky than females. Induced organizational size did not significantly influence decision making.

     

Transformative Decision Rules

A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi'scondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.     

Luck and Decision

abstract Much recent work on moral responsibility and on distributive justice has addressed the concept of luck. Very little attention has been given to the relation of luck to rationality. How does luck bear on our choices? Can beliefs about luck lead to unwise decisions? These questions have particular relevance for understanding gambling behaviour, and for public policy on gambling. In this paper I argue that no one is reliably lucky, and that projecting luck can undermine rational decision‐making. I give various examples to show the conceptual connection between luck and unpredictability. I present an a posteriori conception of projectibility, and argue that because lucky events are rationally unexpected, regularity statements about luck fail to satisfy the conditions of projectibility. I reject the claim that ‘lucky’ is a dispositional term, and thus projectible, on the ground that a dispositional interpretation leads to contradiction. I then defend my claim that luck is not projectible against three objections. I conclude with some thoughts about rational responses to luck, using gambling as an illustration.     

Decision by sampling

We present a theory of decision by sampling (DbS) in which, in contrast with traditional models, there are no underlying psychoeconomic scales. Instead, we assume that an attribute's subjective value is constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the sample. We assume that the sample reflects both the immediate distribution of attribute values from the current decision's context and also the background, real-world distribution of attribute values. DbS accounts for concave utility functions; losses looming larger than gains; hyperbolic temporal discounting; and the overestimation of small probabilities and the underestimation of large probabilities.     

动态决策模型下情绪对风险决策的影响*

通过静态-动态决策模型的创设,考察了不同构造情境下心境、即时性诱发情绪对风险决策行为的影响。实验结果表明:(1)静态决策模型和动态决策模型下风险决策行为有着显著不同,相对于静态决策,动态决策模型下被试的风险决策行为更显保守;(2)不同心境在静态-动态决策模型下对风险决策行为的影响不同;(3)诱发情绪在动态决策模型中能对风险决策行为产生影响,恐惧情绪促使被试在动态决策中趋于保守。     

行为决策研究的新取向——基于经验的决策

基于经验的决策是指,在统计概率情境中,个体通过重复选择与反馈获得选项的收益分布信息后进行的决策.基于经验的决策的研究范式主要包括探索-利用范式和探索→利用范式.其暗含的决策人假设是朴素直觉统计学家.其研究关注的主要内容是描述-经验的差异及其原因,以及基于经验的决策内部过程.未来的研究主要从描述-经验差异的原因、描述性决策范式下的结论的重新检验、基于经验的决策的解释模型及其应用研究等方面进行探讨.     

The CEO Selection Decision Process: Bounded Rationality and Decision Component Ordering

This paper presents a model of the basic components of the CEO selection decision process used by corporate boards of directors. It describes selection as a purposeful and boundedly rational process characterized by three key components: aspiration, judgment and justification. Each of these components is described in detail. In addition, the ordering of these elements is examined. Specifically, it is suggested that the exact ordering varies depending on a number of factors. Among the most important are (1) the performance of the organization, (2) the availability of qualified candidates and (3) the standardization of the CEO's office within the organization at the time of the succession decision. Examples are provided to help illustrate various order effects. Following this, sample research propositions are presented to assist researchers in future studies devoted to this topic.     

Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confidence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence against Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision Making

We present three studies of interactive decision making, where decision makers interact with others before making a final decision alone. Because the theories of lay observers and social psychologists emphasize the role of information collection in interaction, we developed a series of tests of information collection. Two studies with sports collection show that interaction does not increase decision accuracy or meta-knowledge (calibration or resolution). The simplest test of information collection is responsiveness - that people should respond to information against their position by modifying their choices or at least lowering their confidence. Studies using traditional scenarios from the group polarization literature show little responsiveness, and even "deviants," who interact with others who unanimously disagree with their choice, frequently fail to respond to the information they collect. The most consistent finding is that interaction increases people′s confidence in their decisions in both sports predictions and risky shift dilemmas. For predictions, confidence increases are not justified by increased accuracy. These results question theories of interaction which assume that people collect information during interaction (e.g., Persuasive Arguments Theory). They also question the labeling of previous results as "shifts" or "polarization." We suggest that interaction is better understood as rationale construction than as information collection - interaction forces people to explain their choices to others, and a variety of previous research in social psychology has shown that explanation generation leads to increased confidence. In Study 3, we provide a preliminary test of rationale construction by showing that people increase in confidence when they construct a case for their position individually, without interaction.     

“易得性启发式”与决策框架对风险决策倾向的影响

研究目的:探讨易得性启发式对风险决策认知过程的影响,以及易得性启发式与决策框架相互作用下的风险投资行为特点。方法:采用2×2×7混合实验设计和情境实验。结果:成功结果的易得性启发式导致对风险决策问题采用自上而下加工,失败结果为自下而上加工;成功结果时投资倾向为风险趋向,失败结果为风险规避;易得性启发式与决策框架共同影响风险投资倾向。结论:易得性启发式影响风险决策的认知加工过程,并与决策框架对风险投资倾向产生交互作用。     

Decision Neuroscience: New Directions in Studies of Judgment and Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Investigations of decision making have historically been undertaken by different disciplines, each using different techniques and assumptions, and few unifying efforts have been made. Economists have focused on precise mathematical models of normative decision making, psychologists have examined how decisions are actually made based on cognitive constraints, and neuroscientists have concentrated on the detailed operation of neural systems in simple choices. In recent years, however, researchers in these separate fields have joined forces in an attempt to better specify the foundations of decision making. This interdisciplinary effort has begun to use decision theory to guide the search for the neural bases of reward value and predictability. Concurrently, these formal models are beginning to incorporate processes such as social reward and emotion. The combination of these diverse theoretical approaches and methodologies is already yielding significant progress in the construction of more comprehensive decision-making models.     

Transformative Decision Rules, Permutability, and Non-Sequential Framing of Decision Problems

The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing', or `problem specification', or `editing' phase ofdecision making. In the present study we analyze a fundamentalaspect of transformative decision rules, viz. permutability. A setof transformative decision rules is, roughly put, permutable justin case it does not matter in which order the rules are applied.It is argued that in order to be normatively reasonable, sets oftransformative decision rules have to satisfy a number ofstructural conditions that together imply permutability. Thisformal result gives support to a non-sequential theory of framing,i.e., a theory which prescribes no uniform order in which differentsteps in the framing process have to be performed.     

拖延的决策模型

拖延是指尽管预见到该行为会带来不利后果,人们仍自愿推迟开始或完成某一计划好的行为。先前的研究对拖延的类型、影响因素、成因以及干预等方面进行了广泛的探讨,然而拖延的决策过程——"现在做还是以后做?"认知机制还非常不清楚。因此,本文提出拖延决策模型试图从三方面阐明"现在做还是以后做?"的决策机制:首先,拖延动机和不拖延动机的斗争是决定是否拖延的根本;其次,拖延动机的斗争可以进一步简化为任务负性过程和任务正性结果的权衡;最后,主动推迟任务使负性过程发生延迟折扣是拖延的核心目的。拖延决策模型不仅有助于探明拖延的核心认知机制,也能够帮助预测拖延行为的发生及解释各种影响因素的作用机制,因此未来的研究可以借此整合一个从拖延的核心发生机制到各种影响因素的理论系统。     

Contending Medical Decision Models

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

Construing Consumer Decision Making

Understanding how consumers represent outcomes and weigh different decision criteria is critical to consumer behavior research. Construal‐level theory articulates how psychological distance alters the mental representation of inputs and the effective weight given to “high‐level” and “low‐level” criteria. Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak (2007) provide a review of this literature. In this commentary, we illustrate the relevance of construal‐level theory to issues in consumer psychology, particularly consumer decision making. We highlight specific questions that researchers could address by considering consumer behavior within the framework of changes in construal. We focus our discussion on how construal levels affect consideration sets and how shifts in weight from high‐level to low‐level features might lead to consumer regret and dissatisfaction. Construal level can help us understand follow‐through on stated intentions for “really new” products and illuminate public‐policy issues such as consumer saving for retirement and nonredemption of rebates. We identify open issues related to how construal levels for the same object evolve over time and whether resources differ in terms of how susceptible they are to psychological distance effects.     

Decision making and neuropsychiatry

Abnormal decision making is a central feature of neuropsychiatric disorders. Recent investigations of the neural substrates underlying decision making have involved qualitative assessment of the cognition of decision making in clinical lesion studies (in patients with frontal lobe dementia) and neuropsychiatric disorders such as mania, substance abuse and personality disorders. A neural network involving the orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum and modulatory ascending neurotransmitter systems has been identified as having a fundamental role in decision making and in the neural basis of neuropsychiatric diseases. This network accounts for the dissociations among decision-making deficits in different clinical populations. Ultimately, a more refined and sophisticated characterization of such deficits might guide the early diagnosis and cognitive and therapeutic rehabilitation of these patients.