Satire,Analogy, and Moral Philosophy

This article addresses two puzzles, one about the nature of satire and its kinship with moral philosophy and the other about the possibility of practicing philosophy through works of art. While it has long been noted that moral satire and applied ethics share subject matter in common, there has been little attention to the prominence of argument by analogy in satire. This essay shows that satire has a kinship with moral philosophy close enough that it is possible to practice philosophy through satire and thus possible to practice philosophy through works of narrative fiction.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity

The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate if mistakes are to be avoided; combined in the right way, they provide an adequate understanding of severity. Those who think that the weight of the evidence always enables you to choose between hypotheses “ignore one of the factors (the prior probability) altogether, and treat the other (the likelihood) as though it ...meant something other than it actually does. This is the same mistake as is made by someone who has scruples about measuring the arms of a balance (having only a tape measure at his disposal ...), but is willing to assert that the heavier load will always tilt the balance (thereby implicitly assuming, although without admitting it, that the arms are of equal length!). (Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability)²     

Decolonizing the Language of Lutheran Theology: Confessions,Mission, Indians,and the Globalization of Hybridity

Abstract : Christianity as we know it in the United States is essentially a european ethnic religious movement, one that has necessitated decolonizing processes as it has spread into the formerly euro‐colonized global world. In many ways, lutheranism has been and continues to be even more discretely ethnocentric, based largely in the thinking, the cultures, and the languages of the germanic north. This essay challenges lutheran theologians to begin a dedicated process of decoding the narrowly ethnic and implicitly colonizing language of lutheran theology.     

Propositional epistemic luck,epistemic risk,and epistemic justification

If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, and in the process delineate a species of epistemic luck that has hitherto gone unnoticed—what we call propositional epistemic luck—but which we claim is crucial to accounting for the importance of proper basing. As we will see, in order to understand why this type of epistemic luck is malignant, we also need to reflect on the relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk.     

Life: Definition,Origin, and Evolution

Out of all the natural phenomena surrounding us, the phenomena Life, as a matter of course, is that which is the most mysterious and least understood of all. In many aspects, it seems as though it would be possible to investigate, study, and explain Life, like so many of the other subjects that fall within the category of the natural sciences: time, space, mass, movement, and so on. However, in its essence, Life is organized and managed differently than all other natural phenomena, operating, as it were, according to its own laws. Life certainly has certain clearly recognizable characteristics, such as: metabolism, homeostasis, continuity, and more. However, up until the present time, no definition for Life has been provided, which unifies it as an entity, and differentiates it unmistakably from other natural phenomenon. The current article offers a definition of the true nature of the phenomenon of Life, which in turn helps to explain the big questions of life—evolution, the mind–body problem, consciousness, and more.     

Misuse,abuse, overuse,and unuse of on-line computer facilities by psychologists

This, then, is a very personal and informal view of some of the peculiar trends of computer application in experimental psychology. If there is any single point on which I would prefer to end, it would be a reiteration of my belief that, on the whole, the positive attributes and contributions to our science of on-line computers have far outweighed some of these nagging aggravations. Regardless of what has been done and in what way it has been done, it is certainly better to have done something than never to have done anything at all. Our science, like a computer program, is also contingent and self-adapting, and most minor strategic errors are quickly corrected. But no one can debug a computer program or a major technological movement without at least having pushed the startbutton.     

Empowerment,agency, and power

As ‘empowerment’ and ‘agency’ have received wider usage within development research and policy, ambiguities and variant meanings have proliferated. Amidst this conceptual drift, there has also been a tendency to assimilate the two concepts. This tendency is problematic in a number of ways. First, ‘agency’ has various meanings, and the weakest of these captures little of the concept of empowerment. Second, empowerment has a conceptual link with well-being that agency cannot have. Third, when empowerment is assimilated with expanded agency, that agency is not considered in a relational way: the focus is on how the agency of a group or individual becomes greater than it was, not on the degree to which their agency is dependent on or dominated by the agency of others. If ‘empowerment’ no longer refers to social relations, it loses its direct relevance to the transformation of those relations and, as some critics have claimed, it ceases to be a ‘transformative’ concept. After showing that there are cases of empowerment that cannot be captured by conceptions of empowerment that ‘take power out’, I draw upon the capability approach to propose relational conceptions of agency and empowerment that ‘bring power back in’.     

Ebola,epidemics, and ethics - what we have learned

The current Ebola epidemic has presented challenges both medical and ethical. Although we have known epidemics of untreatable diseases in the past, this particular one may be unique in the intensity and rapidity of its spread, as well as ethical challenges that it has created, exacerbated by its geographic location. We will look at the infectious agent and the epidemic it is causing, in order to understand the ethical problems that have arisen.     

Equality,priority and global justice

Derek Parfit has argued that prioritarianism “naturally” has global scope, i.e. naturally applies to everyone, irrespective of his or her particular national, state or other communal affiliation. In that respect, it differs from e.g. egalitarianism. In this article, I critically assess Parfit's argument. In particular, I argue that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the scope of prioritarianism simply from an inspection of its structure. I also make some suggestions as to what it would take to argue that prioritarianism has either global or merely domestic scope.     

Know-how,intellectualism, and memory systems

ABSTRACT

A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I arguethat, currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms thatdo not correspond to categories in psychological science. As aresult, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a vocabularythat is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settledempirically.     

Molar and latent models of cognitive slowing: Implications for aging,dementia, depression,development, and intelligence

The time that it takes a group of participants to respond in simple cognitive tasks varies systematically with the identity of the group. For example, on most tasks, older adults take longer to respond than younger adults. Similarly, on most tasks, younger children take longer to respond than mature children. More generally, response time has been found to vary reliably with a number of other factors that differentiate groups of participants, including the levels of dementia, depression, and intelligence. For each factor, investigators have sought to determine whether the various mental processes are slowed identically as the level of impairment increases. They have based this determination largely on the relation between the overall response times of the relevant groups. Here it is shown how one can base this determination on the relation between the speeds of the individual latent or mental processes governing the performance of the target groups. Such a shift in emphasis has three important advantages: it reduces the possibility of falsely accepting or rejecting the hypothesis that all processes are slowed identically; it pinpoints the actual processes that are lengthened disproportionately when processes are not slowed identically; and it makes possible the rigorous testing of the effects of changes in speed on other dependent variables (e.g., accuracy).     

Perception, Color, and Realism

One reason philosophers have addressed the metaphysics of color is its apparent relevance to the sciences concerned with color phenomena. In the light of such thinking, this paper examines a pairing of views that has received much attention: color physicalism and externalism about the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that the latter is a dubious conception of the workings of our perceptual systems. Together with flawed appeals to the empirical literature, it has led some philosophers to grant color physicalism a scientific legitimacy it does not merit. This discussion provides a useful entry into broader points pertaining to debates about color realism and the relationship between philosophical theories of color and the relevant empirical literatures. A sketch of a novel form of color realism is offered, as is an example that fills in some details of that sketch.     

Desert,fairness, and resentment

Responsibility, blameworthiness in particular, has been characterized in a number of ways in a literature in which participants appear to be talking about the same thing much of the time. More specifically, blameworthiness has been characterized in terms of what sorts of responses are fair, appropriate, and deserved in a basic way, where the responses in question range over blame, sanctions, alterations to interpersonal relationships, and the reactive attitudes, such as resentment and indignation. In this paper, I explore the relationships between three particular theses: (i) the claim that one is blameworthy to the extent that it is fair to impose sanctions, (ii) the claim that one is blameworthy to the extent that one deserves sanctions, and (iii) the claim that one is blameworthy to the extent that it is appropriate to respond with reactive attitudes. Appealing to the way in which luck in the outcome of an action can justifiably affect the degree of sanctions received, I argue that (i) is false and that fairness and desert come apart. I then argue that the relationship between the reactive attitudes and sanction is not as straightforward as has sometimes been assumed, but that (ii) and (iii) might both be true and closely linked. I conclude by exploring various claims about desert, including ones that link it to the intrinsic goodness of receiving what is deserved and to the permissibility or rightness of inflicting suffering.     

Mental Illness,Natural Death,and Non-Voluntary Passive Euthanasia

When it is considered to be in their best interests, withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment from non-competent physically ill or injured patients – non-voluntary passive euthanasia, as it has been called – is generally accepted. A central reason in support of the procedures relates to the perceived manner of death they involve: in non-voluntary passive euthanasia death is seen to come about naturally. When a non-competent psychiatric patient attempts to kill herself, the mental health care providers treating her are obligated to try to stop her. Yet it has been suggested that death by suicide can be a part of the natural course of a severe mental illness. Accordingly, if the perceived naturalness of the deaths occurring in connection with non-voluntary passive euthanasia speaks for their moral permissibility, it could be taken that a similar reason can support the moral acceptability of the suicidal deaths of non-competent psychiatric patients. In this article, I consider whether the suicidal death of a non-competent psychiatric patient would necessarily be less natural than those of physically ill or injured patients who die as a result of non-voluntary passive euthanasia. I argue that it would not.     

Causes, Causity, and Energy

Our ordinary concept of causality is—as David Hume wisely underscored—the concept in which an event or change produces another event or change. This production is the central core of causation, and the objective component of it Hume analyzed as constant conjunction. As is well known, Hume emphasized that our notion of production or causation has a subjective component, namely, the illusion of a certain necessity in the connection between cause and effect. Typically, the critique of Hume has centered on his attack upon, and on his theses about, necessity. But the core idea of production has been generally kept out of the dialectical stage. Here I will put necessity aside and bring this very idea of production to the center of the stage. I propose to explore the most general logical and ontological features of production. The most intriguing feature is the deep connection between production and energy. But as it will become apparent from the ensuing discussion, that deep connection is mediated by a more general concept of world-orderliness that I shall dub causity. Thus, the general principles here formulated belong to the philosophical foundations of thermodynamics.     

THE JERUSALEM DECREE,PAUL, AND THE GENTILE ANALOGY TO HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS

Revisionists and traditionalists appeal to Acts 15, welcoming the Gentiles, for analogies directing the church's response to homosexual persons. John Perry has analyzed the major positions. He faults revisionists for inadequate attention to the Jerusalem Decree and faults one traditionalist for using the Decree literally rather than through analogy. I argue that analogical use of the Decree must supplement rather than displace the plain sense. The Decree has been neglected due to assumptions that Paul opposed it, that it expired, or because Gentiles wanted non‐kosher meat. I argue that Paul continued to observe the Torah and supported the Decree, that it has not expired, and that Gentile desire for non‐kosher meat is not a firm obstacle. Affirming the plain sense of the Decree, I develop the analogy from Acts 15 to homosexual persons.     

Marijuana's effects on human cognitive functions, psychomotor functions, and personality

Marijuana is complex chemically and not yet fully understood, but it is not a narcotic. Like alcohol, marijuana acts as both stimulant and depressant, but it lingers in body organs longer than alcohol. Smoking marijuana can injure mucosal tissue and may have more carcinogenic potential than tobacco. Research has indicated that marijuana intoxication definitely hinders attention, long-term memory storage, and psychomotor skills involved in driving a car or flying a plane. Expectations and past experience with marijuana have often influenced results more than pharmacological aspects have. Marijuana has triggered psychotic episodes in those more vulnerable. Psychological and some instances of physiological dependence on marijuana have been demonstrated. As a psychoactive drug, marijuana surely alters mental functioning. Although it is possible that chronic use of marijuana produces irreversible damage to mind or brain areas, this has not been determined by research.     

Neurobehavioral deficits,adolescent traumatic brain injury,and transition to college

Outcome following traumatic brain injury (TBI) has been frequently evaluated for adults, although there has been minimal research on adolescents with TBI. It has been argued that TBI sequelae may be more difficult for adolescents to adjust to given developmental changes in physical (puberty), interpersonal (self-concept), and environmental domains (transition to college). In addition, it is commonly acknowledged that moderator variables such as psychiatric history, family functioning, substance use, and sexuality impact functional outcome following TBI, although it is often difficult to objectively evaluate these variables. The current study examined relationships among TBI-related deficits, moderator variables, and academic outcomes for six adolescents transitioning to college. The findings suggest that it may not be appropriate to predict functional outcome based solely on objective neuropsychological results. However, moderator variables appear to have a more direct relationship with outcome, depending on the moderator variable and the individual.     

Counting on Whiteness: Religion,race, ethnicity,and the politics of Jewish demography

American Jews have long been an anomaly for scholars concerned with understanding how they fit into extant social scientific or historical categories. Sometimes they seem best described as an ethnic group, other times as a religious one. This ambiguity has also vexed Jewish communal leaders whose desire to comprehend their communities has largely been underwritten by their intention to protect it. This intersection of sociological methods and schema and Jewish communal concerns has resulted in decisive omissions regarding how best to account for the racial and ethnic diversity of American Jews. An analysis of survey instruments used in 175 American Jewish population studies and community portraits conducted since 1970 reveals a focus on questions of religious practice and an avoidance of those about race and ethnicity, resulting in a “religio-racial formation” of American Jews as White. This approach to studying American Jewish life has marginalized or excluded non-White Jews while ensuring ongoing Jewish communal access to Whiteness without having to claim it explicitly.