Test of Competing Explanations of the Bizarre Response Bias in Recognition Memory

Recent research has demonstrated that a more liberal response criterion is used when people make judgments about bizarre items than about common items in old-new tests of recognition. The present study was designed to test 2 possible explanations of the bizarre response bias. The bizarre-relations explanation suggests that the bizarre response bias is triggered by the bizarre relations depicted in test items. The target-constituent explanation suggests that the bizarre response bias is the result of a sense of familiarity with constituents of bizarre test items. These explanations were tested by examining the influence of lure manipulations on memory discrimination and response bias for common and bizarre hand-drawn pictures. The results indicated support for the target-constituent explanation by reversing the response bias (obtaining a common response bias) in a recognition test that used common lures containing constituents from bizarre target items and bizarre lures containing constituents from common target items. The results also indicated that increased verbal elaboration enhanced memory discrimination and reduced response bias for both common and bizarre stimuli. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the false memory controversy.     

False memory across languages: implicit associative response vs fuzzy trace views

We investigated false recognition across languages using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. A group of English-French bilinguals studied lists of converging associates, some lists in English and some in French, and then performed a recognition test containing studied list items and nonstudied critical lures whose language matched or mismatched the language at study. Participants were instructed to answer old only if the test cue was in the same language as the studied word. The results yielded a robust false memory rate both within-language and across-languages. The effect of the study-test language shift was much larger for list items than for critical lures. This finding suggests that memory representations for critical lures contain primarily semantic gist traces and little surface information, and hence is more consistent with the fuzzy trace view than with the implicit associative response view. In sum, the study demonstrates the existence of false memory across languages, and provides information about the memory traces underlying veridical and illusory recognition.     

Conscious and unconscious discriminations between true and false memories

When subjects give higher confidence or memory ratings to a test word in a recognition test, do they simply raise their criterion without making better discrimination, or do they raise both criterion and true discrimination between the studied words (SW) and the lures? Given that previous studies found subjects’ false alarm responses to lures slower than to SW, and recognition latency inversely correlated with the confidence rating, can the latency difference between the lures and SW be accounted for by confidence or memory ratings? The present results showed that when subjects gave higher confidence or memory ratings, both their bias and sensitivity were raised, indicating that they could consciously distinguish the lures from the SW. However, a latency difference between true and false recognitions persisted after confidence and memory ratings were held constant, suggesting an unconscious source of discrimination between the two types of memory.     

Item-specific processing reduces false memories

We examined the effect of item-specific and relational encoding instructions on false recognition in two experiments in which the DRM paradigm was used (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Type of encoding (item-specific or relational) was manipulated between subjects in Experiment 1 and within subjects in Experiment 2. Decision-based explanations (e.g., the distinctiveness heuristic) predict reductions in false recognition in between-subjects designs, but not in within-subjects designs, because they are conceptualized as global shifts in decision criteria. Memory-based explanations predict reductions in false recognition in both designs, resulting from enhanced recollection of item-specific details. False recognition was reduced following item-specific encoding instructions in both experiments, favoring a memory-based explanation. These results suggest that providing unique cues for the retrieval of individual studied items results in enhanced discrimination between those studied items and critical lures. Conversely, enhancing the similarity of studied items results in poor discrimination among items within a particular list theme. These results are discussed in terms of the item-specific/ relational framework (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).     

Test-induced priming of false memories

Of interest was whether prior testing of related words primes false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. After studying lists of related words, subjects made old-new judgments about zero, three, or six related items before being tested on critical nonpresented lures. When the recognition test was self-paced, prior testing of list items led to faster false recognition judgments, but did not increase the rate of false alarms to lures from studied lists. Critically, this pattern changed when decision making at test was speeded. When forced to respond quickly—presumably precluding the use of monitoring processes—clear test-induced priming effects were observed in the rate of false memories. The results are consistent with an activation-monitoring explanation of false memories and support that retrieving veridical memories can be a source of memory error.     

Can corrective feedback improve recognition memory?

An understanding of the effects of corrective feedback on recognition memory can inform both recognition theory and memory training programs, but few published studies have investigated the issue. Although the evidence to date suggests that feedback does not improve recognition accuracy, few studies have directly examined its effect on sensitivity, and fewer have created conditions that facilitate a feedback advantage by encouraging controlled processing at test. In Experiment 1, null effects of feedback were observed following both deep and shallow encoding of categorized study lists. In Experiment 2, feedback robustly influenced response bias by allowing participants to discern highly uneven base rates of old and new items, but sensitivity remained unaffected. In Experiment 3, a false-memory procedure, feedback failed to attenuate false recognition of critical lures. In Experiment 4, participants were unable to use feedback to learn a simple category rule separating old items from new items, despite the fact that feedback was of substantial benefit in a nearly identical categorization task. The recognition system, despite a documented ability to utilize controlled strategic or inferential decision-making processes, appears largely impenetrable to a benefit of corrective feedback.     

Re-exposure to studied items at test does not influence false recognition

In two experiments, we investigated whether re-exposure to previously studied items at test affects false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, we examined whether exposure to the critical lure at test influences memory for subsequently presented study items. In Experiment 1, immediately following each studied DRM list, participants were given a recognition test. The tests were constructed such that the number of studied items preceding the critical lure varied from zero to five. Neither false recognition for critical lures nor accurate memory for studied items was affected by this manipulation. In Experiment 2, we replicated this pattern of results under speeded conditions at test. Both experiments confirm that exposure to previously studied items at test does not affect true or false recognition in the DRM paradigm. This pattern strongly suggests that retrieval processes do not influence false recognition in the DRM paradigm.     

Differential effects of list strength on recollection and familiarity

Numerous studies have found a null list strength effect (LSE) for recognition sensitivity: Strengthening memory traces associated with some studied items does not impair recognition of nonstrengthened studied items. In Experiment 1, the author found a LSE using receiver operating characteristic-based measures of recognition sensitivity. To account for the discrepancy between this and prior research, the author (a) argues that a LSE occurs for recollection but not for discrimination based on familiarity, and (b) presents self-report data consistent with this hypothesis. Experiment 2 tested the dual-process hypothesis more directly, using switched-plurality (SP) lures to isolate the contribution of recollection. There was a significant LSE for comparisons involving SP lures; the LSE for discrimination of studied items and nominally unrelated lures (which can be supported by familiarity) was not significant.     

Re-exposure to studied items at test does not influence false recognition

In two experiments, we investigated whether re-exposure to previously studied items at test affects false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, we examined whether exposure to the critical lure at test influences memory for subsequently presented study items. In Experiment 1, immediately following each studied DRM list, participants were given a recognition test. The tests were constructed such that the number of studied items preceding the critical lure varied from zero to five. Neither false recognition for critical lures nor accurate memory for studied items was affected by this manipulation. In Experiment 2, we replicated this pattern of results under speeded conditions at test. Both experiments confirm that exposure to previously studied items at test does not affect true or false recognition in the DRM paradigm. This pattern strongly suggests that retrieval processes do not influence false recognition in the DRM paradigm.     

Process demands of rejection mechanisms of recognition memory

A surge of research has been conducted to examine memory editing mechanisms that help distinguish accurate from inaccurate memories. In the present experiment, the authors examined the ability of participants to use novelty detection, recollection rejection, and plausibility judgments to reject lures presented on a recognition memory test. Participants studied a list of word pairs that were arranged in a category relationship (both words from the same category) or an unrelated relationship (both words from different categories) under full or divided attention. At test, participants were given a yes/no recognition test in which they were to respond after seeing the test items for 400 ms or 2,800 ms. Some of the test items were rearranged word pairs that were consistent with the study relationship, whereas others were inconsistent with the study relationship. The results demonstrate that the participants required full attention at study to use novelty detection, recollection rejection, and plausibility judgments to reject lures. Moreover, the results indicate that a long response deadline at test was needed for participants to use both recollection rejection and plausibility judgments to reject lures.     

Revelation without presentation: Counterfeit study list yields robust revelation effect

This study explores the revelation effect, a recognition memory phenomenon that occurs when test items (or related items) are specially processed before recognition judgment. These revealed items, whether targets or lures, receive a positive response bias. Although the effect occurs across various conditions, it has not been shown to occur when participants make judgments unrelated to episodic memory. We investigated whether the effect would occur when a recognition decision was nominally one of episodic memory, but when a complete episodic event had not occurred. Specifically, participants listened to noise that allegedly masked a list of words (in fact, no words existed). A revelation effect occurred with this pseudo-subliminal procedure, suggesting that the revelation effect need not rely on stimuli recalled through episodic memory but only a specific event to recall. The effect did not occur when participants simply guessed whether words were on an unheard list or made semantic judgments.     

False recognition across meaning,language, and stimulus format: Conceptual relatedness and the feeling of familiarity

Four experiments examined contributions of conceptual relatedness and feelings of familiarity to false recognition. Participants first studied lists of unrelated items (e.g., table, lock) followed by a recognition test with three types of items: (1) studied items (e.g., table), (2) semantically related lures (e.g., key), and (3) unrelated lures (e.g., cup). Participants falsely recognized more related than unrelated lures when the stimuli were words (Experiment 1A) and pictures (Experiment 1B), when the studied items and related lures differed in language (Experiment 2), and when they differed in perceptual format (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation, designed to make feelings of familiarity nondiagnostic for memory judgments, eliminated the false-recognition effect obtained in Experiment 3. Overall, the study suggests that conceptual relatedness produces false recognition even in the absence of shared perceptual surface features between study and test items, and it does so by generating feelings of familiarity.     

Tests of a cognitive-resource-allocation account of the bizarreness effect

The authors examined the role of cognitive-resource allocation in obtaining the often reported memory advantage for bizarre relative to common information by using the secondary-task method in 4 experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, they investigated the relationship between differences in cognitive resource allocation during comprehension and in recall for common and bizarre information. In Experiments 3 and 4, they investigated the same relationship but measured cognitive-resource allocation during imaging rather than during comprehension. Although bizarre items required more time to comprehend and to image than did common items, the differences were not reliable predictors of the recall differences between item types. Furthermore, analyses of response latencies to a secondary task provided no compelling evidence in support of a cognitive-resource-allocation explanation of bizarreness effects. Implications for the development of a comprehensive model of the influence of bizarreness on memory are discussed.     

Tests of a Cognitive-Resource-Allocation Account of the Bizarreness Effect

The authors examined the role of cognitive-resource allocation in obtaining the often reported memory advantage for bizarre relative to common information by using the secondary-task method in 4 experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, they investigated the relationship between differences in cognitive resource allocation during comprehension and in recall for common and bizarre information. In Experiments 3 and 4, they investigated the same relationship but measured cognitive-resource allocation during imaging rather than during comprehension. Although bizarre items required more time to comprehend and to image than did common items, the differences were not reliable predictors of the recall differences between item types. Furthermore, analyses of response latencies to a secondary task provided no compelling evidence in support of a cognitive-resource-allocation explanation of bizarreness effects. Implications for the development of a comprehensive model of the influence of bizarreness on memory are discussed.     

Repetition effects in associative false recognition: Theme-based criterion shifts are the exception, not the rule

Previous reports have demonstrated that false memory for the critical items of associative lists decreases when lists are studied multiple times (Benjamin, 2001). In three experiments, we explored two hypotheses that might account for false memory reductions with repetition. Under an identification hypothesis, repetition decreases false memory because participants realise that critical items are absent from the list at encoding and thus reject them at test. Under a criterion shift hypothesis, repetition decreases false memory because it increases the discriminability of studied words from lures, causing participants to set a higher response criterion for positive recognition responses. Results uniquely supported the criterion shift hypothesis. Furthermore, results showed that participants only changed their criterion on separate recognition tests, not on an item-by-item basis within a single recognition test. The failure to establish separate criteria within a test increased false memory for repeated lists.     

Lure similarity affects visual episodic recognition: Detailed tests of a noisy exemplar model

Summed-similarity models of visual episodic recognition memory successfully predict the variation in false alarm rates across different test items. With data averaged across subjects, Kahana and Sekuler demonstrated that subjects' performance appears to change along with the mean similarity among study items; with high interstimulus similarity, subjects were less likely to commit false alarms to similar lures. We examined this effect in detail by systematically varying the coordinates of study and test items along a critical stimulus dimension and measuring memory performance at each point. To reduce uncontrolled variance associated with individual differences in vision, the coordinates of study and test items were scaled according to each subject's discrimination threshold. Fitting each of four summed-similarity models to the individual subjects' data demonstrated a clear superiority for models that take account of interitem similarity on a trialwise basis.     

The effect of context on discrimination and bias in recognition memory for pictures and words

When the context accompanying a to-be-remembered word is changed between study and test, recognition memory is impaired. The deleterious effect of context change on recognition memory can be viewed as support for encoding specificity theory, semantic theory, or the existence of two bases for recognition. A fourth possible interpretation, examined here, is that the effect of context change on recognition memory is due to an accompanying change in response bias, rather than a "true" decrease in sensitivity to old and new items. In two experiments, the effect of context change on discrimination and bias in recognition of simple line drawings and their names was examined. Bias was measured using two measures shown by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) to be theoretically independent of their associated discrimination measures. Context change produced marked conservatism in response bias in both experiments but demonstrated an effect on discrimination in the second experiment only. The shift from a neutral to a conservative response strategy as a result of context change may also be seen in other experiments, in which the same experimental paradigm was used with a variety of stimulus materials. We suggest that the major effect of context manipulation is to produce a change in bias. A stimulus in a familiar environment appears to be more familiar than a stimulus in a strange environment, regardless of its old/new status. In addition, there appears to be a true decrease in discrimination with context change, but this is more difficult to detect. The finding that pictures, which are less polysemous than words, are as affected by context change as words are supports encoding specificity theory over semantic theory.     

汉字字形关联对错误记忆的影响

采用DRM范式,研究汉字字形关联对错误记忆的影响。实验以占汉字主体的形声字为材料。学习阶段使用了两类字表:在一半字表中,各字表内汉字及相应的关键诱饵具有相同形旁;另一半字表中,各字表内汉字及相应关键诱饵具有相同声旁。再认测试中,被试对两类关键诱饵均表现出了明显的错误记忆,并且其效应大小与字表汉字相似度成正比。这些结果说明,汉字的字形关联可以诱发错误记忆现象,并且这种错误记忆效应由汉字间字形相似度决定。     

强大的错误记忆效应:词表呈现时间与呈现方式的影响

本研究采用DRM范式(Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm),考察了词表项目的呈现时间与呈现方式对错误记忆效应的影响。结果发现,被试对关键诱饵的错误再认受到学习阶段词表项目的呈现方式的影响,表现为所有项目随机呈现条件下的错误再认明显低于分组呈现条件,尤其是在20ms的随机呈现条件下,观察到了对关键诱饵的最低错误再认率。说明在对词表项目的编码阶段产生了对关键诱饵的连续激活,而对关键诱饵的错误记忆则是基于连续激活的不断累积的结果,当词表项目的随机呈现阻断了连续激活过程时,便会有效降低错误记忆效应。而且,在所有实验条件下均发现了错误记忆效应产生中所伴随的强烈主观体验,证实了错误记忆是一种强大的效应。     

Memory for common and bizarre stimuli: A storage-retrieval analysis

We tested the hypothesis that common stimuli are stored in memory better than bizarre stimuli are. Subjects memorized a series of noun pairs embedded within 20 common or bizarre sentences. By using a between-list design, free and cued recall, and intentional-learning instructions, we were able to obtain a commonness effect (i.e., a recall advantage for the common sentences). Riefer and Rouder’s (1992) multinomial processing-tree model for measuring storage and retrieval was applied to the data, which revealed that the recall advantage for common sentences was due to storage and not retrieval processes. We propose a two-factor theory: that common items are stored better in memory, but that bizarre items are retrieved better from memory. This storage-retrieval explanation does a good job of accounting for a number of findings associated with the bizarreness effect.