A Secular Age: Reflections on Charles Taylor′s Recent Book

Charles Taylor in A Secular Age describes the modern secular age as one in which ‘the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing … falls within the range of an imaginable life for masses of people’. This article reflects on his historico-analytic investigation of the emergence of modern secularity and his account of how it shapes the current conditions of belief. Taylor challenges the widespread presumption against belief mainly on ethical considerations, especially what counts as human fulfilment. The article argues that he fails to deal adequately with epistemic considerations bearing on belief and unbelief. Furthermore, his argument is weakened by a surprising absence of attention to the primary account of human fulfilment in Greek philosophy as a central element in the Christian tradition.     

Jerome on Sinlessness: a Via Media between Augustine and Pelagius

This article will explore Jerome's understanding of sinlessness and will argue that he saw himself just as opposed to Augustine as to Pelagius. I begin by exposing Jerome's context in the Pelagian Controversy. I then expose his understanding of sinlessness. Next, I turn to his arguments in Ep. 133 and the first two books of his Dialogi contra Pelagianos. In book three of that text, we notice a change in his arguments which indicates that Jerome is no longer arguing only against Pelagius; he now disagrees with Augustine as well. I then examine a variety of issues besides sinlessness in the third book of the Dialogi that reveal that Jerome disagreed with Augustine on multiple topics, showing that his opposition to Augustine's position on sinlessness was not exceptional. Finally I turn to statements by Jerome that seem to indicate a positive appreciation for the Bishop of Hippo, but which on closer inspection are seen to contain latent criticisms.     

Beginning,ending and remembering

Wittgenstein famously opens his Philosophical Investigations with a quotation in which Augustine recounts how he acquired language. Instead of going into the widely discussed question of how Wittgenstein relates to Augustine's picture of language, this article inquires into what else might be at stake in invoking Confessions at the very beginning of his work. At the very least, such a gesture seems to suggest that Wittgenstein wants to inscribe himself into the Augustinian legacy. More specifically, this article argues that Philosophical Investigations centres on three problems that Wittgenstein has inherited from Augustine – namely what one might call the problem of beginning, the problem of ending and finally the problem of memory. The problem of beginning not only points to the local problem of how to start writing confessional philosophy, but also what authorizes such philosophy in the first place. The problem of ending concerns the direction of such philosophy and the problematic stance of its goal, while the problem of memory turns on the task of progressing from beginning to ending.     

Augustine and Karl Rahner on the Relationship between the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity

Abstract:  Karl Rahner developed his influential axiom concerning the identity of the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity largely as a polemical reaction to their separation in the Western tradition, a tradition heavily shaped by Augustine. An analysis of Augustine's De Trinitate , however, reveals that Augustine was not guilty of most of the charges of which Rahner accuses him. Furthermore, Rahner's outworking of his fundamental axiom leads him into numerous difficulties that he could have avoided had he adhered to Augustine's view of a close but differentiated relationship between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity.     

Augustine and education in critical thinking

Augustine's concept of the deep self provides a basis for a complex and many‐faceted account of critical thinking. He uncovers the moral sources of thinking in the inner depths of the self and shows that critical thinking presupposes radical self‐reflection ready to face the truth about oneself. Self‐knowledge assumes transparency, consciousness of the corrupt desires and prejudices that distort one's thinking. Unresolved guilt endangers transparency and thereby makes it difficult to become aware of the vices distorting one's perspective on reality. That is why human beings need divine grace that gives them the courage to face their corruption.

For Augustine, the problem of critical thinking is part of a larger problem about how the human self and identity are formed, which factors influence the process, and how a person comes to know herself. Augustine writes an open account of his life in order to clarify this problem. His intention is to make sense of the nature of his self by thinking carefully who he is and how he became who he is.

Augustine seeks to find an answer to this question both philosophically and autobiographically, by analysing the factors that influenced the formation of his own identity and the development of his self‐knowledge and by reflecting philosophically on the nature of these influences. Reason is one essential part of the human soul. Since God has given reason to human beings, it must have a purpose. Augustine seeks to clarify this purpose by reflecting on fundamental epistemological questions: What is knowledge and where does it come from? What is the relationship of human reason to knowledge? How can one reach ultimate knowledge?

According to Augustine, human reason and perception have been formed to acquire knowledge about reality. If God had not made human reason and perception fitting for their task, knowledge would be completely unattainable. Since God has made human reason capable of acquiring reliable knowledge, reason has an important task in the spiritual development of human beings. It is especially useful when trying to make clear conceptual distinctions.

Reason does not, however, function independently of the will and the emotions. For reason to acquire a reliable grasp on reality and to understand things properly, the human heart must love the truth, the good and the right sufficiently to face its own prejudices and to gain self‐knowledge.

Critical thinking has, therefore, certain crucial preconditions, according to Augustine. The aim of this article is to clarify the structure of these preconditions. (1) In order to think critically, one has to distinguish between how reality appears to one and how it is in fact. (2) There is a close connection between willing and thinking, between one's deepest desires and one's view on reality. (3) One cannot distinguish reality from appearances unless one realizes how corrupt desires and prejudices distort one's perspective on reality. (4) In order to be able to face one's evil desires and become conscious of their distorting influence, one needs the courage to face one's depravity. Such a courage presupposes God's grace and his promise of forgiveness, since without divine grace human beings try to cover up the truth about themselves and remain unconscious of the distorting influence of their evil desires. (5) One needs a source of light that enlightens the deep recesses of the self and shows it in the true light but is yet external to the human being and independent of him. (6) This source of inner light has to be of a personal nature to provide the learner with the possibility of inner dialogue. Augustine assumes that God is the inner teacher of every human being. A crucial factor in the development of critical thinking is that one becomes more dialogically engaged with the inner teacher.     

On Understanding Worship in School Part Two: On worship and educating

This article continues a discussion begun in Part One. Together they re-examine the central thesis of Professor John Hull's (1975) book, School Worship, An Obituary, that the practice of worship in school is inappropriate. He attempted to establish his thesis through the analysis of the concept of education and of the concept of worship, and thus to show their essential incompatibility. Part One reviewed what an incompatibility might mean in the school context. After all, many diverse activities are pursued during the school day that, practically speaking, could not be done simultaneously in the same room. His thesis must be taken in the stronger form that, theoretically, the sense of education and the sense of worship are such that the two activities together are conceptually incoherent. The earlier article also reviewed his analysis of the concept of education. It questioned his definition and showed that it hinged on some of the dubious assumptions of an evidentialist philosophy. A better view of understanding and pedagogy might actually require the practise of worship in school. If it is the intention of our society to communicate the substance of religious life to the young, training them in worship may be the best, if not the only, way to do this. The features of education that Hull has identified have been selected for their rhetorical force. They appear to challenge what are assumed to be essential features of worship. Whether they do so in fact will depend on one's understanding of worship, but in what follows, his key assumptions about worship are put to the test and found wanting. Part Two, therefore, investigates Hull's understanding of worship. It finds that he believes a prior unconditional commitment to the belief 'God exists' is of the essence of worship. For him, it is this commitment that puts it at odds with education which he believes must scrutinise everything. The arguments against Hull here are designed to show that he is mistaken in his understanding of worship. Practices do not develop on the formation of belief systems first. Furthermore, religiously speaking, worship actually embraces a radical questioning. Finally, his assumption that there is a logical incompatibility in having an unconditional commitment and in embracing the practice of radical questioning is tested against the figure of Socrates. In the life of Socrates one can see how piety and educational practice belong together in such a way that one is the expression of the other. It is concluded that the nature of education and worship are at stake. These may have changed in such a way that they can no longer be pursued together. But there was a time when education flowered into worship, and worship found its substance in education. Hull's case concerning their intrinsic conceptual incoherence through philosophical analysis does not succeed. He has only shown us how our world has changed, and that, not necessarily for the better.     

回到真切(Direct)的个体体验——从奥古斯丁及安萨里的忏悔录说起

宗教思想发展史上,两位有杰出贡献的哲学家不约而同地提出了,将宗教的超越与神圣意义,与个人的切身(Personal)体验相关起来的问题。基督教神学家奥古斯丁以其著名的《忏悔录》,展现了他如何从真切的生活体验(experience)中,感悟人性、神性及人与神的关系等普遍性问题;而伊斯兰教哲学家安萨里则从其辉煌的学术经历中,深刻反思人类在超越与神圣面前,认识能力所必然具有的局限性。重新理解和比较他们思想的独特性,相信对于我们看待人类共同面对的问题,从独特的个体角度出发,也有取之不尽的宝贵资源。     

VAN FRAASSEN ON THE NATURE OF EMPIRICISM

Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth‐evaluable doctrine than as a stance.     

INQUIRY, CONVERSATION AND THEISTIC BELIEF: WILLIAM JAMES AND RICHARD RORTY GET RELIGION

This essay examines William James' view that pragmatic philosophy allows for theistic belief and compares it to Richard Rorty's argument that theistic belief is fundamentally incompatible with pragmatic philosophy. Theism is permissible for James because it is commensurate with his view of philosophy as inquiry . Theism is impermissible for Rorty because it incommensurate with his view of philosophy as conversation . James' arguments are shown to be too generic in their conception of the God in whom theistic belief may be placed, and Rorty's arguments against the desirability of theistic belief are shown to run afoul of his own philosophical program.     

Can religious arguments persuade?

In his famous essay “The Ethics of Belief,” William K. Clifford claimed “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” (Clifford’s essay was originally published in Contemporary Review in 1877; it is presently in print in Madigan (1999)). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford’s Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade (I take the term ‘religious argument’ to include arguments whose conclusions are either assertions or denials of religious claims). In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call “begging the doxastic question.”~An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument’s conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments.     

Putting Religion Back Into Religious Ethics

This essay on Richard Miller’s Friends and Other Strangers (2016) locates its arguments in the context of how the practice of religious ethics bears upon debates about normativity in the study of religion and the cultural turn in the humanities. After reviewing its main claims about identity and otherness, I focus on three areas. First, while commending Miller’s effort to analogize virtuous empathy with Augustine’s ethics of rightly ordered love, I raise questions about his use of Augustine and his distinctive formulation of Augustinian “iconic realism.” Second, I suggest his discussion of public reason is at odds with the dialogical spirit of the book and may distract from the democratic solidarity required by our political moment. Third, more briefly, I highlight the practical implications of Miller’s vision for higher education at both the graduate and undergraduate level.     

A philosophical examination of coercion for mental health issues

This article considers two philosophical questions about coercion and mental disorders: (1) an analytical question, i.e., what is meant by the concept of coercion? (2) a normative question, i.e., what justifies the use of coercion? The article distinguishes between coercion from other forms of power such as inducement, persuasion, and authority. It then considers a range of arguments for the paternalistic use of coercion for the benefit of mentally disordered persons and the use of coercion to restrain mentally disordered dangerous persons. This article rests on the assumption that there is something to be said for an academic division of labour, that empirical research in mental health and the law can benefit from conceptual clarification and the analysis of normative arguments. In this article I distinguish between two importantly different sorts of questions that we can ask about coercion and then offer some answers to those questions in broad strokes.     

What the Wise Ought Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume's General Rules

This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called ‘the general rules’: natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we ought to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of the mind. Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental.     

Perplexity and Mystery

In this paper I comment on Gareth B. Matthews's "The Socratic Augustine" and Peter King's "Augustine on the Impossibility of Teaching." Matthews's paper adduces several instances of Augustine's apparent willingness to accept Socratic perplexity in some philosophical matters. Matthews suggests that these cases are compatible with Augustine's dogmatism because Augustine presupposes that the phenomena in question, although perplexing, are actual. I suggest instead that Augustine can be viewed as taking a neutral stance toward many of his examples, because they arise in areas of philosophical inquiry where it is not important to the tenets of his faith that he hold the right opinion. King defends the Augustinian thesis that teaching, construed as the causal transmission of knowledge from teacher to learner, is, if not impossible, at least mysterious. I suggest that much of the alleged mystery may rest on a confusion between epistemological dependency and metaphysical dependency.     

The realism that duhem rejected in Copernicus

Pierre Duhem rejected unambiguously the strong version of realism that he believed was held by Copernicus. In fact, although Copernicus believed that his theory was clearly superior to Ptolemy's, he seems to have recognized that his theory was at best only approximately true. Accordingly, he recognized that his arguments were not demonstrative in the traditional sense but probable and persuasive. Duhem regarded even the belief in probably true explanations as misguided. Nevertheless, Duhem recognized that, even if metaphysical intuition does not enter into the content of physical theories, the rejection of hypotheses could be explained only by appeal to common sense. Hence, Duhem held a qualified instrumentalism according to which physical theories are not realist, but the terms of ordinary experience and empirical laws are realist. Accordingly, Duhem rejected the complete subordination of science to philosophy as well as the complete separation of science from philosophy. Duhem's history of cosmological doctrines reflects his belief in the origin of the subordination of science to philosophy and of the struggle to achieve the proper balance without being driven to the opposite extreme of their complete separation.     

Non-directive moments in a directive world

This article considers how a counselor can best serve his clients in the world as it is, where each human being is exposed to an enormous amount of data he must process. The author has, for some years, struggled with this problem and suggests here an answer that seems most comfortable for him and most useful to his clients. Non-directive moments are recommended for the very reason that the world is predominantly directive.     

Credulism

Conclusion The credulity principle approach to the issue of the rationality of religious belief is a clear advance over the proof approach. For the proof approach, in the end, is simply too wedded to an infallibilist conception of rational belief; and initially, at least, the credulity principle approach seems to avoid this conception. In the end, however, it affirms that same viewpoint; for if it does not embody an infallibilist conception of epistemic principles, its critical property of intersubjectivity is beyond defense. Thus, in recognizing the inadequacy of infallibilist conceptions of rationality, we can see the inadequacy of both the proof approach and the credulity principle approach to the existence of God. It is simply false that the experiences of others is efficacious in conferring rationality on our beliefs.But if neither of these approaches is adequate, how is one to approach the issue of the rationality of religious belief? The subjective nature of rational belief provides the answer - if one wishes to argue that God exists, one will have to provide as many arguments as there are divergent sets of acceptable epistemic principles. There still is a place for such arguments; but only given the assumption that we share views about what sorts of inferences are proper, or that other arguments can be constructed for the superiority of certain epistemic principles. The view that must be given up, however, is that the discussions philosophers have of these issues need bear any relation to whether or not the normal religious believer has a reasonable belief or not - he does not need there to be a good philosophical argument that God exists in order to reasonably believe that God exists. Nor is any non-believer necessarily irrational just because there is such a good argument.Thus, once the nature of rational belief is properly appreciated, it appears that the question of the rationality of religious belief is not a central question any longer. Whether such beliefs are rational is a quite subjective question not capable of being answered by any sort of universal generalization about all religious believers and/or non-believers.