Nomothetic science and idiographic history in twentieth-century Americanist anthropology

For over a century, Americanist anthropologists have argued about whether their discipline is a historical one or a scientific one. Proponents of anthropology as history have claimed that the lineages of human cultures are made up of unique events that cannot be generalized into laws. If no laws can be drawn, then anthropology cannot be a science. Proponents of anthropology as science have claimed that there indeed are laws that govern humans and their behaviors and cultures, and these laws can be discovered. Interestingly, both sides have the same narrow view of what science is. The same sorts of debates over science and history were played out in evolutionary biology over a half-century ago, and what emerged was the view that that discipline and its sister discipline, paleontology, were both history and science--hence the term "historical sciences." Anthropology and its sister discipline, archaeology, have only recently begun to realize that they too are historical sciences.     

Impure temporalities in the history of political philosophy: the historiography of dēmokratia in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain

ABSTRACT

Building on Bernard Williams’ thesis about the intertwining of history and political philosophy, the essay explores how the problem of the history of dēmokratia after the late-eighteenth and over the nineteenth-century in Britain constituted a primary and critical field in which the philosophical meaning of democracy was debated. Configuring a new temporal perspective grounded in the relationship between ancient and modern democracy, historiographical works by John Gillies, William Mitford, and George Grote put forth an understanding of the concept as a battlefield, involving several conflicting meanings, narratives and historical forces. This historiographical tradition highlighted the tensions underpinning the definition of democracy in the long-term temporal frame linking antiquity and modernity. So even more than contemporary philosophical and political writings, historical understanding constituted a unique concept of democracy that both concentrated and dispersed meaning; it was not just one vision of democracy, among others, but one that acquired the paradoxical power to forge some semantic stability and coherence over time, and to accentuate the threat of the concept’s break up into distinct political premises and historical moments that constituted it.     

Art, evolution, and history: a case study of paradigm change in anthropology.

An ethnological controversy over the origin and evolution of decorative art is documented for the period 1896-1904 and is used to test the relevance in anthropology of Thomas Kuhn's outline of the structure of scientific revolutions. Using a combination of archival materials and content analysis of professional periodicals, both the appropriateness and the limitations of Kuhn's scheme are explored. The conclusion is that paradigms and scientific revolutions are valid and useful concepts for use in the history of anthropology, but that for the particular period under study they are insufficient. Nonparadigmatic aspects of anthropology's supporting communities must also be considered, especially anthropology's "permeable boundaries".     

The role of history of anthropology in the anthropology curriculum

The practitioners who teach anthropology are usually ethnocentric with regard to their own specialization. In the history course, in contrast, there is no right or wrong answer–only the search for context.     

Assessing research in the history of sociology and anthropology.

This paper reviews recent interpretive trends among historians of anthropology and sociology, examining both introductory texts and scholarly studies. It focuses on works published over the last ten years, and stresses that there has been no resolution of the long-standing conflict between "presentist" and "historicist" approaches to the history of the human sciences.     

Genetic epistemology,history of science and genetic psychology

Genetic epistemology analyzes the growth of knowledge both in the individual person (genetic psychology) and in the socio-historical realm (the history of science). But what the relationship is between the history of science and genetic psychology remains unclear. The biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is inadequate as a characterization of the relation. A critical examination of Piaget's Introduction à l'Épistémologie Généntique indicates these are several examples of what I call stage laws common to both areas. Furthermore, there is at least one example of a paradoxical inverse relation between the two — geometry. Both similarities and differences between the two domains require an explanation, a developmental explanation. Although such an explanation seems to be psychological in nature, it is not merely empirical but also normative (since psychology is both factual and normative according to Piaget). Hence genetic epistemology need not be reduced to psychology (narrowly conceived), but rather should be seen as being both empirical and normative and thus similar to certain types of contemporary philosophy of science.I wish to thank Guy Cellerier, Ken Freeman, Pierre Moessinger, and Pat McKee who provided stimulating conversation on several of the issues discussed in this paper.     

Feminist philosophy of science: history,contributions, and challenges

Feminist philosophy of science has led to improvements in the practices and products of scientific knowledge-making, and in this way it exemplifies socially relevant philosophy of science. It has also yielded important insights and original research questions for philosophy. Feminist scholarship on science thus presents a worthy thought-model for considering how we might build a more socially relevant philosophy of science—the question posed by the editors of this special issue. In this analysis of the history, contributions, and challenges faced by feminist philosophy of science, I argue that engaged case study work and interdisciplinarity have been central to the success of feminist philosophy of science in producing socially relevant scholarship, and that its future lies in the continued development of robust and dynamic philosophical frameworks for modeling social values in science. Feminist philosophers of science, however, have often encountered marginalization and persistent misunderstandings, challenges that must be addressed within the institutional and intellectual culture of American philosophy.     

Folk biology and the anthropology of science: cognitive universals and cultural particulars

This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based, species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, nor as variable across cultures, as the assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials, or social groups. These structures are routine products of our "habits of mind," which may in part be naturally selected to grasp relevant and recurrent "habits of the world." An experiment illustrates that the same taxonomic rank is preferred for making biological inferences in two diverse populations: Lowland Maya and Midwest Americans. These findings cannot be explained by domain-general models of similarity because such models cannot account for why both cultures prefer species-like groups, although Americans have relatively little actual knowledge or experience at this level. This supports a modular view of folk biology as a core domain of human knowledge and as a special player, or "core meme," in the selection processes by which cultures evolve. Structural aspects of folk taxonomy provide people in different cultures with the built-in constraints and flexibility that allow them to understand and respond appropriately to different cultural and ecological settings. Another set of reasoning experiments shows that Maya, American folk, and scientists use similarly structured taxonomies in somewhat different ways to extend their understanding of the world in the face of uncertainty. Although folk and scientific taxonomies diverge historically, they continue to interact. The theory of evolution may ultimately dispense with the core concepts of folk biology, including species, taxonomy, and teleology; in practice, however, these may remain indispensable to doing scientific work. Moreover, theory-driven scientific knowledge cannot simply replace folk knowledge in everyday life. Folk-biological knowledge is not driven by implicit or inchoate theories of the sort science aims to make more accurate and perfect.     

Postmodern ontology,anthropology, and religion

This article analyses some changes produced in the contemporary ‘postmodern’ self and its consequences for the anthropological study of religion. In this regard, these changes influence deeply the way we westerners represent our ontological structure, and approach other religious systems and ontologies, due to the current processes of globalisation and transnationalisation, the notion of Self often fluctuates between an old stable, autonomous, maximiser (condensed) self and a dispersed, multivocal one. It is argued here that traditional anthropological analyses of religion lack this critical and reflexive awareness. For that reason, cultural phenomena such as shamanism, sorcery, and many forms of religious and cosmological syncretisms, are frequently approached from a distant, naturalistic viewpoint In this paper a more existential view of religion is proposed; it approaches the observer to the observed, opening up his/her assumptions about the ‘order of things’. A collection of notions, such as critical hermeneutics, critical intersubjectivity, dialectics, and ontological language is discussed, to build a fresh inquiry into the realms of numinous life.