In Search Of True Things Worth Knowing: Considerations For A New Article Prototype

Within social and personality psychology, the existing “old prototype” of a publishable article is at odds with new expectations for transparent reporting. If researchers anticipate having to report everything while continuing to aim for a research product that includes multiple studies, examining a novel effect, with only statistically significant results, this will have negative implications for initial decisions about what research to conduct. First, researchers will be discouraged from collecting additional data because this could potentially mar existing findings. Second, they will be discouraged from pursuing questions for which the answers are unknown, as this would be a waste if the results do not fit old‐prototype expectations. These practices undermine what seem to be two universal values within personality and social psychology: truth and interestingness. Suggestions for a “new prototype” that de‐emphasizes p‐value cutoffs, multiple studies, and novelty will be discussed with an eye toward encouraging research decisions that foster true and interesting findings.     

Philosophical Error and the Economics of Belief Formation

Recent work has demonstrated that academic research faces serious challenges. Incentives to defend publishable ideas often lead researchers astray. Despite their tendency to produce error, efforts to publish erroneous results typically help a researcher's career. In addition, errors often arise from seemingly innocent methodological assumptions that allow researchers to believe their research is sound. This article discusses this research, as well as research into difficulties facing epistemic rationality caused by nonepistemic incentives. It then applies the lessons of this research to philosophical practice. It explains why philosophy likely suffers from these problems. It then provides an example of a widely shared methodological assumption that allows such research to be pursued and regularly published. It claims that the significance philosophers place on arguments is inappropriate, and that typical evaluations of philosophical arguments involve an instance of the base‐rate fallacy. It concludes by discussing whether or not this article is self‐defeating.     

社会排斥类型对求助行为意愿的影响

从心理需求威胁的视角切入,探讨不同类型的社会排斥对求助行为意愿的影响及其作用机理。两个实验研究的结果表明,相较于被忽略,被拒绝会促使人们在后续困境中产生更高的求助行为意愿。该效应产生的心理机制在于被拒绝会威胁归属需求,被忽略会威胁控制需求,而求助行为本身能够满足人们的归属需求,但同时会降低控制感,因此归属需求和控制需求在社会排斥类型对求助行为意愿的影响中均起着显著的中介作用。