共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Neil Campbell 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):137-145
Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection
claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson
by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense
might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case
the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains. 相似文献
2.
Patrick McGivern 《Synthese》2008,165(1):53-75
I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale
analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience
argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based”
properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts
such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be
revised. 相似文献
3.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
4.
Hilary Kornblith 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):337-349
Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC),
allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of
nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s
criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument
against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism
of the Consequence Argument fails. 相似文献
5.
Seth Shabo 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(3):361-371
Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism
and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively.
In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does
not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’
limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities,
arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’
purposes. 相似文献
6.
Zanja Yudell 《Synthese》2010,175(2):241-253
Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition
of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR
that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by
Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of
buttressing the language with intensional operators such as “it is physically necessary that...”. I argue that their favored
solution effectively requires the former suggestion that they reject. This argument suggests that a notion of natural properties
may be indispensable to SR. 相似文献
7.
Kevin Timpe 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(2):337-368
One well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples is the ‘flicker-of-freedom strategy’. The flicker
strategy claims that even in a Frankfurt-style counterexample, there are still morally relevant alternative possibilities.
In the present paper, I differentiate between two distinct understandings of the flicker strategy, as the failure to differentiate
these two versions has led some philosophers to argue at cross-purposes. I also explore the respective dialectic roles that
the two versions of the flicker strategy play in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Building on this
discussion, I then suggest a reason why the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate has reached a stalemate. 相似文献
8.
Nick Trakakis 《Sophia》2006,45(1):57-77
This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from
the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe’s new argument,
I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in
a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe’s argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by
God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William
Wainwright as well as Rowe’s attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable
difficulties in Rowe’s challenge to theism. 相似文献
9.
Alexander Gebharter 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2017,95(2):353-375
In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's ( 2003 ) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction. 相似文献
10.
Martin Peterson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(4):439-451
This article addresses Taruek’s much discussed Number Problem from a non-consequentialist point of view. I argue that some
versions of the Number Problem have no solution, meaning that no alternative is at least as choice-worthy as the others, and
that the best way to behave in light of such moral indeterminacy is to let chance make the decision. I contrast my proposal
with F M Kamm’s nonconsequentialist argument for saving the greatest number, the Argument for Best Outcomes, which I argue
does not follow from the premises it is based on. 相似文献
11.
Nikk Effingham 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):241-250
The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider’s argument
from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of
everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley’s argument rests on the same premise
as Sider’s argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibility
of simples. Once you stick it all together, you get an absurd consequence. I then survey the possible lessons we could draw
from this, arguing that whichever one you take yields an interesting result. 相似文献
12.
13.
Daniel Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2006,127(3):581-597
In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument
doesn’t depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that
the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action,
it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However,
as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn’t open to the agent not to perform it. 相似文献
14.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
相似文献
Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
15.
David Jehle 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):565-578
This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal
interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and
orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired
causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way
the substance dualist could meet Kim’s central challenge of explaining how souls and bodies are uniquely paired, allowing
for them to enter into specific causal relationships, forming a singular soul–body unit.
“Thanks to Neal Judisch, Dean Zimmerman, Max Goss, Robert O’Connor, John Heil, Sloan Lee, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Carl Ginet,
and Deborah Smith for helpful comments. Thanks also to the audience at the Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting 2004
for helpful comments and suggestions.” 相似文献
16.
ANDREW M. BAILEY 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2012,85(2):351-376
There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide‐ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages. 相似文献
17.
There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism,
the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional
probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content
and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception
of content, and it therefore begs the question against materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness
of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic
conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved
version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief
is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human
environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth. 相似文献
18.
Simon Dierig 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(1):73-92
The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is
Boghossian’s discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means
of a thought experiment that possessing the “twater thought” is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative,
to having the “water thought.” I then examine a modified version of Boghossian’s argument. The attempt is made to substantiate
the claim that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable. Furthermore, a third Boghossian-style
argument is rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by incompatibilists
or its third premise is mistaken because having the “twater thought” instead of the “water thought” is not relevant. Finally,
it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure. The upshot of my discussion is that a compatibilist
can dismiss Boghossian-style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self-knowledge
and the nature of slow switching. 相似文献
19.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
20.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):115-121
Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to
do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to
kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both
Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be
understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such
a challenge unscathed. 相似文献