Truth,authority and epistemological individualism in new age thought

Several problems are involved in studying the New Age, ranging from mapping its enormous diversity of beliefs and practices to locating it with reference to the conditions of modernity and postmodernity. With the latter issue in mind, the article is an analysis of understandings of truth and authority in the New Age. Against the assumption of some theorists, one of the central aims of the discussion is to demonstrate that, epistemologically speaking, the New Age is essentially a manifestation of modernity rather than postmodernity. Having established that, it is also shown that there are certain postmodern elements within the New Age network, as well as a superficial embracing of postmodernity and an emerging postmodern critique, all of which produce increasingly apparent tensions and confusion. The final section provides a critique of some of the principal problem areas.     

Truth,omniscience, and the Knower

Conclusion Let us sum up.The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an auxiliary recourse to hierarchy. But the cost of hierarchy appears to be an abandonment of any notion of all truth or of omniscience. What the contradictions of the Knower seem to demand, then, is at least an abandonment of these.As noted in the introduction, the argument is complicated enough that one must be wary of dogmatic and precipitate conclusions. One may legitimately wonder whether some new response, or some variation on an old one, will yet offer a way out.Far too often, however, it is asked what has gone wrong with paradox rather than what paradox may have to teach us. What the Knower may have to teach us, I think, is that there really can be no coherent notion of all truth and really can be no coherent notion of omniscience. In its own way that conclusion is perhaps as humbling as is any traditional notion of God.I am grateful to C. Anthony Anderson, Robert F. Barnes, David Boyer, Tyler Burge, Evan W. Conyers, and Allen Hazen for correspondence and discussion regarding basic ideas, and owe a special debt to David Boyer and Evan W. Conyers for careful criticism of earlier drafts.     

A Christian for the Christians, a Christian for the Muslims! An Attempt at an Argumentum ad Hominem

Schmidt and Egler's critique of Christianity's exclusivist claimto truth rests on two suppositions: (a) that inter-religiouspastoral care for dying patients requires a respect for theircultural backgrounds which necessitates accepting the equalvalidity of their respective (non-Christian) religions, and(b) that exclusivism is incompatible with the Christian love-of-neighborcommandment. In opposition to this critique, (a) the authors'own "pluralist" understanding of Christianity is refuted ontwo levels. First, it leads to inconsistencies in the authors'own (and very adequate) understanding of pastoral care, especiallywith regard to their notion of intolerance, and second, it isirreconcilable with explicit New and Old Testament claims toabsoluteness. In addition, (b) the authors' understanding ofthe way in which "exclusivism" justifies intolerance and missionaryviolence is shown to rest, first, on a secularized reductionof Christianity, i.e., of Christians' own "religious identity"as well as of the Christian way of "helping those in need,"and second, on a merely theoretical (rather than also practical)view of Christians' commitment to God. As a corollary to thatrefutation, a reconsideration of the truly Christian sourcesof obedience and charity is recommended.     

PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY

Abstract:   I propose a different way of thinking about metaphysical and physical necessity: namely that the fundamental notion of necessity is what would ordinarily be called "truth in all physically possible worlds"– a notion which includes the standard physical necessities and the metaphysical ones as well; I suggest that the latter are marked off not as a stricter kind of necessity but by their epistemic status. One result of this reconceptualization is that the Descartes-Kripke argument against naturalism need no longer trouble us. I end by relating the difference between my view and the standard view to the question, whether there could have been a different world than ours.     

Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank's Augustine

John Milbank's case against secular reason draws much of its authority and force from Augustine's critique of pagan virtue. Theology and Social Theory could be characterized, without too much insult to either Augustine or Milbank, as a postmodern City of God. Modern preoccupations with secular virtues, marketplace values, and sociological bottom‐lines are likened there to classically pagan preoccupations with the virtues of self‐conquest and conquest over others. Against both modern and antique “ontological violence” (where ‘to be’ is ‘to be antagonistic’), Milbank advances an Augustinian hope for the peace that is both beyond and prior to the peace of (temporarily) repressed antagonism. One aim of this essay is to consider whether virtues conceived out of such a hope are really all that different from the virtues they are taken to replace. I take a critical look at Augustine's critique of pagan virtue, Milbank's appropriation of that critique, the applicability of that critique to Plato, and the polemical value of Augustine's notion of original sin. I end up being skeptical of the notion of a peculiarly Christian way to turn antagonistically conceived virtues into love, but I am not unsympathetic to Milbank's concerns about a loveless and self‐complacent secularity.     

Modernity and Postmodernity: The Characteristics of Postmodern Cultural Media

From the academic frontier of modernity and postmodernity,the author aims at exploring the fission between modernity and postmodernity and also the characteristics of postmodern cultural media from a philosophical vantage point.This paper illustrates three aspects of Western modernity:individual modernity,social modernity,and instrumental modernity,and it also clarifies the issues in modernity,starting by explaining three forms of the cultural fission:avant-garde,modernism,and postmodernism.The paper then demonstrates that the rise of postmodernity represents a new transformation and new characteristics of contemporary Westem spirit,namely,the collision and compatibility of various concepts,in which popular culture and high culture,mass culture and elite culture,fashion and games as well as noise and silence have constituted an uncanny landscape of cultural media.This eerie landscape displays the indeterminacy of language,culture,art,consciousness,and aesthetics.From the perspective of theoretical innovation,the author proposes that the postmodem cultural media always displays its commodity and instrumentality,plays and entertainment,anti-culture and anti-art,replication and fabrication logically and practically as an outcome of post-industrial society.In conclusion,three critical issues are addressed:personal spiritual belief,the development of mass culture,and aesthetic principles.The postmodem cultural media has deeply influenced traditional culture,aesthetics,and how they are evaluated,resulting in cultural conflicts and a humanistic dilemma in the world of contemporary capitalism.     

Reading Derrida with Daya Krishna: Postmodern Trends in Contemporary Indian Philosophy

In his published lectures Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia (2012), Daya Krishna criticizes postmodern thought and especially the writings of Jacques Derrida. By outlining similarities between the two, I would claim that, indeed, it was Daya Krishna’s unexpected proximity to Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ project that triggered his scathing critique of the latter. Moreover, Daya Krishna’s response to Derrida reveals an ongoing inner conflict in his own thinking. On the one hand, he provides us with a harsh critique of Derrida the ‘postmodern’; on the other hand, he concedes that the ‘modern’ notion of knowledge has been totally transformed, and the ‘deconstruction’ of its old formulations was the major catalyst that provoked and directed his own philosophical enterprise in the last years of his life, reformulating knowledges (in the plural). Reconstructing in this way, the dialogue which never happened might prove beneficial, not only for understanding the distinctive works of its participants, but also for carrying their writings and us one step further towards a productive, ‘relevant’ philosophical discourse in the twenty-first century.     

Postmodern Thought and Christian Education

This article examines the impact of postmodern thought on Christian education. It briefly defines postmodern perspectives and their impact on reasoning in a Christian context and examines specific postmodern positions on the notion of truth and its validity or rationality. Education has been impacted by postmodern thought by an opening of thinking about the ways of knowing which include more than empirical or technical ways of knowing. Postmodernism argues that meaning is negotiated rather than being exact and limiting. As popular trends and popular culture bring postmodern thought to everyone, the impact on the thinking of Christian students and educators is examined to encourage discovery of what fits in Christian thought and what does not. The impact of what postmodern thought means and does in higher education is discussed as a challenge for all educators. A comparison in a Christian context, of modern and postmodern positions, examines what is good from modernism and what is not, as well as what is good about postmodernism in order to know what to keep and what to discard. As postmodernism opens the way for acceptance of multiple perspectives, Christian educators are challenged to examine their own systems of thought and to know how best to deliver instruction in a Christian context.     

Reflexive modernity and the religious body

There are a growing number of attempts to reconsider the nature and role of contemporary religion with reference to the issues of ‘postmodernity’ and ‘postmodernism’. Against these, it is suggested here that efforts to reconstruct the study of religion within the framework of an assumption that we are entering a postmodern social order would be fundamentally misconceived. While the emergence of features within the present social order are acknowledged, which undermine major components of the modern project, and are manifest as problematizations of the questions of reality and meaning which concern the postmodernists, it is not accepted here that this order itself is in a state of decay. Instead, that postmodernity is a fundamentally modern construct is argued, how the very idea of postmodernity becomes possible is explored, suggesting that it is, in part, the product of a process of ‘disembodiment’ which has gradually come to dominate Western cultures since the time of the Protestant Reformation. Postmodernism is characterized by a mentalism which ignores the anthropological in reality of what we term the religious body; the necessary implication of embodiment in the human construction of meaning and identity. It is proposed therefore, that the study of contemporary religion should be shaped not by postmodernism but by an awareness of both the reality‐threatening impulses of reflexive modernity and the continuing anthropological reality of the religious body.     

On the Importance of Being (Earnestly) Hybrid—Or,Qualms of a Quasi-Postmodernist: Commentary on Paper by Susan Fairfield

Dr. Fairfield makes a strong case that contemporary analytic theorists fail to live up to their apparent aspiration to present a thoroughgoingly postmodern conceptualization of the self. She argues instead in favor of a “hybrid” model—one that includes a dollop of modernism in the postmodernist brew. In this commentary, I critique the theorizing process inherent in psychoanalytic postmodernism, and then comment on and give a clinical example involving the self's “configurality.” I argue that we need to embrace the challenges of postmodernism without so privileging this position that we let it loosen our grasp of the realities of everyday clinical experience that might cause us to question postmodernism's tenets or values. Moreover, we must not assume that we can gauge the full impact of our “model of subjectivity” on the therapeutic process by knowing what we think we think.     

The dark side of fire: Postmodern critique and the elusiveness of the ideological

As scholars commonly maintain, the coming of modernity raised the stakes regarding the pursuit of objective truth and inaugurated the critique of error, unfounded beliefs, prejudice, and ideological interest. In our times, postmodernism has turned the weapons of critique against modernity itself and promoted the wholesale rejection of reason; in the aftermath, without any appraisal criteria left, ideological opinions keep growing in numbers, get decentralized and multifaceted , and are considered as equivalent voices expressing the different experiences of individuals and local groups. But is this inward and self-destructive turn of critique warranted? Unpacking the relevant arguments one finds many contradictions inside postmodernism, derivative of its peculiar antinomial relations to modernity/modernism. A discussion of the various meanings and forms of the notion of meta-narrative demonstrates the weaknesses of both the absolutist (modernist) and radical relativist (postmodernist) positions and points the way toward a moderate, critico-pragmatic understanding of the relationships between, on the one hand, knowledge and critique and, on the other, ideology.     

Faith Beyond Nihilism: The Retrieval of Theism in Milbank and Taylor

This article examines the thought of John Milbank and Charles Taylor, taking them as case studies which suggest, from a philosophical perspective, what a post-metaphysical conception of the religious might look like. It highlights, firstly, how their work takes on board many features of the Nietzschean critique of religion, eschewing foundationalism and absolutism, while retaining a positive notion of faith, as dogmatic theology for Millbank and as one viable form of meaning in modernity for Taylor. It identifies, secondly, the alternative grounding for such reconceptions as broadly communitarian in character, lying in the cultural and historical consitions of spiritual meanings and practices. This entails an immanent turn which removes the need for absolutist justifications and so undercuts claims for religious superiority. Milbank's postmodern Christian apologetics exemplifies such a position and yet at the same time involves exclusivist claims for the superiority of the Christian faith which, I argue, forecloses a genuine engagement with a pluralist reality. In contrast, Taylor's more tentative diagnosis of the state of Western culture and faith involves an openness to change and to the legitimacy of other accounts of moral reality, and signals how a new conception of the problem of faith and pluralism might emerge out of a refigured theism.     

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?

True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: (i) the orthodox definition given in terms of interpretations or models, (ii) a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and (iii) a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference.     

Living in a Post-Punk Papacy: Religion and education in a modernist world

This article examines the constraints on discourse in a modernist context and the means by which these constraints are imposed. It explores the deconstructive possibilities and opportunities offered in applying a postmodern critique of the same within this context. It primarily advocates a re-reading of the construct of knowledge such that it does not depend on epistemological theorising but performative activity, related to the observations of a number of postmodern and pre-postmodern writers. It suggests a dislocation between what we regard as knowledge and what might be experienced as empowerment through involvement in more democratic political processes. It also takes account of what is understood as the changing of an environment from the modern to postmodern, altering the situation of the subject, and applies this critically to religious and educational ideologies.     

Some remarks on the re-building of the category of essence and the reflective modernity

If modernity is manifested as essentialism, postmodernity is manifested as anti-essentialism. Modernity is, in essence, human beings’ discovery of their own power, and is based on rational knowledge that has grasped the essence of things. In fact, in the discourse system of modernity, the various concepts of “essence” connote nothing but people’s imaginative constructions and rational conjectures about objects. In the past, our order, be it internal or external, was in essence guaranteed by God. Afterwards, all “essences”, as essences, must rationally prove the reason for their existence. In the postmodern context and discourse system, God, and also the “human being” who has created essence, has “died”. We should not simply resume the belief in traditional essence, but should reconstruct, on the basis of a full understanding of the intellectual meaning of postmodernity’s challenges, some historicity, practicality, and the concept of essence that accords with the historical as well as communicative rationality. We must realize that the essence of things is the essence of particular things in a particular stage of development, internally containing infinite differences and variety. Only things with postmodern traits contain modernity, and only the concept of essence that conceives difference accords with time.     

The Perils of Shape Shifting: Harry Potter and Christian Fundamentalism

Some conservative Christians have condemned the Harry Potter series, claiming that the stories lure children into witchcraft and contain a completely relative morality. In this article, I posit that both of these concerns are deeply related to fundamentalist Christians’ perceptions of appropriate selfhood. Employing Robert Jay Lifton’s work on the evolving shape of postmodern personalities, I demonstrate that J. K. Rowling’s portrayal of magic is what Lifton would call “symbolic self-projection.” In so doing, I will show that these fundamentalist concerns are really objections to the notion that a “centered self” is the locus of moral control. The divide between the world of Harry Potter and that of fundamentalist Christians is really a struggle over the appropriate shape of the human personality.     

Faith and belief in The Anti-Christ: A re-evaluation of Nietzsche’s relation to Jesus

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at The Anti-Christ. Specifically we will ask whether a re-evaluation of this relation can shed new light on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. And we will do this first by surveying the standard interpretations of this issue, as well as the existing literature on The Anti-Christ. Arguing that the latter picks out nothing new regarding a critique of Christianity, we nonetheless suggest that a new criticism can be developed via the discussion of Jesus there. Further, this can be done by looking at the account given of faith and belief in that text. That is, we will explore the status of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at the origins and development of “faith” as a mode of belief. In particular, we trace the former’s development as a type from a basic mode of faith. As such, we begin by looking at the psychological origins of this kind of belief in “decadence”, and why Nietzsche is critical of this. However, we will then discuss the emergence of a more positive faith in the form of Buddhism, and see how this represents an analogue for Jesus’s faith. Continuing, we will see how Jesus signifies a similar problematic development, but also “overcoming”, of initial decadence faith. And we will argue, also, that this overcoming is rooted in his emphasis on the immediacy of lived experience. Finally though, we will look at how Christianity returns Jesus’s more productive relation to the world again to a primitive mode of faith. In other words, we will see how Christianity converts the fluid, lived, “faith” of Jesus into something again based on transcendent belief. And lastly, we will ask what new light this point sheds on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and his affinity with Jesus the man.     

Different Subjects: Postmodern Selves in Psychology and Religion

This paper explores the postmodern suspicion toward the notion of a unified self in light of the scholarship of Michel Foucault and Michel Certeau. Foucault’s analysis critiques modern subjectivity by highlighting the dangers of the human sciences and the pastoral power of Christianity. His ethical alternative of re-appropriating classical concepts of caring for the self is intriguing but remains unfinished after Foucault’s death. Drawing on Foucault’s ideas, Certeau articulated alternative psychoanalytic and Christian mystical perspectives that describe human subjectivity based not on unity, rationality, and universality but on multiplicity, myth, and possibility.