Happiness,morality, and politics

The idea that politics should promote the happiness of the population is rather common in the community of happiness researchers. This political view is sometimes based on the happiness principle, the fundamental ethical view that we have a strong moral reason to do what we can to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering in the world. The first main purpose of this paper is to investigate (1) what role this principle play in ethics as a whole, how it should be weighed against other moral considerations, and (2) how exactly it should be understood, i.e. which possible version of the principle that is most plausible. This is the only way to arrive at well-founded theory of the fundamental moral (and political) significance of happiness and suffering (an “ethics of happiness and suffering”). The idea that politics should promote happiness is sometimes accompanied by the notion that we should introduce some kind of happiness index, and that it is a central goal of politics to maximize the value of this index. The second main purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion. I will first ask (3) how such an index should be constructed, assuming that it might be a good idea to construct an index in the first place. I assume that an index of this kind cannot be plausible unless it incorporates a number of moral considerations, and that (3) is very closely related to (2). I will then ask (4) whether the suggestion is plausible, or whether there are better ways to put a politics of happiness into practice, e.g. to simply apply the knowledge we have about the determinants of happiness.     

Greater Happiness for a Greater Number: Some Non-controversial Options for Governments

There are dramatic differences in average happiness across nations ranging from 3.24 in Togo to 8.00 in Denmark on a 0–10-points scale. These differences are an indication that collective conditions in nations are important for happiness. Can governments play a role in the creation of such conditions? This question is addressed in an analysis of average happiness in 131 nations in 2006. The following sub-questions are considered. (1) Is there a positive correlation between average happiness in nations and the quality or the size of governments? (2) Can we explain a positive correlation in terms of causality? (3) Can we specify causality by discerning direct and indirect effects? (4) What about governments and inequality in happiness? (5) What can governments do to increase happiness intentionally? The conclusion is that the technical quality of governments is an important cause for average happiness in nations, and this causality can be specified to some extent. Good governments also reduce inequality of happiness in nations eventually. The implication is that governments can increase average happiness, and in due time reduce inequality in happiness, and that they have some non-controversial options to do so on purpose.     

Hedonism and Happiness

Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet, these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily.     

Should happiness guide social policy?

Since the 1970s, and especially since the 1990s, the concept of happiness has grown in importance in both the academic and popular domains. This article focuses on studies that collect empirical data on happiness with the aim of informing public policies that maximise collective happiness. These studies are characterised by two assumptions that are mostly taken for granted: that happiness is a psychological state and that it has a moral and ethical value. In this contribution, I will question this conception of happiness as a social goal from the point of view of political philosophy. I begin by examining the historical origin of the modern political concept of happiness. Following this, I evaluate the principle of happiness maximisation, comparing it to other wide-ranging principles (justice, equity, freedom and plurality), and bringing to the fore some implications of happiness maximisation that place it in conflict with democratic rights and freedoms. Finally, I sum up my line of reasoning and briefly reflect on some proper uses of happiness in public policy.     

Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism Married in a New Index of Societal Performance

According to the utilitarian creed, the quality of a society should be judged using the degree of happiness of its members, the best society being the one that provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Following the egalitarian principle, the quality of a society should rather be judged by the disparity in happiness among citizens, a society being better if differences in happiness are smaller. Performance on these standards can be measured using cross-national surveys, where degree of happiness is measured using the mean response to a question about happiness and disparity expressed as the standard deviation. In this paper we marry these measures together in an index of ‘Inequality-Adjusted Happiness’ (IAH) that gives equal weight to either criterion. It is a linear combination of the mean happiness value and the standard deviation and it is expressed as a number on a 0–100 scale. We applied this index to 90 nations for the 1990s and observed large and systematic differences, IAH being higher in rich, free and well-governed countries. We also considered the trend over time for 14 rich countries and found that IAH has increased over the last 30 years.     

Happiness on the Political Agenda? PROS and CONS

This paper provides a critical analysis of the application of happiness research into policy domains. An overview of the current debate on the politics of happiness is elaborated by focusing on its promising perspectives as well as the potential problems it raises. Arguments of proponents and opponents are confronted with each other in discussing the following central issues in the debate: (1) the state of progress of the happiness research; (2) the value of happiness and its promotion by political means; (3) the possibility of promoting happiness; (4) paternalism versus autonomy and (5) a fair distribution of happiness. It is concluded from this that pragmatic issues do not pose insurmountable obstacles for the realization of a politics of happiness, although further research is definitely recommendable. The ideological or ethical issues however require further debate and research before the actual realization of a politics of happiness is possible. More specifically, the science of happiness needs to give more attention to analyzing the value of happiness and the desirability of increasing happiness by political means. Also the weighing of the value of happiness against other values and goals is an important issue to be put on the agenda. This paper thus explicates the moral choices and challenges that politicians would be confronted with if they want to put the increase of happiness on the political agenda.     

Healthy happiness: effects of happiness on physical health and the consequences for preventive health care

Is happiness good for your health? This common notion is tested in a synthetic analysis of 30 follow-up studies on happiness and longevity. It appears that happiness does not predict longevity in sick populations, but that it does predict longevity among healthy populations So, happiness does not cure illness but it does protect against becoming ill. The effect of happiness on longevity in healthy populations is remarkably strong. The size of the effect is comparable to that of smoking or not.If so, public health can also be promoted by policies that aim at greater happiness of a greater number. That can be done by strengthening individual life-abilities and by improving the livability of the social environment. Some policies are proposed. Both ways of promoting health through happiness require more research on conditions for happiness.     

A non‐utilitarian approach to punishment

Although the view that punishment is to be justified on utilitarian grounds has obvious appeal, an examination of utilitarianism reveals that, consistently and accurately interpreted, it dictates unjust punishments which are unacceptable to the common moral consciousness. In this rule‐utilitarianism is no more satisfactory than is act‐utilitarianism. Although the production of the greatest good, or the greatest happiness, of the greatest number is obviously a relevant consideration when determining which punishments may properly be inflicted, the question as to which punishment is just is a distinct and more basic question and one which must be answered before we can determine which punishments are morally permissible. That a retributivist theory, which is a particular application of a general principle of justice, can account more satisfactorily for our notion of justice in punishment is a positive reason in its support.     

On Being Happy or Unhappy1

The psychological condition of being happy is best understood as a matter of a person's emotional condition. I elucidate the notion of an emotional condition by introducing two distinctions concerning affect, and argue that this “emotional state” view is probably superior on intuitive and substantive grounds to theories that identify happiness with pleasure or life satisfaction. Life satisfaction views, for example, appear to have deflationary consequences for happiness’ value. This would make happiness an unpromising candidate for the central element in a theory of well‐being, as it is in L. W. Sumner's work. Yet on an emotional state conception, happiness may prove to be a key constituent of well‐being. the emotional state view also makes happiness less vulnerable to common doubts about the importance of happiness, and indicates that mood states are more important for well‐being than is generally recognized.

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Area-Level Income Inequality and Individual Happiness: Evidence from Japan

In this study, we investigated how area-level income inequality is associated with an individual’s assessment of happiness, based on micro-level data sourced from nationwide surveys in Japan. It was confirmed from our analysis using logit models that individuals who live in areas of high income inequality tend to report themselves as being less happy, even after controlling for various individual and area-level factors. The association between inequality and happiness is modestly significant, regardless of the choice of covariates at an individual level, and stronger at a lower level of perceived happiness. Moreover, sensitivity to inequality differs substantially according to certain individual attributes. Among others, an important implication for social policy is that those with unstable occupational status are more sensitive to inequality. Given that these people tend to be less happy than others, this result indicates the risk that area-level inequality further reduces the well-being of those with unfavorable employment conditions.     

The pursuit of happiness can be lonely

Few things seem more natural and functional than wanting to be happy. We suggest that, counter to this intuition, valuing happiness may have some surprising negative consequences. Specifically, because striving for personal gains can damage connections with others and because happiness is usually defined in terms of personal positive feelings (a personal gain) in western contexts, striving for happiness might damage people's connections with others and make them lonely. In 2 studies, we provide support for this hypothesis. Study 1 suggests that the more people value happiness, the lonelier they feel on a daily basis (assessed over 2 weeks with diaries). Study 2 provides an experimental manipulation of valuing happiness and demonstrates that inducing people to value happiness leads to relatively greater loneliness, as measured by self-reports and a hormonal index (progesterone). In each study, key potential confounds, such as positive and negative affect, were ruled out. These findings suggest that wanting to be happy can make people lonely. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

At the edge of humanity: human stem cells, chimeras, and moral status

Experiments involving the transplantation of human stem cells and their derivatives into early fetal or embryonic nonhuman animals raise novel ethical issues due to their possible implications for enhancing the moral status of che chimeric individual. Although status-enhancing research is not necessarily objectionable from the perspective of the chimeric individual, there are grounds for objecting to it in the conditions in which it is likely to occur. Translating this ethical conclusion into a policy recommendation, however, is complicated by the fact that substantial empirical and ethical uncertainties remain about which transplants, if any, would significantly enhance the chimeric individual's moral status. Considerations of moral status justify either an early-termination policy on chimeric embryos, or, in the absence of such a policy, restrictions on the introduction of pluripotent human stem cells into early-stage developing animals, pending the resolution of those uncertainties.     

Economy, Values and Happiness in Norway

Why has the level of happiness in the Norwegian population not risen in parallel with the substantial increases in income and possessions in the period 1985–2001? An answer is sought by analysing data from a series of large representative surveys of the Norwegian population. Individual level correlations between indicators of health or family situation and happiness indicate that the measure of happiness is valid, and that happiness is not fully determined by personality traits, but affected also by changes in the circumstances of an individual. Several aspects of a person's economic situation turn out to have significant effects on happiness, in particular how the situation is subjectively experienced. Even if the development for some of these subjective indicators does not reflect the improvement in objective economic conditions, there is sufficient positive change to expect an increase in the level of happiness. The stability in aggregate happiness means that counteracting influences must have been present. One such factor is value orientation. An increasing tendency for Norwegians to give priority to income and material possessions appears to have had an adverse effect on happiness towards the end of the last millennium.     

Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement

This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic significance of disagreement (a topic over which there is some disagreement). After discussing this matter at some length, I conclude, tentatively, that inclusiveness under disagreement can have such epistemic costs. Still, I go on to argue, such costs by themselves would not rationalize substantial limitations on a broad policy of inclusiveness. Insofar as there are grounds for restricting how inclusive one should be in belief-formation, these grounds will not be epistemic, but instead will reflect the practical costs—the time, effort, and resource costs to the subject—of following such a policy.     

Response to Stuart Rennie's ‘Elegant variations’

Abstract

In Happiness, Tabensky equates the notion of happiness to Aristotelian eudaimonia. I shall claim that doing so amounts to equating two concepts that moderns cannot conceptually equate, namely, the good for a person and the good person or good life. In §2 I examine the way in which Tabensky deals with this issue and claim that his idea of happiness is as problematic for us moderns as is any translation of the notion of eudaimonia in terms of happiness. Naturally, if happiness understood as eudaimonia is ambiguous, so will be the notion of a desire for happiness, which we find at the core of Tabensky’s whole project. In §3 I shall be concerned with another aspect of the desire for happiness; namely, its alleged self-justifying nature. I will attempt to undermine the idea that this desire is self-justifying by undermining the criterion on which Tabensky takes self-justifiability to rest, i.e. its basicness, but also by shedding doubt on the idea that there is such a thing as an ultimate basic principle and, even if there were, that it is what Tabensky calls the eudaimon principle.     

Bringing Back Bamiyan's Buddhas

Bamiyan's Buddhas, long the treasured centrepiece of Afghanistan's material culture, were blown up by the Taliban in 2001. Since then controversy has arisen regarding whether — and, if so, how — the sculptures might be resurrected. One option — possible in principle because of careful 20^th century survey work — would be to reconstruct exact replicas. I argue this would be a mistake. Reconstructing the sculptures, though it might serve useful ends, is inappropriate on aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical grounds. I then consider restoration, arguing that it is appropriate on these same grounds. Unlike reconstruction, restoration stands to (partly) resuscitate the artistic, cultural, and historical value that now lies, inaccessible, in piles of rubble. And while restoration stands to achieve this worthy end, it would contribute as well to the economic and political well‐being of Afghani citizens. In short, I argue that restoring — and thereby resurrecting — Bamiyan's Buddhas, both metaphysically possible and morally appropriate, is a win‐win proposition. Afghanistan deserves our support to make this happen.     

Hedonic possibilities and heritability statistics

Several influential psychologists have attempted to estimate to what extent human happiness levels are directly controlled by genes by comparing the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart. If we discover that the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart tend to be closer than the happiness levels of fraternal twins raised apart, this is taken as evidence that average happiness levels are largely controlled by genes. However, if it turns out that identical twins' happiness levels tend to be substantially different, as different as fraternal twins raised apart, it has been argued that this implies that the environment largely determines happiness levels. I contend that this interpretation of the data rests on a set of questionable, closely related assumptions: a) that pairs of identical twins raised apart are raised in substantially different environments; b) that genetically identical twins aren't identical in other pertinent ways; and c) that average levels of affect that are correlated with certain sets of genes in the environments the twin studies were conducted in will be correlated with those genes in other relevant environments because those genes govern average affect levels. In this paper, I will show that these assumptions are false and explain how to properly go about investigating the contingent causal links between genes and happiness. In the end, I argue that there is no good evidence that our genes delimit our hedonic potential and that the fact that this misinterpretation of the data has been widely disseminated is potentially harmful to human well-being.