Trauma and the Unconscious: Double Conscience,The Uncanny and Cruelty

Relatively little has been written on the role of trauma in conceptions of the unconscious. This paper explores Freud’s conceptions of the unconscious, comparing his ideas with the original French notion of “double conscience” and exploring their implications for technique. Whereas Freud’s concept of the unconscious mainly depends upon a theory of internal drives, Ferenczi’s ascribed a central role to trauma, shifting the focus to the individual in the context of relationships. The comparison is illustrated with a case history.     

Curiosity as an Agent of Conscience

Public outcry against social outrages in our nation in the past few years have called for solutions that suggest that we as a nation believe that by strengthening the observational and punishing components of the superego of the American Psyche we can successfully overthrow our moral failings. By using data in regard to Adolph Eichman and other Nazis as clinical examples, it is suggested that the problem of our moral failings resides not in a deficient superego (a refluent moral agent) but in the insufficient development of conscience (a reflective consciousness). The roles that curiosity and impeded curiosity take in the development of morality are shown to be central to an understanding of how conscience differs from superego.     

The Ethics of Immigration Revisited: Response to Brock,Fabre, Risse and Song

To a large extent, the differences between my four interlocutors and me have more to do with the way we choose to frame a question or approach a problem than with substantive disagreements. In her discussion of temporary workers and the brain drain, Gillian Brock implicitly assumes a different background framework of moral responsibility from the one I adopt in my book. Similarly, Cécile Fabre asks important questions about the intersection of immigration and criminal justice, but ones that I chose not to pursue in quite the same way or, in some cases, at all. Matthias Risse says that political theory should be ‘action‐guiding’, and I try to problematize that claim, at least to the extent that it limits the questions we can ask. Finally, I applaud the attention that Sarah Song brings to the link between political community and social membership but resist her suggestion that this shows that political community is more fundamental than social membership. I also suggest the need to clarify further the limits to democratic self‐determination.     

良心和启蒙:真善判断权问题

There were two prevailing sentiments in Europe after the Reformation: One opposing papal authority and one advocating individual freedom. This paper analyzes these two sentiments and finds that the concept of conscience is crucial in understanding them. The issue of conscience is about judging truth and good, and in initiating the Reformation, Martin Luther heavily appealed to his conscience while countering Catholic attacks. With the wide dispersal of the Reformation, Luther’s notion of conscience was well received among his supporters throughout Europe. Descartes later transformed Luther’s conscience into an epistemological being (the cogito), and argued that its existence was the only valid thing that survived his thorough skepticism — and as such is the foundation of human knowledge. Rousseau continued this line of thinking, which we call subjectivism, and re-employed the term conscience as a replacement for cogito, holding that conscience is the final authority in judging good and bad; that, as the starting point of human existence, it cannot be withheld from any human being; and that it therefore constitutes an inalienable human right. This paper argues that the Enlightenment was a subjectivist movement propelled by this conscience-cogito-conscience conceptualization, and that it sought to enlighten this inalienable conscience. __________ Translated from Qiushi xuekan 求是学刊 (Seeking Truth), 2008, (1): 47–54     

Brock on the justification,content, and application of global justice

Abstract

A review essay of Gillian Brock Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford University Press, 2009)     

The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism

An increasingly popular moral argument has it that the story of human evolution shows that we can explain the human disposition to make moral judgments without relying on a realm of moral facts. Such facts can thus be dispensed with. But this argument is a threat to moral realism only if there is no realist position that can explain, in the context of human evolution, the relationship between our particular moral sense and a realm of moral facts. I sketch a plausible evolutionary story that illuminates this relationship. First, the sorts of adaptive pressures facing early humans would have produced more than just potent prosocial emotions, as evolutionary antirealists like to claim; it would have produced judgments—often situated within emotions—to the effect that others could reasonably disapprove of some bit of conduct, for an early human who cared deeply about how others might respond to her action enjoyed the benefits of more cooperative exchanges than those early humans who did not. Second, according to objectivist versions of moral constructivism, moral facts just are facts about how others, ideally situated, would respond to one's conduct. Thus if any objectivist moral constructivism story is true, then we can intelligibly assert that a) our capacity for moral judgment is the product of adaptive pressures acting on early humans and b) some moral judgments are objectively true.     

Conscience in childhood: old questions, new answers

Although conscience has been the focus of reflection for centuries, fundamental questions regarding its organization have not been fully answered. To address those questions, the authors applied structural equation modeling techniques to longitudinal data comprising multiple behavioral measures of children's conscience, obtained in parallel fashion at 33 and 45 months. The measures encompassed moral emotion (guilt and empathic distress) and rule-compatible conduct (internalization of maternal prohibitions and requests and of another adult's rules). Confirmatory factor analyses supported a differentiated view of conscience with 2 latent factors at both ages: Moral Emotion and Rule-Compatible Conduct. The structure of conscience was remarkably stable over time. The coherence between Moral Emotion and Rule-Compatible Conduct factors increased as children grew older.     

Christianity in Singapore: The Voice of Moral Conscience to the State

Christianity has historically been influential in shaping morality, a project which still continues. While substantial literature has addressed the question how conservative Christians in America attempt to maintain moral control, there is little research on the way in which Christianity influences morality in other societies. This study examines the case of Singapore where conservative Christianity dominates the Christian landscape. The first part of this article discusses Christian groups which have become intricately involved in the production and policing of morality in Singapore and the state patronage which this attempt enjoys. This is based on evidence of state support for various Christian based initiatives which focus on the family and sexuality. Also, the recent sites of discord are considered which result from the state's increased tolerance of homosexuality and gambling. Interview data, public speeches, and writings of local church leaders are used to show that the Christian church wants to be the state's voice of conscience. However, while opposing moral degradation, the ‘well disciplined’ Singaporean Christian leaders have carefully negotiated their strategies and tried to avoid being labelled by the state as undesirable voices of conscience.