Choosing to believe

This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

The virtues of belief: toward a non-evidentialist ethics of belief-formation

William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name ethics of belief can nevertheless be preserved. However, in the second half of the paper I argue that Clifford’s response to the problem of unethical belief is insufficiently attentive to the role played by self-deception in the formation of unethical beliefs. By contrasting the first-person perspective of a doxastic agent with the third-person perspective of an outside observer, I argue that unethical belief is a symptom of deficiencies of character: fix these, and belief will fix itself. I suggest that the moral intuitions implicit in our response to examples of unethical belief (like Clifford’s famous example of the ship owner) can better be accounted for in terms of a non-evidentialist virtue ethics of belief-formation, and that such an account can survive the rejection of strong versions of doxastic voluntarism.

Joseph Butler, “Upon Self-Deceit” (1726)

     

Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.

宋以前孝道是否有“教团”崇拜

所谓“孝道”,是晋以来人们因共同尊崇孝或许逊而凝聚成的一个宗教性群体,以推崇孝行为主要特征,乃“净明忠孝道”之前身。学术界关于净明忠孝道形成时间的看法颇有分歧,如日本学者秋月观认为应在元代刘玉教团出现时,而中国大陆学者则多主张应为南宋何真公教团出现时;但无论如何,大家对南宋以后有崇拜许逊之“教团”存在,却有着一致的认识。那么,南宋以前是否有崇拜许逊之“教团”存在呢?笔者所说的“教团”,实指具有宗教性质的团体。在这种团体中,人们不仅追求共同的信仰、崇拜共同的神灵,而且拥有共同的行为规范和活动场所,甚至还造作用以…     

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Epistemic instrumentalists face a puzzle. In brief, the puzzle is that if the reason there is to believe in accord with the evidence depends, as the instrumentalist says it does, on agents’ idiosyncratic interests, then there is no reason to expect that this reason is universal. Here, I identify and explain two strategies instrumentalists have used to try and solve this puzzle. I then argue that we should find these strategies wanting. Faced with the failure of these strategies, I articulate a heretofore neglected solution on behalf of instrumentalism.     

The facts and fictions of religion: make believe on Avatar Forums

Recent scholars of religion have begun to explore the relationship between religion and fiction. Within this context, Johan Huizinga’s theory of religion as make believe or play has received considerable attention. James Cameron’s film Avatar (2009) has inspired behaviour that can be thought of as religious, despite the film’s clear foundations in fiction. Scholarship on fan communities has debated whether such groups can be considered religions. This article develops Huizinga’s account using Kendall Walton’s theory of make believe. Walton’s theory enables the interpretation of fiction into overlapping games of make believe in fan communities. The conversational threads on Avatar Forums show how norms of discourse that preclude disagreement allow the frames of reality and fiction to blur. These norms of discourse provide a means of understanding the process by which media myths can become the basis of fiction-based value structures within the cultic milieu. However, the theory also presents significant problems for theorists of religion in terms of the structure of religious belief and religious experience.     

The Two Faces of Evidentialism

In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Having identified this difference, I consider two complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what I call the threshold problem and what I call the availability problem, and hope to show that: (a) only an independent, bracketed justification principle of evidentialism can deal with those problems; (b) the rationality principle of evidentialism is not in fact independent from the justification principle; (c) the rationality principle is hard to motivate; and that (d) in the final analysis the argument for the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. I thus conclude that although it may be convenient for evidentialists to treat these two principles as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained.

Intuitions are inclinations to believe

Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.

The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe

There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete evidence may be permitted to do something that she knows would be impermissible if she occupied a perspective of complete evidence. In this paper, I argue that this contrast is explained by a disanalogy between the role played by belief in epistemic deliberation and the role played by action in practical deliberation. Epistemic deliberation may be closed by adopting other attitudes than belief (e.g. accepting some hypothesis as the most likely one), whereas in general, practical deliberation can only be closed by endorsing some course of action. Thus, when there are pressures to close some practical deliberation, agents have to make a decision about what to do even if they lack relevant information. By contrast, lacking relevant evidence, agents may always refrain from forming a belief and close instead their epistemic deliberation by adopting some other attitude.     

Order effects in belief updating with consistent and inconsistent evidence

The current study tests for the presence of differential order effects in evaluation tasks with consistent and inconsistent evidence as predicted by the Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) belief-adjustment model. The results, based on both between-subjects and within-subjects experiments, demonstrate that there were significant recency effects with inconsistent evidence as predicted, larger recency effects when the inconsistent evidence was farther apart in subjective value as predicted, and significant recency effects even when subjects were given training designed to both help them understand the task as completely as possible and to be better able to assess the pieces of evidence. By including a within-subjects design, we were able to demonstrate that the difference in subjective value between two pieces of evidence is the primary factor influencing the magnitude of the recency effect, regardless of whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent. This latter finding is unique and contrary to previous research and theory.     

The so-called duty to warn: The psychotherapeutic duty to protect third parties from patients' violent acts

This article discusses the much-misunderstood Tarasoff decision that requires psychotherapists to protect third parties from patients' violent acts. Through a normative approach, the paper analyzes four important issues: what to do when potential victims are unknown; what to do about the fact that the patients' potential for violence may be incorrectly perceived; the value of warning potential victims; and, the problem of discharging potentially violent patients from the hospital. The author proposes that the courts adopt a more flexible substantial departure test in most cases that involve psychiatric negligence.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

Sensitivity to the cognitive and affective qualities of odours

This study examined cognitive and emotional responses to odours in the laboratory in relation to everyday attitudes toward odours. A total of 136 subjects completed a questionnaire about the role of Odours in Everyday Life (OELQ) and their responses were summed to develop an index of overall responsiveness to odours: 36 subjects, who were in the top and bottom quartiles on this index, rated pleasant (e.g., rose) and unpleasant (e.g., synthetic sweat) odours in the laboratory on 7-point scales. Separate factor analyses were done for the OELQ items and the laboratory ratings, and these factors were intercorrelated. The factor analysis on the OELQ data yielded three primary factors, encompassing the Sexual Role of Bodily Odours, Ecological Odour Sensitivity, and Odour-evoked Memories, as well as three secondary factors. Two factors were derived from the laboratory ratings contrasting Cognitive (sensations, images, memories) and Affective (pleasant, soothing, energising) Responses. Correlations among the factors showed that Ecological Odour Sensitivity in everyday life was correlated with strong Cognitive but weak Affective Responsiveness to the laboratory odours. In contrast, the Sexual Role of Bodily Odours (OELQ) was positively correlated with Affective Responses to the odours in the laboratory. These data underscore the dual role of odours in stimulating cognitive and affective reactions both in everyday life and in the laboratory.     

Assessing individual differences in the degree to which people are committed to following their beliefs

The authors developed a new dispositional measure of Commitment to Beliefs (CTB)—the degree to which people feel it is important to follow their value-expressive beliefs—across three phases of research. In Phases 1 and 2 (Studies 1-4), the CTB scale demonstrated strong internal consistency, and convergent and discriminant validity. Phase 3 demonstrated the scale’s predictive validity: high-CTB individuals were more likely to report engaging in activities during the past month and year that followed directly from their beliefs (Study 5), act on their beliefs when given the opportunity (Study 6), and show more polarized attitudes toward ideologically-relevant groups (Study 7). These findings illustrate the utility of a dispositional approach for examining the extent to which people follow their beliefs.