Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Take-the-best in expert-novice decision strategies for residential burglary

We examined the decision strategies and cue use of experts and novices in a consequential domain: crime. Three participant groups decided which of two residential properties was more likely to be burgled, on the basis of eight cues such as location of the property. The two expert groups were experienced burglars and police officers, and the novice group was composed of graduate students. We found that experts’ choices were best predicted by a lexicographic heuristic strategy called take-the-best that implies noncompensatory information processing, whereas novices’ choices were best predicted by a weighted additive linear strategy that implies compensatory processing. The two expert groups, however, differed in the cues they considered important in making their choices, and the police officers were actually more similar to novices in this regard. These findings extend the literature on judgment, decision making, and expertise, and have implications for criminal justice policy.     

Down the Garden Path: The Role of Conditional Inference Processes in Self‐Persuasion

In a controlled experiment, information format and prior knowledge of risk‐related decision attributes altered the response to decision conflict produced by negatively correlated attributes (NCA) in choice under uncertainty. When dominated choice alternatives were presented in a format in which the displayed attributes were not negatively correlated, decision makers used a simple choice process based on the displayed information. This allowed them to detect the dominated alternatives, regardless of their prior knowledge. However, when the same alternatives were presented in a format in which the displayed attributes were negatively correlated, the more‐knowledgeable decision makers used a compensatory choice process based on the displayed attributes and, consequently, missed the dominated alternatives. The less‐knowledgeable participants, who were unable to use the displayed attributes because of their lack of expertise, calculated the nondisplayed attributes and detected the dominated alternatives. With NCA, the more‐knowledgeable participants followed a conflict‐resolution strategy using the displayed NCAs, whereas the less‐knowledgeable individuals followed a conflict‐avoidance strategy using the uncorrelated, nondisplayed attributes that inadvertently revealed the dominance structure of the decision. The implications of person factors for the effects of NCA and in other types of decisions with NCA are discussed.     

The effect of self‐regulated decision making on career path and major‐related career choice satisfaction

The present research examined the influence of self‐regulated decision making on satisfaction in career path (college major for Study 1, job for Study 2) and major‐related career choice. Results indicate a full mediating effect of fit in the relationship between self‐regulated decision making and satisfaction in career path. Self‐regulated decision making also influenced major–job congruence via satisfaction with a participant's college major. Findings suggest that individuals who possess self‐regulatory ability in decision‐making contexts were more likely to choose majors and jobs of good fit, experience satisfaction from their career decisions, and choose careers relevant to their college majors.     

Decision making with the "adaptive toolbox": influence of environmental structure,intelligence, and working memory load

In 2 experiments with a total of 220 participants, the tendency to use simple heuristics such as the take the best heuristic in an adaptive manner was investigated. In a simulated stock market paradigm, the payoff structure of environments was varied, favoring either compensatory or noncompensatory decision strategies in terms of expected long-term payoff. In both experiments, the majority of participants were classified as using strategies that were adequate for the environment, supporting the notion of adaptive strategy selection. These strategy shifts were moderated by intelligence, as measured with common tests. Neither an additional learning phase (Experiment 1) nor working memory load or working memory capacity (Experiment 2) had additional effects on strategy selection.     

Information about expert decision and post‐decision distortion of facts of own decision

Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her‐ or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post‐decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post‐decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.     

From recognition to decisions: Extending and testing recognition-based models for multialternative inference

The recognition heuristic is a noncompensatory strategy for inferring which of two alternatives, one recognized and the other not, scores higher on a criterion. According to it, such inferences are based solely on recognition. We generalize this heuristic to tasks with multiple alternatives, proposing a model of how people identify the consideration sets from which they make their final decisions. In doing so, we address concerns about the heuristic’s adequacy as a model of behavior: Past experiments have led several authors to conclude that there is no evidence for a noncompensatory use of recognition but clear evidence that recognition is integrated with other information. Surprisingly, however, in no study was this competing hypothesis—the compensatory integration of recognition—formally specified as a computational model. In four studies, we specify five competing models, conducting eight model comparisons. In these model comparisons, the recognition heuristic emerges as the best predictor of people’s inferences.     

Interactive decision-making: effects of consultation before personal decisions on postdecision consolidation

Pre- and postdecision processes were studied in triads of participants, dyads of participants, and for individual decision-makers in two experiment (N = 57 and 50). Participants were students volunteering to take part in the study (21 men and 36 women with a mean age of 24 yr. and 25 men and 25 women with a mean age of 27 yr.). The purpose was to examine how much interactive versus individual social interaction (consultation with others before making a personal decision) affects postdecision consolidation. Predecision differentiation and postdecision consolidation have been defined as attractiveness changes over time in favour of the chosen alternative. Participants were coded into three categories (noncompensatory, compensatory, and nonclassified) according to their different decision strategies. For Exp. 1, postdecision consolidation effects were significant for participants who used a noncompensatory (no comparisons across attributes) decision strategy. For Exp. 2, postdecision consolidation effects were significant for participants who made a personal decision but not those who made an interactive decision. The differing results in these two experiments were discussed.     

Termination of information evaluation in auditing

A screening decision is about whether a candidate fails to meet a decision maker's criteria and must be rejected, or whether it meets the criteria and can be accepted. Image theory contends that screening decisions are based on a simple, noncompensatory process that focuses solely upon the candidate's negative attributes. This contention has received empirical support in a job screening context in which students role-played a hypothetical person seeking a job. But how robust is image theory's prediction? The present work was done in the context of professional auditors screening prospective clients. The client screening context is a particularly interesting setting to test the implications of image theory. If auditors reject clients with negative attributes, as predicted by image theory, this will indicate that some clients are being denied access to a socially useful service. Further, auditors can accept prospective clients with negative attributes and simply adjust the audit plan and fees to compensate for the client's riskiness. Thus, it is not clear that the preliminary findings obtained in a job screening context will generalize to the audit context. On the other hand, results consistent with the image theory prediction would suggest a robust theory. Even in the client screening context, where auditors used their own criteria to screen prospective clients, we found overwhelming support for image theory's view of screening. The results indicate the potential payoffs of image theory as a robust framework to address audit and other substantive problems. Implications of a noncompensatory, negative oriented, client screening strategy are discussed.     

Assessing the empirical validity of the "take-the-best" heuristic as a model of human probabilistic inference

The boundedly rational 'Take-The-Best" heuristic (TTB) was proposed by G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, and H. Kleinb?lting (1991) as a model of fast and frugal probabilistic inferences. Although the simple lexicographic rule proved to be successful in computer simulations, direct empirical demonstrations of its adequacy as a psychological model are lacking because of several methodical problems. In 4 experiments with a total of 210 participants, this question was addressed. Whereas Experiment 1 showed that TTB is not valid as a universal hypothesis about probabilistic inferences, up to 28% of participants in Experiment 2 and 53% of participants in Experiment 3 were classified as TTB users. Experiment 4 revealed that investment costs for information seem to be a relevant factor leading participants to switch to a noncompensatory TTB strategy. The observed individual differences in strategy use imply the recommendation of an idiographic approach to decision-making research.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of self‐confidence on the compromise effect

This research reports an investigation into whether the personality aspect of self‐confidence affects the compromise effect. We hypothesize that highly self‐confident people have greater certainty in making decisions and are more attracted to risk‐taking, which makes them less likely to choose the safe or middle option in a large choice set. The three studies involved are conducted using between‐ and within‐subjects experimental designs. Various product categories are used to generalize the findings. Study 1 looks at purchasing decisions and utilizes three scales of self‐confidence, risk preference, and uncertainty; it demonstrates that consumers with high self‐confidence are less likely to choose a compromise option due to high certainty in their decision‐making. Study 2 discovers that people with low self‐confidence are more likely to choose the middle option in a risky condition than in a nonrisky condition. Study 3 decomposes self‐confidence into general and specific self‐confidence, and reveals that people with low general self‐confidence and low specific self‐confidence are more likely to choose the middle option.     

The impact of using forced decision-making strategies on post-decisional confidence

The impact of motivational and cognitive factors on post-decisional confidence (PDC) level was tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, subjects were first identified as having an intuitive preference toward using either a compensatory or a noncompensatory decision strategy and later on were forced to use either a compatible or a non-compatible strategy. PDC level decreased after using a noncompensatory strategy, and the decrease was higher when it was a noncompatible strategy. In a second experiment, subjects received feedback about their preferred strategy but were not later forced to use any specific strategy. Most subjects continued to utilize their preferred strategy and PDC level was not changed. Overall, intuitive PDC was not found to be sensitive to differences between compensatory and noncompensatory strategies. The result suggested that PDC is a function of an internal cost-benefit analysis which includes both cognitive and motivational factors.     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ignorance or integration: the cognitive processes underlying choice behavior

The fast‐and‐frugal heuristic framework assumes noncompensatory tools for human preferences (i.e., priority heuristic) and inferences (i.e., take the best heuristic). According to this framework, these heuristics predict choice behavior as well as model the cognitive processes underlying such behavior. The current paper presents two studies that juxtapose predictions derived from these two simple heuristics with alternative predictions derived from compensatory principles. Dependent measures that included reaction time, choice pattern, confidence level, and accuracy were better predicted by compensatory indices than by noncompensatory indices. These findings suggest that people do not rely on limited arguments only, but tend to integrate all acquired information into their choice processes. This tendency was replicated even when the experimental task facilitated the use of noncompensatory principles. We argue that the fast and frugal heuristics can predict the final outcome only under certain conditions, but even in these particular situations they are not applicable to the processes underlying choice behavior. An integrative model for choice behavior is proposed that better represents the data. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Information selectivity in decision making by younger and older adults

Past research has demonstrated that older adults are more likely than younger adults to exhibit information selectivity in decision making. Two alternative explanations have been proposed to account for this age difference. One explanation attributes the increase in information selectivity to older adults' reliance on prior knowledge, whereas the other explanation suggests that it reflects reduced information processing capacity. The aim of this research was to explore the latter explanation by controlling for experiential factors and varying the cognitive demands involved in decision making. Specifically, participants were faced with unfamiliar decision problems, and had to base their decisions on the available information in order to reach a desired goal. In Experiment 1 younger and older participants were required to play a game involving chance. The outcome payoff was varied between three conditions (approach, avoidance, and control). The results indicated that both the younger and the older participants based their decisions on payoff, though the older participants did so to a lesser extent. In Experiment 2 younger and older participants performed a similar decision task but with higher cognitive demands. Specifically, the decision‐making task included two dimensions of information, outcome probability and outcome payoff. The results showed that the younger participants based their decisions on probability and payoff whereas the older participants based their decisions on probability alone. In Experiment 3 younger and older participants made decisions in a sale context and received instructional cue to incorporate payoff information in their decisions. As before, the younger participants utilized probability and payoff, whereas the older participants based their decisions only on probability information. The findings are discussed in terms of age differences in information‐processing capacity, metacognition, motivation, and goal‐setting.