Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences

A number of recent arguments purport to show that imprecise credences are incompatible with accuracy-first epistemology. If correct, this conclusion suggests a conflict between evidential and alethic epistemic norms. In the first part of the paper, I claim that these arguments fail if we understand imprecise credences as indeterminate credences. In the second part, I explore why agents with entirely alethic epistemic values can end up in an indeterminate credal state. Following William James, I argue that there are many distinct alethic values that a rational agent can have. Furthermore, such an agent is rationally permitted not to have settled on one fully precise value function. This indeterminacy in value will sometimes result in indeterminacy in epistemic behaviour—that is, because the agent’s values aren’t settled, what she believes might not be.     

The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences

It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence (“incomplete” or “non‐specific” evidence), agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy‐centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy‐centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy.     

Disagreement,Credences, and Outright Belief

This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences (call them credal disagreements) and disagreements involving outright beliefs (call them full disagreements)? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B's doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice‐versa.     

Causal inferences as perceptual judgments

We analyze how subjects make causal judgments based on contingency information in two paradigms. In the discrete paradigm, subjects are given specific information about the frequency a, with which a purported cause occurs with the effect; the frequency b, with which it occurs without the effect; the frequency c, with which the effect occurs when the cause is absent; and the frequency d, with which both cause and effect are absent. Subjects respond toP ₁ =a/(a+b) andP ₂ =c/(c+d). Some subjects’ ratings are just a function ofP ₁, while others are a function of ΔP =P ₁ -P ₂. Subjects’ postexperiment reports are accurate reflections of which model they use. Combining these two types of subjects results in data well fit by the weighted ΔP model (Allan, 1993). In the continuous paradigm, subjects control the purported causes (by clicking a mouse) and observe whether an effect occurs. Because causes and effects occur continuously in time, it is not possible to explicitly pair causes and effects. Rather, subjects report that they are responding to the rate at which the effects occur when they click versus when they do not click. Their ratings are a function of rates and not probabilities. In general, we argue that subjects’ causal ratings are judgments of the magnitude of perceptually salient variables in the experiment.     

Sequences of similarity judgments as time series

Sequences of similarity judgments made to pairs of geometrical patterns with three variable elements were obtained from 22 subjects. Each subject made 100 judgments to a series which embodied random input, step transitions and impulse shifts. Three different instructions concerning the use of information from previous trials were used. Time series analyses gave linear transfer function coefficients whose ratios reflected the strategy employed by a subject. Evidence of local nonstationarity in the response gain functions is examined.     

Reminding as a basis for temporal judgments

In the normal course of events, some events bring to mind earlier events. This reminding or, in the context of list learning experiments, study-phase retrieval can serve as a basis for the accurate judgment of the relative recencies of the two events in question. In this article, evidence for this position is presented in three experiments. By manipulations of encoding using visual imagery instructions and word associations, appropriate conditions were arranged for reminding to occur. The results of all three studies support the position that reminding provides a direct basis for later judgments of the relative recency of events.     

The role of observer attitudes in judgments of blame in cases of wife assault

This study examines the importance of observer characteristics in determining blame in cases of wife assault. Four independent variables (observer's attitudes toward sex roles, observer sex and age, and victim behavior) were assessed for their influence on the blaming judgments of 128 participants. Subjects completed a questionnaire that contained demographic items and six wife assault vignettes that varied in level of victim provocation (low or high). Questions about blame of the husband and wife followed each vignette. An attitudes toward women scale (AWS-B) was then administered. The main hypothesis, that subjects with traditional attitudes would blame the victim more and the perpetrator less for the assault than their egalitarian counterparts, was supported, as was the prediction of an interaction between provocation and AWS-B. The results are discussed in light of the role of observer attitudes in attribution models.     

Rats' lever-press durations as psychophysical judgments of time

Hungry rats received food following lever-press durations exceeding a minimum value, which ranged from 0 to 6.4 sec. When no intertrial intervals separated successive presses, modal press durations remained at very short values as the minimum value required for food was increased. This was particularly true immediately after a food presentation. When an 8-sec intertrial interval followed each lever release, modal press durations were always at or beyond the minimum value required for food, and outcome of the preceding press had no effect on press duration. Possible reasons for the effects of intertrial intervals included punishment of short presses, increased delay of reinforcement of short presses, and reduced density of reinforcement. In addition, functions relating discrete-trials lever-press duration to minimum duration required for food were found to be qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the power functions recently proposed by Catania (1970) for interresponse time and response latency. This similarity was taken as support for a general psychophysical law of temporal judgments.     

Diagnostic judgments as a function of client and therapist race

The purpose of the present investigation was to examine the process of differential evaluation of clients as a function of client and therapist race. It was hypothesized that race of client and therapist would interact, influencing the judgments of client psychopathology, appropriateness for therapy, verbal facility, and likelihood of treatment success despite standardization of the clinical stimuli. Graduate students in clinical psychology and with varying levels of training (i.e., 1 to 5 years) were asked to rate videotaped interviews of clients in which race of the client and level of psychopathology (i.e., normal, neurotic, and psychotic) were systematically varied. There were significant differences in ratings as a function of race of client, race of therapist, and level of psychopathology observed. Black clients were not rated differently on degree of psychopathology but were rated as less verbally skilled and less appropriate for treatment but more likely to benefit from treatment than white clients. Contrary to expectations, white therapists tended to underrate the pathology of black clients. On the other hand, black therapists tended to overrate the pathology of white clients and made mixed judgments of black clients. The implications of these findings are discussed.This study was supported in part by NIMH Research Centers in Minority Institutions (RCMI) Grant G12RR03206-2.     

Domain familiarity as a cue for judgments of learning

Students differ in how much they already know about topics within and across their courses. Few studies, however, have examined the relationship between participants’ levels of knowledge across topics (i.e., their “domain familiarity”) and their learning of information from those topics, their study choices related to those topics, and their subjective self-assessments of their learning about the topics. As such, in two studies we had participants (Study 1, college students; Study 2, Mturk workers) rank their domain familiarity for several to-be-studied domains (e.g., chemistry, history), rate their efficacy and interest in those domains, study and make judgments of learning (JOLs) for facts from each domain, and finally complete a short-answer test over those facts. Participants’ efficacy and interest ratings for the topics were linearly related to their topic rankings, as were their recall of and JOLs for facts from those domains. Although the JOLs were consistently overconfident, they were more overconfident for better-known than for lesser-known topics. Participants’ study times were not related to their topic rankings (Studies 1 and 2), but participants did use domain familiarity to strategically decide which domains to restudy before the test (Study 2). Participants typically chose to restudy their least-familiar topics, but chose to restudy their best-known topic under extremely limited restudy conditions. As a whole, the results suggest that participants effectively use their domain familiarity as a basis for their JOLs and restudy choices, but to some extent overuse this factor to assess their learning, and underuse it to guide initial study.