Inducing Thought Processes: Bringing Process Measures and Cognitive Processes Closer Together

The challenge in inferring cognitive processes from observational data is to correctly align overt behavior with its covert cognitive process. To improve our understanding of this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between gamble‐problems. Participants were either free to choose or instructed to use a specific choice strategy (maximizing expected value or a choice heuristic). We found large differences in looking patterns between free and instructed choices. Looking patterns provided no support for the common assumption that attention is equally distributed between outcomes and probabilities, even when participants were instructed to maximize expected value. Eye‐movement data are to some extent ambiguous with respect to underlying cognitive processes. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attention in risky choice

Previous research on the processes involved in risky decisions has rarely linked process data to choice directly. We used a simple measure based on the relative amount of attentional deployment to different components (gains/losses and their probabilities) of a risky gamble during the choice process, and we related this measure to the actual choice. In an experiment we recorded the decisions, decision times, and eye movements of 80 participants who made decisions on 11 choice problems. We used the number of eye fixations and fixation transitions to trace the deployment of attention during the choice process and obtained the following main results. First, different components of a gamble attracted different amounts of attention depending on participants' actual choice. This was reflected in both the number of fixations and the fixation transitions. Second, the last-fixated gamble but not the last-fixated reason predicted participants' choices. Third, a comparison of data obtained with eye tracking and data obtained with verbal protocols from a previous study showed a large degree of convergence regarding the process of risky choice. Together these findings tend to support dimensional decision strategies such as the priority heuristic.     

Behavioral and pharmacological variables affecting risky choice in rats.

The effects of manipulations of response requirement, intertrial interval (ITI), and psychoactive drugs (ethanol, phencyclidine, and d-amphetamine) on lever choice under concurrent fixed-ratio schedules were investigated in rats. Responding on the "certain' lever produced three 45-mg pellets, whereas responding on the "risky" lever produced either 15 pellets (p = .33) or no pellets (p .67). Rats earned all food during the session, which ended after 12 forced trials and 93 choice trials or 90 min, whichever occurred first. When the response requirement was increased from 1 to 16 and the ITI was 20 s, percentage of risky choice was inversely related to fixed-ratio value. When only a single response was required but the ITI was manipulated between 20 and 120 s (with maximum session duration held constant), percentage of risky choice was directly related to length of the ITI. The effects of the drugs were investigated first at an ITI of 20 s, when risky choice was low for most rats, and then at an ITI of 80 s, when risky choice was higher for most rats. Ethanol usually decreased risky choice. Phencyclidine did not usually affect risky choice when the ITI was 20 s but decreased it in half the rats when the ITI was 80 s. For d-amphetamine, the effects appeared to he related to baseline probability of risky choice; that is, low probabilities were increased and high probabilities were decreased. Although increase in risky choice as a function of the ITI is at variance with previous ITI data, it is consistent with foraging data showing that risk aversion decreases as food availability decreases. The pharmacological manipulations showed that drug effects on risky choice may be influenced by the baseline probability of risky choice, just as drug effects can be a function of baseline response rate.     

风险决策和跨期决策的过程比较：以确定效应和即刻效应为例

风险决策和跨期决策与人类生存发展密切相关, 且两类决策在理论发展、行为效应及神经基础等方面具有相似性。为检验二者是否具有共同过程机制, 本研究以风险决策中的确定效应和跨期决策中的即刻效应为例, 采用眼动追踪技术比较了它们的局部、整体过程及模型拟合。辅以贝叶斯因子分析实验数据表明：二者的主要过程特征均相似, 且更符合非折扣模型假设; 二者在加工复杂程度等少数特征上有所不同; 确定和即刻信息在加工方向等特征上存在特异性。这表明二者可能具有共同的核心决策规则：两类决策更可能遵循非折扣模型预期的简捷、启发式规则, 而不是折扣模型所假设的补偿性、基于选项规则。本研究为建立两类决策的共同解释框架做出了有益尝试, 并为决策比较研究方法提供新的方向。     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 40 decision tasks of two gambles with two non‐negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye‐tracking technology. Results for choices, decision time, the amount of information searched for, fixation durations, the direction of the information search, and the distribution of fixations conflict with the prediction of the non‐compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well in line with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory. Process measures indicate that individuals thereby do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's preference for mixed‐ versus fixed‐ratio schedules of reinforcement: A translational study of risky choice

Laboratory research has shown that when subjects are given a choice between fixed‐ratio and bi‐valued mixed‐ratio schedules of reinforcement, preference typically emerges for the mixed‐ratio schedule even with a larger ratio requirement. The current study sought to replicate and extend these findings to children's math problem completion. Using an ABCBC reversal design, four fourth‐grade students were given the choice of completing addition problems reinforced on either a fixed‐ratio 5 schedule or one of three mixed‐ratio schedules; an equivalent mixed‐ratio (1, 9) schedule, a mixed‐ratio (1, 11) schedule with a 20% larger ratio requirement, and an equally lean mixed‐ratio (5, 7) schedule without the small fixed‐ratio 1 component. This was followed by a reversal back to the preceding phase in which preference for the mixed‐ratio schedule had been observed, and a final reversal back to the mixed‐ratio (5, 7) phase. Findings were consistent with previous research in that all children preferred the mixed‐ratio (1, 9) schedule over the equivalent fixed‐ratio 5 schedule. Preference persisted for the leaner mixed‐ratio (1, 11) schedule for three of the four children. Indifference or preference for the fixed‐ratio 5 alternative was observed in phases containing the mixed‐ratio (5, 7) schedule. These results extend previous research on risky choice to children's math problem completion and highlight the importance of a small ratio component in the emergence of preference for bi‐valued mixed‐ratio schedules. Implications of these results for arranging reinforcement to increase children's academic responding are discussed.     

Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of differing priorities in making social decisions. In Experiment 1, formally identical life – death choice problems were presented in different hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame. The risk‐seeking choice became more dominant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased. Framing effects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers. No framing effect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers. We viewed the framing effects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the differential effects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice. In Experiment 2, we presented the life – death problem in two artificial group contexts involving either 6 billion human lives or 6 billion extraterrestrial lives. A framing effect was found only in the human context. Two pre‐conditions of framing effects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker. In Experiment 3, we analyzed the direction of the framing effect by balancing the framing. The direction of the framing effect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a specific decision context. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk perception and risky choice: Situational, informational and dispositional effects

We investigated how situational (gain–loss), informational (opportunity–threat framing) and dispositional (achievement motive and avoidance motive) variables affected opportunity–threat perception and risky choice in managerial decision-making contexts. In Study 1, the risk preference of the participants showed a reflection effect due to situational differences (gain or loss) and a partial framing effect caused by presenting the same choice information in terms of either opportunities or threats. However, both effects were in the opposite direction of predictions from prospect theory. Gains and positive framing enhanced risk-seeking preference whereas losses and negative framing augmented risk-averse preference. Risk-seeking choices were mediated by opportunity perception whereas risk-averse choices were mediated by threat perception. In Study 2, the participants high in achievement motive perceived greater opportunities in a negative situation, and the participants high in avoidance motive perceived greater threats in a positive situation, suggesting that ambition (achievement motive) operates more significantly in the face of adversities whereas cautiousness (avoidance motive) functions more significantly in prosperity.     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information search and mental representation in risky decision making: The advantages first principle

In three experiments the problem is investigated how people identify early in the decision process those alternatives that are worthwhile to be examined in more detail. We assume that decision makers employ the Advantages first Principle: They first search for information about positive outcomes and then focus their information search (e.g., for negative consequences or for risk defusing operators) on those alternatives that appear attractive after this initial evaluation. In Experiment 1 (120 participants), initial information about consequences was varied for eight alternatives (no information, positive consequences, negative, or mixed for four alternatives). In all conditions, the great majority of participants followed both aspects of the Advantages first Principle. In Experiment 2, 60 participants decided in two quasi‐realistic scenarios with two alternatives each. Initial information was presented so that one alternative had better positive consequences, worse negative consequences, or both. In all conditions, more information was searched for in the initially better alternative. In Experiment 3 (20 participants) the Advantages first Principle was not only confirmed for a scenario but also for choices in traditional gambling tasks with two and eight alternatives, respectively. Participants could win or lose real money. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The evil eye: Eye gaze and competitiveness in social decision making

We demonstrate that a person's eye gaze and his/her competitiveness are closely intertwined in social decision making. In an exploratory examination of this relationship, Study 1 uses field data from a high‐stakes TV game show to demonstrate that the frequency by which contestants gaze at their opponent's eyes predicts their defection in a variant on the prisoner's dilemma. Studies 2 and 3 use experiments to examine the underlying causality and demonstrate that the relationship between gazing and competitive behavior is bi‐directional. In Study 2, fixation on the eyes, compared to the face, increases competitive behavior toward the target in an ultimatum game. In Study 3, we manipulate the framing of a negotiation (cooperative vs. competitive) and use an eye tracker to measure fixation number and time spent fixating on the counterpart's eyes. We find that a competitive negotiation elicits more gazing, which in turn leads to more competitive behavior.     

A decision model for steady-state choice in concurrent chains

Grace and McLean (2006) proposed a decision model for acquisition of choice in concurrent chains which assumes that after reinforcement in a terminal link, subjects make a discrimination whether the preceding reinforcer delay was short or long relative to a criterion. Their model was subsequently extended by Christensen and Grace (2008, 2009a, 2009b) to include effects of initial- and terminal-link duration on choice. We show that an expression for steady-state responding can be derived from the decision model, which enables a model for choice that provides an account of archival data that is equal or superior to the contextual choice model (Grace, 1994) and hyperbolic value-added model (Mazur, 2001) in terms of goodness of fit, parsimony, and parameter invariance. The success of the steady-state decision model validates the strategy of understanding acquisition phenomena as a bridge toward explaining choice at the molar level.     

The relationship between indecisiveness and eye movement patterns in a decision making informational search task

Indecisiveness is a trait‐related general tendency to experience decision difficulties across a variety of situations, leading to decision delay, worry, and regret. Indecisiveness is proposed (Rassin, 2007) to be associated with an increase in desire for information acquisition and reliance on compensatory strategies—as evidenced by alternative‐based information search—during decision making. However existing studies provide conflicting findings. We conducted an information board study of indecisiveness, using eye tracking methodology, to test the hypotheses that the relationship between indecisiveness and choice strategy depends on being in the early stage of the decision making process, and that it depends on being in the presence of an opportunity to delay choice. We found strong evidence for the first hypothesis in that indecisive individuals changed shift behavior from the first to the second half of the task, consistent with a move from greater to lesser compensatory processing, while the shift behavior of decisive individuals suggested lesser compensatory processing over the whole task. Indecisiveness was also related to time spent viewing attributes of the selected course, and to time spent looking away from decision information. These findings resolve past discrepancies, suggest an interesting account of how the decision process unfolds for indecisive versus decisive individuals, and contribute to a better understanding of this tendency. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotion regulation and risk taking: Predicting risky choice in deliberative decision making

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the “cold” deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and—one month later—the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes.     

Adaptive criterion setting in perceptual decision making

Pigeons responded in a perceptual categorization task with six different stimuli (shades of gray), three of which were to be classified as "light" or "dark", respectively. Reinforcement probability for correct responses was varied from 0.2 to 0.6 across blocks of sessions and was unequal for correct light and dark responses. Introduction of a new reinforcement contingency resulted in a biphasic process of adjustment: First, choices were strongly biased towards the favored alternative, which was followed by a shift of preference back towards unbiased choice allocation. The data are well described by a signal detection model in which adjustment to a change in reinforcement contingency is modeled as the change of a criterion along a decision axis with fixed stimulus distributions. Moreover, the model shows that pigeons, after an initial overadjustment, distribute their responses almost optimally, although the overall benefit from doing so is extremely small. The strong and swift effect of minute changes in overall reinforcement probability precludes a choice strategy directly maximizing expected value, contrary to the assumption of signal detection theory. Instead, the rapid adjustments observed can be explained by a model in which reinforcement probabilities for each action, contingent on perceived stimulus intensity, determine choice allocation.     

Indecisiveness and response to risk in deciding when to decide

When making decisions, people must determine not only what to choose but also when to choose. Do individuals modulate behavior in response to potential risks associated with delay in determining when to choose? The present work provides evidence that at least one group of people—indecisive individuals—do not. Two process‐tracing studies simulated a 5‐day college‐course selection period in which new course alternatives appeared on each day. In a risk‐free condition, no risks were associated with delay of decision making over the days. In a risk condition, each day of delay was associated with a risk of loss of existing course alternatives. Unlike decisive individuals, who modulated days of deliberation in response to presence versus absence of risk, indecisive individuals did not. The results illustrate not that indecisive individuals show uniformly increased delay relative to others, but rather that their delay behavior may be more striking in its unresponsiveness to risk. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Empirical underidentification in estimating random utility models: The role of choice sets and standardizations

A standard approach to distinguishing people’s risk preferences is to estimate a random utility model using a power utility function to characterize the preferences and a logit function to capture choice consistency. We demonstrate that with often-used choice situations, this model suffers from empirical underidentification, meaning that parameters cannot be estimated precisely. With simulations of estimation accuracy and Kullback–Leibler divergence measures we examined factors that potentially mitigate this problem. First, using a choice set that guarantees a switch in the utility order between two risky gambles in the range of plausible values leads to higher estimation accuracy than randomly created choice sets or the purpose-built choice sets common in the literature. Second, parameter estimates are regularly correlated, which contributes to empirical underidentification. Examining standardizations of the utility scale, we show that they mitigate this correlation and additionally improve the estimation accuracy for choice consistency. Yet, they can have detrimental effects on the estimation accuracy of risk preference. Finally, we also show how repeated versus distinct choice sets and an increase in observations affect estimation accuracy. Together, these results should help researchers make informed design choices to estimate parameters in the random utility model more precisely.