Feminist Philosophy and the Genetic Fallacy

Feminist philosophy seems to conflict with traditional philosophical methodology. For example, some uses of the concept of gender by feminist philosophers seem to commit the genetic fallacy. I argue that use of the concept of gender need not commit the genetic fallacy, but that the concept of gender is problematic on other grounds.     

意识哲学,还是身体哲学——中国传统哲学理论范式的重新认识

在当代西方哲学面临从意识哲学向后意识的身体哲学的理论转型之际,其也为我们重新认识中国传统哲学的理论范式提供了契机。一种对中西传统哲学的深入比较将使我们发现,与传统西方哲学不同,中国传统哲学与其说是坚持一种“反思”的取向,不如说是坚持一种“反身”的取向;与其说是具有一种“祛性”的特征,不如说是具有一种“尊性”的特征;与其说是以“还原论”为其原则,不如说是以“系谱学”为其原则。凡此种种,都使中国传统哲学在其理论范式上,更多地体现为一种身体性哲学而非意识性哲学。故我们看到,在中国传统哲学中,古人不仅坚持“即身而道在”把身体提升到“道”的高度,而且还使该“身道”一以贯之地贯彻在诸如宇宙论、伦理学以及宗教观等中国古代的理论之中,使之成为通向中国传统哲学文化精神的真正的不二法门。     

Consciousness in Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind

Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett.     

道家哲学时间观初探——科学和哲学两种时间观对道学的启发

本文是在科学和哲学两种时间观启发下,以道家方式对时间所作的一种全新理解和诠释.这种时间观立足于传统道论,通过道家的生命体验模式,指出时间的本质是能量.这种能量是道的主要运动和存在形式,时间的流逝发散造就了万事万物,时间能量的不同存在方式决定了事物的不同形态.在时间的能量性中完成时间形式与内容、生命与宇宙的统一,是道学实现个人和人类生命升华的方式,也是其对当今哲学和生命问题的独特回应.它或许将是道学和科学、哲学的主要交汇点之一.     

哲学进步与现代意识

现代化的社会需要有现代化的哲学。造就现代化的哲学，就需要哲学本身具备现代意识，突出现代意识特征。这对促进哲学进步甚为重要。哲学现代意识，从现代性的角度上讲，其完整意义主要表现在两大方面：一是对传统哲学意识的时代性突破、批判、扬弃和超越，在哲学的质态中包容、传承和改造传统理性的形式和内容，使其在新的时代背景和理性意蕴下创造新意境、开辟新天地，展现新形态；二是从相对单一的、迷信的、宿命的、教条的盲从或凝固化、模式化甚至是曲     

The Smuggler's Fallacy

Abstract: David Hume has warned us not to endeavor to derive an “ought” from an “is” (1990, 469–70), reprimanding those who attempt to draw value judgments from empirical facts. But Judith Jarvis Thomson refuses to accept that values and facts are logically disjoint in this manner, primarily because of her worry that such a partition of our moral values from the “facts” will place a grave limitation on any ethical system, namely, that its claims apparently cannot be proven. Consequently, Thomson is on the lookout for some provably true facts that can be used, contra Hume, to draw conclusions about moral values. Thomson begins by rejecting all generalist conceptions of the good (specifically, the utilitarian's identification of the good with pleasure) and proceeds to fracture the good into various kinds of “goodness in a way,” hoping to produce by this disintegration some moral facts that can be used to set ethics on an objective foundation. But I will argue that Thomson's so‐called objective facts are actually nothing but disguised moral claims, and that in attempting to sidestep the classic fallacy identified by Hume, she has blundered into another pitfall—the Smuggler's Fallacy, the offense of concealing her moral conclusions inside the premises of her argument.     

The Fallacy Fallacy: From the Owl of Minerva to the Lark of Arete

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy.

     

The Fallacy of Calibrationism

Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base-rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct.     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题.20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注.现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论.目前的研究主要集中于克里克的"视觉意识".但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的"二元论"将对于意识的研究大有裨益.     

Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness

This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题。20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注。现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论。目前的研究主要集中于克里克的“视觉意识”。但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的“二元论”将对于意识的研究大有裨益。     

The Fallacy of the Private-Public Self-Focus Distinction

ABSTRACT Taking the distinction between Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought (Lewin, 1931) as a background, the bifurcation of the self-focus concept into “private” and “public” types of self-focus is discussed critically A theoretical connection between the private-public distinction and other central concepts within the self-awareness literature is found to be lacking Further, it is found that (a) the relation between the theoretical definitions of “private” and “public” and their respective empirical definitions is not explicated, that (b) the public half of the dichotomy does not involve a focus of attention toward or away from the self, and perhaps most important, that (c) the conceptual work surrounding the private-public distinction illustrates how an Aristotelian approach to theorizing prevents the raising of pertinent questions     

The Comparative Set Fallacy

This paper argues for the validity of inferences that take the form of: A is more X than B; therefore A and B are both X. After considering representative counterexamples, it is claimed that these inferences are valid if and only if the comparative terms in the inference are taken from no more than one comparative set, where a comparative set is understood to be comprised of a positive, comparative, and superlative, represented as {X, more X than, most X}. In all instances where arguments appearing to be of this form are invalid, it is the case that the argument has fallaciously taken terms from more than one comparative set. The fallacy of appealing to more than one comparative set in an inference involving comparative terms is shown to be analogous to the fallacy of equivocation in argumentation. The paper concludes by suggesting a conflation of logical issues with grammatical issues is the core difficulty leading some to consider inferences in the form of A is more X than B; therefore A and B are X to be invalid.     

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

One takes one’s word that p when a source vouches for p and one accepts the word of that source. If the source is reliable in this case, p is acceptable. The reliability of the source is a measure of its plausibility. If a source has the relevant competence, credibility, authority, that word is acceptable. Likewise, the word may be acceptable if accompanied by a cogent argument, but presumption may be misplaced. One may recognize a presumption for a statement when such recognition is not justified, the positive version of the fallacy. One may refuse to recognize a presumption for a statement when there really is a presumption for the statement, the negative version of the fallacy. The essay proceeds to explore various dimensions of when it is justified to take a source’s word for a claim, and when it is justified to reject a claim from a source. The discussion ranges over considerations of sexism and race, cultural differences, and the relationship of presumptions to fallacies. Also considered is the role of trust in taking someone’s word and the factors involved in trusting someone.

     

意识哲学还是文化哲学?——现代性研究的范式问题

在二十多年的发展中,文化哲学不论在理论体系建构上还是现实问题的研究中都取得了重要的成果,但时至今日,似乎仍要为其合法性作论证,仍要为其理论限域作界定,学界对于其“哲学回归生活世界”的主张仍有不同程度的怀疑和顾虑。之所以如此,主要是由于我们还没有对意识哲学的思维范式进行彻底的反思和检讨,这种范式仍然在主导着人们的哲学思维。文化哲学仍需解决合法性论证、理论限域的界定和批判意识哲学这三重任务,而现代性研究恰恰是澄清以上问题的“试金石”。首先,文化哲学的合法性和优先性在于对哲学之文化属性的自觉。“虽然文化一直作…     

Charles Hartshorne,The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy,ed. by Mohammed Valady

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